Is there Objective Morality?

[Kylie]

Because we are created in love and with love we have a moral compass. That is simple observation. And those that destroy their conscience have no empathy as they have no love. That is also simple observation.
Now, because we have been created with a moral compass doesn't mean we are compelled to use it, though anyone who values their conscience won't do anything to risk losing it or suffer a bad conscience. We have free will. But people who willingly go against their conscience end up with guilty feelings that may cause them grief.

That's assuming that the person has a moral compass that tells them that those things are wrong. A person who does not think that such things are wrong will experience no such guilt.

And since the presence of that moral compass is a social one (meaning that we are raised to have moral views that are based on the society we live in, that allow us to be a part of that society), people from other societies may not experience that same guilt. And that's not including people who just hold different moral views. A vegan, for example, might feel guilty if they ate a dish with meat in it, for example, because of their own moral compass. I, however, hold a different moral compass, and I would not feel that same guilt.

 

[Kylie]

But what does this have to do with circumstances? Your original point was that dependency on circumstances is inversely related to justification for concluding that it is objective. (link)

Because you can use different circumstances to explain away anything that indicates the theory failed.

I say 1+1=3. You say no it doesn't, and I say, "Oh, that's because we're on Earth. If we were on another planet, I'd be correct." You'd say that the mathematics of spacecraft sent out to to other planets is based on 1+1=2, and I'd say, "Ah, but they didn't actually land on other planets." You'd say that some of them did, and I'd say, "But those were spherical planets like Earth." And it would go on like that. No matter what criticism you presented, I could always find some circumstance which would let me explain away any failure.

Again, what does this have to do with circumstances?

You're the one who claimed it depends on the circumstances, back when you said, " As for your example of smacking a child it will depend on the circumstances. We cannot just say its right or wrong across the board with a strict rule. That is not how objective morals work. You would have to be more specific." That was in post 215.

When we deal with objective facts, there is a strict rule. In decimal counting, 1+1 will equal 2, never 3. And when it comes to figuring out trajectories, we can do the same. We can use a formula into which we can insert the different variables - the strength of local gravity, launch angle, launch speed, air speed (which could blow the projectile off course), air density (which will affect how wind will blow the projectile off course as well as atmospheric drag), projectile shape (which will also affect drag), planetary rotation and probably a lot of other variables I've not considered, and it will give us an accurate result.

But the point is that each of these things is a clearly describable thing and is not open to interpretation.

When it comes to a disobedient child, (let's say they stole a chocolate bar from the shop), there are still variables to consider. Is there a pattern of disobedient behaviour, or is this a one-off thing, for example. But such variables can not in this case be accounted for in a way that all people will agree on. Some people will say that smacking is appropriate, but others will say no, smacking is not appropriate no matter what. Others might say smacking is appropriate in some cases, but only for serious transgressions and this doesn't count. Some people will say that grounding the child for two weeks is a more suitable punishment, but others will say that two weeks is too long, and it should only be for one week. These are all matters of OPINION, unlike the variables that need to be considered in the trajectory example. And since they are matters of opinion, they are subjective, not objective. Thus, we can not say that there is objective morality.

Of course you are free to present new arguments, but I was responding to your claim about circumstances, which Orel criticized. Do you agree that your argument about circumstances was invalid?

No, it was not invalid. People who claim that objective morality often use the "It depends on the exact circumstances) argument in an effort to show that each and every situation is different and thus can't be described with a "strict rule" as you said, despite the fact that many other objective things can be described with such a rule.

And even without that argument, the proof of morality being subjective is that you can get two people looking at the same exact situation so the circumstances are identical, and they will STILL come to different conclusions! This would not happen if morality was indeed objective. Subjective morality is the best explanation for why this is so.

 

[Moral Orel]

Perhaps we are talking about two different things. I'm talking about morality; right vs wrong not correct vs incorrect. This thread is about objective morality. Perhaps you can start another thread about relative and incorrect vs incorrect.

