Is Moral Neutrality a Myth?

[Moral Orel]

I think it's fairly clear that we disagree on what "good" means (cf. "Why Is this A Problem???"). But I think it's best to postpone this part of the conversation on account of time limitations.

Okay, then I suggest refraining from using the words I listed because I'm still going to treat them literally as I've described. Just say the statements you mean instead.

"Bias" strikes me as a strange word to use, as it implies a lack of objectivity or rationality. Do you think it doesn't imply those things, or merely that those things aren't "bad"?

It certainly implies those things.
"Badness" isn't a real property that a thing can have.

See, that sounds unreasonable.

Sez you.

First, my preference for blondes need not mean that I prefer that women dye their hair. Maybe I prefer natural blondes. Maybe I prefer blondes as a certain limited proportion of the population, etc.

But if you did prefer there to be more blondes, natural or not, then women ought to dye their hair? Of course not.

Second, to skip a few steps, I am concerned with the claim that none of one's preferences correlate to 'oughts'. To re-write the statement:

• "None of my preferences about others' behavior correlate to any sort of belief that they ought to behave in a certain way."

On my view there is a difference between a mere preference and an ought-preference, so to speak, and you seem to claim that you have only mere preferences and no ought-preferences. The things I listed <here> sure look like ought-preferences.

For example, if someone misrepresents you five times in a row you will get angry and rebuke them. The claim that such behavior is reflective of a mere preference as opposed to an ought-preference is not plausible. Your behavioral response clearly indicates that you believe they ought not misrepresent you five times in a row. Claiming, "I would prefer that you not misrepresent me five times in a row, but I do not believe that you have any onus to stop misrepresenting me," would not jibe with the response of anger and rebuke. Indeed, when people get angry enough they will attempt to punish others for their bad behavior, sometimes through physical force.

So if you feel really really strongly, then a preference magically implies an "ought"? Nope. All the word "prefer" is for is making a hierarchy of desires. Some things are way up on the top of the list, some things are way at the bottom, some things are close enough to get jumbled around in the list on a whim.

It means nothing more than that.

 

[durangodawood]

...So if you feel really really strongly, then a preference magically implies an "ought"? Nope. All the word "prefer" is for is making a hierarchy of desires. Some things are way up on the top of the list, some things are way at the bottom, some things are close enough to get jumbled around in the list on a whim.

It means nothing more than that.

What causes our preferences?

 

[zippy2006]

It certainly implies those things.
"Badness" isn't a real property that a thing can have.

Then we can just say that you have admitted that you lack objectivity and rationality, and that you regularly act in irrational and unjustifiable ways.

So if you feel really really strongly, then a preference magically implies an "ought"?

No, you're not listening.

When you get frustrated, complain to your interlocutor, and rebuke him because he has misrepresented you five times in a row, your actions betray a belief in 'oughts' that your profession denies. Your actions prove that what is being acted out is not a mere preference. Analogously, it is like when a piece of gossip causes someone to get quiet, blush, and sweat profusely. I would say, "Oh, you're embarrassed." They might reply, "No, I'm not embarrassed!," but everyone knows that they are. Their actions are more reliable than their words, and often more rational than their claims.

If you really didn't project the 'ought', and you were rational, then you would not get frustrated, complain, and rebuke. Similarly, if someone harms your wife and you harm them back, then you clearly hold the belief that they should not have harmed your wife. That is the reason you harmed them: because you believe they did something they should not have done. As I said recently, to act in ways that clearly presuppose 'oughts' while professing to avoid all 'oughts' inevitably places one into a schizophrenic position. It is self-contradiction.


Okay, I'm out. Be good while I'm away.

 

[Moral Orel]

Then we can just say that you have admitted that you lack objectivity and rationality, and that you regularly act in irrational and unjustifiable ways.

Yep, we all do.

No, you're not listening.

Yes I am. When I prefer a thing, I take action to promote that thing. Whether that thing be something you call a "mere preference" or a "moral preference" doesn't matter, I do something to promote that thing either way. All you've said is that when I feel very strongly, I take more extreme actions, and that proves I hold a belief. Which is ridiculous.

Analogously, it is like when a piece of gossip causes someone to get quiet, blush, and sweat profusely. I would say, "Oh, you're embarrassed." They might reply, "No, I'm not embarrassed!," but everyone knows that they are. Their actions are more reliable than their words, and often more rational than their claims.

