Israel-Hamas Thread II

[Benaiah468]

Ireland's new president, Catherine Cnnolly, has been considered one of the loudest voices against Israel for years. But with her entry into the country's highest office, this political line takes on a new quality and a new responsibility. Her stance towards the terrorist organisation Hamas, her rhetoric about Israel and her long-standing political alliances suggest that Europe is facing a serious shift in its Middle East policy. For Israel, this means that Dublin will become a political outpost for those circles that not only criticise the Jewish state, but also seek to delegitimise it.

During her election campaign, Connolly publicly stated that Hamas was ‘part of the Palestinian people’ and ‘legitimately elected.’ She initially refused to clearly condemn the massacres of Oct 7 2023, a day on which hundreds of Israelis were murdered, tortured or kidnapped. Only after widespread criticism did she backtrack, later describing the act as ‘absolutely unacceptable.’ But her assessment remained contradictory. In the same breath, she called Israel a ‘terrorist state,’ thereby placing perpetrators and victims on the same level.

This choice of words is not just a political stance, but has real influence: as head of state, Connolly shapes the international perception of Ireland. Her statements are heard in a Europe that has seen a dramatic increase in anti-Semitic incidents since Oct 7 and where anti-Jewish narratives are increasingly fuelling violence.

For Israel, Connolly's election sends a warning signal: political voices that downplay Hamas or demonise Israel are gaining institutional weight. This also affects Jewish communities in Europe, which are coming under increasing pressure. The rhetoric of political leaders shapes social attitudes. When leaders adopt the narrative of the perpetrators, the threshold for aggression against the victims is lowered.

European history shows that enemy stereotypes rarely remain harmless. Over the centuries, Jews were expelled from dozens of countries: England, France, Spain, Portugal, Russia, the Arab world. Almost everywhere, political agitation was followed by social violence. Today, European Jews are once again witnessing demonstrations outside synagogues and hatred of Israel turning into open anti-Semitism.

 

[Benaiah468]

Turkey is building a multi-layered air defence shield called ‘Steel Dome’, explicitly inspired by Israel's Iron Dome. Contracts worth billions have already been signed. A state that has sharply condemned Israel for years for its defensive measures is now claiming the same protection as if Erdogan's tirades defaming any Israeli self-defence as aggression had never happened.

While Ankara publicly announces a defence system against alleged Israeli threats, Turkey continues to offer safe havens for Hamas officials. Some of them live freely in Istanbul, travel unhindered, operate, recruit and plan. Even European intelligence agencies speak openly about the Turkish hinterland, on which the terrorist organisation can still rely today. It is therefore no coincidence that Israeli ministers are now openly calling for Turkey's diplomatic missions to be closed. Those who support a terrorist network cannot be partners in security matters.

At the same time, Erdogan is trying to position himself as an indispensable player in the debate about Gaza's future. He is signalling his willingness to participate in an international presence and gain influence in the post-war order. The political calculation behind this is transparent: Turkey wants to play the role of mediator without taking responsibility for its own years of support for Islamist structures. The fact that a country that offers Hamas operational protection wants to have a say in stabilising Gaza reveals the absurdity of international diplomacy.

But the more Ankara provokes Israel, Greece, Cyprus and the Kurds, the greater the fear of the consequences becomes. The Steel Dome is not a strategic necessity, but a political cover for the risks of Turkish foreign policy. In contrast, Iron Dome was born out of bitter necessity. Israel was confronted with incessant attacks that explicitly targeted civilians. The threat was real, concrete and life-threatening.

A country that destabilises the region by courting terrorists and putting pressure on minorities cannot ensure its security with steel and sensors. As long as Hamas operates in Istanbul, as long as Turkey disregards its international obligations, as long as anti-Semitic sentiments are reinforced by the government and the media, any defensive shield will remain nothing more than a façade.

 

[Benaiah468]

For the first time in years, all perpetrators who murdered Israelis were arrested or eliminated. This is a turning point that shows how determined Israel is to crack down on terrorist structures in Judea and Samaria despite international criticism.

