How to prove God exists.

[HitchSlap]

Okay, dear everyone here including atheists, you know babies exist?


Anyway, they are evidence of God existing in concept as first and foremost the creator cause and operator cause of the universe and man and everything with a beginning.


For atheists who do not know babies exist, please do not participate in this thread, because you don’t have the pre-requisite for participating here: it is like you want to take up a course in college, but you have not completed the pre-requisite course, so you don’t or are not eligible to take up that course.

Still when you complete the pre-requisite course, then you can take up that course.


So, dear atheists who do not know babies exist, please go and learn about babies, ask your neighbors who are married and have a family and home, and every morning they bring their kids to school.



So, let us go forth.


Babies exist, yes of course.


But they did not make themselves, so they were caused by other entities to come to existence.


Do we all agree to that, namely, that babies did not cause themselves to come to existence, so they need other entities to cause them to come to existence?


And that makes babies the evidence, one piece of evidence, that God exists, in concept as first and foremost the creator cause and operator cause of the universe and man and everything with a beginning.


At this point, do you want to discuss infinite regress?

Or what objections do you have in regard to evidence with babies, as proof to the existence of God?

You may be on to something. Go on.

 

[Loudmouth]

This thread is yet more evidence of why I am no longer a theist.

 

[Loudmouth]

Okay, dear everyone here including atheists, you know babies exist?


Anyway, they are evidence of God existing in concept as first and foremost the creator cause and operator cause of the universe and man and everything with a beginning.


For atheists who do not know babies exist, please do not participate in this thread, because you don’t have the pre-requisite for participating here: it is like you want to take up a course in college, but you have not completed the pre-requisite course, so you don’t or are not eligible to take up that course.

Still when you complete the pre-requisite course, then you can take up that course.


So, dear atheists who do not know babies exist, please go and learn about babies, ask your neighbors who are married and have a family and home, and every morning they bring their kids to school.



So, let us go forth.


Babies exist, yes of course.


But they did not make themselves, so they were caused by other entities to come to existence.


Do we all agree to that, namely, that babies did not cause themselves to come to existence, so they need other entities to cause them to come to existence?


And that makes babies the evidence, one piece of evidence, that God exists, in concept as first and foremost the creator cause and operator cause of the universe and man and everything with a beginning.


At this point, do you want to discuss infinite regress?

Or what objections do you have in regard to evidence with babies, as proof to the existence of God?

The lack of evidence for God being in the chain of events leading to babies is the major objection.

 

[Subduction Zone]

For all practical purposes I like to make a clear line of demarcation between those who aren't sure that God exists-Agnostics and those who are certain that God doesn't exist-Atheists. As for Einstein really being an atheisat, well, he just doesn't seem to fit into my personal definition. In fact, he doesn't even fit into the agnostic one either. So I guess we simply disagree on thus. The cartoon is simply to illustrate the confusion that such quibbling creates.

BTW
I never said that Einstein had the same concept that I have about God.

The problem is that you cannot know what sort of atheist that you are dealing with. Almost all of the atheists here would change their mind if given valid evidence for a god. You are dealing with the real world here. Your "personal definition" is worthless. If I had a "personal definition" of Christians I am sure that it would not be allowed here as a valid way to tell who or who was not a Christian. In the same way your claims about atheists are not valid.

Try putting the shoe on the other foot. How would you like it if the atheists got to determine whether your were a Christian or not?

 

[Kylie]

Okay, dear everyone here including atheists, you know babies exist?


Anyway, they are evidence of God existing in concept as first and foremost the creator cause and operator cause of the universe and man and everything with a beginning.


For atheists who do not know babies exist, please do not participate in this thread, because you don’t have the pre-requisite for participating here: it is like you want to take up a course in college, but you have not completed the pre-requisite course, so you don’t or are not eligible to take up that course.

Still when you complete the pre-requisite course, then you can take up that course.


So, dear atheists who do not know babies exist, please go and learn about babies, ask your neighbors who are married and have a family and home, and every morning they bring their kids to school.



So, let us go forth.


Babies exist, yes of course.


But they did not make themselves, so they were caused by other entities to come to existence.


Do we all agree to that, namely, that babies did not cause themselves to come to existence, so they need other entities to cause them to come to existence?


And that makes babies the evidence, one piece of evidence, that God exists, in concept as first and foremost the creator cause and operator cause of the universe and man and everything with a beginning.


At this point, do you want to discuss infinite regress?

Or what objections do you have in regard to evidence with babies, as proof to the existence of God?

You got anything better than the first cause argument? Because that's a really bad argument.

 

[KCfromNC]

Argument by dictionary AND argument by hyperlink.

Convinced me - although not in the way the poster might have intended.

Yep, I don't get why more people don't understand this. If this is really the best they can do perhaps it would simply be more effective to not say anything. Not everyone has the gift of whatever it is they're trying to accomplish.

 

[bhsmte]

Yep, I don't get why more people don't understand this. If this is really the best they can do perhaps it would simply be more effective to not say anything. Not everyone has the gift of whatever it is they're trying to accomplish.

For those who just post videos and links and shy away from explaining the same, the links are used like a child uses their favorite blanket.

 

[Freodin]

After pages and pages of posts in a thread called "How to prove God exists.", and no such proof forthcomming, beyond threats, insults, repetitions of definitions and empty questions, claims and completely unrelated google-searches, I think it is time to show a "How to prove..."

I know that mathematical proofs follow a slightly more rigid standard, and use a more formal language and approach. Still, I think it is interesting to see that such a proof manages to do its job without any needs to insult anyone, that every claim can in itself be traced back to a "true" statement, and that it doesn't have to constantly repeat its definitions to achive anything.

For this example, I would like to present one of my favorites: Prime factorization. It is a very basic and useful concept of elementary numbers theory, and the proof is complex enough to be entertaining.

So, without further ado... into the fray.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Assertion: Every natural number greater than 1 can be represented by exactly one unique product of prime numbers. (*)

Some definitions, for those who really don't know the matter, or those who like to nitpick.

A "natural number" is one of those numbers by which we count: {1,2,3,4....}. There is an infinite amount of natural numbers.

A "prime number" is a natural number which can only divided without rest by 1 and itself. {1}, though it technically falls under this definition, is not regarded as a prime number. The first prime numbers thus are {2,3,5,7,11,13,17,19,23....}. There is an infinite amount of prime numbers. (Something that we will not prove today.)

"Divided without rest", for those who do not know, means to be completly divided into equal natural numbers. For simplicity the "without rest" is usually left off. So it can be said that "2 divides 6" or " 4 is not a divider of 9".

So, back to our assertion.
This proof will consist of two parts. First, we will prove that there is at least on product of prime numbers to represent each natural number.

Each natural number n > 2 falls under one of two cases:
1) It is a prime number.
It can not be divided by anything else, the prime factorization thus consist of only one factor: the number n itself.
2) It is not a prime number.
It can be divided by a set of other numbers, called the "dividers".
In this set, there is a smallest number. (In every set of natural numbers, there is a minimum number. This is another true assertion that we will not prove today. I hate to call it 'obvious', but it is very basic.)
This smallest divider of a natural number n is a prime number.
(And yet another assertion, which we should prove. It's easy to do. Small sidetrack incomming

Let's call this smallest divider d, and assume that it is NOT a prime number.
Thus there exist at least two other numbers a and b, where a * b = d, where a < d and b < d. (To carry on, we only need to consider one of these two. It works eqally well for a and b. Also of course we disregard the 1 and d itself as trivial.)
So we know that a is a divider of d. A factor in a product is always a divider of that product.
For that reason, we also know that a is a divider of our original number n.
So a is smaller than d and is a divider of n. But we started with the assumption that d is the smallest divider of n.
That is a contradiction, and thus the assumption that a not prime number d can be the smallest divider of a natural number n must be false.
The opposite must be correct... so we have indeed proven that the smallest divider of any natural number is a prime number.
(This method is called "inverse proof" or "proof by contradiction". We will use it again later.)

So back to our prime factorization:
We have established that every natural number n can be divided by a smallest divider d, which is a prime number.

So n = d * m.

