One of the biggest issues I notice that people of faith and non faith have is that of free will and divine omniscience. The argument, as far as I can tell, goes something like this:
"If God is omniscient, that is, all - knowing which is to include all events of past, present, and future happenings, then He knows I will partake in event x tomorrow at time t. If God knows what I am going to do in the future, then I cannot do anything than that, and thus I have no free will. If I do end up doing something other than what God foreknew to say I have free will, then He cannot be omniscient. Either God is omniscient and we don't have free will, or He isn't omniscient and we do."
To me this argument is faulty. I think we can have free will while God has foreknowledge. The two are not mutually exclusive but rather compatible. One quick not about "foreknowledge" though is that the word is simply a anthromorphism since God is not related to time in the sense that the past, present, or future affect Him.
It is a false dilemma to conclude that "either God is omniscience and we don't have free will, or He isn't omniscient and we do" as there remains another legitimate possibility that is not being considered in any sort of rational way. Of course I cannot do something other than what God foreknows of, which admittedly implies there is only one viable future of which God has foreknown from all eternity (determinism in some sense), but that does not mean I have no free will since that would be to suggest an unwarranted and more significantly unaccounted for conclusion. How is the attribute of doing something else, better known as PAP or Principle of Alternative Possibilities, necessary to sustain the human free will?
If anything the idea is against free will. Freedom is associated with moral responsibility. The two go hand in hand. One cannot exist without the other and if one is neglected the other is too. PAP as it is defined is not related to moral responsibility in the least as somehow having the option of doing something different means we are responsible for our actions. That just doesn't make sense in the least bit. How is that so?
If PAP is not connected to moral responsibility, then it is not necessary for free will. PAP is not connected to moral responsibility. Therefore PAP is not necessary for free will. In other words, I don't have to be able to do otherwise than what I originally did in order to be free. The question then shifts to what is freedom then?
Again free will and moral accountability are directly related. To be held responsible for of our actions or to take responsibility for them ourselves requires that we are mentally competent enough to understand our actions and the consequences that shall result. However free will cannot be understood by means of just comprehending our actions, but also that we carry out those actions. So long as I carry out what I want to without any external or internal factors preventing or forcing me to act I am free. For example, if one is to physically hold me against my will or force another to do something they don't want to do, there is no free will. Our will is being violated. If I want to go to the coffe shop and I go to the coffe shop and get whatever I please then I am free. So those two vital aspects define free will -- the type of freedom of the mind and the more physical addition.
Since PAP is not necessary for free will, the fact that I can do nothing other than x at t because of foreknowledge is irrelevant, since what God foreknows is what I ultimately desire in the first place. As long as I carry out x at t I am free, even though I cannot do otherwise as God foreknows. Thus, I am accountable for x as it is something that I wanted to do and uderstood what would happen as a result of carrying x out.
Since I cannot do anything other than what God foreknows, then said point cannot be argued as God's knowledge of the future is infallible. Though, as it has been shown I don't need to be able to act otherwise in order to have free will, so that I cannot do anything other than what God foreknows is a very trival crux.
Omniscience is therefore compatible with free will. Even though God foreknows of our actions we are held responsible for them. We have free will whilst God has foreknowledge.
"If God is omniscient, that is, all - knowing which is to include all events of past, present, and future happenings, then He knows I will partake in event x tomorrow at time t. If God knows what I am going to do in the future, then I cannot do anything than that, and thus I have no free will. If I do end up doing something other than what God foreknew to say I have free will, then He cannot be omniscient. Either God is omniscient and we don't have free will, or He isn't omniscient and we do."
To me this argument is faulty. I think we can have free will while God has foreknowledge. The two are not mutually exclusive but rather compatible. One quick not about "foreknowledge" though is that the word is simply a anthromorphism since God is not related to time in the sense that the past, present, or future affect Him.
It is a false dilemma to conclude that "either God is omniscience and we don't have free will, or He isn't omniscient and we do" as there remains another legitimate possibility that is not being considered in any sort of rational way. Of course I cannot do something other than what God foreknows of, which admittedly implies there is only one viable future of which God has foreknown from all eternity (determinism in some sense), but that does not mean I have no free will since that would be to suggest an unwarranted and more significantly unaccounted for conclusion. How is the attribute of doing something else, better known as PAP or Principle of Alternative Possibilities, necessary to sustain the human free will?
If anything the idea is against free will. Freedom is associated with moral responsibility. The two go hand in hand. One cannot exist without the other and if one is neglected the other is too. PAP as it is defined is not related to moral responsibility in the least as somehow having the option of doing something different means we are responsible for our actions. That just doesn't make sense in the least bit. How is that so?
If PAP is not connected to moral responsibility, then it is not necessary for free will. PAP is not connected to moral responsibility. Therefore PAP is not necessary for free will. In other words, I don't have to be able to do otherwise than what I originally did in order to be free. The question then shifts to what is freedom then?
Again free will and moral accountability are directly related. To be held responsible for of our actions or to take responsibility for them ourselves requires that we are mentally competent enough to understand our actions and the consequences that shall result. However free will cannot be understood by means of just comprehending our actions, but also that we carry out those actions. So long as I carry out what I want to without any external or internal factors preventing or forcing me to act I am free. For example, if one is to physically hold me against my will or force another to do something they don't want to do, there is no free will. Our will is being violated. If I want to go to the coffe shop and I go to the coffe shop and get whatever I please then I am free. So those two vital aspects define free will -- the type of freedom of the mind and the more physical addition.
Since PAP is not necessary for free will, the fact that I can do nothing other than x at t because of foreknowledge is irrelevant, since what God foreknows is what I ultimately desire in the first place. As long as I carry out x at t I am free, even though I cannot do otherwise as God foreknows. Thus, I am accountable for x as it is something that I wanted to do and uderstood what would happen as a result of carrying x out.
Since I cannot do anything other than what God foreknows, then said point cannot be argued as God's knowledge of the future is infallible. Though, as it has been shown I don't need to be able to act otherwise in order to have free will, so that I cannot do anything other than what God foreknows is a very trival crux.
Omniscience is therefore compatible with free will. Even though God foreknows of our actions we are held responsible for them. We have free will whilst God has foreknowledge.
