Is Moral Neutrality a Myth?

[partinobodycular]

He isn't neutral about whether its "good" or "bad" because he prefers it himself. It's "good to him", as it were.

No, it simply doesn't require a moral choice. It's like me claiming that your choice to wear a red shirt instead of a blue one means that you must think that red tastes better.

It's a non sequitur.

 

[durangodawood]

He isn't neutral about whether its "good" or "bad" because he prefers it himself. It's "good to him", as it were.

So theres nothing about the judgement "moral" thats different from the judgement "tasty"?

Why do we even have the word?

 

[Moral Orel]

No, it simply doesn't require a moral choice. It's like me claiming that your choice to wear a red shirt instead of a blue one means that you must think that red tastes better.

It's a non sequitur.

Your response is a non sequitur. Why you prefer one thing over another is inconsequential.

You seem to think that some behaviors belong in a special category that we call "morality" but haven't offered any sort of definition to show a distinction between behavior types.

 

[partinobodycular]

So theres nothing about the judgement "moral" thats different from the judgement "tasty"?

They're both attributes by which we differentiate things, but not every attribute applies in every circumstance.

Attempting to do that leads to non sequiturs as pointed out.

 

[partinobodycular]

Your response is a non sequitur. Why you prefer one thing over another is inconsequential.

You seem to think that every instance in which one makes a choice of any kind equates to a moral choice. This simply isn't true. Most choices aren't moral choices.

You seem to think that some behaviors belong in a special category that we call "morality"

There are indeed choices that are based wholly or partially on their moral attributes. But not every choice falls into that category, just as every choice isn't based upon how something tastes.

 

[durangodawood]

Moral choices are based on what you think is correct to do.

Aesthetic choices are based on what appeals to your senses.

How did we get to the point where those must be mushed together as if they are the exact same idea?

 

[Moral Orel]

There are indeed choices that are based wholly or partially on their moral attributes. But not every choice falls into that category, just as every choice isn't based upon how something tastes.

Maybe go back to the beginning of all this and reread my initial post. I said "in the same way" not "for the same reason". Untangling this strawman that you claim I said morals are food flavors is just too tiresome.

 

[Moral Orel]

Moral choices are based on what you think is correct to do.

Aesthetic choices are based on what appeals to your senses.

How did we get to the point where those must be mushed together as if they are the exact same idea?

What you think the "correct" thing to do is based on an appeal to your senses. Harming others is "wrong" because it feels bad.

 

[zippy2006]

For the record, I voted "no". I am not neutral about the way I or others behave the same way I'm not neutral about whether I prefer chocolate over vanilla ice cream. And if that's all you and Mac are saying, I agree.

I drafted post #130 last night before you began posting in the thread. I decided to post the draft without any edits just for fun. This is apparently the crux:

I can prefer to behave a certain way, and I can prefer that others behave a certain way without any sort of belief that they must behave that way or that there is any correct way to behave.

Perhaps we can present the proposition:

• "I can prefer that others behave a certain way without any sort of belief that they ought to behave that way."

That is the proposition that first needs investigating.

(I added you into post #130 to bait you into the thread, but now you're already posting so it lost some of its purpose. I will post a bit tomorrow before taking off, but I won't start any long conversations given that fact.)

 

[zippy2006]

Recap Post

@durangodawood, if you want to continue with the "sidebar" when I return in a few weeks we can. If we do I would want you to describe the sidebar in your own words. I will leave off with a recap post which also touches on some aspects of the sidebar.

First, there is a central premise that often grounds everyday theories of moral neutrality:

MNP: There are morally neutral acts.​

Obviously if there are morally neutral acts, such as the category 3 acts I described in post #43, then some form of moral neutrality is possible. Since I believe moral neutrality is not possible, I gave arguments against MNP, including post #73. I also went a step further:

ZP1: ~MNP -> Moral neutrality is impossible.​

Now in general you and partinobodycular took issue with some of the internal reasoning I gave in my arguments against MNP, but you did not object to the conclusion that MNP is false nor did you dispute ZP1. There is a possible objection to ZP1 that I anticipated in a few different posts, but since no one raised it it hasn't been important.