The final blow was dealt by the targeted operation against Sultan al-Ghani, the terrorist who killed security guard Gideon Perry in 2024. He hid in the Jenin area for over a year, changing safe houses and using the rugged terrain, local structures and proximity of armed groups to aid his escape. Then Israeli forces returned to the area and this time his escape came to an end. The man who destroyed a family was eliminated. His house near Kedumim had already been evacuated and demolished as part of measures against those who misuse their surroundings for terrorism.

Just one day earlier, Israeli forces had killed Ala Raouf Shetiyya, who was responsible for the murder of two soldiers from the Kfir Brigade, Eliya Hilel and Diego Shvisha Harsaj. He, too, had long evaded capture. The arrest and elimination operations of the past few months were complex, risky and characterised by precise coordination between the army, intelligence services and border police. But they followed a clear line: the perpetrators must no longer be allowed to find a safe haven.

At the same time, Israel carried out a broad campaign in Judea and Samaria against arms trafficking, terrorist cells and logistics chains. Within a few days, more than 60 wanted persons were arrested, including 18 operational members of Hamas. In villages, towns and rough terrain, the forces encountered explosive devices, weapons caches, means of communication and cash flows, a dense network that enables and finances terrorism. The operations aimed to curb these structures before they could produce new attacks.

While European governments morally pressure Israel, consider sanctions and bow to political campaigns, Israel works tirelessly to ensure the safety of its citizens. Every step, every night-time raid, every precision operation, every arrest, serves to protect the people of Jerusalem, Samaria, the Jordan Valley, Gush Etzion and all the places that have been targeted by "Palestinian" terrorist groups for years.

Anyone who sees Judea and Samaria merely as a map is misjudging the reality. The area is a network of civilian populations, strategic transit points, arms flows and ideological tensions. Terrorist groups use it as a breeding ground, Israel is trying to stabilise it.

Those who know the region know that the danger has not disappeared. New cells are forming, old networks are waiting for opportunities. But Israel's success in recent weeks demonstrates a principle that has proven itself time and again: terrorism is not defeated by incantations, but by determination. And for the first time in years, this determination has produced a result in Judea and Samaria that gives cause for hope, a rare moment that will remain.

 

[Benaiah468]

The PA, led by Mahmoud Abbas, is set to play a central role in the Gaza Strip of tomorrow. In the eyes of the EU, the UN and other actors, the PA is Israel's peace partner par excellence. Germany alone plans to pay hundreds of millions of euros in taxpayers' money directly to the PA as reconstruction aid. Trump's peace plan speaks of a ‘reformed’ PA. These are reforms that have been half-heartedly demanded by donors for decades but never implemented.

Israel has ruled out the PA in its current form as a peace partner because it glorifies and finances terrorism and teaches hatred of Jews in its school textbooks. Nevertheless, Israel acts as the PA's bodyguard in Judea and Samaria. Without Israeli military and intelligence cooperation, Abbas and the PA would not be politically or physically viable. This is because the rival party Hamas has a large following in the "West Bank" and would win elections. Hamas, as a common enemy, is the only glue that binds Israel and the PA together.

There was great jubilation within the PA after Oct 7 2023. Several representatives openly celebrated the massacre on social media. The Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigade even boasted of having been directly involved. The brigade is the military wing of Fatah, which in turn is the largest faction in the PLO, which governs the "West Bank". Abbas, who heads Fatah, the PLO and the PA, took almost two years before he condemned the massacre for the first time in 2025 under international pressure.

The PLO officially renamed its autonomous authority the State of "Palestine" in 2013. It therefore already sees itself at the head of a "Palestinian" state. However, it does not share the West's dream of a two-state solution. The Palestinian National Charter of 1968 calls for the violent destruction of the entire Jewish state. It has deliberately not been updated to this day.

 

[Desk trauma]

The PA, led by Mahmoud Abbas, is set to play a central role in the Gaza Strip of tomorrow. In the eyes of the EU, the UN and other actors, the PA is Israel's peace partner par excellence. Germany alone plans to pay hundreds of millions of euros in taxpayers' money directly to the PA as reconstruction aid. Trump's peace plan speaks of a ‘reformed’ PA. These are reforms that have been half-heartedly demanded by donors for decades but never implemented.