That's what it means for morality to be objective

 

[Ken-1122]

While the subjectivist says that "Murder is wrong" can't be true or false, the relativist says that "Murder is wrong" might be true depending on the person or the circumstance.

The subjectivist will say murder is subjectively wrong; not objectively wrong.

 

[Ken-1122]

That's what it means for morality to be objective

No, for morality to be objective, it has to be based on facts. Take murder for example; can you provide facts that prove murder to be wrong? No; that's why morality is subjective and not objective.

 

[Moral Orel]

No, for morality to be objective, it has to be based on facts. Take murder for example; can you provide facts that prove murder to be wrong? No; that's why morality is subjective and not objective.

I didn't say that morality is objective. I said what it means if it is objective. If morality is objective, and if "Murder is wrong" then anyone who chooses to murder made an incorrect choice. Please pay attention to what I'm actually talking about. I'm only talking about what the claims are, not whether or not those claims are correct.

 

[Ken-1122]

I don't believe there is objective morality. I lack the belief in god(s), and so there is no true or higher authority in the universe to enact such a standard.

Bigger, stronger, or higher authority does not make you exempt from that which is objective. Objective morality is defined as a moral proposition whose truth conditions are met without bias caused by any sentient being not just humans. God is a sentient being. Objective morality would mean it's true apart from God.

 

[durangodawood]

....No, it was not invalid. People who claim that objective morality often use the "It depends on the exact circumstances) argument in an effort to show that each and every situation is different and thus can't be described with a "strict rule" as you said, despite the fact that many other objective things can be described with such a rule.....

I wonder if your circumstances objection could be resolved by separating moral reasoning into 2 parts:

1. the objective rights & wrongs (stealing is wrong)

2. how to apply moral rules in situations where they conflict (I think its better to steal than to let this person starve to death in front of me). People may approach this moral balancing differently.

 

[Kyrani]

That's assuming that the person has a moral compass that tells them that those things are wrong. A person who does not think that such things are wrong will experience no such guilt.

And since the presence of that moral compass is a social one (meaning that we are raised to have moral views that are based on the society we live in, that allow us to be a part of that society), people from other societies may not experience that same guilt. And that's not including people who just hold different moral views. A vegan, for example, might feel guilty if they ate a dish with meat in it, for example, because of their own moral compass. I, however, hold a different moral compass, and I would not feel that same guilt.

I said a humane person has a moral compass. An inhumane person has destroyed their conscience actively. And no it is not something we are brought up with. I grew up in a house of psychopaths. I was the only one humane. So nothing of what I know and my conscience are taught, not one stick.
Society does play a role but you will find that this has more to do with inhumane people gaining positions of power from where they can adversely influence others. For example how a scripture is to be interpreted.

 

[Kylie]

I wonder if your circumstances objection could be resolved by separating moral reasoning into 2 parts:

1. the objective rights & wrongs (stealing is wrong)

2. how to apply moral rules in situations where they conflict (I think its better to steal than to let this person starve to death in front of me). People may approach this moral balancing differently.

Surely, if morality is objective, we could always determine which of two moral actions was better than the other, and hence there would still be no disagreement.

 

[Kylie]

I said a humane person has a moral compass. An inhumane person has destroyed their conscience actively. And no it is not something we are brought up with. I grew up in a house of psychopaths. I was the only one humane. So nothing of what I know and my conscience are taught, not one stick.
Society does play a role but you will find that this has more to do with inhumane people gaining positions of power from where they can adversely influence others. For example how a scripture is to be interpreted.

There are plenty of cases of people who have suffered deciding that no one should have to suffer like they did.

 

[zippy2006]

I made that unclear, I see the misunderstanding. It might be true or false that Bob should murder Larry. If Bob should murder Larry, then "Bob should murder Larry" is true to everyone, even if it isn't true that Sally (or anyone else) should murder Larry. The relativist wouldn't even say "Murder is wrong" without specifying which person or persons such a statement refers to.