I think MNP is the main reason that common people believe moral neutrality exists, and I think it is founded on a strained idea of morality that doesn't hold up under scrutiny. It is the idea that commonplace acts have no moral quality; that if I steal a pack of gum I am involved in a moral act but if I buy a pack of gum I am not.

@Moral Orel is the poster on CF who has most questioned morality, but he has at the same time denied the distinction between a "moral" act and a commonplace act. Thus in challenging moral realists on whether their morality has any grounding in reality, he has eventually come to the position that no 'oughts' exist--moral or otherwise. In my opinion Orel holds an uncommon variety of moral neutrality insofar as he holds that there are no rationally grounded 'oughts', and that he himself recognizes no normative obligations. I think both of those ideas are false, and this is one possible sidebar since it seems to be based on the same mistaken notion of morality that drives MNP. It seems to me that the only person who might be morally neutral is the person who does not act at all, which is considered pathological.

---------------

Your sidebar has to do more with questioning the idea that we can make strong inferences about a person's moral beliefs from knowledge of their actions. More generally, it is about the way that we sometimes act contrary to our better judgment. The ancient Greek philosophers called this "akrasia".

 

[partinobodycular]

I am not neutral about the way I or others behave the same way I'm not neutral about whether I prefer chocolate over vanilla ice cream.

Allow me to rephrase your analogy.

There are certain things about which people may hold a personal preference, for example the taste of chocolate versus vanilla ice cream.

In the same way they may hold a personal preference about the way people behave. Preferring some forms of behavior over others.

But there's a logical disconnect between saying that certain behaviors are, or aren't preferred, and saying that they are, or aren't moral.

For example, I may prefer that my neighbor not mow the lawn before 7:00 am. But that doesn't mean that I think that mowing the lawn before 7:00 am is immoral.

Unless of course that's the way that you would like to define immoral behavior, as simply those things which you would prefer that people not do. In which case every trivial thing that you prefer that people not do becomes by definition immoral. If not, then claiming that having personal preferences concerning people's behavior equates to having a moral stance on that behavior is simply wrong.

It's possible to have a personal preference concerning people's behavior without elevating that preference to the status of a moral standard.

 

[zippy2006]

...It's possible to have a personal preference concerning people's behavior without elevating that preference to the status of a moral standard.

I don't think you've defined what you mean by moral and immoral. It's not clear what you mean by those terms or whether you are using them in a meaningful way.

 

[partinobodycular]

I don't think you've defined what you mean by moral and immoral.

You're right I haven't. But I'm open to suggestions.

 

[partinobodycular]

It's not clear what you mean by those terms or whether you are using them in a meaningful way.

I'm not sure that I am either. Give me some time, I'll think about it.

 

[Moral Orel]

But there's a logical disconnect between saying that certain behaviors are, or aren't preferred, and saying that they are, or aren't moral.

As @zippy has pointed out a couple times, you've claimed a distinction you have yet to define or describe or illuminate at all.

As a Subjectivist, I say there is no difference because preferences are how you justify all the stuff you call "Morality" anyways. People say "It's immoral to murder" because they would prefer folks not be murdered and for no reason deeper than that. Whether I'm correct or incorrect about that claim belongs in one of the many other threads on the topic, and I would love to discuss it further with you there if you like.

For the purposes of this thread, a simple preference makes you not neutral. You prefer to eat meat. You prefer that people are free to choose whether or not to eat meat. You have preferences for all behaviors you've given any thought to. You prefer that your neighbor refrain from mowing his yard in the early morning. Zippy would say that because you hold that preference, that you believe your neighbor "ought" to wait until later to mow, but I say "Hogwash!" to that.

The only way I see to achieve any kind of moral neutrality would be some kind of semantic argument that tries to show that being oblivious or ignorant causes neutrality. Which would be boring, but I think a strong case could be made.

 

[Moral Orel]

@Moral Orel is the poster on CF who has most questioned morality, but he has at the same time denied the distinction between a "moral" act and a commonplace act. Thus in challenging moral realists on whether their morality has any grounding in reality, he has eventually come to the position that no 'oughts' exist--moral or otherwise. In my opinion Orel holds an uncommon variety of moral neutrality insofar as he holds that there are no rationally grounded 'oughts', and that he himself recognizes no normative obligations. I think both of those ideas are false, and this is one possible sidebar since it seems to be based on the same mistaken notion of morality that drives MNP. It seems to me that the only person who might be morally neutral is the person who does not act at all, which is considered pathological.

