Presuppositonal apologetics

[hedrick]

Presuppositional apologetics starts by assuming that Christianity means conservative Protestant Christianity, refuses discussion about whether it makes sense, and goes on the attack against everything else.

 

[Radagast]

Presuppositional apologetics starts by assuming that Christianity means conservative Protestant Christianity, refuses discussion about whether it makes sense, and goes on the attack against everything else.

That seems like a less than charitable characterisation.

 

[gordonhooker]

I think Hedrick is spot on given my experience over the years.

 

[mark kennedy]

I do not understand what this is. Is it only a Reformed theological or protestant thing?

I think it starts with Cornelius Van Til, it looks to me like it goes back to Immanuel Kant and his Transcendental Arguments. In the 'Defense of the Faith', Van Til does a masterful job of presenting Reformation theology in systematic order, it's nicely done. Then, strangely, he comes up with this hypothetical discussion of Mr. Black, Mr. Grey and Mr. White, the Calvinist is Mr. White of course. They make their way to a telescope and Mr. Grey is discussing how it's evidence of God, Mr. Black is unimpressed and Mr. White knows his silence was a mistake but never really speaks up.

He does a great job discerning between the communicable and incommunicable attributes of God and the noetic effects of sin. I really liked the book and still have it. My whole problem with presuppositional apologetics, that apparently started with Van Til, is that there is an evidencial approach that is worthwhile even if the skeptic doesn't walk away persuaded. It's a form of rationalism Athanasias but if I know you, you probably will recognize it as such. Don't get me wrong, there is great merit in this approach in my estimation but I see it as withdrawing from the debate rather then engaging in it.

It's the strangest thing, I learn more from the skeptics then I do from the people I identify with the strongest, even some of my Calvinist brethren. As much as I don't like the worldview of Darwinians a number of them took the time to teach me and my Creationist friends really didn't stick around long.

I'm not saying presuppositional apologetics is the answer, but it serves a purpose. On top of that I've always liked the transcendental philosophy of Immanuel Kant. It's an interesting approach to apologetics that has a solid rationalistic approach, I just think the evidencial approach has it's merit and if that makes me Mr. Grey, then so be it.

Grace and peace,
Mark

 

[Paidiske]

MOD HAT ON
This thread has had a small clean.
Please stick to discussing the topic, rather than making disrespectful personal comments.
MOD HAT OFF​

 

[Apologetic_Warrior]

I do not understand what this is. Is it only a Reformed theological or protestant thing?

"Presuppositional apologetics may be understood in the light of a distinction common in epistemology, or theory of knowledge. In any factual inquiry, it is important to distinguish between the ideas we have prior to the inquiry and those we gain in the course of the inquiry. No one, of course, embarks on an investigation with an empty mind. If indeed we had done no previous thinking, nothing would motivate us to seek further information.

Now, a process of inquiry often corrects ideas we held previously. But it is also true that our previous ideas often serve as assumptions governing the inquiry: defining the field of investigation, determining the methods of study, governing our understanding of what results are possible, thus limiting what conclusions may come from the study. So there is usually a dynamic interaction in any study between assumption and investigation: the investigation corrects and refines our assumptions, but the assumptions limit the investigation.

There are some kinds of assumptions we usually consider immune from revision. Among these are the basic laws of logic and mathematics: what factual discovery could possibly persuade us that 2 + 2 is not equal to 4? The same is true of basic ethical principles, especially those governing the inquiry itself: For example, no factual discovery could legitimately persuade a researcher to be less than honest in recording data.

What about religious faith, as an assumption governing human thought? Scripture teaches that believers in Christ know God in a supernatural way, with a certainty that transcends that obtainable by investigation. Jesus himself reveals the Father to those he chooses (Matt. 11:25-27). Believers know God’s mysteries by revelation of his Spirit, in words inspired by the Spirit, giving them “the mind of Christ” (1 Cor. 2:9-16, compare 2 Tim. 3:16). So, by believing in Jesus, they know that they have eternal life (1 John 5:7).