This new number m, the remaining factor in n, is now either a prime number, or it is not. (What else could it be?)
Thus we can go back to step one, and do the same thing to this new number.

Because all natural numbers are finite, they can all be written as a finite product of natural numbers. Thus at some point we will reach an end of this repeating factorization, when the last factor is a prime number.

Thus every natural number can be written as a product of prime numbers.

q.e.d. step 1. (Quod erat demonstrandum - which has been to demonstrate)

Step 2: we have shown that there is one way to represent any natural number as a product of prime numbers. Now we have to show that there is only one such product, (*) disregarding the sequence of factors. In a product, the sequence of different factors does not matter. This is called "commutativity".

We will do that with an inverse proof again. So we start off with assuming that there is a set of natural numbers, for which there are at least two different sets of prime factors.

As said above, in every set of natural numbers, there is a smallest number.
So we will call this smallest number again n. It has at least two sets of prime factors, thus it can be written in this way.

n = p1 * p2 * p3 * ... * pk = q1 * q2 * q3 * ... * ql

Each of the p prime factors must be different from each of the q prime factors. There cannot be two identical factors in these two products.

Why? If we assume that there were identical factors, we could remove this identical factor from both products, to get a new number which could be written by two different products... and this new number would be smaller than our original. But we said the original number was the smallest that could be written this way. This contradiction tells us that the assumption is false: there cannot be any identical factors in these two products.

Now that we know that, we can pick some numbers to work with. Let's say we order the p's and q's according to size, and thus p1 and q1 are the smallest of their respective sets. We already know that they are not identical, so one is smaller than the other.
Let's say - without limitation of generality - that
p1 < q1
We can do that without problems. These are only placeholder names. If in reality, q1 would be smaller, we would simply change the names - call q p and vice versa and work from there.

Now let's do a little mathemagic: We define three new numbers.

a = n / p1
That means it is now the product of the prime numbers p2...pk.
This representation must be unique, because a must be smaller than n (because we divided it by something), and we said that n is the smallest natural number with more that one prime factor representations.

b = n / q1
Same as above, only that it is now the product of the prime numbers q2...ql.

c = n - p1 * b
Why not? Just another number with we can have fun with. And fun we will have. We will do a few transformations with this equation. First, we will replace n with the two lines from above.

c = p1 * a - p1 * b
c = q1 * b - p1 * b

We can put the factor p1 outside of the brackets in the first line, and the factor b in the second line, getting us to.

c = p1 * (a-b)
c = (q1 - p1) *b

And, of course both being equal, we can simplify this equation to

p1 * (a-b) = (q1 - p1) *b

So, what do we have gained? Doesn't look like much, does it?
But wait! We can see that p1 is a single factor in this equation. That means it divides it.

p1 | (q1 - p1) *b ( "|" just means "divides")

Now if a number divides a product, that means it divides at least one of the factors in this product. (This is another basic theorem, called the "Lemma of Euklid". We will not prove it today.)

Thus p1 divides either (q1 - p1) or it divides b. But we already know it does not divide b. b is the product of all the q's... and we have already learned that there cannot be any factor p in the q's.

So p1 divides (q1 - p1). And a final assertion that is indeed true but that we will not prove today: if a number divides some other two numbers, it also divides a sum of these other numbers.

If a | b and a | c then a | (b + c).

We will use that to simplify the last expression. Knowing that of course p1 divides itself, we get to understand that
p1 | (q1 - p1) + p1.
Solving the brackets the p1 cancel out, leaving us with
p1 | q1

p1 is a divider of q1.

But that again is a contradiction. Both p1 and q1 are different prime numbers. There is no way one can divide the other.

That means that the whole assumptions on which this math-rant was based in false.

n is not the smallest number for which there are more than one prime factorizations. And if there isn't a smallest number, that means that there is NO number of such a kind.

q.e.d. part 2.


So, for all those who managed to walk through this... this is how you prove things. You make assumptions, follow them through to either show them correct or false. You base them on other proven assertions, down to some fundamental "truths" in your system.

(Disclaimer: the second step of the proof is of at least medium complexity. I had to translate all the math terms into English, I had to write it down without correct mathematical connotations, and I only proof-read it once. So if there are any mistakes in this post, just let me know.)

 

[AV1611VET]

After pages and pages of posts in a thread called "How to prove God exists.", and no such proof forthcomming, beyond threats, insults, repetitions of definitions and empty questions, claims and completely unrelated google-searches,

Don't forget auto-denials too.

(Any from you?)

And as to the rest of your post: tl;dr.

 

[HitchSlap]

Don't forget auto-denials too.

Is that the same as auto-acceptance in reverse?

 

[Freodin]

Is that the same as auto-acceptance in reverse?

You could say that. There is no need to just "accept" it... and I never asked anyone to "auto-accept" it. It is all reasonable and logically valid. Everyone should be able to follow and understand it.

 

[Pachomius]

Dear readers, in particular atheists here, I like to bring to your attention that existence is the default status of things in the totality of reality.

Now, look up with google the word existence, see below in ANNEX, and ask yourself, Has there ever been nothing or non-existence as the default status of the totality of the reality of things?

Can you, Oh atheists here, even make sense of the statement, Non-existence is the default status of things in the totality of reality?

You see, existence is the evidence for the existence of God, in concept as first and foremost the creator cause and operator cause of the universe and man and everything with a beginning.

That is where I am going, at this point in time.

Of course the thread is all about How to prove God exists, so the whole thread is into at every point in time into over-all directly or indirectly explicitly or implicitly, all into the evidence of God existing, with evidence like the existence of babies. and also transcendentally into existence itself as the evidence for the existence of God, in concept as first and foremost the creator cause and operator cause of the universe and man and everything with a beginning.

See my next post when you are finished with the ANNEX below.


ANNEX
Google: existence
About 310,000,000 results (0.55 seconds)
Search Results


the fact or state of living or having objective reality.
"the plane was the oldest Boeing remaining in existence"

o continued survival.

"she helped to keep the company alive when its very existence was threatened"

synonyms:

actuality, being, existing, reality; More

survival, continuation

"the industry's continued existence"

o a way of living.

plural noun: existences

"living in a city was more expensive than a rural existence"

synonyms:

way of life, way of living, life, lifestyle

"her suburban existence"

o any of a person's supposed current, future, or past lives on this earth.

"reaping the consequences of evil deeds sown in previous existences"

o archaic

a being or entity.

o all that exists.

Origin


late Middle English: from Old French, or from late Latin existentia, from Latin exsistere ‘come into being,’ from ex- ‘out’ + sistere ‘take a stand.’

Translate existence to

Use over time for: existence


Translations, word origin, and more definitions

Feedback

Existence - Wikipedia

Wikipedia, the free encyclopediaExistence

Existence is commonly held to be that which objectively persists independent of one's presence. Ontology is the philosophical study of the nature of being, existence or reality in general, as well as of the basic categories of being and their relations.

‎Ontology · ‎Being · ‎Existence theorem · ‎Independence

Existence | Define Existence at Dictionary.com

www.dictionary.com/browse/existence

the state or fact of existing; being. 2. continuance in being or life; life: a struggle for existence.

existence - definition of existence in English | Oxford Dictionaries

Oxford Dictionaries - Dictionary, Thesaurus, & Grammarexistence

the fact or state of living or having objective reality: Meaning, pronunciation, example sentences, and more from Oxford Dictionaries.

Existence | Definition of Existence by Merriam-Webster

Dictionary and Thesaurus | Merriam-Websterexistence

Define existence: reality as opposed to appearance — existence in a sentence.

Existence Synonyms, Existence Antonyms | Thesaurus.com

www.thesaurus.com/browse/existence

Synonyms for existence at Thesaurus.com with free online thesaurus, antonyms, and definitions. Dictionary and Word of the Day.

existence Meaning in the Cambridge English Dictionary

dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/existence

existence meaning, definition, what is existence: the fact of something or someone existing: . Learn more.

