My only problem with hard determinism

[elman]

=FishFace;41920756]Libet performed an experiment. He asked people to do something like wiggle a finger or push a button while looking at a dot rotating on a screen, and note the position of the dot, "when he/she was first aware of the wish or urge to act."
Performing the action automatically recorded the position of the dot on the screen, and the scientists later could work out the time it had been pushed in relation to when the subject thought the were going to. It turned out that there was a gap of about 200 milliseconds between "wishing" to act and actually doing it - no surprises.
However, they also attached electrodes to the subject's head, and found that the brain started preparing for the action a full half a second before the subject performed it - 300 milliseconds before they consciously knew about wanting to do it.

Now, we don't need to go into the complicated analysis here, because we're interested in a very broad conclusion - that your perception is not accurate with regard to yourself.

How do you see this indicating my percepltion is not accurate?

*sigh* you are misunderstanding the analogy. The point is that you assume what you seek to convince me of, when you are trying to convince me of it. In that respect, the two arguments are exactly the same.
Of course they're different otherwise - if they were just the same argument, there'd be no point in the analogy.

Why should I assume my perceptions are not real?

 

[FishFace]

How do you see this indicating my percepltion is not accurate?

Oh? Your brain is getting ready to move your arm about a third of a second before you're aware of wishing to move your arm. Your perception is that you just started wanting to move your arm, whereas your brain was wanting to move your arm for 300ms before.

This should, at the very least, cast doubt on the accuracy of introspection.

 

[elman]

Oh? Your brain is getting ready to move your arm about a third of a second before you're aware of wishing to move your arm. Your perception is that you just started wanting to move your arm, whereas your brain was wanting to move your arm for 300ms before.

This should, at the very least, cast doubt on the accuracy of introspection.

I think this is in an area that we don't understand. When and how our brain first begins to think about something I would think would be very difficult to pinpoint, and I think that is more of an explanation of this than to assume this means my decisions are made for me from some source outside my brain and then delivered to me to carry out.

Are you saying my brain decides to move my arm without me being part of the decision?

 

[FishFace]

I think this is in an area that we don't understand. When and how our brain first begins to think about something I would think would be very difficult to pinpoint, and I think that is more of an explanation of this

Not so. Before the brain can command a limb to do something, it has to build up "readiness potential." It has to get ready to do it. It is possible to detect this readiness potential - quite different from detecting thought. But the brain "gets ready" before you start wanting to actually do anything.
This indicates that your perceptions about yourself are not accurate on the whole, so you can't just appeal to them on the subject of free will.

than to assume this means my decisions are made for me from some source outside my brain and then delivered to me to carry out.

Libet doesn't conclude that. But my argument does.

Are you saying my brain decides to move my arm without me being part of the decision?

No, Libet says we can still decide not to move your arm. However, your perception was still incorrect, because you were unaware that you were getting ready to do it.

 

[elman]

Not so. Before the brain can command a limb to do something, it has to build up "readiness potential." It has to get ready to do it. It is possible to detect this readiness potential - quite different from detecting thought. But the brain "gets ready" before you start wanting to actually do anything.
This indicates that your perceptions about yourself are not accurate on the whole, so you can't just appeal to them on the subject of free will.



Libet doesn't conclude that. But my argument does.



No, Libet says we can still decide not to move your arm. However, your perception was still incorrect, because you were unaware that you were getting ready to do it.

Just because I was unaware I was getting ready to move my arm before I did does not prove lack of free will if in fact I can chose to not go along with the preparations to move it and not move it.

 

[quatona]

Just because I was unaware I was getting ready to move my arm before I did does not prove lack of free will if in fact I can chose to not go along with the preparations to move it and not move it.

For the time being, it wasn´t even meant to prove that. You asked for reasons to distrust the self-perception of one´s inner processes, and the poster gave you an example where our self-perception is demonstrably wrong. Conclusion: Self-perception isn´t necessarily reliable just because it is the way we perceive.

 

[elman]

For the time being, it wasn´t even meant to prove that. You asked for reasons to distrust the self-perception of one´s inner processes, and the poster gave you an example where our self-perception is demonstrably wrong. Conclusion: Self-perception isn´t necessarily reliable just because it is the way we perceive.

