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I'm no expert on truth, which is why I attempt to use methods that are. Unfortunately for you (and the other 153 followers of UB) choosing some anonymous book as your arbiter for things true, is well, laughable.
I dismiss what you have asserted regarding supernatural claims based on your understanding of the UB.If you had read the book you wouldn't sound so narrow minded criticizing it. At least I could assume you know what it is you disagree with. Your methods must suck if you dismiss a 2,000 page book without reading it.
Arguments from popularity aside, I lol'd.I'm no expert on truth, which is why I attempt to use methods that are. Unfortunately for you (and the other 153 followers of UB)
I got as far as 13 minutes, to where he says, atheist cosmologist have unanswered questions? We don't, we have "God".choosing some anonymous book as your arbiter for things true, is well, laughable.
Yeah, the video's a bit painful, and I have only made it through the first presenter, but I liked the fact that here is a UB follower, and he's basically claiming that most of the "science" in UB is BS.Arguments from popularity aside, I lol'd.
I got as far as 13 minutes, to where he says, atheist cosmologist have unanswered questions? We don't, we have "God".
At 16 minutes "...all of us on the planets of the seven super universes...".
Having actually read the book I'm aware of the use of science of the day which wasn't BS at the time. The revelatory commission explained why they were limited.Yeah, the video's a bit painful, and I have only made it through the first presenter, but I liked the fact that here is a UB follower, and he's basically claiming that most of the "science" in UB is BS.
LOL! I don't think it works that way, besides, I don't think they were performing caesareans during Jesus day???What about spiritual caesarean?
It depends on the process they used to reach their conclusions. If you present a black hole to 1000 people who know little or nothing about black holes, you might expect a range of responses. However, as those individuals examine the phenomenon more closely, over time, you would expect a convergence in their thinking that reflects a general understanding of how black holes work.
As mentioned previously, I think I can satisfy that burden by pointing to the ramshackle case the religious present in support of their various supernatural claims.
Sorry about the slight ambiguity in my wording. I didn't mean to imply that there are "globally reliable psychics." Instead, I was linking the example to P1 of your argument, according to which human beings are generally reliable.
I take this as agreement with (3; emphasis added)?
I don't recall you introducing this caveat in your original formulation of the argument, so I assume that this is an addition.
In any case, I think there is something more pertinent to focus on than the composition of the group, and that is the process by which they reached a consensus. You could take a hand-picked sample of YEC archaeologists and argue that the consensus of the group lacks merit because the process by which it was derived is fundamentally flawed. The process is what distinguishes YEC archaeologists from archaeologists and what makes the consensus of the latter group more credible than that of the former.
On this point I would disagree. First, you haven't established that there is a consensus of religious thought.
You have conflated the pervasiveness of religion with a consensus among religions. As I noted previously, ubiquity is not equivalent to consensus.
Moreover, it seems that theology is plagued by the opposite, by a lack of consensus, with little agreement on the methods and results needed to move toward one.
Second, if the composition of the group is important, as you argue above, then what group should we look to for a consensus and why? Should we take the entire body of religious believers as our group, or theologians, philosophers, and scientists? You seem to have opted for the former simply because it is most convenient to your argument, in which you conflate pervasiveness with consensus.
You later go on to argue that a consensus becomes "rationally significant" if it is established by legitimate experts. But what makes one a legitimate expert on the supernatural? Third, as I noted previously, I think the atheist can satisfy her burden by pointing to the weak case presented by the religious. She doesn't need to thoroughly discredit claims that are already unfounded.
In the case of gymnastics, for example, expertise is demonstrated in the performance (e.g., the floor routine).
Thanks for your thoughtful response. I think we have at least clarified a number of issues that were ambiguous in the beginning.
Welcome back! My time is also limited for the moment, so apologies for the piecemeal response that follows!Greetings! I hope you've been well. I still have limited time for CF at the moment, but here is a reply...
Again, I can only interpret this as agreement with the point I made earlier:"Other question" #1: theology. By "theology" I understood you to mean broad religious experience (i.e. diversity in world religions and conceptions of God). In this case we would not be dealing with experts.
Yet if you were thinking of Christian theology and consensus within Christianity, then what you say here is certainly applicable (and, of course, true). Is there a convergence or is there not? For the time being I will only say that sciences of any kind always produce a diversity of views, not because there is no fundamental agreement, but because sciences are not tools of affirmation and agreement. That's what social clubs are for.
But again, I am going to leave the topic of theology for another day. It is a local consideration, and my argument has to do with global reliability. Your theology argument is presumably elicited by the burden of proof which has already been established.
(3) Again, accepting the argument in its entirety, it's worthwhile considering the 'local' reliability of theology. It may be that, even if human beings are generally reliable, there are particular domains in which their conclusions are notoriously unreliable.