Words like "ought" and "should" and "good" and "bad" and "moral" and "immoral" are all (technically) nonsense because they can't be used as intended to form true statements. Sure, we use them colloquially, but we have to translate them as we hear them. For instance, any statement of the form "N is A" where N is a noun and A is an adjective, grammatically, means that A is a property or quality of N. Correct?

So If I say that "Chocolate ice cream is good" that statement claims that "goodness" is a quality or property of the chocolate ice cream. But we all know that when people say that what they mean is "I personally enjoy the flavor of chocolate ice cream" because it's a subjective statement and subjective statements aren't true without reference to the subject. In other words, they just aren't true. So let's look at those statements.

Chocolate ice cream is good.
I enjoy chocolate ice cream.

In the first we are claiming that a noun has a certain property. In the second we are claiming that a noun does a verb. Not the same thing at all.

A I prefer that folks be nice.
B Folks ought to be nice.
C Folks being nice is right.

Not the same thing at all. In the first I am claiming a noun feels a certain way. In the second I am claiming that a verb is a correct choice. In the third I'm claiming a verb has a certain property. B and C aren't comparable to A.

And yet I still say I haven't escaped moral neutrality. No action is right or wrong, yet my preferences for how people behave keeps me from being neutral. It's a bias. Not good enough for you?

 

[zippy2006]

Words like "ought" and "should" and "good" and "bad" and "moral" and "immoral" are all (technically) nonsense because they can't be used as intended to form true statements. Sure, we use them colloquially, but we have to translate them as we hear them. For instance, any statement of the form "N is A" where N is a noun and A is an adjective, grammatically, means that A is a property or quality of N. Correct?

So If I say that "Chocolate ice cream is good" that statement claims that "goodness" is a quality or property of the chocolate ice cream. But we all know that when people say that what they mean is "I personally enjoy the flavor of chocolate ice cream" because it's a subjective statement and subjective statements aren't true without reference to the subject. In other words, they just aren't true. So let's look at those statements.

Chocolate ice cream is good.
I enjoy chocolate ice cream.

In the first we are claiming that a noun has a certain property. In the second we are claiming that a noun does a verb. Not the same thing at all.

I think I responded to this very idea in post #430 of "Where is the Objective Morality?" You didn't offer a response.

And yet I still say I haven't escaped moral neutrality. No action is right or wrong, yet my preferences for how people behave keeps me from being neutral. It's a bias. Not good enough for you?

Oh, I think you do deny moral neutrality as characterized in the OP, but I still think you hold to a separate, "uncommon variety of moral neutrality." You profess an indifference to normative claims, but admit having biased preferences regarding the actions of others. Your profession represents an alternative form of neutrality, but your bias and your actions are at odds with that profession. No?

Some questions: Why are you biased? Is it bad to be biased? Is there a way to remove your bias?

Much of this comes back to whether or not the proposition I presented in post #129 is reasonable:

• "I can prefer that others behave a certain way without any sort of belief that they ought to behave that way."

 

[zippy2006]

You prefer that your neighbor refrain from mowing his yard in the early morning. Zippy would say that because you hold that preference, that you believe your neighbor "ought" to wait until later to mow, but I say "Hogwash!" to that.

To triangulate the issue:

• Partino: I prefer that my neighbor refrain from mowing his lawn in the early morning, and he ought to refrain, but this is not a moral 'ought'.
• Zippy: I prefer that my neighbor refrain from mowing his lawn in the early morning, and he ought to refrain, and this is a moral 'ought'.
• Orel: I prefer that my neighbor refrain from mowing his lawn in the early morning, but I do not believe that he ought refrain in any way, moral or otherwise.

I am guessing that all of us agree that preferences in themselves do not entail 'oughts'. Most people would say that only certain kinds of preferences entail 'oughts', namely those which are grounded by rational expectations and arguments. Technically we would say that the rational expectation is what grounds the preference, which is secondary. In this way the preference about lawn mowing does correlate to an 'ought', whereas a preference for blondes does not correlate to a belief that all women should dye their hair.