Israel has ruled out the PA in its current form as a peace partner because it glorifies and finances terrorism and teaches hatred of Jews in its school textbooks. Nevertheless, Israel acts as the PA's bodyguard in Judea and Samaria. Without Israeli military and intelligence cooperation, Abbas and the PA would not be politically or physically viable. This is because the rival party Hamas has a large following in the "West Bank" and would win elections. Hamas, as a common enemy, is the only glue that binds Israel and the PA together.

There was great jubilation within the PA after Oct 7 2023. Several representatives openly celebrated the massacre on social media. The Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigade even boasted of having been directly involved. The brigade is the military wing of Fatah, which in turn is the largest faction in the PLO, which governs the "West Bank". Abbas, who heads Fatah, the PLO and the PA, took almost two years before he condemned the massacre for the first time in 2025 under international pressure.

The PLO officially renamed its autonomous authority the State of "Palestine" in 2013. It therefore already sees itself at the head of a "Palestinian" state. However, it does not share the West's dream of a two-state solution. The Palestinian National Charter of 1968 calls for the violent destruction of the entire Jewish state. It has deliberately not been updated to this day.

No quotes around the P in PA and PLO, disappointing.

 

[Benaiah468]

An Israeli Criminologist and terrorism expert, Dr Shagit Yehoshua, sits opposite terrorists, from Hamas commanders to supporters of Islamic State. Her findings are a slap in the face for all those who reduce terrorism to slogans. What she describes reveals a grim truth about the transformation of "Palestinian" extremism.

The perpetrators she met after the 2023 massacre were fundamentally different from those she had known before. Radicalisation under Hamas, years of ideological isolation and an education that focused on demonising Israel from early childhood onwards had created a new type of assassin. Young men who knew nothing but the worldview of a total enemy acted with a brutality that they themselves perceived as ‘logical.’ Some of them seemed programmed in conversation: sentence fragments, phrases, mantras, repeated as if memorised.

This makes these perpetrators more difficult to apprehend. While earlier generations of Hamas leaders acted on the basis of political and strategic calculations, the new generation combines two much more dangerous components: the old nationalist narrative of ‘resistance’ and the radical self-aggrandisement through violence that ISIS supporters once sought. A toxic mixture of collective myth and personal ego redemption. Jehoschua describes them as ‘posters’, memorable, radicalised, almost unreachable.

This analysis leads to a sobering conclusion: methods of deradicalisation that work in Europe are hardly effective with this generation.

This has less to do with cultural differences than with the total ideological isolation to which they have been subjected since childhood. In Gaza, a generation of young people has grown up whose worldview is not shaped by personal trauma, but by systematically instilled hatred. Anyone who comes from a social environment saturated with execution videos, martyr cults and enemy stereotypes enters adulthood with a basic psychological conditioning that is almost impossible to undo.

The generation that grew up under Hamas is almost impossible to reach. The decisive factor will be how the next generation is shaped.

Israel is not facing an abstract enemy, but people whose thinking has been programmed for violence over many years, a programming that has become more radical with each generation. Oct 7 was not only an attack on life, but also an attack on the understanding of how terror works. What Jehoshua describes shows that the battle is not only taking place on the battlefield, but in the minds of an entire generation.

And that is precisely why their warning is so important: anyone who wants to combat terrorism must understand how it arises. Anyone who wants to curb it must understand the mechanisms that legitimise it. And anyone who is not prepared to face up to the psychological realities will only combat the surface and not what is simmering beneath.

On Oct 7, Israel learned that its opponents have changed. The question now is whether the world is prepared to draw the right conclusions from this.

 

[Benaiah468]

Who were the two men who fled from the tunnels?

Two terrorists who had emerged from the extensive tunnel system in the east of Rafah were eliminated from the air. The question arises as to whether Israel has just caught the highest-ranking terrorist leaders in eastern Rafah.

From the outside, this skirmish may seem like one of many, but this time something was different. The two emerged alone from the depths, not as part of a group, as had been customary in the region in recent weeks. It is precisely this circumstance that has prompted the security authorities to investigate whether they could be the commander of the so-called East Rafah Battalion, known in Israel as ‘Magd Janina’ and his deputy. It would be a blow that would severely affect the entire remaining Hamas structure in the region.