Existence (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

Update Your Link (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)existence/

Oct 10, 2012 - Existence raises deep and important problems in metaphysics, philosophy of language, and philosophical logic. Many of the issues can be ...

existence - Dictionary Definition : Vocabulary.com

Dictionary : Vocabulary.comexistence

Existence is the state of being alive or being real. For example, you and your best friend disagree about the existence of Bigfoot if you think it's real and your ...

existence - Wiktionary

Wiktionary, the free dictionaryexistence

Most people doubt the existence of the Loch Ness monster. . Empirical reality; the substance of the physical universe. (Dictionary of Philosophy; 1968) ...

Existence Exists - Importance Of Philosophy

www.importanceofphilosophy.com/Metaphysics_ExistenceExists.html

Existence exists is an axiom. It cannot be refuted without being used as a premise.

Searches related to existence

existence thesaurus

existence sentence

existence movie

existence or existance

existence in tagalog

existence quotes

existence book

existence francais


12345678910 Next

[End of ANNEX]

 

[HitchSlap]

Dear readers, in particular atheists here, I like to bring to your attention that existence is the default status of things in the totality of reality.

Now, look up with google the word existence, see below in ANNEX, and ask yourself, Has there ever been nothing or non-existence as the default status of the totality of the reality of things?

Can you, Oh atheists here, even make sense of the statement, Non-existence is the default status of things in the totality of reality?

You see, existence is the evidence for the existence of God, in concept as first and foremost the creator cause and operator cause of the universe and man and everything with a beginning.

That is where I am going, at this point in time.

Of course the thread is all about How to prove God exists, so the whole thread is into at every point in time into over-all directly or indirectly explicitly or implicitly, all into the evidence of God existing, with evidence like the existence of babies. and also transcendentally into existence itself as the evidence for the existence of God, in concept as first and foremost the creator cause and operator cause of the universe and man and everything with a beginning.

See my next post when you are finished with the ANNEX below.


ANNEX
Google: existence
About 310,000,000 results (0.55 seconds)
Search Results


the fact or state of living or having objective reality.
"the plane was the oldest Boeing remaining in existence"

o continued survival.

"she helped to keep the company alive when its very existence was threatened"

synonyms:

actuality, being, existing, reality; More

survival, continuation

"the industry's continued existence"

o a way of living.

plural noun: existences

"living in a city was more expensive than a rural existence"

synonyms:

way of life, way of living, life, lifestyle

"her suburban existence"

o any of a person's supposed current, future, or past lives on this earth.

"reaping the consequences of evil deeds sown in previous existences"

o archaic

a being or entity.

o all that exists.

Origin


late Middle English: from Old French, or from late Latin existentia, from Latin exsistere ‘come into being,’ from ex- ‘out’ + sistere ‘take a stand.’

Translate existence to

Use over time for: existence


Translations, word origin, and more definitions

Feedback

Existence - Wikipedia

Wikipedia, the free encyclopediaExistence

Existence is commonly held to be that which objectively persists independent of one's presence. Ontology is the philosophical study of the nature of being, existence or reality in general, as well as of the basic categories of being and their relations.

‎Ontology · ‎Being · ‎Existence theorem · ‎Independence

Existence | Define Existence at Dictionary.com

www.dictionary.com/browse/existence

the state or fact of existing; being. 2. continuance in being or life; life: a struggle for existence.

existence - definition of existence in English | Oxford Dictionaries

Oxford Dictionaries - Dictionary, Thesaurus, & Grammarexistence

the fact or state of living or having objective reality: Meaning, pronunciation, example sentences, and more from Oxford Dictionaries.

Existence | Definition of Existence by Merriam-Webster

Dictionary and Thesaurus | Merriam-Websterexistence

Define existence: reality as opposed to appearance — existence in a sentence.

Existence Synonyms, Existence Antonyms | Thesaurus.com

www.thesaurus.com/browse/existence

Synonyms for existence at Thesaurus.com with free online thesaurus, antonyms, and definitions. Dictionary and Word of the Day.

existence Meaning in the Cambridge English Dictionary

dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/existence

existence meaning, definition, what is existence: the fact of something or someone existing: . Learn more.

Existence (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

Update Your Link (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)existence/

Oct 10, 2012 - Existence raises deep and important problems in metaphysics, philosophy of language, and philosophical logic. Many of the issues can be ...

existence - Dictionary Definition : Vocabulary.com

Dictionary : Vocabulary.comexistence

Existence is the state of being alive or being real. For example, you and your best friend disagree about the existence of Bigfoot if you think it's real and your ...

existence - Wiktionary

Wiktionary, the free dictionaryexistence

Most people doubt the existence of the Loch Ness monster. . Empirical reality; the substance of the physical universe. (Dictionary of Philosophy; 1968) ...

Existence Exists - Importance Of Philosophy

www.importanceofphilosophy.com/Metaphysics_ExistenceExists.html

Existence exists is an axiom. It cannot be refuted without being used as a premise.

Searches related to existence

existence thesaurus

existence sentence

existence movie

existence or existance

existence in tagalog

existence quotes

existence book

existence francais


12345678910 Next

[End of ANNEX]

Hey, I'm always down for things that exist.

 

[FrumiousBandersnatch]

Hey, I'm always down for things that exist.

Did you know that the totality of reality defaults to things that exist?

Yeah, me too.

 

[HitchSlap]

Did you know that the totality of reality defaults to things that exist?

Yeah, me too.

Yep, and it's babies all the way, baby!

 

[Pachomius]

Dear readers, in most particular, atheists here, you will notice clearly how Russell has also the vice of self-obfuscation and self-obscurantism, when concepts are not propitious to his self-absurd conviction that God is similar to an orbiting teapot in space.



See ANNEX below where I reproduce the part 1 of the famous debate in BBC international in 1948.



The ending of part 1 reveals how Russell arbitrarily and contrary to all open-mindedness from the part of rational mankind, dismisses as illegitimate to even think about causality.

[Quote from Pachomius]
A Debate on the Argument from Contingency

[…]

Copleston: Surely that's a first cause within a certain selected field. It's a relatively first cause.

Russell: I don't think he'd say so. If there's a world in which most events, but not all, have causes, he will then be able to depict the probabilities and uncertainties by assuming that this particular event you're interested in probably has a cause. And since in any case you won't get more than probability that's good enough.

Copleston: It may be that the scientist doesn't hope to obtain more than probability, but in raising the question he assumes that the question of explanation has a meaning. But your general point then, Lord RusseII, is that it's illegitimate even to ask the question of the cause of the world?

Russell: Yes, that's my position.

Copleston: If it's a question that for you has no meaning, it's of course very difficult to discuss it, isn't it?

Russell: Yes, it is very difficult. What do you say -- SHALL WE PASS ON TO SOME OTHER ISSUE? [Upper case courtesy of Pachomius]

[End of quote by Pachomius]

Please read part 1 of the debate, God exists on cosmology, in ANNEX below.


Now I will go and see what Michael and other posters have in regard to my question to them about babies being evidence for God existing.

ANNEX
Click on
A Debate on the Argument from Contingency


A Debate on the Argument from Contingency

Father F. C. Copleston and Bertrand Russell



Broadcast in 1948 on the Third Program of the British Broadcasting Corporation. Published in Humanitas (Manchester) and reprinted in Bertrand Russell, Why I Am Not a Christian (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1957).



Copleston: As we are going to discuss the existence of God, it might perhaps be as well to come to some provisional agreement as to what we understand by the term "God." I presume that we mean a supreme personal being -- distinct from the world and creator of the world. Would you agree -- provisionally at least -- to accept this statement as the meaning of the term "God"?

Russell: Yes, I accept this definition.

Copleston: Well, my position is the affirmative position that such a being actually exists, and that His existence can be proved philosophically. Perhaps you would tell me if your position is that of agnosticism or of atheism. I mean, would you say that the non-existence of God can be proved?

Russell: No, I should not say that: my position is agnostic.

Copleston: Would you agree with me that the problem of God is a problem of great importance? For example, would you agree that if God does not exist, human beings and human history can have no other purpose than the purpose they choose to give themselves, which -- in practice -- is likely to mean the purpose which those impose who have the power to impose it?

Russell: Roughly speaking, yes, though I should have to place some limitation on your last clause.