In many respects, this supernatural knowledge contradicts the claims of people who don’t know the true God. There is an opposition between the wisdom of God and the wisdom of the world (1 Cor. 1:18-2:16, 3:18-23). Wicked people (including all of us, apart from God’s grace) “suppress” the truth of God, exchanging it for a lie (Rom. 1:18, 25). The apostle Paul claims that his supernatural knowledge is powerful to “demolish arguments and every pretension that sets itself up against the knowledge of God” so that he can “take captive every thought to make it obedient to Christ” (2 Cor. 10:5). Spiritual warfare in Scripture, then, is intellectual as well as moral.

So when some claim that Christ will not return because “everything goes on as it has since the beginning of creation,” Peter opposes them, not by an empirical inquiry to ascertain the relative uniformity of physical law, but by citing the Word of God, his source of supernatural knowledge (2 Pet. 3:1-13).

The supernatural revelation of Scripture, therefore, is among the assumptions, what we may now call the presuppositions, that Christians bring to any intellectual inquiry. May a Christian revise those presuppositions in the course of an inquiry? He may certainly revise his understanding of those presuppositions by inquiring further into God’s revelation in Scripture and nature. But he may not abandon the authority of Scripture itself, as long as he believes that Scripture is God’s Word. God must prove true, though every man a liar (Rom. 3:4). Nor may he abandon the most fundamental truths of Scripture, such as the existence of God, the deity of Christ, and salvation by the shed blood of Jesus, without denying Christ himself.

Indeed, Christians believe that the very meaningfulness of rational discourse depends on God, as everything depends on God. Indeed, it is Christ “in whom all things hold together” (Col. 1:17) and “in whom are hid all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge” (Col. 2:3). It is the “fear of the Lord” that is “the beginning of knowledge” (Prov. 1:7) and “the beginning of wisdom” (Psm. 111:10, Prov. 9:10).

These facts pose a problem for apologetics. Non-Christians do not share the presuppositions we have discussed. Indeed, they presuppose the contrary, as they suppress the truth. The job of the apologist, trusting in God’s grace, is to persuade the non-Christian that the biblical presuppositions are true. What sort of argument can he use? If his argument presupposes the truths of Scripture, then his conclusions will be the same as his presuppositions. He will argue from Christian presuppositions to Christian conclusions. But since the unbeliever will not grant the Christian presuppositions, he will not find the argument persuasive. But if the apologist presents an argument that does not presuppose the truths of Scripture, how can he be faithful to his Lord? And how can he produce an intelligible argument unless he presupposes those conditions that are necessary for intelligibility?

Many schools of apologetics (sometimes called “classical” or “traditional” or “evidentialist”) either ignore this question or take the second alternative: they present arguments that avoid any use of distinctively Christian presuppositions. When they take the second alternative, they defend their faithfulness to biblical revelation by saying that the presuppositions they adopt are neither distinctively Christian, nor distinctively non-Christian, but “neutral.”

Presuppositional apologists claim that there is no neutrality, invoking Jesus’ saying that “one cannot serve two masters” (Matt. 6:24). There can be no compromise between the wisdom of God and the wisdom of the world. Unbelief leads to distortion of the truth, exchanging the truth for a lie (Rom. 1:25). Only by trusting God’s Word can we come to a saving knowledge of Christ (John 5:24, 8:31, 15:3, Rom. 10:17). And trusting entails presupposing: accepting God’s Word as what it is, the foundation of all human knowledge, the ultimate criterion of truth and error (Deut. 18:18-19, 1 Cor. 14:37, Col. 2:2-4, 2 Tim. 3:16-17, 2 Pet. 1:19-21). So the apologetic argument, like all human inquiries into truth, must presuppose the truths of God’s Word.

2. The problem of circularity
The presuppositionalist then faces the problem I mentioned earlier. If he proceeds from Christian presuppositions to Christian conclusions, how can his argument be persuasive to a non-Christian? And how can he avoid the charge of vicious circularity?

Presuppositionalists have given different answers to this question.

1. Edward J. Carnell, who is sometimes described as a presuppositionalist, affirms the Trinity as the “logical starting point” which “gives being and meaning to the many of the time-space universe” (An Introduction to Christian Apologetics, p. 124). But his apologetic method treats the Trinity, not as an ultimate criterion of truth, but as a hypothesis to be tested by “both logic and experience” (Gordon R. Lewis, Testing Christianity’s Truth-Claims, p. 179). He never indicates in any clear way how logic and experience themselves are related to Christian presuppositions.
2. Gordon H. Clark, who accepted the label “presuppositionalist,” held that Scripture constitutes the “axiom” of Christian thought, drawing an analogy between religion and geometry. The axiom, or first principle, cannot be proved. But axioms of different worldviews can be tested (1) to determine their logical consistency, and (2) to determine which of them is most fruitful in answering the questions of life. (See Clark, A Christian View of Men and Things, pp. 26-34.)
   