Whether the two men killed in the morning were indeed the battalion commander of East Rafah and his deputy remains unclear for the time being. If this assumption is confirmed, the incident marks a turning point: not only would another part of the leadership be eliminated, but it would also show that the underground structures no longer offer protection. It is rare for high-ranking commanders to leave their positions and it is a clear sign of decline.

For weeks, Israel has been fighting in the depths beneath Rafah against a structure that Hamas has built up over many years. The tunnels of the eastern Rafah corridor were once a place of retreat, a weapons depot, a command post and a lifeline for terrorist cells seeking to evade the Israeli armed forces. But the systematic destruction of the underground passages is dramatically changing the situation. More than 44 terrorists were killed last month; many more have surrendered or been captured.

The night before the current operation, Israeli forces discovered four more terrorists who had also emerged from an underground tunnel in Rafah and were killed in a coordinated operation with the air force. The pressure is mounting, and it is becoming increasingly difficult for Hamas to protect its last enclaves.

At the same time, Israel has sent an offer to the terrorist organisation via intermediaries: those who are still in the tunnels can surrender, will then be imprisoned in Israel and allowed to return to Gaza after serving their sentences – on condition that they completely disarm and renounce violence. The proposal may seem generous, but it has a clear goal: to completely break the underground backbone of Hamas without putting soldiers at unnecessary risk. So far, the organisation has not responded officially, but several prisoners have stated that they have come to the surface because their situation had become untenable.

The situation remains serious, but it is moving noticeably in a direction that hardly anyone dared to hope for months ago: the underground in Rafah is losing its power.

These days will decide how long Hamas will remain capable of acting in this area. The signs indicate that its ability to fight in a coordinated manner is virtually non-existent.

 

[Benaiah468]

After months of diplomatic negotiations, a decisive moment is approaching. According to information from government and Western circles, US President Donald Trump intends to announce the second phase of the Gaza agreement before Christmas. At the heart of this phase is an international committee that will oversee the reconstruction and political reorganisation of the coastal strip. Around ten leading figures from Arab and Western states are to be represented on this committee, flanked by an executive council of prominent international players. Tony Blair, Jared Kushner and US Special Envoy Steve Witkoff are to play central roles. This structure follows a clear formula that is already considered an internal guideline. The IDF is leaving the Gaza Strip, but Hamas is losing its power structures for good.

This is precisely where the most difficult line in the current talks lies. The mediators are working to persuade the terrorist organisation to completely renounce its weapons. A gradual process is being considered: first the heavy systems, then the light ones. For Israel, the crucial question remains whether an organisation that has spent years building up warheads, rockets and complex command structures is actually prepared to give them up completely. The American side is relying on pressure, guarantees and a regionally supported control system. For the Arab states, on the other hand, the future stability of Gaza is closely linked to the question of whether the population would recognise a civilian alternative to Hamas.

In Washington, it is said that all the building blocks are well advanced. Before the holidays, the US government wants to present its vision of a Gaza Strip that is building new structures without Hamas and without Israeli troops. For Trump, the timing has not only foreign policy implications, but also domestic political ones. He can present himself as the architect of a post-war model that integrates regional actors while clearly defining which powers must not be allowed to return.

Whether Hamas will agree to such a construct remains uncertain. As internal documents have recently shown, its leadership fears targeted attacks, international isolation and the loss of control. A ‘Board of Peace’ that intervenes deeply in security architecture, administration and reconstruction would end the organisation's decades-long monopoly-like rule. But this is precisely the prerequisite for any sustainable solution. Without an end to the structures of violence, without guaranteed security for Israel and without an administration that is not based on blackmail and oppression, the Gaza Strip will not find peace.

The coming weeks will determine whether Phase II will be a diplomatic success or another entry in the long list of failed reconstruction plans. For Israel, one thing is clear: withdrawal without a reliable successor structure is out of the question. For the United States, a great deal of political capital is at stake. And for the people of Gaza, perhaps the most important question of our time is: Will their future really change this time?

 

[Benaiah468]

The report from Jerusalem marks one of the most effective blows against Hamas since the start of the war. Israeli troops have eliminated the commander of the so-called East Rafah Battalion, Muhammad Jawad Muhammad al Bawab, in Rafah. He was directly involved in planning and carrying out the massacre on Oct 7 and had been leading targeted attacks against Israeli soldiers since the start of the war. Together with his deputy and two other leading members, he was hit as the group emerged from a tunnel. The IDF released the confirmation.

