I decided to move my arm. That is what happened that caused my arm to move.
Please answer the question I asked, not the one you'd like to answer - I asked what happened which caused your decision. You already told me an immediate cause of your arm moving. I want to know what happened to cause your decision.
I refuse to deny my observations and experience as being what they appear to be. I do not deny they are dependable and without flaws, but they are the best we have and you have not shown me any reason to believe they are completely illusion.
What is a complete illusion? Tell me, what sensory experience do you have that makes you so sure that you have free will? David Hume gives us a valuable heuristic here - every empirical fact should be based on an
impression, that is to say, something we receive directly from the senses. What do you receive from the senses that convinces you so surely that the outcome of your decision isn't determined?
Because robots follow their programing and humans create programing.
But you don't know whether or not humans have their own programming, either given to them by nature or by a deity (simple molecules certainly have a kind of programming) so your argument seems to be based entirely on the fact that you
don't know that humans have "programming."
Arguments based on lack of knowledge are generally considered to not be very good.
You build a straw horse to knock down. I never assumed experience is utterly infallible. Have you assumed experience is utterly fallible?
I assume that such experience as I think you are relying on (since you've not actually detailed your experience at all) is so shaky, and also so similar to the same kind of experience as Libet proved to be utterly fallible, that it should certainly bow to rational thought.
You seem to be unable to follow the argument though, so perhaps it's not surprising you cling to whatever experience it is you have.
You should not make those kind of assumptions. If you mean I am not part of the cause, then I don't agree.
Again, you're not looking at the argument, or the examples, or anything I say except for the conclusion. Take the example of Lee Harvey Oswald. Did
he cause J.F.K.'s death? Well, of course he did. But I bet the death certificate didn't say, "cause of death: Lee Harvey Oswald." You see, what happened was that the bullet entered Kennedy's body, and that caused it to collide with nerves and blood vessels in his brain. This caused signals passed from other nerves in his brain, and blood from other vessels, to be disrupted. Etc etc.
We can also work backwards. The bullet's motion was caused by Oswald pulling the trigger, right? But in actual fact what happened was Oswald's finger muscles contracted, causing his finger to move, causing the trigger to move, causing the firing pin to strike the bullet, causing the volume around the propellant to decrease, causing the propellant to react, causing the pressure to increase, causing the bullet to move.
Now, both of these accounts of each action are correct, yes? But if we were trying to conduct a rigorous analysis of the causes involved, we'd want the more detailed one, right? But notice that it's not "Oswald" and it's not "The Bullet" which did any causing. It's the bullet's
colliding or the
movement of Oswald's finger.
I'm not
leaving out the bullet, Oswald, or you in any of these accounts. You're
still there it's just I'm not saying "The Bullet," "Oswald," or "You." I'm using certain events that are linked with these things. Because using the events is
more accurate than just referring to the thing with which the events are associated. If I was conducting an inquest and I asked the autopsy team for the cause of death and they kept insisting it was Oswald, or the bullet, I'd be pretty irritated. Even though it's fine and accurate to say this in normal conversation, when we actually get into the analysis of causes it's
not.
That doesn't mean it suddenly becomes wrong, it just means it's wrong
in the particular context. Now, do or don't you agree that in these examples it is
more accurate to talk about the events associated with the things we might usually say were the causes? Do you or don't agree that, therefore, what we really mean when we say "some
thing caused an event" is actually something to do with an event associated with that thing?
What prejudice? The one about not assuming all experience is just illusion?
The one about assuming that you really do have any experience relating to free will. The one assuming that that experience is reliable. Even the one assuming that, when you are aware of starting to make a decision, you've already "got ready" to do the action, completely unawares.
If it is not true in everyday language it is not true in the search for truth and reality-philosophy.
Irrelevant since you don't talk about causal chains in everyday language. But your point appears to be that, if you say something in normal conversation, then you must entirely agree with that in every other context. You need to read some Wittgenstein - he has a lot to say about
contextualism - that is, the philosophical principle that the truth value of a statement depends on the context in which you say it. For example, now you would say, presumably, that you know what you had a couple of days ago for breakfast. But if I said, are you
certain, or, if you were in the witness box perhaps, then you wouldn't say you
knew. In fact, it would be false to say you know, because the context implies a different standard.
Same here. The context of philosophy requires a different standard of language. Just because you can say it in everyday language doesn't mean it makes sense now.
My perceptions are that I do have the ability to move or not move my arm just about anytime I decide either way. What is your perception on that, that is different from mine?
Most of the time I move my arm I have no perception of any ability to move or not move it whatsoever. I just think "I want a cookie" and reach for it. Mostly, I am completely unaware of any choice at all. For much of my childhood, I had never even considered the question yet, crucially, I still thought I had some kind of free will because that just seems to be the inbuilt assumption in the absence of evidence.
Now, suppose I am to make a decision - when, or whether, to move a finger. I am aware of making a decision. I have the experience of not knowing whether I am going to move it. I then have the experience of deciding to move it, and then it moves. At no point is there any perception which leaps out at me and shouts, "you have a choice! You could or could not move your finger!" The only thing that implies that is
not knowing whether I am going to move it. But that is pure ignorance - I don't somehow know that the outcome is not yet determined. I know I have not yet decided, but I do not perceive that the outcome of my decision is as yet undetermined.
I think you're probably mistaking a lack of knowledge of the outcome for knowledge that the outcome is unknowable. Two rather different things.
I refuse to thow it out simply because you tell me philosophy and logic demands I do so.
You refuse also to even engage with that philosophy.
Present your argument that will prove my perception of reality is an illusion. You have stated this over and over but you have not presented a compelling argument to support it.
We already know that introspection is unreliable via Libet. So you need a pretty good reason to say that another closely related kind of introspection is infallible.
The programer's decision is what caused the selection as it occured.
But that is not saying that he decided which bucket the ball will going in -
as you have already agreed with me.
So, who or what
did make that selection?