Yes, I would agree with that. Of course a reason for the domain's unreliability would need to be furnished, given the global reliability of human beings.
While not relevant to your argument per se, I do think it remains relevant to the discussion at hand. As mentioned previously, not every consensus has merit, and not every consensus is achieved by means of random sampling. The process by which a consensus is established matters, and is why the consensus of archaeologists on the age of the Earth has greater merit than the consensus of religious scholars who dispute it by citing sacred texts.My original argument had to do with global reliability. Your point about psychics had to do with local reliability. Global reliability has to do with humans considered as humans, in which case a consensus would need to be >50% of the human race. The "consensus" of psychics you produced simply does not fulfill the requirements of a true consensus of human beings. Yet a true consensus can always be approximated by random sampling.
I included all archaeologists because I assume that their expertise derives from their archaeological education, and I also assume that their education is similar (and able to produce increased reliability).
But you're still talking about local reliability when my argument talks about global reliability. The extent to which a particular circumstance increases or decreases default reliability is not relevant to my argument.
To be honest, I'm not sure.Now, I should say that my memory may be misleading me. I read the previous 4 posts to refresh my memory, but perhaps you have already submitted that my argument is sound and that the substitution with respect to religion is also sound? I believe you conceded the former but not the latter, but perhaps you did concede both? In which case you have moved on to further questions such as the reliability of particular disciplines and especially theology?
Are you asking whether I accept the argument that atheists hold the burden because of an apparent consensus among the religious? If so, then no, I don't accept that argument, for reasons previously mentioned:Okay, so you accept the argument but do not accept a consensus of religiosity?
I would add a fourth point: the process by which a consensus is established matters. To use your example, if Islam were ubiquitous then there would be religious consensus in that every religionist would consider Islam the "one true religion." But how was this consensus achieved? Was it achieved by open inquiry into the basis of the religion?On this point I would disagree. First, you haven't established that there is a consensus of religious thought. You have conflated the pervasiveness of religion with a consensus among religions. As I noted previously, ubiquity is not equivalent to consensus. Moreover, it seems that theology is plagued by the opposite, by a lack of consensus, with little agreement on the methods and results needed to move toward one. Second, if the composition of the group is important, as you argue above, then what group should we look to for a consensus and why? Should we take the entire body of religious believers as our group, or theologians, philosophers, and scientists? You seem to have opted for the former simply because it is most convenient to your argument, in which you conflate pervasiveness with consensus. You later go on to argue that a consensus becomes "rationally significant" if it is established by legitimate experts. But what makes one a legitimate expert on the supernatural? Third, as I noted previously, I think the atheist can satisfy her burden by pointing to the weak case presented by the religious. She doesn't need to thoroughly discredit claims that are already unfounded.
That is indeed the question: What does the pervasiveness of religion imply? Does it tell us something about the supernatural or does it tell us something about human beings, many of whom believe in and worship supernatural forces?Why isn't ubiquity equivalent to consensus? If Islam were ubiquitous there would be religious consensus.
The question is, "What kind of consensus does ubiquitous religiosity imply?" It might imply consensus with respect to the existence of the supernatural, the importance of worship and religious observance, the validity of religious belief, etc.
Perhaps I'm losing track, but didn't you say that a consensus becomes "rationally significant" once it has been established by legitimate experts? Is every member of the human species an expert on the supernatural? How did they (we) acquire this expertise?I have opted for the entirety of the human race, believers and unbelievers alike, because it is required by the argument.
Welcome back! My time is also limited for the moment, so apologies for the piecemeal response that follows!
Again, I can only interpret this as agreement with the point I made earlier:
While not relevant to your argument per se, I do think it remains relevant to the discussion at hand. As mentioned previously, not every consensus has merit, and not every consensus is achieved by means of random sampling. The process by which a consensus is established matters, and is why the consensus of archaeologists on the age of the Earth has greater merit than the consensus of religious scholars who dispute it by citing sacred texts.
I would add a fourth point: the process by which a consensus is established matters.
To use your example, if Islam were ubiquitous then there would be religious consensus in that every religionist would consider Islam the "one true religion." But how was this consensus achieved? Was it achieved by open inquiry into the basis of the religion?
- Man is inherently reliable (global skepticism is false).
- Consensus among inherently reliable instruments establishes a burden of proof for those inclined against the consensus position.
- Therefore consensus among humans establishes the relevant burden of proof.
That is indeed the question: What does the pervasiveness of religion imply? Does it tell us something about the supernatural or does it tell us something about human beings, many of whom believe in and worship supernatural forces?
Perhaps I'm losing track, but didn't you say that a consensus becomes "rationally significant" once it has been established by legitimate experts? Is every member of the human species an expert on the supernatural? How did they (we) acquire this expertise?
