All that does is just redefine the problem, not solve it. For now we just added another layer that needs to be resolved, while in fact not addressing the original one sufficiently. We just define consciousness as something different, extend it as almost an Aristotlean Sensitive Soul into most of Animalia, while thus failing to address our Reason and so forth, that which traditionally is termed Consciousness or Sentience.
I think you misread his intent - he's not explaining consciousness in depth, he's describing it as an instance of a certain class of self-organising processes.
There is confusion here. Let us take the four cause approach: The material cause are the animals themselves, the Efficient cause is their 'survival of the fittest' competition, the Formal cause is the genetic material being passed on. How can we leave out the Final cause; the propagation of those genes, the organism's survival and its most successful competitive advantages?
I'm no expert on Aristotelian metaphysics, but I think the answer to that question depends on the interpretation of Aristotle's teleology and so what 'Final Cause' means. As I understand it, there are two views, that of intended purpose, and that of the natural result of physical law (laws of nature) operating on/in some context; and to complicate things, they may not necessarily be exclusive.
If we take the latter view, that the Final Cause is simply the end result of a natural process, then I have no problem with adaptive fitness being the Final Cause of evolution, in much the same way as a rounded pebble is the Final Cause of a rough stone lying on the beach - except that for evolution, the 'end result' is taken to be the situation at some arbitrary elapsed time after some arbitrary starting point.
It's also worth noting that Aristotle excluded some events from having/requiring ends (Final Causes), such as chance events, and (his specific example) the eclipse of the moon, for which the efficient cause was the major explanatory cause. It's not clear to me what the distinguishing criteria are between events that have Final Causes and those that don't, but I see evolution as a process whose efficient cause is the action of natural selection on heritable variation, and as far as I'm concerned, that alone suffices as its Aristolean major cause.
Alternatively, it can be seen fundamentally as the result of energy dissipation driven by entropy increase - a process built on chance events at both a thermodynamic level (i.e. statistical mechanics) and at the process level of individual variation (e.g. via random mutation), and the stochastic elimination of individuals in a population, influenced by those variations. Perhaps this excuses it from a Final Cause?
Clearly Evolution is driven by survival, for otherwise none of it could occur.
No, survival is an enabler, not the driver. Survivors are the raw material on which evolution acts. It is driven by natural selection, with survival and heritable variation as enablers (although there is an argument to be made that genetic drift is an evolutionary driver independent of natural selection, so heritable variation could be considered a subsidiary driver). Some recent ideas also suggest that phenotypic plasticity (phenotypic changes by the selective activation or deactivation of genes, e.g. epigenetics) and boichemical self-organisation (e.g. protein folding) can also be evolutionary drivers.
Agreed, but you need to differentiate 'because' as well. It can be read as 'on account of' or 'by reason of'. These suggest very much different things, as the second also suggest agenticity.
Either way, the basketball player analogy applies.
If you look at a broader view of an organism, a trait evolved because it aids survival, but is maintained in order to do so, of which both are slippery evolutionary constructs with multiple philosophic interpretations of our terms.
I agree that a trait evolves because it aids survival, but I don't agree a trait is maintained
in order to aid survival - a trait is maintained because it aids (continues to aid) survival; as I suggested earlier, it's an ongoing process.
As is often the case, subtle semantic differences make for a tricky discussion.
This goes back to Final Causes that I talked about earlier. When a phenomenon appears to have a goal, it is necessary to explain this or at least the appearance thereof. In Biology, there is a need to ask a couple of related questions:
When we ask why do goal directed entities exist, we can comfortably answer that evolution by Natural Selection produced them. This easily encompasses all of population genetic theory. We then ask what their goals are, we point to adaptive devices for feeding, defence, reproduction and in short, survival. We then ask how goal-directed entities work and we enter the realm of complex systems, of General Systems Theory or Control Theory or even things like Cybernetics.
The latter two are part of modern biology and the Sciences. They are also very much Final Causes, in essence Teleological explanation of the activity produced by Natural Selection then. Natural Selection is merely a part of the complex, not that itself is teleological, but our broader modern physiological systems very much are. This is why his procrustean theory of consciousness seems set against itself.
It seems to me that we favour teleological (purposeful, agent-centred) descriptions because we have a temporally extended consciousness that enables us to plan ahead (model futures) and so define explicitly goal-seeking behaviour. We call this having purpose or intent. We can also visualise the past to trace the consequences of our past (and possible past) actions, which inclines us to interpret causal sequences teleologically.
However, it is an emergent expression of combinations of low-level behaviours that are not themselves considered purposeful or intentional, and is ultimately an elaboration of simple stimulus-response (reflexive) behaviour, enabled by memory (storage of the results of experience) and virtualisation (modelling of possible pasts & futures).
It is a useful interpretation in as much as it distinguishes or identifies certain emergent classes of behaviours (e.g. goal-seeking), but it's misleading when applied to lower level behavioural sequences, however much they seem to be teleological.
I tend to the view that we apply teleological language to undirected, non-purposeful processes and their results because it's a familiar and useful conceptual shorthand, in the same way as we are inclined to assign imaginary purposeful agency, and even gender, to inanimate objects (especially machines), and even conceptual abstractions; e.g. the car refuses to start, she's a beautiful boat, Lady Luck is against me, etc.