But it is still all we have to work with since it is some evidence of free will and we have no evidence that proves we do not make the choices we appear to make nor do we have any evidence that would suggest we could not make difference choices in the same circumstances if repeated. I wonder when and why the decision to not move it came from--the one to not respond to the preparation to move it before I decided to move it. I have always understood my perception of reality is flawed. My point has been there is no reason to believe I am not making the choices I seem to be making even if my peception is flawed.

 

[FishFace]

But it is still all we have to work with

Yes but we don't have to restrict ourselves to evidence - we have rational argument as another technique too. And thus far you haven't refuted the argument for determinism, nor have you argued for compatibilism.

since it is some evidence of free will and we have no evidence that proves we do not make the choices we appear to make nor do we have any evidence that would suggest we could not make difference choices in the same circumstances if repeated.

But we have no evidence that we could either. What's left? Rational argument. I argue by analogy: if we were looking at anything other than a human being, we would assume that, in the same circumstances, it would do exactly the same thing. The only reason we think we might do something different is because we perceive ourselves as having an option. But self-perception is unreliable, and perceiving that we have an option does not mean there is actually a non-zero chance of choosing more than one option.

I wonder when and why the decision to not move it came from--the one to not respond to the preparation to move it before I decided to move it. I have always understood my perception of reality is flawed. My point has been there is no reason to believe I am not making the choices I seem to be making even if my peception is flawed.

You are making the choices, it's just that "making a choice" doesn't imply that it was possible for you to have made the other choice, all things being the same. It implies that it was possible for you to have made the choice if, for example, you had been feeling differently.

 

[Patashu]

I think this is in an area that we don't understand. When and how our brain first begins to think about something I would think would be very difficult to pinpoint, and I think that is more of an explanation of this than to assume this means my decisions are made for me from some source outside my brain and then delivered to me to carry out.

Are you saying my brain decides to move my arm without me being part of the decision?

The idea is that what appears to be your will, your mind, is actually manifested by your brain after the event for the purposes of being a general model for the brain to evaluate future decisions with. That is, the brain uses what is known as the mind and not the other way around.

(If you want to accept these findings and also accept free will you're going to have to consider how free will can exist when the will doesn't actually do anything.)

 

[FishFace]

(If you want to accept these findings and also accept free will you're going to have to consider how free will can exist when the will doesn't actually do anything.)

These findings themselves are not quite enough to watertightly demonstrate a lack of free will. But they are enough to show that introspective experience is not perfect. Therefore an argument which contradicts introspective experience is not automatically wrong simply because of that contradiction.

 

[elman]

Quote:
Originally Posted by elman
But it is still all we have to work with

Yes but we don't have to restrict ourselves to evidence - we have rational argument as another technique too. And thus far you haven't refuted the argument for determinism, nor have you argued for compatibilism.

Your arguments for determinism does not seem reasonble to me and I have pointed out many times why I felt that way. If by compatibilism you mean our decisions are a combination of our choice and our being influenced by other factors, I have constantly argued that to be the case.
Quote:
since it is some evidence of free will and we have no evidence that proves we do not make the choices we appear to make nor do we have any evidence that would suggest we could not make difference choices in the same circumstances if repeated.

But we have no evidence that we could either. What's left? Rational argument. I argue by analogy: if we were looking at anything other than a human being, we would assume that, in the same circumstances, it would do exactly the same thing.

You are incorrect I think most animals make choice similar to the way we do.

The only reason we think we might do something different is because we perceive ourselves as having an option. But self-perception is unreliable, and perceiving that we have an option does not mean there is actually a non-zero chance of choosing more than one option.

We cannot test your theory because we cannot exactly duplicate all conditions, but the inability to test your theory does not mean it is reasonable to accept your theory.


Quote:
I wonder when and why the decision to not move it came from--the one to not respond to the preparation to move it before I decided to move it. I have always understood my perception of reality is flawed. My point has been there is no reason to believe I am not making the choices I seem to be making even if my peception is flawed.

You are making the choices, it's just that "making a choice" doesn't imply that it was possible for you to have made the other choice, all things being the same.

Yes the very word choice implies I could have chosen different, all things being the same.

It implies that it was possible for you to have made the choice if, for example, you had been feeling differently.

That is also true.

 

[elman]

The idea is that what appears to be your will, your mind, is actually manifested by your brain after the event for the purposes of being a general model for the brain to evaluate future decisions with. That is, the brain uses what is known as the mind and not the other way around.

(If you want to accept these findings and also accept free will you're going to have to consider how free will can exist when the will doesn't actually do anything.)