The operation was part of an ongoing campaign in an area that is now completely under Israeli control. Around two hundred Hamas fighters had been holed up in underground facilities in this section for months. The fact that so many terrorists remained isolated in the same tunnels for such a long period of time highlights the strategic collapse of the organisation in Rafah. Israeli and American sources had known for weeks that this group had neither supplies nor operational freedom of movement. Some attempted to flee or surrendered, while many were killed in combat.

The most recent elimination occurred when terrorists attempted to emerge from a tunnel and advance toward an Israeli unit. The IDF responded immediately, identified the group and neutralised it. Over forty Hamas fighters were killed during the underground fighting. The operation shows that the terrorist organisation in Rafah is not only militarily weakened, but structurally hollowed out.

Al Bawab is considered one of the architects of the massacres and the subsequent coordinated attacks against Israeli forces. His role as battalion commander made him a key figure who controlled logistical supplies, tunnel movements and combat operations. His death strikes a blow to the remaining Hamas structures at a time when the organisation has neither leadership reserves nor tactical depth.

While international critics continue to attempt to delegitimise Israel's actions in Gaza, the facts on the ground paint a different picture. Hamas is not only losing territory, but also its command structure, its ability to coordinate and the tools it has used for decades to oppress the civilian population and plan armed attacks. The elimination of al Bawab is therefore more than a tactical success. It is a symbol of the disintegrating core of the terrorist organisation in one of its most important areas.

 

[Benaiah468]

The situation remains serious, but it is moving noticeably in a direction that hardly anyone dared to hope for months ago: the underground in Rafah is losing its power.

Why don't the trapped terrorists surrender?

The most likely answer lies at the heart of Hamas ideology, and thus also at the heart of the entire war. Surrender is out of the question for the terrorists. They would rather sacrifice themselves, their families and the Palestinian civilian population. From kindergarten to combat training, men are taught that surrender is treason. Anyone who surrenders to the Israelis loses their honour, and their right to exist. They are considered a security risk because they could reveal information during Israeli interrogations. Such alleged ‘collaborators with Israel’ face cruel treatment by Hamas. For those imprisoned, the prospect of renouncing terror and then being released, or rather ‘handed over’, by Israel is therefore the worst-case scenario.

 

[Benaiah468]

Files from Gaza reveal Hamas' influence on NGOs in Gaza

NGOs in Gaza are part of an ‘institutionalised coercion system’ that serves the goals of the terrorist organisation, according to a new report by NGO Monitor. It said that the documents laid out how Hamas exerted control over NGOs at an institutional and individual level, and that they had no freedom of operation in Gaza. NGOs operating in Gaza were aware of the realities of working under Hamas rule, said the watchdog, but failed to disclose Hamas’s coercive conditions and exploitations.

 

[rjs330]

Ireland's new president, Catherine Cnnolly, has been considered one of the loudest voices against Israel for years. But with her entry into the country's highest office, this political line takes on a new quality and a new responsibility. Her stance towards the terrorist organisation Hamas, her rhetoric about Israel and her long-standing political alliances suggest that Europe is facing a serious shift in its Middle East policy. For Israel, this means that Dublin will become a political outpost for those circles that not only criticise the Jewish state, but also seek to delegitimise it.

During her election campaign, Connolly publicly stated that Hamas was ‘part of the Palestinian people’ and ‘legitimately elected.’ She initially refused to clearly condemn the massacres of Oct 7 2023, a day on which hundreds of Israelis were murdered, tortured or kidnapped. Only after widespread criticism did she backtrack, later describing the act as ‘absolutely unacceptable.’ But her assessment remained contradictory. In the same breath, she called Israel a ‘terrorist state,’ thereby placing perpetrators and victims on the same level.

This choice of words is not just a political stance, but has real influence: as head of state, Connolly shapes the international perception of Ireland. Her statements are heard in a Europe that has seen a dramatic increase in anti-Semitic incidents since Oct 7 and where anti-Jewish narratives are increasingly fuelling violence.