This isn't analogous. You're detecting an emotion based on autonomic responses. You aren't determining a belief based on choices.

If you really didn't project the 'ought', and you were rational, then you would not get frustrated, complain, and rebuke.

Wrong. If I take a drink of something vile, I make a sour pus, spit it out, and complain. I feel a bit of anger directed at the drink too. I react aggressively to things I don't like. I take action to stop the experience I don't like, and I take action to prevent myself from experiencing it again. It does not require that I hold a belief that the drink should not have chosen to hurt me.

 

[Moral Orel]

What causes our preferences?

I'll tell you what I told Zippy:

"What causes preferences is as varied as the preferences themselves. I'm not sure how you want me to answer such a broad question."​

 

[zippy2006]

Analogously, it is like when a piece of gossip causes someone to get quiet, blush, and sweat profusely. I would say, "Oh, you're embarrassed." They might reply, "No, I'm not embarrassed!," but everyone knows that they are. Their actions are more reliable than their words, and often more rational than their claims.

This isn't analogous. You're detecting an emotion based on autonomic responses. You aren't determining a belief based on choices.

Oh, it is analogous. When you get angry at Steve because he isn't reading your posts everyone knows you are angry because you believe Steve ought to read the posts he responds to. Your denial of this fact is no more persuasive than the blusher's denial.

Wrong. If I take a drink of something vile, I make a sour pus, spit it out, and complain. I feel a bit of anger directed at the drink too. I react aggressively to things I don't like. I take action to stop the experience I don't like, and I take action to prevent myself from experiencing it again. It does not require that I hold a belief that the drink should not have chosen to hurt me.

If you get angry at drinks then you are an irrational person, although you have already admitted that. The difference between you and most people, then, is that if most people see themselves doing something irrational they stop doing it. That is why you are irrational in a much more radical way than most people are.

 

[Moral Orel]

Oh, it is analogous. When you get angry at Steve because he isn't reading your posts everyone knows you are angry because you believe Steve ought to read the posts he responds to. Your denial of this fact is no more persuasive than the blusher's denial.

Sure, at the height of emotion I feel that I am owed things I'm not really owed. That feeling doesn't persist though.

If you get angry at drinks then you are an irrational person, although you have already admitted that. The difference between you and most people, then, is that if most people see themselves doing something irrational they stop doing it. That is why you are irrational in a much more radical way than most people are.

Huh? That's a weird thing I do? No one else is ever angry at inanimate objects? I am a pretty radical dude, but I'm not buyin that.

 

[zippy2006]

Huh? That's a weird thing I do? No one else is ever angry at inanimate objects? I am a pretty radical dude, but I'm not buyin that.

Let me put it this way: Do you think anger or rebuke are ever rationally justifiable?

Most people think some subset of anger is irrational, and they aim to stop acting angry in those ways. You seem to think that most if not all anger is irrational, and so for you the only rational course is to never get angry. That seems like a pretty strange goal.

 

[Moral Orel]

Let me put it this way: Do you think anger or rebuke are ever rationally justifiable?

Nah, nah, nah... You said when people know what they've done is irrational, they stop. People get angry at inanimate objects, everyone knows that's irrational, but people are gonna keep doing it. C'mon, you overplayed your hand.

 

[zippy2006]

Nah, nah, nah... You said when people know what they've done is irrational, they stop. People get angry at inanimate objects, everyone knows that's irrational, but people are gonna keep doing it. C'mon, you overplayed your hand.

I actually made this addition to #148 before you posted your reply:

Most people think some subset of anger is irrational, and they aim to stop acting angry in those ways. You seem to think that most if not all anger is irrational, and so for you the only rational course is to never get angry. That seems like a pretty strange goal.​

...The reason others can stop being irrational in a way that you cannot is because they perceive their irrational anger to be only a subset of their total anger. They have a more "achievable goal," so to speak.

 

[Moral Orel]

I actually made this addition to #148 before you posted your reply:

Most people think some subset of anger is irrational, and they aim to stop acting angry in those ways. You seem to think that most if not all anger is irrational, and so for you the only rational course is to never get angry. That seems like a pretty strange goal.
...The reason others can stop being irrational in a way that you cannot is because they perceive their irrational anger to be only a subset of their total anger. They have a more "achievable goal," so to speak.

But no one seems capable of stopping getting angry at inanimate objects. So why do you deem it "achievable" at all? We can all learn to turn it off quicker, and that keeps us from doing more drastic things in an emotional state, but we can't turn it off completely.