You are assuming this proves the will does not do anything and I don't think that has been proven.

 

[elman]

These findings themselves are not quite enough to watertightly demonstrate a lack of free will. But they are enough to show that introspective experience is not perfect. Therefore an argument which contradicts introspective experience is not automatically wrong simply because of that contradiction.

I agree it is not automatically wrong and it is not automatically correct either. We are let with what we think is the most reasonable probability.

 

[FishFace]

Your arguments for determinism does not seem reasonble to me and I have pointed out many times why I felt that way.

Yes, you keep saying that "you" cause your decision. This is an impasse because you fail to understand what it truly is that causes a decision. "You" only cause your decision inasmuch as "you" includes the cause of the decision - some part or parts of your mental state. You need to understand this before we can progress any further.

If by compatibilism you mean our decisions are a combination of our choice and our being influenced by other factors, I have constantly argued that to be the case.

No, compatibilism is the term given to the philosophical doctrine that, although our decisions are fully determined by prior histories, we still have free will. Many compatibilists assert that this is the only way in which we can meaningfully be said to have free will - Hume, for example, as I mentioned earlier.

You are incorrect I think most animals make choice similar to the way we do.

Most but not all? So, where do you draw the line? An amoeba, you presumably think is fully determined, correct? What about some primitive chordate which has nerves and a spinal cord, but no brain? What about a fish, which as a small bundle of nervous tissue for a brain? Then we progress through other animals, to mammals, to primates, to us. What we see is a nervous system that gets progressively more complex, whilst the behaviour gets more complex and less predictable at the same time.
At some point, surely, there must be a dividing line between those organisms which are wholly determined and those which have some slight chance of doing something different, if you were to repeat the situation exactly the same. Where is that line?

Because to me, this is perfectly inconsistent. You point to one thing with some elements of complex, unpredictable behaviour and say, "no, that has no element of freedom" and point to another and say the opposite.
Why would you do so? Presumably because the latter is more similar to yourself, correct? But why do you think something similar to yourself has freedom? Because you think you do. But why do you think you do - purely due to introspection, which, as we have shown, is unreliable. You are perfectly capable of using the same reasoning that I am doing, it's just that, when it comes to humans or similar animals, you reject it in favour of unreliable introspective experience.

We cannot test your theory because we cannot exactly duplicate all conditions, but the inability to test your theory does not mean it is reasonable to accept your theory.

The question, then, is what is the null hypothesis? I say it must be determinism because it is what we assume in all cases except those where we are drawing conclusions from introspection.
It is clear enough that determinism exists - we observe it all around us. So if you somehow could not introspect, or if you did not find something that appeared free when you did so, then you would have an idea of determinism, but not of free will. And if you then looked at human behaviour, you would not think, "Aha, that is clearly free" you would think, "Well, if I put them in exactly the same situation they would do exactly the same thing."
You would do this because the default assumption - without being able to actually test it - is determinism not free will. And we can't use introspection because we know it to be unreliable. What are we left with? The only sensible choice is determinism.

Yes the very word choice implies I could have chosen different, all things being the same.

Actually no it doesn't, but even if it did it wouldn't matter. This is philosophy - words are used precisely and may be stripped of implication to that end. Still, if you look up "choose" in a dictionary, it just says, "to select from a number of options." A computer can do that.

The problem is this, though: suppose that everything is the same. We have effectively hit "rewind" on everything in existence. We go back to the moment before you made a choice - say you chose between apple and cake, and chose cake. Now, this time, you say that it is possible for you to choose the apple.
How is this possible? Everything is the same - every single event that led up to your choice was the same. At some point, the two scenarios diverge - correct? Some time before you finally go for the apple, some process inside your brain must have gone differently and before that some other process and so on. Now, how exactly does this difference start?
In all other elements of life, if there is some different effect, we assume that there must have been some different cause. If a ball goes further, we infer that it was thrown harder or the wind caught it or so on. You are proposing that a difference has been produced uncaused. That is to say, you start off at t=0 with the exact same set of events, these events cause events at t=1 and they cause events at t=2 etc, until at some point, the same set of causes cause a different set of effects.
What kind of cause, being exactly the same cause (because, as you told me, everything is exactly the same) can cause two different effects? I know of only one such cause - a random one. So you are telling me that there is set of causes that is not random, but does not always produce the same effect. Could you explain to us all what this mysterious kind of cause is?