   Clark admits that more than one system of thought could be logically consistent, and that fruitfulness is a relative and debatable question. So Clark’s method is more like an exploration than like a proof. By renouncing proof, he avoids the circularity of having to prove the axiom by means of the axiom. But if Christianity is not provable, how can Paul say in Romans 1:20 that the clarity of God’s self-revelation leaves unbelievers without excuse?
3. Cornelius Van Til accepted the “presuppositionalist” label somewhat reluctantly but admitted straightforwardly that the argument for Christianity is in one sense circular. But Van Til believes that the non-Christian’s argument, too, is circular: “…all reasoning is, in the nature of the case, circular reasoning. The starting-point, the method, and the conclusion are always involved in one another” (Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, p. 101). It is part of the unbeliever’s depravity to suppress the truth about God (Rom. 1:18-32, 2 Cor. 4:4), and that depravity governs their reasoning so that unbelief is their presupposition, which in turn governs their conclusion.
   
   How, then, can believer and unbeliever debate the truth of Christianity, given that the issue is already settled in the presuppositions of both parties? Van Til recommends a kind of “indirect” argument:
   The Christian apologist must place himself upon the position of his opponent, assuming the correctness of his method merely for argument’s sake, in order to show him that on such a position the “facts” are not facts and the “laws” are not laws. He must also ask the non-Christian to place himself upon the Christian position for argument’s sake in order that he may be shown that only upon such a basis do “facts” and “laws” appear intelligible. (Van Til, Defense, 100-101)
   
   But in this strategy, how does the apologist argue that the non-Christian’s “facts” are not facts and his “laws” not laws? Should he argue on presuppositions acceptable to the unbeliever? If so, then on Van Til’s account, he can reach only non-Christian conclusions. Should he argue on Christian presuppositions? Then the problem of circularity returns.
   

I would say that it is best for presuppositionalists to respond to the question of circularity as follows:

1. As Van Til says, circular argument of a kind is unavoidable when we argue for an ultimate standard of truth. One who believes that human reason is the ultimate standard can argue that view only by appealing to reason. One who believes that the Bible is the ultimate standard can argue only by appealing to the Bible. Since all positions partake equally of circularity at this level, it cannot be a point of criticism against any of them.
2. Narrowly circular arguments, like “the Bible is God’s Word, because it is God’s Word” can hardly be persuasive. But more broadly circular arguments can be. An example of a more broadly circular argument might be “The Bible is God’s Word, because it makes the following claims…, makes the following predictions that have been fulfilled…, presents these credible accounts of miracles…, is supported by these archaeological discoveries…, etc.” Now this argument is as circular as the last if, in the final analysis, the criteria for evaluating its claims, its predictions, its accounts of miracles, and the data of archaeology are criteria based on a biblical worldview and epistemology. But it is a broader argument in the sense that it presents more data to the non-Christian and challenges him to consider it seriously.
3. God created our minds to think within the Christian circle: hearing God’s Word obediently and interpreting our experience by means of that Word. That is the only legitimate way to think, and we cannot abandon it to please the unbeliever. A good psychologist will not abandon reality as he perceives it to communicate with a delusional patient; so must it be with apologists.
4. In the final analysis, saving knowledge of God comes supernaturally. We can be brought from one circle to another only by God’s supernatural grace.

3. Transcendental Argument
Van Til and those who closely follow him hold that apologetic argument must be transcendental. He also calls it “reasoning by presupposition” (Van Til, Defense, p. 99). A transcendental argument tries to show the conditions that make anything what it is, particularly the conditions or presuppositions necessary for rational thought. This understanding of apologetics underscores Van Til’s conviction that the Christian God is not merely another fact to be discovered alongside the ones we already know, but is the fact from whom all other facts derive their meaning and intelligibility.