Copleston: Would you agree that if there is no God -- no absolute Being -- there can be no absolute values? I mean, would you agree that if there is no absolute good that the relativity of values results?

Russell: No, I think these questions are logically distinct. Take, for instance, G. E. Moore's Principia Ethica, where he maintains that there is a distinction of good and evil, that both of these are definite concepts. But he does not bring in the idea of God to support that contention.

Copleston: Well, suppose we leave the question of good till later, till we come to the moral argument, and I give first a metaphysical argument. I'd like to put the main weight on the metaphysical argument based on Leibniz's argument from "Contingency" and then later we might discuss the moral argument. Suppose I give a brief statement on the metaphysical argument and that then we go on to discuss it?

Russell: That seems to me to be a very good plan.

The Argument from Contingency

Copleston: Well, for clarity's sake, I'll divide the argument into distinct stages. First of all, I should say, we know that there are at least some beings in the world which do not contain in themselves the reason for their existence. For example, I depend on my parents, and now on the air, and on food, and so on. Now, secondly, the world is simply the real or imagined totality or aggregate of individual objects, none of which contain in themselves alone the reason for their existence. There isn't any world distinct from the objects which form it, any more than the human race is something apart from the members. Therefore, I should say, since objects or events exist, and since no object of experience contains within itself reason of its existence, this reason, the totality of objects, must have a reason external to itself. That reason must be an existent being. Well, this being is either itself the reason for its own existence, or it is not. If it is, well and good. If it is not, then we must proceed farther. But if we proceed to infinity in that sense, then there's no explanation of existence at all. So, I should say, in order to explain existence, we must come to a being which contains within itself the reason for its own existence, that is to say, which cannot not exist.

Russell: This raises a great many points and it is not altogether easy to know where to begin, but I think that, perhaps, in answering your argument, the best point at which to begin is the question of necessary being. The word "necessary," I should maintain, can only be applied significantly to propositions. And, in fact, only to such as are analytic -- that is to say -- such as it is self-contradictory to deny. I could only admit a necessary being if there were a being whose existence it is self-contradictory to deny. I should like to know whether you would accept Leibniz's division of propositions into truths of reason and truths of fact. The former -- the truths of reason -- being necessary.

Copleston: Well, I certainly should not subscribe to what seems to be Leibniz's idea of truths of reason and truths of fact, since it would appear that, for him, there are in the long run only analytic propositions. It would seem that for Leibniz truths of fact are ultimately reducible to truths of reason. That is to say, to analytic propositions, at least for an omniscient mind. Well, I couldn't agree with that. For one thing it would fail to meet the requirements of the experience of freedom. I don't want to uphold the whole philosophy of Leibniz. I have made use of his argument from contingent to necessary being, basing the argument on the principle of sufficient reason, simply because it seems to me a brief and clear formulation of what is, in my opinion, the fundamental metaphysical argument for God's existence.

Russell: But, to my mind, "a necessary proposition" has got to be analytic. I don't see what else it can mean. And analytic propositions are always complex and logically somewhat late. "Irrational animals are animals" is an analytic proposition; but a proposition such as "This is an animal" can never be analytic. in fact, all the propositions that can be analytic are somewhat late in the build-up of propositions.

Copleston: Take the proposition "if there is a contingent being then there is a necessary being." I consider that that proposition hypothetically expressed is a necessary proposition. If you are going to call every necessary proposition an analytic proposition, then -- in order to avoid a dispute in terminology -- I would agree to call it analytic, though I don't consider it a tautological proposition. But the proposition is a necessary proposition only on the supposition that there is a contingent being. That there is a contingent being actually existing has to be discovered by experience, and the proposition that there is a contingent being is certainly not an analytic proposition, though once you know, I should maintain, that there is a contingent being, it follows of necessity that there is a necessary being.

Russell: The difficulty of this argument is that I don't admit the idea of a necessary being and I don't admit that there is any particular meaning in calling other beings "contingent." These phrases don't for me have a significance except within a logic that I reject.

Copleston: Do you mean that you reject these terms because they won't fit in with what is called modern logic"?

Russell: Well, I can't find anything that they could mean. The word "necessary," it seems to me, is a useless word, except as applied to analytic propositions, not to things.

Copleston: In the first place, what do you mean by "modern logic?" As far as I know, there are somewhat differing systems. In the second place, not all modern logicians surely would admit the meaninglessness of metaphysics. We both know, at any rate, one very eminent modern thinker whose knowledge of modern logic was profound, but who certainly did not think that metaphysics are meaningless or, in particular, that the problem of God is meaningless. Again, even if all modern logicians held that metaphysical terms are meaningless, it would not follow that they were right. The proposition that metaphysical terms are meaningless seems to me to be a proposition based on an assumed philosophy. The dogmatic position behind it seems to be this: What will not go into my machine is non-existent, or it is meaningless; it is the expression of emotion. I am simply trying to point out that anybody who says that a particular system of modern logic is the sole criterion of meaning is saying something that is over-dogmatic; he is dogmatically insisting that a part of philosophy is the whole of philosophy. After all, a "contingent" being is a being which has not in itself the complete reason for its existence that's what I mean by a contingent being. You know, as wel I as I do, that the existence of neither of us can be explained without reference to something or somebody outside us, our parents, for example. A "necessary" being, on the other hand means a being that must and cannot not exist. You may say that there is no such being, but you wil find it hard to convince me that you do not understand the terms I am using. If you do not understand them, then how can you be entitled to say that such a being does not exist, if that is what you do say?

Russell: Well, there are points here that I don't propose to go into at length. I don't maintain the meaninglessness of metaphysics in general at all. I maintain the meaninglessness of certain particular terms -- not on any general ground, but simply because I've not been able to see an interpretation of those particular terms. It's not a general dogma -- it's a particular thing. But those points I will leave out for the moment. And I will say that what you have been saying brings us back, it seems to me, to the ontological argument that there is a being whose essence involves existence, so that his existence is analytic. That seems to me to be impossible, and it raises, of course, the question what one means by existence, and as to this, I think a subject named can never be significantly said to exist but only a subject described. And that existence, in fact, quite definitely is not a predicate.

Copleston: Well, you say, I believe, that it is bad grammar, or rather bad syntax to say for example "T. S. Eliot exists"; one ought to say, for example, "He, the author of Murder in the Cathedral, exists." Are you going to say that the proposition, "The cause of the world exists," is without meaning? You may say that the world has no cause; but I fail to see how you can say that the proposition that "the cause of the world exists" is meaningless. Put it in the form of a question: "Has the world a cause?" or "Does a cause of the world exist?" Most people surely would understand the question, even if they don't agree about the answer.

Russell: Well, certainly the question "Does the cause of the world exist?" is a question that has meaning. But if you say "Yes, God is the cause of the world" you're using God as a proper name; then "God exists" will not be a statement that has meaning; that is the position that I'm maintaining. Because, therefore, it will follow that it cannot be an analytic proposition ever to say that this or that exists. For example, suppose you take as your subject "the existent round-square," it would look like an analytic proposition that "the existent round- square exists," but it doesn't exist.

Copleston: No, it doesn't, then surely you can't say it doesn't exist unless you have a conception of what existence is. As to the phrase "existent round-square," I should say that it has no meaning at all.

Russell: I quite agree. Then I should say the same thing in another context in reference to a "necessary being."

Copleston: Well, we seem to have arrived at an impasse. To say that a necessary being is a being that must exist and cannot not exist has for me a definite meaning. For you it has no meaning.

Russell: WelI, we can press the point a Iittle, I think. A being that must exist and cannot not exist, would surely, according to you, be a being whose essence involves existence.

Copleston: Yes, a being the essence of which is to exist. But I should not be willing to argue the existence of God simply from the idea of His essence because I don't think we have any clear intuition of God's essence as yet. I think we have to argue from the world of experience to God.

Russell: Yes, I quite see the distinction. But, at the same time, for a being with sufficient knowledge, it would be true to say "Here is this being whose essence involves existence!"

Copleston: Yes, certainly if anybody saw God, he would see that God must exist.