 

[elman]

Quote:
Originally Posted by elman
Your arguments for determinism does not seem reasonble to me and I have pointed out many times why I felt that way.

Yes, you keep saying that "you" cause your decision. This is an impasse because you fail to understand what it truly is that causes a decision.

I think neither of us knows what it truly is that causes a decision.

"You" only cause your decision inasmuch as "you" includes the cause of the decision - some part or parts of your mental state. You need to understand this before we can progress any further.

You need to understand that my mental state if it means I am angry or depressed is not always the sole cause of my decisions and if by mental state you mean me, I have never agrued I am the sole cause of my decisions but I have argued I am one of the causes.

Quote:
If by compatibilism you mean our decisions are a combination of our choice and our being influenced by other factors, I have constantly argued that to be the case.

No, compatibilism is the term given to the philosophical doctrine that, although our decisions are fully determined by prior histories, we still have free will.

That is contradictory. If we have any free will to any extent, our decisions are not fully determined by prior histories.

Quote:
You are incorrect I think most animals make choice similar to the way we do.

Most but not all? So, where do you draw the line? An amoeba, you presumably think is fully determined, correct?

I would not say fully determined but certainly does not seem to make choices outside of or contrary to stimuli.

What about some primitive chordate which has nerves and a spinal cord, but no brain? What about a fish, which as a small bundle of nervous tissue for a brain?

Fish make choices. They take the bait or they don't.

Then we progress through other animals, to mammals, to primates, to us. What we see is a nervous system that gets progressively more complex, whilst the behaviour gets more complex and less predictable at the same time.
At some point, surely, there must be a dividing line between those organisms which are wholly determined and those which have some slight chance of doing something different, if you were to repeat the situation exactly the same. Where is that line?

Somewhere south of human, in other words humans have the ability to make decisions.

Because to me, this is perfectly inconsistent. You point to one thing with some elements of complex, unpredictable behaviour and say, "no, that has no element of freedom" and point to another and say the opposite.

I see a difference between humans and a germ--don't you?

Why would you do so? Presumably because the latter is more similar to yourself, correct? But why do you think something similar to yourself has freedom? Because you think you do. But why do you think you do - purely due to introspection, which, as we have shown, is unreliable.

But not totally unreliabe. It does give us some valid information.

You are perfectly capable of using the same reasoning that I am doing, it's just that, when it comes to humans or similar animals, you reject it in favour of unreliable introspective experience.

Because I do not find your reasoning to be sound enough to justify going against my introspective experiences.


Quote:
We cannot test your theory because we cannot exactly duplicate all conditions, but the inability to test your theory does not mean it is reasonable to accept your theory.

The question, then, is what is the null hypothesis? I say it must be determinism because it is what we assume in all cases except those where we are drawing conclusions from introspection.

Explain null hypothesis.

It is clear enough that determinism exists - we observe it all around us.

It is clear enough that free will exists-we observe it all around us.

So if you somehow could not introspect, or if you did not find something that appeared free when you did so, then you would have an idea of determinism, but not of free will.

I do not understand that statment.

And if you then looked at human behaviour, you would not think, "Aha, that is clearly free" you would think, "Well, if I put them in exactly the same situation they would do exactly the same thing."
You would do this because the default assumption - without being able to actually test it - is determinism

Exactly why is determinism true because we cannot test it?

not free will. And we can't use introspection because we know it to be unreliable. What are we left with? The only sensible choice is determinism.

I don't agree. Determinism is not sensible. It is a theory that contridicts the observable world.

Quote:
Yes the very word choice implies I could have chosen different, all things being the same.

Actually no it doesn't, but even if it did it wouldn't matter. This is philosophy - words are used precisely and may be stripped of implication to that end. Still, if you look up "choose" in a dictionary, it just says, "to select from a number of options." A computer can do that.

But we can create some of our options. A computer does not do that.

The problem is this, though: suppose that everything is the same. We have effectively hit "rewind" on everything in existence. We go back to the moment before you made a choice - say you chose between apple and cake, and chose cake. Now, this time, you say that it is possible for you to choose the apple.
How is this possible? Everything is the same - every single event that led up to your choice was the same. At some point, the two scenarios diverge - correct?

You see a problem with chosing the apple because you cannot conceive of the possibillity of our being able to chose different. You inability to be able to see that possibility does not make it true that possibility would not exist.