Van Til was convinced that his transcendental argument was very different from traditional proofs for God’s existence and the usual treatments of the historical evidences for Christianity. He speaks of his argument as “indirect rather than direct” (Van Til, Defense, 100), as a reductio ad absurdum of the non-Christian’s position, rather than a direct proof of the Christian’s. He intends to show that the alternatives to Christian theism destroy all meaning and intelligibility, and, of course, that Christian theism establishes these. These statements, however, raise some questions:

1. Is it possible for an apologist to refute all the alternatives to Christian theism? Van Til thought that it is possible, for in the final analysis there is only one alternative. Either the biblical God exists or he doesn’t. And if he doesn’t, Van Til claims, there can be no meaning or intelligibility.
2. Is a negative or reductio argument the only way to show that Christian theism alone grounds intelligibility? Van Til thought it was. But (a) if, say, Thomas Aquinas was successful in showing that that the causal order begins in God, then God is the source of everything, including the intelligibility of the universe. Aquinas’s argument, then, though it is positive rather than negative, proves Van Til’s transcendental conclusion. And (b) if, say, physical law is unintelligible apart from the biblical God, why should we not say that physical law implies the existence of God? In that way, any transcendental argument can be formulated as a positive proof.
3. Is the transcendental argument a simplification of apologetics? Presuppositionalists sometimes seem to suggest that with the transcendental argument in our arsenal we need not waste time on theistic proofs, historical evidences, detailed examinations of other views, and the like. But presuppositionalists, like all apologists, have to answer objections. If the apologist claims that physical law is unintelligible without the biblical God, he will have to explain why he thinks that. What other possible explanations are there for the consistency of physical law? What does each of them lack? How does the Christian view supply what is lacking in the other explanations? Thus the presuppositional transcendental argument can become as complicated as more traditional arguments. And the presuppositionalist may often find himself arguing in much the same way traditional apologists have.

4. Conclusion
Despite these difficulties, the presuppositional approach has these advantages:

1. It takes account of what Scripture says about our obligation to presuppose God’s revelation in all our thinking and about the unbeliever’s suppression of the truth.
2. It understands what according to Scripture must be the goal of apologetics: to convince people that God’s revelation is not only true, but the very criterion of truth, the most fundamental certainty, the basis for all intelligible thought and meaningful living."

SOURCE: JOHN M. FRAME FROM HIS WEBSITE
Originally published as “Presuppositional Apologetics,” in Jack, Walter C., Gavin McGrath, and C S. Evans, New Dictionary of Christian Apologetics (Downers Grove, Ill: InterVarsity Press, 2006).

 

[FireDragon76]

It's mostly restricted to conservative Reformed Christians, and even then, not universally so. Mostly the conservative Dutch and Continental Reformed types. Princeton theologians relied alot more upon classical apologetics.

Lutherans, when they have engaged in apologetics (some like me, think it is misguided), typically have relied upon an approach resembling classical apologetics. But there has been some interest in presuppositional apologetics as well, especially as Lutherans don't necessarily share the same philosophical perspective as Catholics (I don't think the analogy of being works so well, we would probably be closer to the Orthodox in that sense). However, I don't think many of us accept the rationalistic worldview that underpins Reformed presuppositional apologetics, since Lutheranism is more grounded in dialectic.

 

[Apologetic_Warrior]

It's mostly restricted to conservative Reformed Christians, and even then, not universally so. Mostly the conservative Dutch and Continental Reformed types. Princeton theologians relied alot more upon classical apologetics.

Lutherans, when they have engaged in apologetics (some like me, think it is misguided), typically have relied upon an approach resembling classical apologetics. But there has been some interest in presuppositional apologetics as well, especially as Lutherans don't necessarily share the same philosophical perspective as Catholics (I don't think the analogy of being works so well, we would probably be closer to the Orthodox in that sense). However, I don't think many of us accept the rationalistic worldview that underpins Reformed presuppositional apologetics, since Lutheranism is more grounded in dialectic.

I'd like to share a quote (or two) with you from a book titled "Faith Has Its Reasons" by Kenneth Boa & Robert Bowman. This first quotation is found in Section Five: Apologetics as Persuassion:

"The fideist approach to apologetics, though by no means limited to one theological or denominational camp, is most deeply rooted in the Lutheran tradition. Not surprisingly, key aspects of fideism can be traced back to Martin Luther himself. We are not classifying Luther as a fideist, but rather saying that key elements of fideism have their seed in the views of the German Reformer.