Yes, we are talking about local reliability because, when it comes to the specific questions we are concerned with, the consensus achieved by polling the entire human race does not matter if the majority of its members are not reliable in that domain. In other words, when considering specific matters, we are necessarily talking about what you call "local reliability," even if we are polling the entire human species or a random sample of its members. We are asking whether they (in this case, the entire species) are reliable on that particular question or in that particular domain ("local reliability"). As I noted previously, and to which you agreed, even if human beings are generally reliable, there may be particular domains in which their conclusions are notoriously unreliable. Whether you are sampling the entire set or a particular subset, the question is the same: is this set of individuals reliable in this domain?I think I understand how we got to these topics of local reliability. One argument I used to justify the rational significance of a consensus of human beings (via global reliability) was the analogy between that and a consensus among scientists. If you read my last main paragraph here you will see that I already objected to the idea that not every consensus has merit when the set in question is not a subset. That is precisely the case in my argument about the entire human race.
When you say "Not every consensus has merit" you are talking about local reliability and subsets. A consensus always requires a group being "polled." In my argument, the group is not a subset, not a sample group, but the entire human race. When you say, "Not every consensus has merit," you are speaking of consensus among subsets of the entire race.
Once one understands my argument they also understand that the group in which the consensus resides can only be the entire human race (or else an approximation achieved by random sampling). My argument is about a consensus of humans, not a consensus of psychics or archaeologists. A consensus of the complete set of human beings always has merit. Consensuses of subsets do not always have merit. And again, the principle for a subset having merit rests on the complete set having merit. Local reliability does not exist without global reliability.
It seems that you are conflating the consensus view of the complete set with what you call "global reliability." But if we are talking about a consensus view on a particular matter, then we must be talking about "local reliability," regardless of whether the consensus was achieved by the complete set or only a subset.With regard to local reliability and subsets, maybe and maybe not. With regard to global reliability and the complete set, no it does not matter. Perhaps process could be important in determining the truth, but not in establishing the burden of proof.
This is why I specified "religionists," a subset of humans. If most religionists were Muslims, then opponents of Islam wouldn't necessarily have the burden. If the consensus was achieved by means of indoctrination and conquest, rather than by satisfying the burden of proof for Islam, then nonbelievers need only point to these facts to argue that the consensus, however large, has no merit.If most all humans were Muslims then opponents of Islam would have the burden of proof based on the argument already given:
Essentially, every aspect of it. I feel that I have already articulated the main reasons, so I'll try to summarise them concisely here. Regarding P1, even if human beings are generally reliable, there may be particular domains in which their conclusions are notoriously unreliable. You agreed on this point. Regarding P2, you have introduced religion into the argument, thereby raising the question of whether man is inherently reliable in that domain. (What you call "local reliability" thus enters the picture.) Related to this, I have argued that the way in which the consensus is established matters, which implies that not every consensus has equal merit. This is true regardless of whether we are talking about the complete set (the entire species) or a particular subset (e.g., archaeologists). Again, you seemed to agree on this point also, noting that a consensus is "rationally significant" once it has been established by legitimate experts. However, you make an exception for the complete set, arguing that any consensus achieved by the complete set has merit regardless of how it was achieved. I don't think it necessarily has any merit beyond telling us what the majority of human beings believe. It certainly doesn't tell us whether their conclusions in that domain are reliable or not.For Islam:
- Man is inherently reliable.
- A consensus of humans believe Islam to be true.
- Therefore the burden of proof with respect to Islam is established.
What part of either argument are you disagreeing with?
No, it seems to me that you are jumping from "inherently reliable" to "reliable in this particular domain." But every time I point out that the discussion has moved into that specific domain, simply by necessity given that you have introduced religion into the discussion, you revert back to talking about general reliability. Even accepting the first premise for the sake of argument, we are left wondering whether human beings are reliable in the domain being discussed.Human beings are inherently reliable. That was the first premise of an argument that you seem to have already agreed with. Are you now saying that they aren't inherently reliable?
I think you are giving this consensus more credit than it deserves, given how it was achieved (e.g., superstition, tradition, indoctrination). I don't think this consensus has any merit beyond what it tells us about the supernaturalistic beliefs of the majority of humans. It would have greater merit if those who achieved consensus (religionists) were able to satisfy their burden of proof, rather than merely expressing shared belief in the supernatural. (As I argued previously, the way in which the consensus is established matters).To take one of the implications I offered, the pervasiveness of religiosity implies that the majority of human beings believe in the existence of the supernatural. The fact that they are reliable establishes a burden of proof, plain and simple.
If the majority view is baseless and is maintained merely by indoctrination or tradition, for example, then I don't see what additional pressure must compel Johnny to do more than merely point that out. He is under no obligation to disprove claims that are already unfounded. He just needs to point to the emperor and say, "He's wearing no clothes."Colloquially this is like the mother who chides her child who is stubbornly persisting in a vast minority, "Oh Johnny, I'm sure that's it! You're right and everyone else is wrong! How did I miss such an obvious fact?"