Some time before you finally go for the apple, some process inside your brain must have gone differently and before that some other process and so on. Now, how exactly does this difference start?

I start it because I decide to do it that way.

In all other elements of life, if there is some different effect, we assume that there must have been some different cause. If a ball goes further, we infer that it was thrown harder or the wind caught it or so on. You are proposing that a difference has been produced uncaused.

No for the umpteenth time I am not saying my decisions are uncaused. I say I am the cause.

That is to say, you start off at t=0 with the exact same set of events, these events cause events at t=1 and they cause events at t=2 etc, until at some point, the same set of causes cause a different set of effects.
What kind of cause, being exactly the same cause (because, as you told me, everything is exactly the same) can cause two different effects?

A being with the ability to chose from two different options.

I know of only one such cause - a random one.

News alert. A being making a choice is not a random cause.

So you are telling me that there is set of causes that is not random, but does not always produce the same effect. Could you explain to us all what this mysterious kind of cause is?

A human being with a brain.

 

[levi501]

...an old dog incapable of learning a new trick.

 

[FishFace]

I think neither of us knows what it truly is that causes a decision.

Just as neither of us knows exactly what CPU instruction causes this text to appear on the screen, but I know it is some set of CPU instructions, but not the brute fact of the computer's existence, which causes the same.

You need to understand that my mental state if it means I am angry or depressed is not always the sole cause of my decisions and if by mental state you mean me, I have never agrued I am the sole cause of my decisions but I have argued I am one of the causes.

False dichotomy - I mean that your mental state is the sum of everything in your mind at one time. That means it cannot be the same as you because you exist at more than one time, and it also means it is not just your emotions - it is also thoughts, motives, memories and so on. I cannot believe how many times I have said this already.

That is contradictory. If we have any free will to any extent, our decisions are not fully determined by prior histories.

Assertion given without evidence or argument. I'm sorry elman, but you can't just dispatch of a well established philosophical school of thought with a mere assertion that it is false. Here is the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on the subject. It may be worth your while reading and understanding it if you want to be able to discuss the topic.

I would not say fully determined but certainly does not seem to make choices outside of or contrary to stimuli.

The article I linked to gives a definition of determinism. Do you think this applies in the case of an amoeba? What about simpler forms of life, like a virus? A single strand of replicating RNA?

Fish make choices. They take the bait or they don't.

By that argument - robots make choices. They pick up the pencil or they don't. You have to establish that it is possible both for the fish to take and not take the bait, given the exact same circumstances.

Somewhere south of human, in other words humans have the ability to make decisions.
I see a difference between humans and a germ--don't you?
Because I do not find your reasoning to be sound enough to justify going against my introspective experiences.

But you find the very same reasoning quite adequate for arguing that, say, a germ is completely determined (Note that you can still make decisions if you're determined - a computer makes decisions. It's just that it only has one choice it can decide to make given a complete description of the environment)
So you have exactly the same reasoning when looking at a germ as when you are looking at, say, a goat. Both of them are unpredictable. For neither of them do you have any introspective experience, so we can set that aside, reliable or not. Yet you feel that the germ is determined and the goat isn't. What is it about the goat that tells you it is not determined?

But not totally unreliabe. It does give us some valid information.

How do you know?

Explain null hypothesis.

The default assumption. Determinism is the null hypothesis because it is a given - if you drop a ball from the same height in the same place with no wind, you expect it to fall at the same speed.

It is clear enough that free will exists-we observe it all around us.

No, the only evidence you have ever raised in favour of free will is introspective evidence. When we look at other animals, or other humans, we don't observe free will. We observe unpredictability, but in all other cases, if something is unpredictable we assume that there is a hidden cause - i.e. that it is still determined.

I do not understand that statment.

It is part of the argument that determinism is the default assumption. First we notice that determinism is a given - it is not possible to plausibly doubt it. Then we suppose that we don't have the one piece of "evidence" for free will you claim we do - introspectivity. Imagine, then, that you come across a human doing something. What do you assume will happen if you put him back in exactly the same situation, with exactly the same emotions, thoughts, and so on? You would assume that he would do the same. That is because determinism is your null hypothesis.

This means that, if you can't test either determinism or non-determinism, it is sensible to go with determinism, because it is your default position.

I don't agree. Determinism is not sensible. It is a theory that contridicts the observable world.

What does it contradict? Introspection? Big deal - introspection is by no means reliable and determinism explains all kinds of things.