For Israel, Connolly's election sends a warning signal: political voices that downplay Hamas or demonise Israel are gaining institutional weight. This also affects Jewish communities in Europe, which are coming under increasing pressure. The rhetoric of political leaders shapes social attitudes. When leaders adopt the narrative of the perpetrators, the threshold for aggression against the victims is lowered.

European history shows that enemy stereotypes rarely remain harmless. Over the centuries, Jews were expelled from dozens of countries: England, France, Spain, Portugal, Russia, the Arab world. Almost everywhere, political agitation was followed by social violence. Today, European Jews are once again witnessing demonstrations outside synagogues and hatred of Israel turning into open anti-Semitism.

Dublin itself is now a hot bed of Islam and extremism. I was listening today an interview with a man from the area. The western side of Ireland has been nearly taken over by Islamists. Ireland is becoming unrecognizable in many places as the Irish culture is being supplanted. Its no wonder why someone like her was voted in.

 

[Benaiah468]

New findings from the army and domestic intelligence services reveal a widely ramified financial system that channels hundreds of millions of dollars to Hamas via Turkey. The revelations shed a harsh light on the quiet rooms where terrorism is financed.

While the terrorist organisation Hamas continues its war against Israel and relies on Tehran's support, its financial architects in Turkey have built a system that consists not of weapons and fighters, but of accounts, currency exchange offices and discreet businessmen. But the goal remains the same: to prepare new attacks and rebuild the destroyed structures beyond the Gaza Strip.

The new documents published by IDF Arabic spokesperson Colonel Avichai Adraee paint a clear picture. Money changers from Gaza are operating in Istanbul and other Turkish cities, having become a strategic arm of Hamas. They are exploiting the financial architecture there, not by chance and not sporadically, but methodically. The mechanism is simple and therefore so dangerous: funds from Iran are received in Turkey, stored there, concealed and then forwarded to Hamas commanders and operational units. In this way, hundreds of millions of dollars flow into the organisation's military structures.

Three men are at the centre of this operation. Tamar Hassan, a high-ranking official in Hamas's finance ministry, lives in Turkey and reports directly to Khalil al Hayya, one of the movement's most important leaders. He is assisted by two money changers, Khalil Farwana and Farid Abu Dayir. According to the investigation, together they form a network that not only transfers money but also organises large-scale economic activities, a shadow empire that converts political ruthlessness into financial power.

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With this structure, Iran is pursuing a clear strategy. Tehran is not only offering ideological support, but is also deliberately rebuilding its regional proxies. Attempts to prepare attacks on Israel are no longer confined to Gaza, but are also taking place in cells operating far away and gaining a foothold in states that are officially diplomatically restrained. This is precisely what makes these structures so threatening. They are invisible to the public, but they fuel terrorism in its most dangerous forms.

Adraee put it bluntly: Hamas is trying to rebuild its military capabilities and is actively working on new attack plans. Anyone who participates in this network, who provides it with money, infrastructure or logistics, is considered by Israel to be a supporter of terror, with all the consequences that entails. The warning is directed not only at individuals, but also at economic actors and states who believe that the financing of such organisations can be relativised politically.

For Israel, this revelation is more than just another indication of the ramified structures of its enemies. It shows that the fight against terrorism is not only being waged at borders and front lines, but also in offices and back rooms, where invoices are written and transfers are made. This is where the funds are generated that finance rockets, build tunnels and prepare new attacks. And this is where it will be decided whether the region will eventually find peace or whether it will continue to be destabilised by those who fuel violence with money.

 

[Benaiah468]

At the Doha Forum, a surprising common course of action emerged among Arab governments: the next phase of the American Gaza agreement should go ahead, but no one wants to send their own forces. Israel's security interests remain the blind spot in this debate.

While the Doha Forum attracted international attention, a remarkable consensus emerged among the Arab states regarding the future of Gaza. Almost all public statements expressed a desire to move forward with the next phase of the American-led ceasefire model. But behind this cheerful political picture lies a reality that cannot be overlooked: hardly any of the countries loudly calling for a ‘new order for Gaza’ are willing to take responsibility themselves.

Egypt's Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty called for the rapid deployment of an international monitoring mission. Turkey demanded a "Palestinian" civil administration and a police force to remove Hamas from power. Qatar is also pushing for progress, even though an Israeli hostage remains in the hands of terrorists. Doha nevertheless believes the new phase is possible before all those kidnapped are released.