But is the permissibility of murder here based on circumstances or persons? If Sally shouldn't murder Larry because she is Sally, then we have relativism based on persons which is apparently non-objective. If Sally shouldn't murder Larry because she is in a different circumstance than Bob, then what we are really talking about is circumstances, and this could be objective.

Saying, "Sally shouldn't murder Larry because she is Sally," is apparently non-objective. I don't know of a legitimate definition of objective that could apply.

 

[zippy2006]

Because you can use different circumstances to explain away anything that indicates the theory failed.

I say 1+1=3. You say no it doesn't, and I say, "Oh, that's because we're on Earth. If we were on another planet, I'd be correct." You'd say that the mathematics of spacecraft sent out to to other planets is based on 1+1=2, and I'd say, "Ah, but they didn't actually land on other planets." You'd say that some of them did, and I'd say, "But those were spherical planets like Earth." And it would go on like that. No matter what criticism you presented, I could always find some circumstance which would let me explain away any failure.

But it is false reasoning to blame this problem on the circumstance. The problem is post hoc rationalization, not circumstantial phenomena. Consider two examples given by Joe:

• 1+1=3
• Gravity = 3.7 m/s/s

You could dispute both, and Joe might say, "That's because we're on Earth rather than Mars." His answer is true for the second and false for the first. Gravity really is circumstantial with respect to the planet one is on, whereas mathematics is not. The fact that gravity is circumstantial does not mean that Mars' gravity isn't objectively 3.7 m/s/s.

You're the one who claimed it depends on the circumstances, back when you said, " As for your example of smacking a child it will depend on the circumstances. We cannot just say its right or wrong across the board with a strict rule. That is not how objective morals work. You would have to be more specific." That was in post 215.

The problem with that is that I am zippy2006, not stevevw.

When we deal with objective facts, there is a strict rule. In decimal counting, 1+1 will equal 2, never 3. And when it comes to figuring out trajectories, we can do the same. We can use a formula into which we can insert the different variables - the strength of local gravity, launch angle, launch speed, air speed (which could blow the projectile off course), air density (which will affect how wind will blow the projectile off course as well as atmospheric drag), projectile shape (which will also affect drag), planetary rotation and probably a lot of other variables I've not considered, and it will give us an accurate result.

But the point is that each of these things is a clearly describable thing and is not open to interpretation.

When it comes to a disobedient child, (let's say they stole a chocolate bar from the shop), there are still variables to consider. Is there a pattern of disobedient behaviour, or is this a one-off thing, for example. But such variables can not in this case be accounted for in a way that all people will agree on. Some people will say that smacking is appropriate, but others will say no, smacking is not appropriate no matter what. Others might say smacking is appropriate in some cases, but only for serious transgressions and this doesn't count. Some people will say that grounding the child for two weeks is a more suitable punishment, but others will say that two weeks is too long, and it should only be for one week. These are all matters of OPINION, unlike the variables that need to be considered in the trajectory example. And since they are matters of opinion, they are subjective, not objective. Thus, we can not say that there is objective morality.

You're proposing an argument for moral skepticism. That's interesting, but I've heard it many times before. Maybe someone else will engage on you moral skepticism and the difficulty described in post #2.

No, it was not invalid. People who claim that objective morality often use the "It depends on the exact circumstances) argument in an effort to show that each and every situation is different and thus can't be described with a "strict rule" as you said, despite the fact that many other objective things can be described with such a rule.

Just because someone disagreed with you on the basis of circumstances does not mean that circumstantial accounts are non-objective or erroneous. What you seem to be talking about is verifiability or falsifiability, not circumstances.

And even without that argument, the proof of morality being subjective is that you can get two people looking at the same exact situation so the circumstances are identical, and they will STILL come to different conclusions! This would not happen if morality was indeed objective. Subjective morality is the best explanation for why this is so.