But we can create some of our options. A computer does not do that.

What if we were only programmed to create those options? What if a computer were programmed to do the same? You're just arguing from lack of imagination.

You see a problem with chosing the apple because you cannot conceive of the possibillity of our being able to chose different. You inability to be able to see that possibility does not make it true that possibility would not exist.

You are preempting me. Please don't - just answer the question - do the sequences diverge?

I start it because I decide to do it that way.

Please stop using this concept of "I," unless you can justify yourself - it's far too vague for proper philosophy. Besides, I asked how it started, not what started it. Please think and answer again.

No for the umpteenth time I am not saying my decisions are uncaused. I say I am the cause.

And for the umpteenth time I am asking you to consider how on earth this vague concept of "you" causes any of your decisions. It is fine for everyday language, but this is not. When talking about causation a computer doesn't cause text on the screen - a specific CPU instruction causes it. Every single time I try to bring your attention to this distinction you ignore it.
At some point in the chain of events leading up to your final decision, a difference was caused. That was the first difference. You are saying you caused that difference, but you, your whole body, mind and everything doesn't cause things. Some part of you causes things. When you pick up a pencil, it's fine in everyday language to say that you caused the movement of the pencil. But here, we have to be precise. It was not "you" - it was the movement of your fingers, which was caused by electrical signals in your nerves, which were caused by other signals in your brain, which were caused by yet more signals, and so on. At no point does the whole that is "you" come into the equation.
So the only sensible way of understanding your claim "I caused the difference" is "A part of me caused the difference." That part being, probably a part of your mind or something. But how does a single unit of your mind, which is exactly the same, cause something different? The difference between using "you" and using "a part of you" should be obvious. You can be the same "you" but have parts different. You are still the same you if you have a hand transplanted. But your hand is not the same. So it is very important that you use the correct language.

A being with the ability to chose from two different options.

And what kind of cause is a being? You are simply repeating yourself. I have analysed "choosing between two different options" and come to the conclusion that it requires a cause which is exactly the same but has two different effects. When I ask you what that cause is you just say exactly the same thing!

News alert. A being making a choice is not a random cause.

Common sense alert - the argument is meant to show that that is the only thing it can be. You're just saying, "nope! no it isn't!"

A human being with a brain.

Again, too vague. Come back when you're using proper language.
Addendum - this is getting incredibly frustrating. If you're still insisting that "you" cause your decisions without some good justification, my next post will probably be my last. Sorry elman, but it's no fun talking philosophy with people who aren't willing to learn the language.

 

[elman]

...an old dog incapable of learning a new trick.

Young dogs are easier to fool.

 

[elman]

Quote:
Originally Posted by elman
I think neither of us knows what it truly is that causes a decision.

Just as neither of us knows exactly what CPU instruction causes this text to appear on the screen, but I know it is some set of CPU instructions, but not the brute fact of the computer's existence, which causes the same.

I know a computer cannot make choices like a human can.

Quote:
You need to understand that my mental state if it means I am angry or depressed is not always the sole cause of my decisions and if by mental state you mean me, I have never agrued I am the sole cause of my decisions but I have argued I am one of the causes.

False dichotomy - I mean that your mental state is the sum of everything in your mind at one time. That means it cannot be the same as you because you exist at more than one time, and it also means it is not just your emotions - it is also thoughts, motives, memories and so on. I cannot believe how many times I have said this already.

False dichotomy-my mental state is everything in my mind at one time but not me.

Quote:
That is contradictory. If we have any free will to any extent, our decisions are not fully determined by prior histories.

Assertion given without evidence or argument.

That is using the ideas expressed by free will and determinism.

I'm sorry elman, but you can't just dispatch of a well established philosophical school of thought with a mere assertion that it is false. Here is the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on the subject. It may be worth your while reading and understanding it if you want to be able to discuss the topic.

If you cannot explain it don't give me references.


Quote:
I would not say fully determined but certainly does not seem to make choices outside of or contrary to stimuli.

The article I linked to gives a definition of determinism. Do you think this applies in the case of an amoeba? What about simpler forms of life, like a virus? A single strand of replicating RNA?

You give me the defintion of determinism if you wish and explain how it applys to a being with free will.

Quote:
Fish make choices. They take the bait or they don't.

By that argument - robots make choices. They pick up the pencil or they don't.

Robots and computers are programed. Fish are not.