So I think @durangodawood has a point about aesthetics. Just because I have an aesthetic preference for blondes does not mean that I believe women ought to dye their hair.

 

[Moral Orel]

I think I responded to this very idea in post #430 of "Where is the Objective Morality?" You didn't offer a response.

I don't think it relates as well as you think it does. The problem with that post is that the implicit premise is "You ought to experience things you enjoy". How it relates to this is that your P1 is already false. A thing is not "good". We enjoy a thing.

The issue here is that Subjectivists claim "what people really mean" when they say "Murder is wrong" is "Boo murder!". It's an expression of dislike, or distaste. So, I'm all about making statements true. Phrase things correctly as true statements that express what we mean instead of this clunky "to me" subjective speak.

Chocolate ice cream is good. <-- False.
I enjoy chocolate ice cream. <-- True.

Their status as "false" and "true", respectively, is objective fact. Insisting on muddy speech is starting to look like obfuscation to me.

To tie this in to the conversation Steve and I were having that you jumped in on, saying more true things is more likely to lead to a true conclusion. But you're free to say things that are false.

Your profession represents an alternative form of neutrality, but your bias and your actions are at odds with that profession. No?

No.

Some questions: A Why are you biased? B Is it bad to be biased? C Is there a way to remove your bias?

A What causes preferences is as varied as the preferences themselves. I'm not sure how you want me to answer such a broad question.
B No. Things aren't "bad".
C Some preferences, yes.

Much of this comes back to whether or not the proposition I presented in post #129 is reasonable:

• "I can prefer that others behave a certain way without any sort of belief that they ought to behave that way."

What's unreasonable about it? To use your example, if you prefer blondes, then surely you prefer that women die their hair blonde, but you don't believe they ought to die their hair just because you prefer it. I like red-heads myself.

 

[zippy2006]

I don't think it relates as well as you think it does. The problem with that post is that the implicit premise is "You ought to experience things you enjoy". How it relates to this is that your P1 is already false. A thing is not "good". We enjoy a thing.

The issue here is that Subjectivists claim "what people really mean" when they say "Murder is wrong" is "Boo murder!". It's an expression of dislike, or distaste. So, I'm all about making statements true. Phrase things correctly as true statements that express what we mean instead of this clunky "to me" subjective speak.

Chocolate ice cream is good. <-- False.
I enjoy chocolate ice cream. <-- True.

Their status as "false" and "true", respectively, is objective fact. Insisting on muddy speech is starting to look like obfuscation to me.

I think it's fairly clear that we disagree on what "good" means (cf. "Why Is this A Problem???"). But I think it's best to postpone this part of the conversation on account of time limitations.

A What causes preferences is as varied as the preferences themselves. I'm not sure how you want me to answer such a broad question.
B No. Things aren't "bad".
C Some preferences, yes.

"Bias" strikes me as a strange word to use, as it implies a lack of objectivity or rationality. Do you think it doesn't imply those things, or merely that those things aren't "bad"?

What's unreasonable about it? To use your example, if you prefer blondes, then surely you prefer that women die...

See, that sounds unreasonable.

What's unreasonable about it?

First, my preference for blondes need not mean that I prefer that women dye their hair. Maybe I prefer natural blondes. Maybe I prefer blondes as a certain limited proportion of the population, etc.

Second, to skip a few steps, I am concerned with the claim that none of one's preferences correlate to 'oughts'. To re-write the statement:

• "None of my preferences about others' behavior correlate to any sort of belief that they ought to behave in a certain way."

On my view there is a difference between a mere preference and an ought-preference, so to speak, and you seem to claim that you have only mere preferences and no ought-preferences. The things I listed <here> sure look like ought-preferences.

For example, if someone misrepresents you five times in a row you will get angry and rebuke them. The claim that such behavior is reflective of a mere preference as opposed to an ought-preference is not plausible. Your behavioral response clearly indicates that you believe they ought not misrepresent you five times in a row. Claiming, "I would prefer that you not misrepresent me five times in a row, but I do not believe that you have any onus to stop misrepresenting me," would not jibe with the response of anger and rebuke. Indeed, when people get angry enough they will attempt to punish others for their bad behavior, sometimes through physical force.