Einar Billings’s dictum that the test of a correct understanding of Luther is whether it can be reduced “to a simple corollary of the forgiveness of sins” is relevant to a discussion of Luther’s view of apologetics. For Luther forgiveness of sins is a gift of God through faith alone, a gift needed by all human beings because of their bondage to sin. This spiritual bondage is so radical that the human mind is simply incapable of knowing anything significant about God and his will or about understanding the liberating truth of the gospel apart from the work of the Holy Spirit.

In this context, Luther takes a very dim view of human reason. In the temporal affairs of human beings in the kingdom of earth, “the rational man is self-sufficient.” But in the eternal issues of life in the kingdom of heaven, “nature is absolutely stone-blind” and human reason is completely incompetent. Worse, reason is an enemy of God, “the devil’s harlot,” whom Luther nicknames “Frau Hulda.” Reason was responsible for the distortion of the gospel by the Scholastics, who had tried to reconcile the gospel with Aristotle. For Luther, Aristotle was “the stinking philosopher” (rancidi philosophi, one of Luther’s more polite descriptions of Aristotle), “that noble light of nature, that heathen master, that archmaster of all masters of nature, who rules in all of our universities and teaches in the place of Christ.”

Some of what Luther says about apologetic issues overlaps the views of both classical and Reformed apologetics. Non-Christians can, Luther admits, by their reason know that there is a God. Natural reason “is aware that this Godhead is something superior to all things” and recognizes “that God is a being able to help”; indeed, such knowledge “is innate in the hearts of all men.” This innate knowledge Luther calls a “general” knowledge of God, one for which the universality of religion and worship (in all its corrupt forms) provides “abundant evidence.” By this general knowledge, all people know “that God is, that He has created heaven and earth, that He is just, that He punishes the wicked, etc.” The light of natural reason even “regards God as kind, gracious, merciful, and benevolent.” But “that is as far as the natural light of reason sheds its rays.” This knowledge does them no good, since reason “does not know who or which is the true God” and cannot know “what God thinks of us, what He wants to give and to do to deliver us from sin and to save us.” Luther calls such knowledge the special, proper, or particular knowledge of God.

Worse still, what God has done for human beings—becoming incarnate, dying and rising from the dead—seems quite unreasonable to them. “All works and words of God are contrary to reason.” The use of syllogistic reasoning in theology will inevitably lead to falsehood, even when the premises are true and the form of reasoning logically valid. “This is indeed not because of the defect of the syllogistic form but because of the lofty character and majesty of the matter which cannot be enclosed in the narrow confines of reason or syllogisms. So it [the matter] is not indeed something contrary to, but is outside, within, above, before, and beyond all logical truth.”

Luther concludes, “God is not subject to reason and syllogisms but to the word of God and faith.” This view of reason has important implications for the usefulness of apologetical appeals to the natural realm. Since logic is inapplicable to God and the central claims of Christianity, no arguments can be given for the gospel of grace from the natural realm or from reason. The gospel must be heard from the Word, and its sole argument is that God has spoken. Attempts to defend it utilizing reason (in its arrogant mode) will only succeed in subverting it. “Let us not be anxious: the Gospel needs not our help; it is sufficiently strong of itself. God alone commends it.”​

Others associated with the fideist approach include: Tertullian, Blaise Pascal, Søren Kierkegaard, Karl Barth, and Donald G. Bloesch.

The following quotes are from Part Four: Apologetics as Offense:

"With the decline throughout the twentieth century of the orthodox, supernaturalistic Christian worldview in American culture, it is understandable that many Christians have declared traditional apologetics a failure and have cast about for a new approach to defending the faith. In conservative Calvinistic or Reformed circles, several closely related apologetic systems have been developed as alternatives to both the classical and the evidentialist approaches. Most of these systems are known by the label presuppositionalism, although the term Reformed apologetics is more inclusive of the different systems to be considered here. The approach emphasizes the presentation of Christianity as revealed—as based on the authoritative revelation of God in Scripture and in Jesus Christ. Its most common forms find absolute and certain proof of Christianity in the absolute and certain character of the knowledge that God has and that he has revealed to humanity."
​

Others associated with Reformed Apologetics include: John Calvin, Thomas Reid, Charles Hodge, Abraham Kuyper, Herman Dooyeweerd, Cornelius Van Til, Gordon H. Clark, and Alvin Plantinga.