You have to establish that it is possible both for the fish to take and not take the bait, given the exact same circumstances.

No you have to establish it is not possible for the fish to take or not take the bait, given the exact same circumstances.

Quote:
Somewhere south of human, in other words humans have the ability to make decisions.
I see a difference between humans and a germ--don't you?
Because I do not find your reasoning to be sound enough to justify going against my introspective experiences.

But you find the very same reasoning quite adequate for arguing that, say, a germ is completely determined (Note that you can still make decisions if you're determined - a computer makes decisions.

No the computer does what the programer has predecided it should do.

It's just that it only has one choice it can decide to make given a complete description of the environment)

If we or a computer only has one choice, we do not have a choice. The word choice is inapproprate in this scenario.

So you have exactly the same reasoning when looking at a germ as when you are looking at, say, a goat. Both of them are unpredictable.

I don't believe that to be true. I suspect a germ if unpredictable is because you don't have all the informtion on the simuli.

For neither of them do you have any introspective experience,

A goat may well have some intospective experience. I don't see how a germ could.

so we can set that aside, reliable or not. Yet you feel that the germ is determined and the goat isn't. What is it about the goat that tells you it is not determined?

The goat has a brain and can chose from different options. I doubt this is true of a germ.

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But not totally unreliabe. It does give us some valid information.

How do you know?

I have used this information all my life. It has allowed me to grow and mature and help others to do so.


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Explain null hypothesis.

The default assumption. Determinism is the null hypothesis because it is a given - if you drop a ball from the same height in the same place with no wind, you expect it to fall at the same speed.

OK it works with balls in a vacume. That in no way means it works with humans with a brain.

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It is clear enough that free will exists-we observe it all around us.

No, the only evidence you have ever raised in favour of free will is introspective evidence.

Which is more evidence than you have presented that my observations are incorrect.

When we look at other animals, or other humans, we don't observe free will. We observe unpredictability, but in all other cases, if something is unpredictable we assume that there is a hidden cause - i.e. that it is still determined.

I don't assume that at all. I assume the hidden cause is the exercise of free will.

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I do not understand that statment.

It is part of the argument that determinism is the default assumption. First we notice that determinism is a given - it is not possible to plausibly doubt it.

I already don't follow. It is not a given and I do doubt it.

Then we suppose that we don't have the one piece of "evidence" for free will you claim we do - introspectivity.

Which we do have.

Imagine, then, that you come across a human doing something. What do you assume will happen if you put him back in exactly the same situation, with exactly the same emotions, thoughts, and so on? You would assume that he would do the same. That is because determinism is your null hypothesis.

No that is simple probablity. But it is not absolute knowledge.

This means that, if you can't test either determinism or non-determinism, it is sensible to go with determinism, because it is your default position.

Your default position--not mine.


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I don't agree. Determinism is not sensible. It is a theory that contridicts the observable world.

What does it contradict? Introspection? Big deal - introspection is by no means reliable and determinism explains all kinds of things.

Not very well.


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But we can create some of our options. A computer does not do that.

What if we were only programmed to create those options? What if a computer were programmed to do the same? You're just arguing from lack of imagination.

It is lack of imagination to assume we are the same as a computer. Why should we believe we are only programed to create the options we do? Why should we not believe we did in fact create the options it appears we did and not some preprogramer?


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You see a problem with chosing the apple because you cannot conceive of the possibillity of our being able to chose different. Your inability to be able to see that possibility does not make it true that possibility would not exist.

You are preempting me. Please don't - just answer the question - do the sequences diverge?

No they don't.


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I start it because I decide to do it that way.

Please stop using this concept of "I," unless you can justify yourself - it's far too vague for proper philosophy. Besides, I asked how it started, not what started it. Please think and answer again.

You are free to deny you exist. I am free to work with the assumption I do exist.


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No for the umpteenth time I am not saying my decisions are uncaused. I say I am the cause.

And for the umpteenth time I am asking you to consider how on earth this vague concept of "you" causes any of your decisions.

I am sorry but simply denial of my existence is not convincing.

It is fine for everyday language, but this is not. When talking about causation a computer doesn't cause text on the screen - a specific CPU instruction causes it. Every single time I try to bring your attention to this distinction you ignore it.

No I do not ignore it. I remind you a compluter is progamed and cannot come up with something it was not programed to do. A human is not programed and can come up with an original though and action. It is unbelievable to me that you think computers and humans are the same.