Russell: So that I mean there is a being whose essence involves existence although we don't know that essence. We only know there is such a being.

Copleston: Yes, I should add we don't know the essence a priori. It is only a posteriori through our experience of the world that we come to a knowledge of the existence of that being. And then one argues, the essence and existence must be identical. Because if God's essence and God's existence was not identical, then some sufficient reason for this existence would have to be found beyond God.

Russell: So it all turns on this question of sufficient reason, and I must say you haven't defined sufficient reason" in a way that I can understand -- what do you mean by sufficient reason? You don't mean cause?

Copleston: Not necessarily. Cause is a kind of sufficient reason. Only contingent being can have a cause. God is His own sufficient reason; and He is not cause of Himself. By sufficient reason in the full sense I mean an explanation adequate for the existence of some particular being.

Russell: But when is an explanation adequate? Suppose I am about to make a flame with a match. You may say that the adequate explanation of that is that I rub it on the box.

Copleston: Well, for practical purposes -- but theoretically, that is only a partial explanation. An adequate explanation must ultimately be a total explanation, to which nothing further can be added.

Russell: Then I can only say that you're looking for something which can't be got, and which one ought not to expect to get.

Copleston: To say that one has not found it is one thing; to say that one should not look for it seems to me rather dogmatic.

Russell: Well, I don't know. I mean, the explanation of one thing is another thing which makes the other thing dependent on yet another, and you have to grasp this sorry scheme of things entire to do what you want, and that we can't do.

Copleston: But are you going to say that we can't, or we shouldn't even raise the question of the existence of the whole of this sorry scheme of things -- of the whole universe?

Russell: Yes, I don't think there's any meaning in it at all. I think the word "universe" is a handy word in some connections, but I don't think it stands for anything that has a meaning.

Copleston: If the word is meaningless, it can't be so very handy. In any case, I don't say that the universe is something different from the objects which compose it (I indicated that in my brief summary of the proof), what I'm doing is to look for the reason, in this case the cause of the objects -- the real or imagined totality of which constitute what we call the universe. You say, I think that the universe -- or my existence if you prefer, or any other existence -- is unintelligible?

Russell: First may I take up the point that if a word is meaningless it can't be handy. That sounds well but isn't in fact correct. Take, say, such a word as "the" or "than." You can't point to any object that those words mean, but they are very useful words; I should say the same of "universe." But leaving that point, you ask whether I consider that the universe is unintelligible. I shouldn't say unintelligible -- I think it is without explanation. Intelligible, to my mind, is a different thing. Intelligible has to do with the thing itself intrinsically and not with its relations.

Copleston: Well, my point is that what we call the world is intrinsically unintelligible, apart from the existence of God. You see, I don't believe that the infinity of the series of events -- I mean a horizontal series, so to speak -- if such an infinity could be proved, would be in the slightest degree relevant to the situation. If you add up chocolates you get chocolates after all and not a sheep. If you add up chocolates to infinity, you presumably get an infinite number of chocolates. So if you add up contingent beings to infinity, you still get contingent beings, not a necessary being. An infinite series of contingent beings will be, to my way of thinking, as unable to cause itself as one contingent being. However, you say, I think, that it is illegitimate to raise the question of what will explain the existence of any particular object?

Russell: It's quite all right if you mean by explaining it, simply finding a cause for it.

Copleston: Well, why stop at one particular object? Why shouldn't one raise the question of the cause of the existence of all particular objects?

Russell: Because I see no reason to think there is any. The whole concept of cause is one we derive from our observation of particular things; I see no reason whatsoever to suppose that the total has any cause whatsoever.

Copleston: Well, to say that there isn't any cause is not the same thing as saying that we shouldn't look for a cause. The statement that there isn't any cause should come, if it comes at all, at the end of the inquiry, not the beginning. In any case, if the total has no cause, then to my way of thinking it must be its own cause, which seems to me impossible. Moreover, the statement that the world is simply there if in answer to a question, presupposes that the question has meaning.

Russell: No, it doesn't need to be its own cause, what I'm saying is that the concept of cause is not applicable to the total.

Copleston: Then you would agree with Sartre that the universe is what he calls "gratuitous"?

Russell: Well, the word "gratuitous" suggests that it might be something else; I should say that the universe is just there, and that's all.

. Copleston: Well, I can't see how you can rule out the legitimacy of asking the question how the total, or anything at all comes to be there. Why something rather than nothing, that is the question? The fact that we gain our knowledge of causality empirically, from particular causes, does not rule out the possibility of asking what the cause of the series is. If the word "cause" were meaningless or if it could be shown that Kant's view of the matter were correct, the question would be illegitimate I agree; but you don't seem to hold that the word "cause" is meaningless, and I do not suppose you are a Kantian.

Russell: I can illustrate what seems to me your fallacy. Every man who exists has a mother, and it seems to me your argument is that therefore the human race must have a mother, but obviously the human race hasn't a mother -- that's a different logical sphere.

Copleston: Well, I can't really see any parity. If I were saying "every object has a phenomenal cause, therefore, the whole series has a phenomenal cause," there would be a parity; but I'm not saying that; I'm saying, every object has a phenomenal cause if you insist on the infinity of the series -- but the series of phenomenal causes is an insufficient explanation of the series. Therefore, the series has not a phenomenal cause but a transcendent cause.

Russell: That's always assuming that not only every particular thing in the world, but the world as a whole must have a cause. For that assumption I see no ground whatever. If you'll give me a ground I'll listen to it.

Copleston: Well, the series of events is either caused or it's not caused. If it is caused, there must obviously be a cause outside the series. If it's not caused then it's sufficient to itself, and if it's sufficient to itself it is what I call necessary. But it can't be necessary since each member is contingent, and we've agreed that the total has no reality apart from its members, therefore, it can't be necessary. Therefore, it can't be (caused) -- uncaused -- therefore it must have a cause. And I should like to observe in passing that the statement "the world is simply there and is inexplicable" can't be got out of logical analysis.

Russell: I don't want to seem arrogant, but it does seem to me that I can conceive things that you say the human mind can't conceive. As for things not having a cause, the physicists assure us that individual quantum transitions in atoms have no cause.

Copleston: Well, I wonder now whether that isn't simply a temporary inference.

Russell: It may be, but it does show that physicists' minds can conceive it.

Copleston: Yes, I agree, some scientists -- physicists -- are willing to allow for indetermination within a restricted field. But very many scientists are not so willing. I think that Professor Dingle, of London University, maintains that the Heisenberg uncertainty principle tells us something about the success (or the lack of it) of the present atomic theory in correlating observations, but not about nature in itself, and many physicists would accept this view. In any case, I don't see how physicists can fail to accept the theory in practice, even if they don't do so in theory. I cannot see how science could be conducted on any other assumption than that of order and intelligibility in nature. The physicist presupposes, at least tacitly, that there is some sense in investigating nature and looking for the causes of events, just as the detective presupposes that there is some sense in looking for the cause of a murder. The metaphysician assumes that there is sense in looking for the reason or cause of phenomena, and, not being a Kantian, I consider that the metaphysician is as justified in his assumption as the physicist. When Sartre, for example, says that the world is gratuitous, I think that he has not sufficiently considered what is implied by "gratuitous."

Russell: I think -- there seems to me a certain unwarrantable extension here; a physicist looks for causes; that does not necessarily imply that there are causes everywhere. A man may look for gold without assuming that there is gold everywhere; if he finds gold, well and good, if he doesn't he's had bad luck. The same is true when the physicists look for causes. As for Sartre, I don't profess to know what he means, and I shouldn't like to be thought to interpret him, but for my part, I do think the notion of the warld having an explanation is a mistake. I don't see why one should expect it to have, and I think you say about what the scientist assumes is an over-statement.

Copleston: Well, it seems to me that the scientist does make some such assumption. When he experiments to find out some particular truth, behind that experiment lies the assumption that the universe is not simply discontinuous. There is the possibility of finding out a truth by experiment. The experiment may be a bad one, it may lead to no result, or not to the result that he wants, but that at any rate there is the possibility, through experiment, of finding out the truth that he assumes. And that seems to me to assume an ordered and intelligible universe.