Again, see post #2.

 

[zippy2006]

I consider "objective" as that which is a concrete fact of existence, and "morality" as a standard through which we determine right from wrong, so that "objective morality" is a particular standard of right from wrong as a concrete fact.

I don't believe there is objective morality. I lack the belief in god(s), and so there is no true or higher authority in the universe to enact such a standard.

Hello Kupdiane, welcome to the forum.

I gave some links to arguments for non-divine objective moralities in post #83 (link). Perhaps you might want to read some of those posts to see attempts to derive objective morality in a way that is not dependent on God.

 

[Kylie]

But it is false reasoning to blame this problem on the circumstance. The problem is post hoc rationalization, not circumstantial phenomena. Consider two examples given by Joe:

• 1+1=3
• Gravity = 3.7 m/s/s

You could dispute both, and Joe might say, "That's because we're on Earth rather than Mars." His answer is true for the second and false for the first. Gravity really is circumstantial with respect to the planet one is on, whereas mathematics is not. The fact that gravity is circumstantial does not mean that Mars' gravity isn't objectively 3.7 m/s/s.

And how do you know that there isn't some place in the universe where 1+1=3 is true?

Yes, that's not the best argument, but considering some of the arguments I've seen put forward to support other claims, this is nowhere near the worst.

The problem with that is that I am zippy2006, not stevevw.

Oops.

That's what I get for just following the covnersation back and not paying attention to names.

In any case, I'll ask you now if you agree with Steve's claim.

You're proposing an argument for moral skepticism. That's interesting, but I've heard it many times before. Maybe someone else will engage on you moral skepticism and the difficulty described in post #2.

I don't know that I'd say that.

From the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:

"“Moral Skepticism” names a diverse collection of views that deny or raise doubts about various roles of reason in morality. Different versions of moral skepticism deny or doubt moral knowledge, justified moral belief, moral truth, moral facts or properties, and reasons to be moral."

I think there's plenty of good reasons to act in a morally good way. But those reasons are subjective based on the shared society we live in.

Just because someone disagreed with you on the basis of circumstances does not mean that circumstantial accounts are non-objective or erroneous. What you seem to be talking about is verifiability or falsifiability, not circumstances.

If it's unfalsifiable, how can you claim that circumstantial accounts could be objective?

Again, see post #2.

I think that is coming at it from the wrong side.

Think of it like this. I can say all of my shirts are tee shirts. But then someone takes a shirt out of my wardrobe and says, "This isn't a tee shirt, it's a polo shirt." I could then say, "Okay, but apart from that, all my shirts are tee shirts." And they take out another shirt and say, "This is a Hawaiian shirt, not a tee shirt." We could go on like this. And with each shirt that is taken out and revealed to not be a tee shirt, my claim that all of my remaining shirts are tee shirts becomes less and less plausible. Pretty soon, you're just going to stop believing me.

Likewise, if someone claims that morality is objective, and someone points out, "But there's no agreement about the morality of Issue A," the first person might say, "Okay, but in other issues, morality is objective." The second person could then go through with Issues B, C, D etc, and each time the first person says, "Yeah, but morality is objective in the other cases." With each demonstration of an issue where morality is not objective, the claim that the other issues are morally objective gets weaker and weaker.

 

[durangodawood]

Surely, if morality is objective, we could always determine which of two moral actions was better than the other, and hence there would still be no disagreement.

I'm proposing that certain basic moral rules could be objective. But when they conflict, then subjective judgment may play a part.

 

[Kylie]

I'm proposing that certain basic moral rules could be objective. But when they conflict, then subjective judgment may play a part.

Why only some moral rules? And how would we determine which are objective and which weren't? Can you propose a method of making that determination? And if the moral rules were objective, how could they ever conflict with each other?

 

[durangodawood]

Why only some moral rules? And how would we determine which are objective and which weren't? Can you propose a method of making that determination? And if the moral rules were objective, how could they ever conflict with each other?

