Good Day, Solid_core
Certainly you can see forced is not equal to running to so your point is moot no matter how you equivocate it.
I will leave you with Edwards:
The dispute about grace’s being resistible or irresistible, is perfect nonsense. For the effect of grace is upon the will, so that it is nonsense, except it be proper to say, that a man with his will can resist his own will, or except it be possible for a man to will a thing and not will it at the same time, and so far as he does will it. Or if you speak of enlightening grace, and say this grace is upon the understanding, it is nothing but the same nonsense in other words. For them the sense runs thus: that a man, after he has seen so plainly that a thing is best for him that he wills it, yet he can at the same time nill it. If you say he can will anything he pleases, this is most certainly true, for who can deny that a man can will anything he does already will? That a man can will anything that he pleases, is just as certain as what is, is. Wherefore it is nonsense to say that after a man has seen so plainly a thing to be so much best for him that he will it, he could have not willed it if he had pleased. That is to say, if he had not willed it, he could have not willed it. It is certain that a man never does anything but what he can do. But to say, after a man has willed a thing, that he could have not willed it if he had pleased, is to suppose two wills in a man: the one to will which goes first, and the other to please or choose to will. And so with the same reason we may say that there is another will to please; to please to will; and so on to a thousand. Wherefore, to say that the man could have willed otherwise if he had pleased, is just all one as to say, that if he had willed otherwise, then we might be sure he could will otherwise.
The Works of Jonathan Edwards: Volume II IV Revised
In Him,
Bill