Here's what I think you're saying. No one wants to be irrational, sure. Pulling numbers out of thin air, everyone has 100 things that make them angry. For me, 100 of those are irrational. For everyone else, 50 of those things are irrational. Their goal is more achievable because they have less to work on. That's the gist, right?

But it's impossible to turn off emotions, so the fact that they only have 50 impossible tasks to do isn't more achievable than my 100 impossible tasks.

 

[zippy2006]

But no one seems capable of stopping getting angry at inanimate objects. So why do you deem it "achievable" at all? We can all learn to turn it off quicker, and that keeps us from doing more drastic things in an emotional state, but we can't turn it off completely.

Oh, I think you can stop getting angry at inanimate objects.

Here's what I think you're saying. No one wants to be irrational, sure. Pulling numbers out of thin air, everyone has 100 things that make them angry. For me, 100 of those are irrational. For everyone else, 50 of those things are irrational. Their goal is more achievable because they have less to work on. That's the gist, right?

But it's impossible to turn off emotions, so the fact that they only have 50 impossible tasks to do isn't more achievable than my 100 impossible tasks.

My underlying point is that anger is rational, just not always. Someone who never gets angry under any circumstance is irrational, and yet your claims commit you to this irrational goal. Others are not committed to that irrational goal. Their goal is rational and achievable (two different things).

 

[Moral Orel]

Oh, I think you can stop getting angry at inanimate objects.

Well, we'll just agree to disagree. I'm not going to bother looking into psychological studies on stubbed toes and car repair.

 

[Gregory Thompson]

Is moral neutrality possible?

No, because all actions have a motive, whether conscious or subconscious. This motive flavors the action in terms of it's moral quality or lack thereof.

 

[partinobodycular]

People get angry at inanimate objects, everyone knows that's irrational, but people are gonna keep doing it.

I actually thought you were kidding...you get angry at inanimate objects...really? I don't even get angry at animate ones? Why would I do that? It just doesn't make sense to me. I'm well aware that people get angry, I'm not blind. I just don't get why a rational person would do that.

But hey, if you feel the need to get angry go ahead, but just don't mislead yourself into believing that everybody does. Some of us don't.

 

[partinobodycular]

No, because all actions have a motive, whether conscious or subconscious. This motive flavors the action in terms of it's moral quality or lack thereof.

I'm not disagreeing with you, or criticizing you, but this is simply a claim and not really an argument. And I'm actually interested in how you support it. I agree that we're all motivated by things, but why do you believe that those motivations must by necessity include morality?

 

[Gregory Thompson]

I'm not disagreeing with you, or criticizing you, but this is simply a claim and not really an argument. And I'm actually interested in how you support it. I agree that we're all motivated by things, but why do you believe that those motivations must by necessity include morality?

How are motivations amoral?

Based on what morals are described as, the fact that there is a motive, implies the moral or immoral quality of an action.

 

[partinobodycular]

How are motivations amoral?

I'm sorry, but I don't want to steer this discussion. I would rather you told me why you think motivations can't be amoral.

Based on what morals are described as, the fact that there is a motive, implies the moral or immoral quality of an action.

What makes you believe that it implies that?

 

[Moral Orel]

I actually thought you were kidding...you get angry at inanimate objects...really? I don't even get angry at animate ones? Why would I do that? It just doesn't make sense to me. I'm well aware that people get angry, I'm not blind. I just don't get why a rational person would do that.

But hey, if you feel the need to get angry go ahead, but just don't mislead yourself into believing that everybody does. Some of us don't.

I only said that everyone knows it's irrational. Not everyone does it, no. But it's normal. Folks who don't experience anger ever aren't normal. So rare in fact, that I would say that if anyone claims they never experience anger, it is more likely as a result of a lack of serious introspection on their part.

I don't know you from Adam, so I can't really say one way or the other, I guess. I phrased my statements in the general sort of way I did not to pretend I'm not talking about you as well as anyone else who might make such a claim. Just to say that a safe bet ain't to believe that you are one of those rare exceptions. No offense.

But either way, even if you are a Zen Master, it doesn't speak to what I've said. For all the other ways I am not normal, it is normal for me and other folks to get angry.

 

[Gregory Thompson]

I'm sorry, but I don't want to steer this discussion. I would rather you told me why you think motivations can't be amoral.

What makes you believe that it implies that?

No thanks. I don't respond to this rhetorical mode.