At first glance, this political harmony appears to be a regional consensus. But on closer inspection, a different picture emerges: the states that are most vocal in demanding stabilisation in Gaza are at the same time refusing to make any measurable contribution. Hardly any of the players involved are willing to send their own personnel to join an international stabilisation force. Even those governments that publicly criticise Israel for not moving fast enough avoid making any concrete commitments.

The situation is further complicated by Turkey's claim to play a role in Gaza's security architecture. The government in Jerusalem rejects this for one simple reason: Ankara's close support for Hamas makes a Turkish contribution to stabilisation unacceptable. A state that has provided refuge for leading Hamas cadres for years cannot be a guarantor of peace in Gaza.

Egypt also used the forum to draw a clear line. Under no circumstances will Cairo allow the border crossing at Rafah to serve merely as an exit point for Gazans to migrate to other countries. Egypt's position is unambiguous: any opening of the border must work both ways. The country does not want to become an instrument of regional population displacement. The fact that some Israeli government officials have publicly considered over the past two years that Gazans could leave for third countries thus remains politically ineffective.

Meanwhile, expectations are growing in Arab capitals that Israel must actively allow the next phase to proceed and not ‘extend’ the ceasefire. The fact that Jerusalem needs a credible security solution before taking any further steps remains largely unspoken in these debates. The region demands stability in Gaza, while at the same time shying away from its crucial responsibility – its own involvement.

This creates a vacuum that the American government increasingly has to fill. President Donald Trump will have to become more involved in the talks if the politically appealing consensus reached in Doha is to become a real structure. One thing is certain: without an international force that acts credibly, professionally and independently, any vision of a stable Gaza will remain mere rhetoric. And as long as key players avoid taking responsibility, Israel will have to protect the security interests of its population itself. The region may regret this situation, but it cannot ignore it.

 

[Benaiah468]

The Turkish government calls Trump's Gaza plan indispensable while ignoring its own role as a protective power for Islamist actors. The discrepancy between aspiration and reality is growing.

The latest warning from Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan that a failure of the US-backed Gaza initiative would be a ‘huge mistake’ for Washington and the world exemplifies the contradictory role Ankara has been playing for years. Ironically, a state that offers Hamas officials refuge, logistical support and a political platform is now presenting itself as a guarantor of stability. For Israel, this construct is difficult to comprehend and for many Western observers, increasingly questionable.

In the interview, Fidan emphasises that a functioning "Palestinian" civil administration, flanked by a police force that is ‘not Hamas,’ is crucial for the plan's progress. At the same time, he claims that the organisation is prepared to relinquish control of the Gaza Strip. Israel has seen for years how unreliable similar assurances have been in the past. Hamas has never voluntarily relinquished its power; it has consolidated it through repression, intimidation and violence.

The fact that Turkey is one of the loudest critics of Israeli military action and yet sometimes plays a key role in brokering ceasefires is part of this political double movement: moral distance on the outside, strategic self-interest on the inside.

Ankara has declared its willingness to participate in an international stabilisation force. Jerusalem clearly rejects this option. Israel's concern is understandable: a force coming from a country that has harboured Hamas politically and organisationally for years would not be a neutral player. Such a mission could instead create new areas of tension especially if Ankara interprets its mandate in line with its own regional ambitions.

President Donald Trump is visibly pushing ahead with the Gaza peace process himself. Ankara says there is no alternative to this path. But what matters is not Fidan's rhetoric, but whether Turkey is prepared to change the political conditions that have kept Hamas in a comfortable position for years. Words alone cannot create a new security architecture.

The fact that Fidan is simultaneously promising an early lifting of US sanctions over the S-400 deal and commenting on the war in Ukraine shows how broadly Ankara interprets its interests. This is legitimate but it explains why Israel views Turkey's role with caution. Turkey is not a hostile state, but an actor that always writes its own script, even when it claims to support someone else's.

For the Gaza plan, this means that only a realistic view of the regional balance of power will determine whether the second phase is actually achieved. And realism begins with not ignoring Ankara's dual role as a self-appointed mediator and, at the same time, a long-standing protective power for Islamist networks.