At some point in the chain of events leading up to your final decision, a difference was caused. That was the first difference. You are saying you caused that difference, but you, your whole body, mind and everything doesn't cause things.

That is your faith system. It is not reasonable and I don't buy into your faith system.

Some part of you causes things. When you pick up a pencil, it's fine in everyday language to say that you caused the movement of the pencil. But here, we have to be precise. It was not "you" - it was the movement of your fingers,

OK lets be precise, it was me that decided to move my fingers.

which was caused by electrical signals in your nerves, which were caused by other signals in your brain, which were caused by yet more signals, and so on. At no point does the whole that is "you" come into the equation.

Again with your belief system. I do come into the equation and the equation does not occur unless I did come into the process.

So the only sensible way of understanding your claim "I caused the difference" is "A part of me caused the difference." That part being, probably a part of your mind or something. But how does a single unit of your mind, which is exactly the same, cause something different? The difference between using "you" and using "a part of you" should be obvious. You can be the same "you" but have parts different. You are still the same you if you have a hand transplanted. But your hand is not the same. So it is very important that you use the correct language.

I cannot hope to satisfy you with your language requirements. We don't know exactly how decisions are made and I can only observe that I make them and then carry them out. You cannot convince me I am fooling myself and somebody oor something other than me is really responsible for what I have observed myself doing. I understand wanting to theorize about weird ideas but taking them on as a religion and dismissing what is happening in front of you is not reasonable.
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A being with the ability to chose from two different options.

And what kind of cause is a being? You are simply repeating yourself.

That is because you have not adequately delt with the point I am making but simply ignore it.

I have analysed "choosing between two different options" and come to the conclusion that it requires a cause which is exactly the same but has two different effects. When I ask you what that cause is you just say exactly the same thing!

And you reject the answer because you don't like it and it does not fit into your faith system.

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News alert. A being making a choice is not a random cause.

Common sense alert - the argument is meant to show that that is the only thing it can be. You're just saying, "nope! no it isn't!"

You call my believing what I see as not being common sense and your believing that what you see is not what is happening is using your common sense.

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A human being with a brain.

Again, too vague. Come back when you're using proper language.

Come back when you have a better reason for me to believe what I see happening is not what is happening.

Addendum - this is getting incredibly frustrating. If you're still insisting that "you" cause your decisions without some good justification, my next post will probably be my last.

Yes it is and your argument is that I should not believe what I see is happening without some good justification from you.

Sorry elman, but it's no fun talking philosophy with people who aren't willing to learn the language.

Philosophy is a search for truth and reality, not an attempt to discredit observable reallity and if you are to prove the reality we are observing is not real you need better arguments than you have been presenting.

 

[FishFace]

OK, never mind then. You can't be bothered to learn and use precise language, I can't be bothered to debate it.

Perhaps you're just not cut out for it. That's fine, but please don't be so arrogant as to dismiss entire schools of thought without bothering to learn the first foreign thing about them.

P.S. your new point in the post was that a computer is programmed and humans and fish are not. "Programmed" implies a programmer. If "not programmed" is your criterion for freedom then fine - we're free, but still determined. If determinism is not your default assumption then what is? Free will? So you assume free will until you find evidence to the contrary? I find that hard to believe - but that is what you would do if it were your default assumption.
Programmers do not "predecide" things in the vast majority of cases. They merely determine the parameters with which the machine makes the decision. If I decide to only buy shoes that are under £35, then I could still find a pair I liked for more and buy those. That's because deciding parameters is not the same as making a decision. I could program a computer to go out and buy shoes for me - I could give it all my preferences in colour and design, my size, my price range and so on. Yet I would not have decided which pair of shoes to buy, would I? The robot would make that decision, although it was absolutely constrained by my parameters. Likewise, no philosopher has any trouble in using the word choice when only one option is actually possible - that is a purely artificial problem.

If you ever decided to do some reading on the subject, the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy is an excellent resource. It is reliable, written by world class philosophers and is generally presented extremely well - laid out in a sensible fashion and easy to understand. Here are the articles most relevant:

• Causal Determinism
• Arguments for Incompatibilism (you are an incompatibilist)
• Compatibilism

If you want to carry on with this, read at least some of one or more of those articles. I'm quite happy to answer questions on the articles, but I am not willing to spend hours trying to reason with someone who doesn't appear to understand a word I'm saying.