Now, Johnny may be right and everyone else may be wrong, but if Johnny does not offer the majority an open ear and the benefit of the doubt then he is acting irrationally. If he does not believe that the opposing consensus places a particular rational pressure upon his minority view, then he is acting irrationally.
Okay, but that still leaves open the question of how expertise on the supernatural is acquired and how we might recognise such expertise in ourselves or in others.In this post I said that a consensus of legitimate experts is rationally significant, but I was explaining the rationale behind scientific consensus, which is a form of local reliability. Consensus among subsets requires either neutrality (i.e. a random sample of all human beings) in which case the rational significance would be similar to that of the complete set, or else it requires expertise, in which case the rational significance would be increased.
The basic idea behind rational significance cannot be established by a consensus of experts, it can only be strengthened. If non-experts were not globally reliable, experts could not be locally reliable. Or rather, experts would not actually exist. Thus when some scientific consensus establishes a new theory, the rational significance is not obtained by circumventing global reliability, but rather by presupposing and building upon it. If these persons were not scientific experts and constituted a random sample of the human race, then a consensus among them would still have weight, albeit less.
Many of the threads you abandon remain active, absent your contributions.Encouraged to see the thread still active.
And in this I rejoice.Many of the threads you abandon remain active, absent your contributions.
Yes, we are talking about local reliability because, when it comes to the specific questions we are concerned with, the consensus achieved by polling the entire human race does not matter if the majority of its members are not reliable in that domain. In other words, when considering specific matters, we are necessarily talking about what you call "local reliability," even if we are polling the entire human species or a random sample of its members. We are asking whether they (in this case, the entire species) are reliable on that particular question or in that particular domain ("local reliability"). As I noted previously, and to which you agreed, even if human beings are generally reliable, there may be particular domains in which their conclusions are notoriously unreliable. Whether you are sampling the entire set or a particular subset, the question is the same: is this set of individuals reliable in this domain?
It seems that you are conflating the consensus view of the complete set with what you call "global reliability." But if we are talking about a consensus view on a particular matter, then we must be talking about "local reliability," regardless of whether the consensus was achieved by the complete set or only a subset.
But if we are talking about a consensus view on a particular matter, then we must be talking about "local reliability," regardless of whether the consensus was achieved by the complete set or only a subset.
Yes, we are talking about local reliability because, when it comes to the specific questions we are concerned with, the consensus achieved by polling the entire human race does not matter if the majority of its members are not reliable in that domain.
This is why I specified "religionists," a subset of humans.
If the consensus was achieved by means of indoctrination and conquest, rather than by satisfying the burden of proof for Islam, then nonbelievers need only point to these facts to argue that the consensus, however large, has no merit.
Essentially, every aspect of it. I feel that I have already articulated the main reasons, so I'll try to summarise them concisely here. Regarding P1, even if human beings are generally reliable, there may be particular domains in which their conclusions are notoriously unreliable. You agreed on this point. Regarding P2, you have introduced religion into the argument, thereby raising the question of whether man is inherently reliable in that domain. (What you call "local reliability" thus enters the picture.) Related to this, I have argued that the way in which the consensus is established matters, which implies that not every consensus has equal merit. This is true regardless of whether we are talking about the complete set (the entire species) or a particular subset (e.g., archaeologists). Again, you seemed to agree on this point also, noting that a consensus is "rationally significant" once it has been established by legitimate experts. However, you make an exception for the complete set, arguing that any consensus achieved by the complete set has merit regardless of how it was achieved. I don't think it necessarily has any merit beyond telling us what the majority of human beings believe. It certainly doesn't tell us whether their conclusions in that domain are reliable or not.
Even accepting the first premise for the sake of argument, we are left wondering whether human beings are reliable in the domain being discussed.
(As I argued previously, the way in which the consensus is established matters).
Good post.Made me think. I first read it early in the morning and just couldn't organise my thoughts about it at that time. Coffee helped a lot.
I don't quite agree with the way you've conceptualised "global reliability." From my perspective, global reliability would be a composite of local or domain-specific reliabilities. So when one says that human beings are "generally reliable," one is saying that they tend to be reliable across multiple domains. They may be more or less reliable in some domains than in others, but overall, when multiple domains are considered, they are "generally reliable."First, I grant that global reliability does not mean the same thing as the complete set, and local reliability does not mean the same thing as a subset. Yet global reliability is related to the complete set in the same way that local reliability is related to the subset. Further, given your domain emphasis, let us think of local reliability only in terms of expertise (even though it is true that a reliable subset could be reliable on the basis of expertise or the basis of random sampling).
