There are two premises: G and H. You have a certain kind of omni God, and humans consigned to eternal torment. Those are the conditions. Given those conditions, then consider 1-3. Now at that point the argument is deductive. You can fuss about validity if that is your main contention, and I won't try to dissuade you. If you want to talk about the soundness of the argument, then pick an omni or add a premise.
I think you're mistaken all around. First, the OP. Here is a simplified version of your argument from the OP:
1. God exists and is omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent
2. If (1), then God would not send anyone to Hell
3. Therefore, there is no Hell
Now in any argument premises have to be defended. This is especially true in very simple arguments with few inferences (such as this one). In refusing to defend premise (2), your OP is reduced to a mere assertion. It's literally not an argument. Again, to say (2) is self-evidently entailed by (1) is the same thing as saying that you can jump right from (1) to (3) without needing (2). But if (1-3) are self-evidently entailed by G, then why in the world are we pretending to include (1-3) as
premises in an
argument?
Now let's look at Adams:
There are two premises: G and H. You have a certain kind of omni God, and humans consigned to eternal torment.
No, G and H are not premises in Adam's paper. In Adam's paper the only premises are (1-3) as stated in the OP. G and H are merely propositions, and Adam's goal is to prove that they are logically incompossible. Below is the structure of Adam's argument. I will use her own identifiers, I and III, rather than G and H:
Propositions:
I. God exists, and is essentially omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good.
II. Evil exists.
III. Some created persons will be consigned to hell forever.
Argument:
1. If God existed and were omnipotent, then God would be able to avoid (III).
2. If God existed and were omniscient, then God would know how to avoid (III).
3. If God existed and were perfectly good, then God would want to avoid (III).
4. Therefore, if (I), not (III).
I, II, and III are propositions; 1, 2, and 3 are premises; and 4 is the conclusion. Technically the conclusion for incompossibility is the biconditional [ (I) iff ~(III) ], but that is only a minor mistake on her part, as she is primarily concerned with rejecting (III).
You can fuss about validity if that is your main contention, and I won't try to dissuade you. If you want to talk about the soundness of the argument, then pick an omni or add a premise.
No, I am not fussing about validity. In my very first post I argued against the truth of the premises, but since the premises are just assertions with no support there is really nothing to argue against. That's why I said that you ought to give us
some reason to believe the premises (1-3). You refused to defend the premises and claimed they were straightforwardly entailed by "premise" G. That is, you committed the fallacy of begging the question.
Adams knows that (1-3) are bald premises that have been denied for over 2,000 years. That's why she spends 24 pages trying to defend them. You, on the other hand, think they can simply be asserted without any defense and that this counts as an argument.