Russell: I think you're generalizing more than is necessary. Undoubtedly the scientist assumes that this sort of thing is likely to be found and will often be found. He does not assume that it will be found, and that's a very important matter in modem physics.

Copleston: Well, I think he does assume or is bound to assume it tacitly in practice. It may be that, to quote Professor Haldane, "when I Iight the gas under the kettle, some of the water molecules will fly off as vapor, and there is no way of finding out which wiII do so, " but it doesn't follow necessarily that the idea of chance must be introduced except in relation to our knowledge.

Russell: No it doesn't -- at least if I may believe what he says. He's finding out quite a lot of things -- the scientist is finding out quite a lot of things that are happening in the world, which are, at first, beginnings of causal chains -- first causes which haven't in themselves got causes. He does not assume that everything has a cause.

Copleston: Surely that's a first cause within a certain selected field. It's a relatively first cause.

Russell: I don't think he'd say so. If there's a world in which most events, but not all, have causes, he will then be able to depict the probabilities and uncertainties by assuming that this particular event you're interested in probably has a cause. And since in any case you won't get more than probability that's good enough.

Copleston: It may be that the scientist doesn't hope to obtain more than probability, but in raising the question he assumes that the question of explanation has a meaning. But your general point then, Lord RusseII, is that it's illegitimate even to ask the question of the cause of the world?

Russell: Yes, that's my position.

Copleston: If it's a question that for you has no meaning, it's of course very difficult to discuss it, isn't it?

Russell: Yes, it is very difficult. What do you say -- shall we pass on to some other issue?



Audio of the Debate -- Part 1
Audio of the Debate -- Part 2



Transcribed into hypertext by Andrew Chrucky, Oct. 12, 1999.





[End of ANNEX]

 

[HitchSlap]

You have brains in your head. You have feet in your shoes. You can steer yourself any direction you choose.

-Dr. Seuss

Dear readers, in most particular, atheists here, you will notice clearly how Russell has also the vice of self-obfuscation and self-obscurantism, when concepts are not propitious to his self-absurd conviction that God is similar to an orbiting teapot in space.



See ANNEX below where I reproduce the part 1 of the famous debate in BBC international in 1948.



The ending of part 1 reveals how Russell arbitrarily and contrary to all open-mindedness from the part of rational mankind, dismisses as illegitimate to even think about causality.

[Quote from Pachomius]
A Debate on the Argument from Contingency

[…]

Copleston: Surely that's a first cause within a certain selected field. It's a relatively first cause.

Russell: I don't think he'd say so. If there's a world in which most events, but not all, have causes, he will then be able to depict the probabilities and uncertainties by assuming that this particular event you're interested in probably has a cause. And since in any case you won't get more than probability that's good enough.

Copleston: It may be that the scientist doesn't hope to obtain more than probability, but in raising the question he assumes that the question of explanation has a meaning. But your general point then, Lord RusseII, is that it's illegitimate even to ask the question of the cause of the world?

Russell: Yes, that's my position.

Copleston: If it's a question that for you has no meaning, it's of course very difficult to discuss it, isn't it?

Russell: Yes, it is very difficult. What do you say -- SHALL WE PASS ON TO SOME OTHER ISSUE? [Upper case courtesy of Pachomius]

[End of quote by Pachomius]

Please read part 1 of the debate, God exists on cosmology, in ANNEX below.


Now I will go and see what Michael and other posters have in regard to my question to them about babies being evidence for God existing.

ANNEX
Click on
A Debate on the Argument from Contingency


A Debate on the Argument from Contingency

Father F. C. Copleston and Bertrand Russell



Broadcast in 1948 on the Third Program of the British Broadcasting Corporation. Published in Humanitas (Manchester) and reprinted in Bertrand Russell, Why I Am Not a Christian (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1957).



Copleston: As we are going to discuss the existence of God, it might perhaps be as well to come to some provisional agreement as to what we understand by the term "God." I presume that we mean a supreme personal being -- distinct from the world and creator of the world. Would you agree -- provisionally at least -- to accept this statement as the meaning of the term "God"?

Russell: Yes, I accept this definition.

Copleston: Well, my position is the affirmative position that such a being actually exists, and that His existence can be proved philosophically. Perhaps you would tell me if your position is that of agnosticism or of atheism. I mean, would you say that the non-existence of God can be proved?

Russell: No, I should not say that: my position is agnostic.

Copleston: Would you agree with me that the problem of God is a problem of great importance? For example, would you agree that if God does not exist, human beings and human history can have no other purpose than the purpose they choose to give themselves, which -- in practice -- is likely to mean the purpose which those impose who have the power to impose it?

Russell: Roughly speaking, yes, though I should have to place some limitation on your last clause.

Copleston: Would you agree that if there is no God -- no absolute Being -- there can be no absolute values? I mean, would you agree that if there is no absolute good that the relativity of values results?

Russell: No, I think these questions are logically distinct. Take, for instance, G. E. Moore's Principia Ethica, where he maintains that there is a distinction of good and evil, that both of these are definite concepts. But he does not bring in the idea of God to support that contention.

Copleston: Well, suppose we leave the question of good till later, till we come to the moral argument, and I give first a metaphysical argument. I'd like to put the main weight on the metaphysical argument based on Leibniz's argument from "Contingency" and then later we might discuss the moral argument. Suppose I give a brief statement on the metaphysical argument and that then we go on to discuss it?

Russell: That seems to me to be a very good plan.

The Argument from Contingency

Copleston: Well, for clarity's sake, I'll divide the argument into distinct stages. First of all, I should say, we know that there are at least some beings in the world which do not contain in themselves the reason for their existence. For example, I depend on my parents, and now on the air, and on food, and so on. Now, secondly, the world is simply the real or imagined totality or aggregate of individual objects, none of which contain in themselves alone the reason for their existence. There isn't any world distinct from the objects which form it, any more than the human race is something apart from the members. Therefore, I should say, since objects or events exist, and since no object of experience contains within itself reason of its existence, this reason, the totality of objects, must have a reason external to itself. That reason must be an existent being. Well, this being is either itself the reason for its own existence, or it is not. If it is, well and good. If it is not, then we must proceed farther. But if we proceed to infinity in that sense, then there's no explanation of existence at all. So, I should say, in order to explain existence, we must come to a being which contains within itself the reason for its own existence, that is to say, which cannot not exist.

Russell: This raises a great many points and it is not altogether easy to know where to begin, but I think that, perhaps, in answering your argument, the best point at which to begin is the question of necessary being. The word "necessary," I should maintain, can only be applied significantly to propositions. And, in fact, only to such as are analytic -- that is to say -- such as it is self-contradictory to deny. I could only admit a necessary being if there were a being whose existence it is self-contradictory to deny. I should like to know whether you would accept Leibniz's division of propositions into truths of reason and truths of fact. The former -- the truths of reason -- being necessary.

Copleston: Well, I certainly should not subscribe to what seems to be Leibniz's idea of truths of reason and truths of fact, since it would appear that, for him, there are in the long run only analytic propositions. It would seem that for Leibniz truths of fact are ultimately reducible to truths of reason. That is to say, to analytic propositions, at least for an omniscient mind. Well, I couldn't agree with that. For one thing it would fail to meet the requirements of the experience of freedom. I don't want to uphold the whole philosophy of Leibniz. I have made use of his argument from contingent to necessary being, basing the argument on the principle of sufficient reason, simply because it seems to me a brief and clear formulation of what is, in my opinion, the fundamental metaphysical argument for God's existence.

Russell: But, to my mind, "a necessary proposition" has got to be analytic. I don't see what else it can mean. And analytic propositions are always complex and logically somewhat late. "Irrational animals are animals" is an analytic proposition; but a proposition such as "This is an animal" can never be analytic. in fact, all the propositions that can be analytic are somewhat late in the build-up of propositions.