"Alvin Plantinga is clearly a different sort of Reformed apologist than Herman Dooyeweerd, Gordon Clark, or Cornelius Van Til. He represents what might be termed the “left wing” of Reformed apologetics, advocating in many respects a more classical approach to the field. By classifying Plantinga as a Reformed apologist, we are by no means glossing over the significant differences between his thought and that of the presuppositionalists. Nevertheless, his indebtedness to the Kuyperian tradition and his advocacy of the idea that belief in God is properly basic position his apologetic in the Reformed type. We will discuss some of Plantinga’s views further in the next two chapters, while giving more attention to presuppositionalism.

Dooyeweerd’s philosophy is essentially a highly sophisticated development of Kuyper’s position. Of the twentieth-century thinkers profiled here, he was closest to Kuyper both culturally and philosophically.

Clark combined the primacy of deductive logic, characteristic of the classical model, with a radical view of the Bible as furnishing the premises from which logic can derive conclusions qualifying as knowledge. The result is an unusually rationalistic form of Reformed apologetics.

Van Til is by far the most controversial of the major Reformed apologists of the twentieth century. He combined the apologetic tradition of Old Princeton (which drew from both classical and evidentialist approaches) with the anti-apologetic theology of Kuyper. He used the concept of a transcendental argument, which was at the heart of Dooyeweerd’s philosophy, but employed it as an overtly apologetic argument. The result is a theory of apologetics that has been both highly influential and severely disputed. In the next two chapters we will give special attention to understanding Van Til in our analysis of the Reformed approach to apologetics."​

"Reformed apologetics is an approach to defending the faith that differs significantly from traditional apologetics. Nevertheless, Reformed apologists do seek to provide a reasoned defense of the gospel. The apostle Paul described his ministry as “destroying speculations and every lofty thing raised up against the knowledge of God, and . . . taking every thought captive to the obedience of Christ” (2 Corinthians 10:5). Reformed apologists commonly understand their ministry as continuing Paul’s mandate. They staunchly oppose the idea of neutrality in any area of thought, insisting that Jesus Christ is Lord over science, philosophy, theology, and apologetics. The title of John Frame’s book Apologetics to the Glory of God nicely captures the spirit of Reformed apologetics.

The distinctive theological and philosophical assumptions of Reformed apologetics lead its advocates to equally distinctive approaches to such issues as the existence of God and the problem of evil. In general, Reformed apologetics, especially as articulated by such conservative apologists as Gordon Clark and Cornelius Van Til, may be fairly characterized as offensive. The term is susceptible of two senses here, and actually both apply. Objectively, Reformed apologetics seeks to take the initiative and show that unbelieving thought is irrational, not merely that faith is plausible or reasonable. In this sense “offensive” contrasts with a “defensive” approach to apologetics."

"Clark and Van Til both insisted on the necessity of presupposing the divine inspiration and absolute truth of Scripture, not only in theology but also in apologetics. For them the divine authority of Scripture is the beginning, not the conclusion, of the apologetic case for Christianity. As with other aspects of their thought, Clark and Van Til worked out this presuppositional view of biblical authority in somewhat differing ways."​

I've quoted from this book because I think it is for the most part fair and balanced in covering different approaches to apologetics, whereas most of the responses in this thread, have been anything but.

 

[FireDragon76]

Dietrich Bonhoeffer also considered apologetics misguided.

Apologetics, as most Christians understand it, as a rational defense of the Christian faith, began with Justin Martyr and the Greek intellectual tradition. It is foreign to the Bible. Paul relies upon Jewish rhetorical tradition, primarily.

 

[FireDragon76]

Presuppositional apologetics starts by assuming that Christianity means conservative Protestant Christianity, refuses discussion about whether it makes sense, and goes on the attack against everything else.

That fits my experience as well. The big weakness in it all is a relative disinterest in actual history of ideas and the actual complexity of the real world. But in some ways, it fits with the ahistorical, disembodied religion that is common among conservative Reformed types.

If I were defending the Christian faith, I think I would do so less aggressively, and point to the near-universal human need for spirituality and idealism, and also to the historicity of the religion. That's far more modest than basically bowlderizing a complex topic with a transcendental argument, and it lends itself potentially to discussion and dialogue rather than circling the intellectual wagons.