Why is global reliability related to the complete set? Because global reliability is the antithesis of global skepticism, and the object of global skepticism is the human being (rather than some particular sort of qualified human being). That is, there is no human being that does not escape the judgment of global skepticism. Global reliability, as the opposite of global skepticism, also takes the human being (considered as human) as its object. So global reliability says that human beings are reliable. It doesn't say that scientists, archaeologists, or psychics are reliable. Insofar as they are human, they are reliable, but global reliability passes no judgment on particular varieties of humans.
An instrument's reliability can only be estimated for what it was specifically designed to measure. This necessarily brings us to what you call "local reliability."It is related to the complete set because we are talking about consensus. The argument I gave rests on a consensus of reliable instruments--indeed, of all existing reliable instruments of the human kind.
Well, that's exactly why I disputed the distinction you were making from the beginning. I don't think it's particularly informative when we are dealing with any particular issue to say that "well, humans are generally reliable." Okay, but are they are reliable on this specific matter? Are they reliable in their responses to this particular question?I disagree. Every matter is a particular matter. Therefore if what you say is true, we could never talk about global reliability.
Exactly. Global reliability is a composite of local domain-specific reliabilities. Human beings may be outstandingly reliable in some domains, while being notoriously unreliable in others. Saying that they are, on the whole, "generally reliable" does not tell us whether they are reliable in the specific domain in question. It may be that, in that domain, their conclusions are consistently poorly reasoned. It seems to me that, in such a situation, one could always defend conclusions made in that domain by insisting that human beings are "generally reliable." That seems to be what you are doing in fact.Again, all questions are specific questions. Global reliability extends to all "domains," just as global skepticism extends to all "domains." Human beings are not inherently reliable when it comes to counting to five, and inherently unreliable when it comes to astronomy.
But, as I already said, the way in which the consensus was established matters. So I wouldn't rely solely on testimony at all. Nor would I consider polling the entire human species since I don't assume that every member of the species possesses sufficient knowledge to reliably determine which celestial model has the greatest merit. As I said previously, and to which you agreed, even if human beings are generally reliable, there may be particular domains in which their conclusions are notoriously unreliable. Moreover, in considering different celestial models, I would know that many such models are derived entirely from religion - a domain plagued by a lack of consensus!Let's revisit your example of 10 psychics at this point. The problem I already pointed out has to do with the nature of consensus, sets, and subsets. If there are 5,999,999,990 humans who do not believe the future can be known by tarot cards, and 10 psychics who disagree, it is misleading to talk about a consensus. If we hold to global reliability (and therefore prescind from expertise) then this answer I already gave is quite relevant to your scenario of 10 psychics.
But you want something stronger. You want to suppose that there is a true consensus among all humans in favor of psychic activity, and that their belief is simultaneously known to be false. Does this create a problem for my argument? If so, I would be curious as to what premise it falsifies. I don't think it does.
- I don't think there actually exists a true consensus among all humans in favor of psychic activity.
- If at some point in the past such a consensus did exist (e.g. geocentrism), then it carried the relevant rational weight of a burden of proof given the state of knowledge at the time. If everyone then knew what we know now, no such consensus would have existed.
If there is a bias in the consensus population that is known to you and not to them, and this biases them in favor of their belief, then this would be a reason to ignore the consensus. At this point the discussion could branch in many directions. I would contend that this bias is a secondary consideration that follows after the burden of proof.
My main argument is based on reliability and testimony. Let me spell out a scenario. You are living a few millenia ago and you poll the human race, asking what celestial model is thought to be true. You yourself are undecided on the matter. The overwhelming answer is geocentrism. All you have is the answer. You don't have explanations, methods, or rational argumentation. You have testimony. Will this incline you to believe or disbelieve in geocentrism? The answer has to do with whether you are a proponent of global skepticism or global reliability.
I don't consider it secondary at all; I think it cuts right to the heart of your argument. Not every consensus has equal merit, even if it is based on a poll of the entire species. If we cannot consider the way in which a consensus was established, then we cannot judge its merits and whether it should have any purchase on us.Again, I take this to be a secondary consideration that does not bear on my argument.
I think I have answered this question: no, not necessarily. One must consider what you call "extraneous factors" to ascertain the extent to which the consensus has merit. If your "consensus" on a specific issue is based on a poll of the entire human species, in a domain in which the majority of its members are unreliable, then your consensus isn't likely to have much merit beyond indicating what the majority believe.The question is this: does consensus qua consensus have merit, or not? Without introducing extraneous factors, this question must be answered. My argument has nothing to do with methods or means, it has to do with consensus and reliability.