Copleston: Take the proposition "if there is a contingent being then there is a necessary being." I consider that that proposition hypothetically expressed is a necessary proposition. If you are going to call every necessary proposition an analytic proposition, then -- in order to avoid a dispute in terminology -- I would agree to call it analytic, though I don't consider it a tautological proposition. But the proposition is a necessary proposition only on the supposition that there is a contingent being. That there is a contingent being actually existing has to be discovered by experience, and the proposition that there is a contingent being is certainly not an analytic proposition, though once you know, I should maintain, that there is a contingent being, it follows of necessity that there is a necessary being.

Russell: The difficulty of this argument is that I don't admit the idea of a necessary being and I don't admit that there is any particular meaning in calling other beings "contingent." These phrases don't for me have a significance except within a logic that I reject.

Copleston: Do you mean that you reject these terms because they won't fit in with what is called modern logic"?

Russell: Well, I can't find anything that they could mean. The word "necessary," it seems to me, is a useless word, except as applied to analytic propositions, not to things.

Copleston: In the first place, what do you mean by "modern logic?" As far as I know, there are somewhat differing systems. In the second place, not all modern logicians surely would admit the meaninglessness of metaphysics. We both know, at any rate, one very eminent modern thinker whose knowledge of modern logic was profound, but who certainly did not think that metaphysics are meaningless or, in particular, that the problem of God is meaningless. Again, even if all modern logicians held that metaphysical terms are meaningless, it would not follow that they were right. The proposition that metaphysical terms are meaningless seems to me to be a proposition based on an assumed philosophy. The dogmatic position behind it seems to be this: What will not go into my machine is non-existent, or it is meaningless; it is the expression of emotion. I am simply trying to point out that anybody who says that a particular system of modern logic is the sole criterion of meaning is saying something that is over-dogmatic; he is dogmatically insisting that a part of philosophy is the whole of philosophy. After all, a "contingent" being is a being which has not in itself the complete reason for its existence that's what I mean by a contingent being. You know, as wel I as I do, that the existence of neither of us can be explained without reference to something or somebody outside us, our parents, for example. A "necessary" being, on the other hand means a being that must and cannot not exist. You may say that there is no such being, but you wil find it hard to convince me that you do not understand the terms I am using. If you do not understand them, then how can you be entitled to say that such a being does not exist, if that is what you do say?

Russell: Well, there are points here that I don't propose to go into at length. I don't maintain the meaninglessness of metaphysics in general at all. I maintain the meaninglessness of certain particular terms -- not on any general ground, but simply because I've not been able to see an interpretation of those particular terms. It's not a general dogma -- it's a particular thing. But those points I will leave out for the moment. And I will say that what you have been saying brings us back, it seems to me, to the ontological argument that there is a being whose essence involves existence, so that his existence is analytic. That seems to me to be impossible, and it raises, of course, the question what one means by existence, and as to this, I think a subject named can never be significantly said to exist but only a subject described. And that existence, in fact, quite definitely is not a predicate.

Copleston: Well, you say, I believe, that it is bad grammar, or rather bad syntax to say for example "T. S. Eliot exists"; one ought to say, for example, "He, the author of Murder in the Cathedral, exists." Are you going to say that the proposition, "The cause of the world exists," is without meaning? You may say that the world has no cause; but I fail to see how you can say that the proposition that "the cause of the world exists" is meaningless. Put it in the form of a question: "Has the world a cause?" or "Does a cause of the world exist?" Most people surely would understand the question, even if they don't agree about the answer.

Russell: Well, certainly the question "Does the cause of the world exist?" is a question that has meaning. But if you say "Yes, God is the cause of the world" you're using God as a proper name; then "God exists" will not be a statement that has meaning; that is the position that I'm maintaining. Because, therefore, it will follow that it cannot be an analytic proposition ever to say that this or that exists. For example, suppose you take as your subject "the existent round-square," it would look like an analytic proposition that "the existent round- square exists," but it doesn't exist.

Copleston: No, it doesn't, then surely you can't say it doesn't exist unless you have a conception of what existence is. As to the phrase "existent round-square," I should say that it has no meaning at all.

Russell: I quite agree. Then I should say the same thing in another context in reference to a "necessary being."

Copleston: Well, we seem to have arrived at an impasse. To say that a necessary being is a being that must exist and cannot not exist has for me a definite meaning. For you it has no meaning.

Russell: WelI, we can press the point a Iittle, I think. A being that must exist and cannot not exist, would surely, according to you, be a being whose essence involves existence.

Copleston: Yes, a being the essence of which is to exist. But I should not be willing to argue the existence of God simply from the idea of His essence because I don't think we have any clear intuition of God's essence as yet. I think we have to argue from the world of experience to God.

Russell: Yes, I quite see the distinction. But, at the same time, for a being with sufficient knowledge, it would be true to say "Here is this being whose essence involves existence!"

Copleston: Yes, certainly if anybody saw God, he would see that God must exist.

Russell: So that I mean there is a being whose essence involves existence although we don't know that essence. We only know there is such a being.

Copleston: Yes, I should add we don't know the essence a priori. It is only a posteriori through our experience of the world that we come to a knowledge of the existence of that being. And then one argues, the essence and existence must be identical. Because if God's essence and God's existence was not identical, then some sufficient reason for this existence would have to be found beyond God.

Russell: So it all turns on this question of sufficient reason, and I must say you haven't defined sufficient reason" in a way that I can understand -- what do you mean by sufficient reason? You don't mean cause?

Copleston: Not necessarily. Cause is a kind of sufficient reason. Only contingent being can have a cause. God is His own sufficient reason; and He is not cause of Himself. By sufficient reason in the full sense I mean an explanation adequate for the existence of some particular being.

Russell: But when is an explanation adequate? Suppose I am about to make a flame with a match. You may say that the adequate explanation of that is that I rub it on the box.

Copleston: Well, for practical purposes -- but theoretically, that is only a partial explanation. An adequate explanation must ultimately be a total explanation, to which nothing further can be added.

Russell: Then I can only say that you're looking for something which can't be got, and which one ought not to expect to get.

Copleston: To say that one has not found it is one thing; to say that one should not look for it seems to me rather dogmatic.

Russell: Well, I don't know. I mean, the explanation of one thing is another thing which makes the other thing dependent on yet another, and you have to grasp this sorry scheme of things entire to do what you want, and that we can't do.

Copleston: But are you going to say that we can't, or we shouldn't even raise the question of the existence of the whole of this sorry scheme of things -- of the whole universe?

Russell: Yes, I don't think there's any meaning in it at all. I think the word "universe" is a handy word in some connections, but I don't think it stands for anything that has a meaning.

Copleston: If the word is meaningless, it can't be so very handy. In any case, I don't say that the universe is something different from the objects which compose it (I indicated that in my brief summary of the proof), what I'm doing is to look for the reason, in this case the cause of the objects -- the real or imagined totality of which constitute what we call the universe. You say, I think that the universe -- or my existence if you prefer, or any other existence -- is unintelligible?

Russell: First may I take up the point that if a word is meaningless it can't be handy. That sounds well but isn't in fact correct. Take, say, such a word as "the" or "than." You can't point to any object that those words mean, but they are very useful words; I should say the same of "universe." But leaving that point, you ask whether I consider that the universe is unintelligible. I shouldn't say unintelligible -- I think it is without explanation. Intelligible, to my mind, is a different thing. Intelligible has to do with the thing itself intrinsically and not with its relations.

Copleston: Well, my point is that what we call the world is intrinsically unintelligible, apart from the existence of God. You see, I don't believe that the infinity of the series of events -- I mean a horizontal series, so to speak -- if such an infinity could be proved, would be in the slightest degree relevant to the situation. If you add up chocolates you get chocolates after all and not a sheep. If you add up chocolates to infinity, you presumably get an infinite number of chocolates. So if you add up contingent beings to infinity, you still get contingent beings, not a necessary being. An infinite series of contingent beings will be, to my way of thinking, as unable to cause itself as one contingent being. However, you say, I think, that it is illegitimate to raise the question of what will explain the existence of any particular object?

Russell: It's quite all right if you mean by explaining it, simply finding a cause for it.

Copleston: Well, why stop at one particular object? Why shouldn't one raise the question of the cause of the existence of all particular objects?