I'm not trying to defend objective moral rules in principle. I'm just seeing that your objection regarding circumstances doesn't close the door on them.

(I'm still not totally sure what an objective moral rule actually is proposed to be. Is it like a law of nature?)

 

[Kylie]

I'm not trying to defend objective moral rules in principle. I'm just seeing that your objection regarding circumstances doesn't close the door on them.

(I'm still not totally sure what an objective moral rule actually is proposed to be. Is it like a law of nature?)

I'll answer your second question first.

Saying that morality is objective is like saying that the speed of light is objective. It is the same for all people and can be demonstrated by one person to another person to show the second person that it is correct. Morality can't be shown like that. No one can objectively show that a particular punishment for a naughty child is wrong.

My objection to the circumstances argument is that you can use that to explain away anything. If we follow the logic to its conclusion, then we can conclude that each and every objective moral claim applies only to one specific instance at one specific point in time and will never apply to anything else again.

Now, that by itself doesn't show that objective morality does not exist, I agree. After all, if the circumstances argument is correct, then we could get two people to observe the same thing and they should still both agree on what the morally correct thing is.

But it does weaken the circumstances argument in two ways. Firstly, that kind of agreement doesn't actually happen when we have more than one person observing. Secondly, that kind of "it only applies once and then it's gone forever" thing never happens with any other objective things.

 

[zippy2006]

And how do you know that there isn't some place in the universe where 1+1=3 is true?

Yes, that's not the best argument, but considering some of the arguments I've seen put forward to support other claims, this is nowhere near the worst.

If there is then Joe would be right about that claim as well.

Oops.

That's what I get for just following the covnersation back and not paying attention to names.

In any case, I'll ask you now if you agree with Steve's claim.

Which claim?

I don't know that I'd say that.

From the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:

"“Moral Skepticism” names a diverse collection of views that deny or raise doubts about various roles of reason in morality. Different versions of moral skepticism deny or doubt moral knowledge, justified moral belief, moral truth, moral facts or properties, and reasons to be moral."

I think there's plenty of good reasons to act in a morally good way. But those reasons are subjective based on the shared society we live in.

So you would claim that punishing a child is based entirely on opinion, is not objective, and yet there is a correct, rational, and good way to do it?

If it's unfalsifiable, how can you claim that circumstantial accounts could be objective?

The point is that if a non-objective claim is circumstantial and unfalsifiable, it is non-objective because it is unfalsifiable, not because it is circumstantial. See post #234.

Think of it like this. I can say all of my shirts are tee shirts. But then someone takes a shirt out of my wardrobe and says, "This isn't a tee shirt, it's a polo shirt." I could then say, "Okay, but apart from that, all my shirts are tee shirts." And they take out another shirt and say, "This is a Hawaiian shirt, not a tee shirt." We could go on like this. And with each shirt that is taken out and revealed to not be a tee shirt, my claim that all of my remaining shirts are tee shirts becomes less and less plausible. Pretty soon, you're just going to stop believing me.

But I won’t believe you because your theory was disproved, not because it is circumstantial. A theory needs to account for data, whether the theory is circumstantial or not. If it doesn’t account for the data then it is falsified. Post hoc rationalizing a bad theory is a problem, but it isn’t a problem that per se attends circumstantial theories. The relevant circumstances just need to be spelled out ahead of time, when the theory is proposed, rather than after the fact.

Likewise, if someone claims that morality is objective, and someone points out, "But there's no agreement about the morality of Issue A," the first person might say, "Okay, but in other issues, morality is objective." [...]

Here you’ve shifted to a different definition of “objective” than the definition you provided in post #101. Ironically your new definition is based on consensus (“agreement”), as opposed to your original definition which was “not something that exists just because someone says so.”

If X is objective when it enjoys consensus then morality is surely not objective, and this is due to moral disagreements (described in post #2).