Again, you seem to shift to "global reliability" whenever I point to the fact that we must focus on what you call "local reliability" given that the discussion is about reliability in a particular domain. As I noted earlier, even accepting global reliability, we are left wondering about reliability in the particular domain under discussion.In order to attack my argument, you need to prescind from the means by which the belief was formed. The only insight my argument offers into the means is general human reliability, which you can oppose if you like.
The rational significance of consensus rests on the notion of reliability. You are attempting to undermine that reliability in particular instances. But even before we look further and move into particular questions of reliability, we already have global reliability. That is our starting point. If, after investigation, nothing is learned regarding reliability, we necessarily default to the position of global reliability (and the burden of proof I already noted). Investigation into particular reliability, means, etc., can produce positive or negative results, but my point is that the neutral position is already rationally significant.
I have already addressed this from multiple angles. You are once again leaping from "human beings are generally reliable" to "human beings are reliable in this particular domain." When I point out that you are doing this, however, you go back to defending the former when it's the latter that is desperately in need of justification.Therefore you can battle apologists all day long in an attempt to discredit the reliability of this consensus, but if your arguments against reliability are refuted then you are in the same position you were in before the investigation into reliability: inclination towards belief (i.e. you have the burden of proof). As I already said, the atheist therefore lives or dies by his arguments.
The following bears repeating:Therefore you can battle apologists all day long in an attempt to discredit the reliability of this consensus, but if your arguments against reliability are refuted then you are in the same position you were in before the investigation into reliability: inclination towards belief (i.e. you have the burden of proof). As I already said, the atheist therefore lives or dies by his arguments.
I think you are giving this consensus more credit than it deserves, given how it was achieved (e.g., superstition, tradition, indoctrination). I don't think this consensus has any merit beyond what it tells us about the supernaturalistic beliefs of the majority of humans. It would have greater merit if those who achieved consensus (religionists) were able to satisfy their burden of proof, rather than merely expressing shared belief in the supernatural. (As I argued previously, the way in which the consensus is established matters).
The implications that the consensus has depends on those "secondary factors" you don't appear to want to consider, like how the consensus was established, how it is maintained, and whether it should have any purchase on us.It matters in strengthening or weakening the bare fact of consensus. But the question is this: what is the implication of the bare fact of consensus?
I don't quite agree with the way you've conceptualised "global reliability." From my perspective, global reliability would be a composite of local or domain-specific reliabilities. So when one says that human beings are "generally reliable," one is saying that they tend to be reliable across multiple domains. They may be more or less reliable in some domains than in others, but overall, when multiple domains are considered, they are "generally reliable."
An instrument's reliability can only be estimated for what it was specifically designed to measure. This necessarily brings us to what you call "local reliability."
Well, that's exactly why I disputed the distinction you were making from the beginning. I don't think it's particularly informative when we are dealing with any particular issue to say that "well, humans are generally reliable." Okay, but are they are reliable on this specific matter? Are they reliable in their responses to this particular question?
Exactly. Global reliability is a composite of local domain-specific reliabilities. Human beings may be outstandingly reliable in some domains, while being notoriously unreliable in others. Saying that they are, on the whole, "generally reliable" does not tell us whether they are reliable in the specific domain in question. It may be that, in that domain, their conclusions are consistently poorly reasoned. It seems to me that, in such a situation, one could always defend conclusions made in that domain by insisting that human beings are "generally reliable." That seems to be what you are doing in fact.
If all I have is a poll of what humanity believes, then all I have is a crude estimation of the amalgamation of various views, many of them poorly justified. I have, in other words, very little in the way of evidence for the superiority of any one model over another. But I do have some idea of which models are most popular. They may be popular because they are well supported, or they may be popular because superstition and tradition have made them so. I would need to investigate further to determine which is the case.My main argument is based on reliability and testimony. Let me spell out a scenario. You are living a few millenia ago and you poll the human race, asking what celestial model is thought to be true. You yourself are undecided on the matter. The overwhelming answer is geocentrism. All you have is the answer. You don't have explanations, methods, or rational argumentation. You have testimony. Will this incline you to believe or disbelieve in geocentrism? The answer has to do with whether you are a proponent of global skepticism or global reliability.
I don't consider it secondary at all; I think it cuts right to the heart of your argument. Not every consensus has equal merit, even if it is based on a poll of the entire species. If we cannot consider the way in which a consensus was established, then we cannot judge its merits and whether it should have any purchase on us.
I think I have answered this question: no, not necessarily.The question is this: does consensus qua consensus have merit, or not? Without introducing extraneous factors, this question must be answered. My argument has nothing to do with methods or means, it has to do with consensus and reliability.
Again, you seem to shift to "global reliability" whenever I point to the fact that we must focus on what you call "local reliability" given that the discussion is about reliability in a particular domain. As I noted earlier, even accepting global reliability, we are left wondering about reliability in the particular domain under discussion.