Russell: Because I see no reason to think there is any. The whole concept of cause is one we derive from our observation of particular things; I see no reason whatsoever to suppose that the total has any cause whatsoever.

Copleston: Well, to say that there isn't any cause is not the same thing as saying that we shouldn't look for a cause. The statement that there isn't any cause should come, if it comes at all, at the end of the inquiry, not the beginning. In any case, if the total has no cause, then to my way of thinking it must be its own cause, which seems to me impossible. Moreover, the statement that the world is simply there if in answer to a question, presupposes that the question has meaning.

Russell: No, it doesn't need to be its own cause, what I'm saying is that the concept of cause is not applicable to the total.

Copleston: Then you would agree with Sartre that the universe is what he calls "gratuitous"?

Russell: Well, the word "gratuitous" suggests that it might be something else; I should say that the universe is just there, and that's all.

. Copleston: Well, I can't see how you can rule out the legitimacy of asking the question how the total, or anything at all comes to be there. Why something rather than nothing, that is the question? The fact that we gain our knowledge of causality empirically, from particular causes, does not rule out the possibility of asking what the cause of the series is. If the word "cause" were meaningless or if it could be shown that Kant's view of the matter were correct, the question would be illegitimate I agree; but you don't seem to hold that the word "cause" is meaningless, and I do not suppose you are a Kantian.

Russell: I can illustrate what seems to me your fallacy. Every man who exists has a mother, and it seems to me your argument is that therefore the human race must have a mother, but obviously the human race hasn't a mother -- that's a different logical sphere.

Copleston: Well, I can't really see any parity. If I were saying "every object has a phenomenal cause, therefore, the whole series has a phenomenal cause," there would be a parity; but I'm not saying that; I'm saying, every object has a phenomenal cause if you insist on the infinity of the series -- but the series of phenomenal causes is an insufficient explanation of the series. Therefore, the series has not a phenomenal cause but a transcendent cause.

Russell: That's always assuming that not only every particular thing in the world, but the world as a whole must have a cause. For that assumption I see no ground whatever. If you'll give me a ground I'll listen to it.

Copleston: Well, the series of events is either caused or it's not caused. If it is caused, there must obviously be a cause outside the series. If it's not caused then it's sufficient to itself, and if it's sufficient to itself it is what I call necessary. But it can't be necessary since each member is contingent, and we've agreed that the total has no reality apart from its members, therefore, it can't be necessary. Therefore, it can't be (caused) -- uncaused -- therefore it must have a cause. And I should like to observe in passing that the statement "the world is simply there and is inexplicable" can't be got out of logical analysis.

Russell: I don't want to seem arrogant, but it does seem to me that I can conceive things that you say the human mind can't conceive. As for things not having a cause, the physicists assure us that individual quantum transitions in atoms have no cause.

Copleston: Well, I wonder now whether that isn't simply a temporary inference.

Russell: It may be, but it does show that physicists' minds can conceive it.

Copleston: Yes, I agree, some scientists -- physicists -- are willing to allow for indetermination within a restricted field. But very many scientists are not so willing. I think that Professor Dingle, of London University, maintains that the Heisenberg uncertainty principle tells us something about the success (or the lack of it) of the present atomic theory in correlating observations, but not about nature in itself, and many physicists would accept this view. In any case, I don't see how physicists can fail to accept the theory in practice, even if they don't do so in theory. I cannot see how science could be conducted on any other assumption than that of order and intelligibility in nature. The physicist presupposes, at least tacitly, that there is some sense in investigating nature and looking for the causes of events, just as the detective presupposes that there is some sense in looking for the cause of a murder. The metaphysician assumes that there is sense in looking for the reason or cause of phenomena, and, not being a Kantian, I consider that the metaphysician is as justified in his assumption as the physicist. When Sartre, for example, says that the world is gratuitous, I think that he has not sufficiently considered what is implied by "gratuitous."

Russell: I think -- there seems to me a certain unwarrantable extension here; a physicist looks for causes; that does not necessarily imply that there are causes everywhere. A man may look for gold without assuming that there is gold everywhere; if he finds gold, well and good, if he doesn't he's had bad luck. The same is true when the physicists look for causes. As for Sartre, I don't profess to know what he means, and I shouldn't like to be thought to interpret him, but for my part, I do think the notion of the warld having an explanation is a mistake. I don't see why one should expect it to have, and I think you say about what the scientist assumes is an over-statement.

Copleston: Well, it seems to me that the scientist does make some such assumption. When he experiments to find out some particular truth, behind that experiment lies the assumption that the universe is not simply discontinuous. There is the possibility of finding out a truth by experiment. The experiment may be a bad one, it may lead to no result, or not to the result that he wants, but that at any rate there is the possibility, through experiment, of finding out the truth that he assumes. And that seems to me to assume an ordered and intelligible universe.

Russell: I think you're generalizing more than is necessary. Undoubtedly the scientist assumes that this sort of thing is likely to be found and will often be found. He does not assume that it will be found, and that's a very important matter in modem physics.

Copleston: Well, I think he does assume or is bound to assume it tacitly in practice. It may be that, to quote Professor Haldane, "when I Iight the gas under the kettle, some of the water molecules will fly off as vapor, and there is no way of finding out which wiII do so, " but it doesn't follow necessarily that the idea of chance must be introduced except in relation to our knowledge.

Russell: No it doesn't -- at least if I may believe what he says. He's finding out quite a lot of things -- the scientist is finding out quite a lot of things that are happening in the world, which are, at first, beginnings of causal chains -- first causes which haven't in themselves got causes. He does not assume that everything has a cause.

Copleston: Surely that's a first cause within a certain selected field. It's a relatively first cause.

Russell: I don't think he'd say so. If there's a world in which most events, but not all, have causes, he will then be able to depict the probabilities and uncertainties by assuming that this particular event you're interested in probably has a cause. And since in any case you won't get more than probability that's good enough.

Copleston: It may be that the scientist doesn't hope to obtain more than probability, but in raising the question he assumes that the question of explanation has a meaning. But your general point then, Lord RusseII, is that it's illegitimate even to ask the question of the cause of the world?

Russell: Yes, that's my position.

Copleston: If it's a question that for you has no meaning, it's of course very difficult to discuss it, isn't it?

Russell: Yes, it is very difficult. What do you say -- shall we pass on to some other issue?



Audio of the Debate -- Part 1
Audio of the Debate -- Part 2



Transcribed into hypertext by Andrew Chrucky, Oct. 12, 1999.





[End of ANNEX]

 

[Pachomius]

Thanks for your interaction, dear posters here, and also everyone reading this thread, on How to prove God exists.

I have not seen any atheists here explaining why he has seen no evidence for God existing, instead there is one comment here that the chain of causation does not seem to lead from babies as evidence to the existence of God, in concept as first and foremost the creator cause and operator cause of the universe and man and everything with a beginning.

So, let us do it this way, you and I ask each other a question, and we will reciprocally and respectively answer the question as we ask it.

I will ask the first question to atheists:

Do you atheists know about the reality of causation?

See you guys all again tomorrow.

 

[Pachomius]

One last word before I leave you guys.

Let us just talk about babies, as also about the nose in our face, both are accessible to us.

Keep to the realm of objective reality outside and independent of the conceptual realm in our mind.

So, to the question to atheists, Do you know about the reality of causation: if you don't know, please do not answer at all, just first get to know about causation by asking your papa and mama who gave you birth, to explain what is causation in regard to babies.

Now, if still you can't understand the reality of causation, then please no longer read this thread, because you are not even eligible to be present in an internet forum, since as you cannot understand from your papa and mama, what is causation in re babies, you are simply not eligible to be here or anywhere else where people talk about issues at all.

 

[FrumiousBandersnatch]

I have not seen any atheists here explaining why he has seen no evidence for God existing...

Well, I suppose the non-existence of God would explain why we have seen no evidence for God existing.

The absence of evidence is not (necessarily) evidence of absence, but absence is an explanation for the absence of evidence.

Further, the absence of evidence is corroborating evidence of absence when we would expect to have evidence. Should we expect to have evidence of God?

Do you atheists know about the reality of causation?

Do tell, have you solved the problem of induction?