"Determinism is deeply connected with our understanding of the physical sciences and their explanatory ambitions, on the one hand, and with our views about human free action on the other. In both of these general areas there is no agreement over whether determinism is true (or even whether it can be known true or false), and what the import for human agency would be in either case."
"The majority view, however, is that we can readily conceive willings that are not free. Indeed, much of the debate about free will centers around whether we human beings have it, yet virtually no one doubts that we will to do this and that. The main perceived threats to our freedom of will are various alleged determinisms: physical/causal; psychological; biological; theological. For each variety of determinism, there are philosophers who (i) deny its reality, either because of the existence of free will or on independent grounds; (ii) accept its reality but argue for its compatibility with free will; or (iii) accept its reality and deny its compatibility with free will. (See the entries on compatibilism; causal determinism; fatalism; arguments for incompatibilism; and divine foreknowedge and free will.) There are also a few who say the truth of any variety of determinism is irrelevant because free will is simply impossible." You appear to be one of the few.
On the contrary - I believe that
your conception of free will as something as something that is neither random nor causally determined is impossible. I agree with Hume's view that there is a more sensible and meaningful way of understanding free will, something along the lines of "The ability to act in accordance with your desires." (although I overheard the lecturer talking with another lecturer afterwards about another interesting theory) With this in mind, I slot slap-bang in the middle of (ii).
Determinism, in case one of those articles hasn't already divulged a definition (which I'm sure will be better than this) is the theory that all events are fully
determined by prior causes. That means that at a given time, if you hypothetically had complete knowledge of the universe, you could, with sufficient reasoning ability, say exactly what will happen at subsequent points in time.
This sounds familiar: "I grant, then, that an effect uncaused is a contradiction, and that an event uncaused is an absurdity. The question that remains is whether a volition, undetermined by motives, is an event uncaused. This I deny. The cause of the volition is the man that willed it. (Letter to James Gregory, in 1967, 88) "
Sure does. And I disagree for reasons you know well already. Your quotes show that, as with many things in philosophy, there is a large amount of disagreement. If I may be blunt, the difference between you and those the article refers to is that they have studied the subject a lot more than you - or indeed I, and know the intricacies, terminology and so on. That is not to say that someone with more study under their belt is necessarily right, but if anyone - myself included - were to offhandedly dismiss any philosophical school of thought without anything more than an appeal to intuition, that person would hardly be convincing.
The fundamental struggle you appeared to be having with compatibilism is that your conception of free will is - fundamentally -
incompatible. But it is not the only one, and there are several arguments for using a different one - compatibilism being one form of argument, others being from a moral standpoint, for example. If I dig out last term's philosophy notes, let's see... Hmm, still open at the page.
OK, there are two general accounts of free will. One is yours:
1. Given a complete account of the world, I still have more than one option available.
This is the Libertarian view of free will. The other is:
2. Had I wanted, I c/would have chosen differently.
This is a counterfactual account (If <one thing that is not true> were true then <another thing>) but the Libertarians say that being constrained by your desires (what you want) is not free.
There are a few details left about second order desires but we needn't go into those.
A bit more on stuff from your other post: One option being a choice.
The difficult here is that we don't really have a very good word for describing what I mean. I think perhaps 'option' is not a very good one. A choice, certainly implies that there is more than one thing to choose between. My contention is that one can still have a choice, even if the outcome is predetermined. This implies that choosing is about selecting, not about being free. There's really not any funny business here - it's just a certain conception of the word choice. In the everyday world when we say, "I chose cake," we are not really concerned with whether I was actually
free in this or that sense of the word, rather with what I chose and why I chose it.
And as for questioning what one reads well, you may have misinterpreted my intention of giving you encyclopaedia references. The only thing one should take on trust in those articles is what they say people say. When I say the SEP is reliable, I mean that it doesn't say things like "Descartes was an empiricist" (he wasn't.) not that every argument it puts forward is right! The articles in there are written by lots of different philosophers, and they're
not designed to convince you of this or that point of view, only to inform you of this or that
argument for that point of view. And it isn't necessary to just take an argument on trust - the argument being there allows you to make a reasoned - argued - decision as to whether the view is correct.
but if you want to continue, i will try. 