The implications that the consensus has depends on those "secondary factors" you don't appear to want to consider, like how the consensus was established, how it is maintained, and whether it should have any purchase on us.
But whether human beings are reliable on the particular matter we are discussing (gods and supernatural forces) is a domain-specific issue, regardless of whether we are surveying the entire population, a random selection of its members, or those who claim to possess supernatural expertise.Then perhaps we are disagreeing on what is meant by global reliability. Yet I've never been unclear about what it is. It is the opposite of global skepticism, a technical term that comes from the field of epistemology. Indeed in my argument I don't even use the term "global reliability," I just note that global skepticism is false. It is an epistemological issue proper to human beings, not a domain-specific issue.
I studied philosophy formally; I know what global skepticism is. I just don't see it as having any significant bearing on the argument you go on to make, which focuses on a particular domain and therefore raises questions about local reliability. Even rejecting global skepticism, this remains the core issue.Unless you have the blueprint of the Designer, conjectures about what humans are or aren't designed to measure are unfounded. Global reliability--the position which contradicts global skepticism--claims first and foremost that man's sense perceptions are accurate, and secondarily that his reasoning apparatus is fundamentally sound. Unless you've had some training in epistemology and the idea of global skepticism, I'm not sure this will go anywhere... The global skeptic doesn't say, "We shouldn't believe him because he's a psychic." Instead he says, "We shouldn't believe him because he's a human." I'm not sure you're understanding this point, the nature of global skepticism.
You made the analogy, not me. If this is problematic, then it is problematic for your analogy.Unless you have the blueprint of the Designer, conjectures about what humans are or aren't designed to measure are unfounded.
Not necessarily. Remember that, very early on, I noted that skepticism can help to improve domain-specific reliability by exposing errors and encouraging us to approach our inquiry with greater care. That's how knowledge in that domain grows.To claim that human beings are inherently unreliable in a particular domain is just to say that that domain is inaccessible to human beings, and therefore imaginative or fictional in the first place. According to your own reasoning, it isn't a domain at all.
What else do I have but that? Even if global reliability holds (and global skepticism is therefore false), you are still forced to deal with the same issue: is this set of individuals reliable in this domain? Again, you are shifting to "global reliability" to avoid this. Whether you've sampled the entire population or a random collection of its members, the issue remains the same.I think you need to re-read my argument. If global reliability holds, then you have much more than just "a crude estimation of the amalgamation of various views."
I am saying that I would not search for the answer to that question ("which celestial model is best?") by collecting testimonials from the entire population, for reasons I've already outlined.You don't seem to be comprehending the argument, but perhaps that is because you don't understand global skepticism. Two questions become important:
- Are you saying that if you have only testimony and consensus, you would not be rationally influenced whatsoever?
I've addressed this already from various angles across multiple posts; most recently in this post with reference to your example of Islam being the consensus:If this is so, then which premise of my argument do you reject and why?
Essentially, every aspect of it. I feel that I have already articulated the main reasons, so I'll try to summarise them concisely here. Regarding P1, even if human beings are generally reliable, there may be particular domains in which their conclusions are notoriously unreliable. You agreed on this point. Regarding P2, you have introduced religion into the argument, thereby raising the question of whether man is inherently reliable in that domain. (What you call "local reliability" thus enters the picture.) Related to this, I have argued that the way in which the consensus is established matters, which implies that not every consensus has equal merit. This is true regardless of whether we are talking about the complete set (the entire species) or a particular subset (e.g., archaeologists). Again, you seemed to agree on this point also, noting that a consensus is "rationally significant" once it has been established by legitimate experts. However, you make an exception for the complete set, arguing that any consensus achieved by the complete set has merit regardless of how it was achieved. I don't think it necessarily has any merit beyond telling us what the majority of human beings believe. It certainly doesn't tell us whether their conclusions in that domain are reliable or not.
I don't think you have given reasons why such a consensus should be taken to indicate anything more than what the majority of human beings happen to believe on a particular matter. You've simply stated that human beings are "generally reliable." Even if true, are they reliable on that particular matter?The argument claims that there is weight apart from the means and gives reasons why.
No, but your argument does ascribe more merit to such a consensus than it deserves, given how it was established. If you want to argue that such a consensus should have some intellectual purchase on us, then you must accept that a consideration of the means by which it was achieved is required.Your response can be seen to be secondary because it focuses exclusively on the means, despite the fact that the argument deliberately prescinds from the means (much like the basketball example given in my last). Secondarily your response can be seen to be tangential because it relies so heavily on the assertion that, "Not every consensus has equal merit," despite that fact that my argument in no way requires that every consensus have equal merit.
But are they are reliable in that domain? As I noted many times before, even if human beings are generally reliable, there may be particular domains in which their conclusions are unreliable. (You even agreed on this point.) I am not saying that such a consensus has no merit whatsoever; I am saying that it has no merit beyond telling us what the majority of human beings believe.You have answered but you haven't yet given justification for your answer. Why doesn't it have merit? If humans are generally reliable, then it would have merit. If humans are generally unreliable, then it would also have merit (in the opposite direction). Only if humans have no relation at all to reliability would it not have merit. Is that what you think? (The fact that the means by which a consensus was achieved can either strengthen or weaken the consensus does not at all answer the question of why a consensus qua consensus has no merit)
Yes, they are somewhat arbitrary, in the sense that the boundaries are blurred and what happens in one domain affects activity in others, particularly those closely related to it.I address the misunderstanding of global reliability above. Beyond that, domains are arbitrary. We have sense data and rational inference, to which all "domains" are reduced. The domain is human knowledge (or opinion). We can subdivide human knowledge or opinion into whatever categories we like, but the basis of each of them is the same. There is no qualitative difference between any two domains: each is a product of sense knowledge and rational inference. Some are founded on errors, but the error is always reducible to sense perception or rational inference. My argument focuses on the bare fact of consensus which prescinds from particular errors and particular knowledge and is based on reliability, not infallibility.
I think I already answered a similar question with regard to celestial models.Suppose, for the sake of argument, that I take up your "domain" model. A similar conclusion follows. Suppose that, in the face of human consensus, you are unfamiliar with whether the domain in question is reliable or unreliable. Do you do nothing, lean towards the consensus, or lean against the consensus? Are most human domains reliable or unreliable?
No implications beyond providing an indication of what "the majority of X believes." Perhaps enough to warrant further investigation, but not enough to say that the consensus must have a purchase on us. If we want to know whether the consensus should have a purchase on us, then we are forced to consider those secondary factors, principally how the consensus was established and how it is maintained.Of course the weight of a consensus will vary based on those secondary factors, I've admitted that several times. The question is whether there are implications prior to the secondary factors.
I studied philosophy formally; I know what global skepticism is. I just don't see it as having any significant bearing on the argument you go on to make, which focuses on a particular domain and therefore raises questions about local reliability. Even rejecting global skepticism, this remains the core issue.
You made the analogy, not me. If this is problematic, then it is problematic for your analogy.
Not necessarily. Remember that, very early on, I noted that skepticism can help to improve domain-specific reliability by exposing errors and encouraging us to approach our inquiry with greater care. That's how knowledge in that domain grows.
Arch said:I am saying that I would not search for the answer to that question ("which celestial model is best?") by collecting testimonials from the entire population, for reasons I've already outlined.Zip said:1. Are you saying that if you have only testimony and consensus, you would not be rationally influenced whatsoever?
I don't think you have given reasons why such a consensus should be taken to indicate anything more than what the majority of human beings happen to believe on a particular matter. You've simply stated that human beings are "generally reliable." Even if true, are they reliable on that particular matter?
No, but your argument does ascribe more merit to such a consensus than it deserves, given how it was established.
Arch said:But are they are reliable in that domain? As I noted many times before, even if human beings are generally reliable, there may be particular domains in which their conclusions are unreliable. (You even agreed on this point.) I am not saying that such a consensus has no merit whatsoever; I am saying that it has no merit beyond telling us what the majority of human beings believe.Zip said:You have answered but you haven't yet given justification for your answer. Why doesn't it have merit? If humans are generally reliable, then it would have merit. If humans are generally unreliable, then it would also have merit (in the opposite direction). Only if humans have no relation at all to reliability would it not have merit. Is that what you think? (The fact that the means by which a consensus was achieved can either strengthen or weaken the consensus does not at all answer the question of why a consensus qua consensus has no merit)
Arch said:Yes, they are somewhat arbitrary, in the sense that the boundaries are blurred and what happens in one domain affects activity in others, particularly those closely related to it.Zip said:I address the misunderstanding of global reliability above. Beyond that, domains are arbitrary. We have sense data and rational inference, to which all "domains" are reduced. The domain is human knowledge (or opinion). We can subdivide human knowledge or opinion into whatever categories we like, but the basis of each of them is the same. There is no qualitative difference between any two domains: each is a product of sense knowledge and rational inference. Some are founded on errors, but the error is always reducible to sense perception or rational inference. My argument focuses on the bare fact of consensus which prescinds from particular errors and particular knowledge and is based on reliability, not infallibility.
Arch said:I think I already answered a similar question with regard to celestial models.Zip said:Suppose, for the sake of argument, that I take up your "domain" model. A similar conclusion follows. Suppose that, in the face of human consensus, you are unfamiliar with whether the domain in question is reliable or unreliable. Do you do nothing, lean towards the consensus, or lean against the consensus? Are most human domains reliable or unreliable?
No implications beyond providing an indication of what "the majority of X believes." Perhaps enough to warrant further investigation...
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