Freewill and Souls

[David Gould]

Good. You agree. Now let find the contradiction.

Yes I can comprehend that and I used it in my proof that the events must be independent, because one of them is uncaused.

I don't agree. They are dependent. You either have both of them or have none of them. There is no apple without color but with moton nor an apple with color but without motion.

Then this is our problem.

Is that your problem? I can say "The beard of the dwarf is brown". The essence (the beard of the dwarf) must exist according to the instantiation principle, even if it only exists in my imagination.

Then we have a different idea about what it means to say that something exists. If that is what you mean, then God exists. Yet I do not believe he does.

P(X, Y) => Exists(X)
P(I, Thinking) => Exists(I)

I don't see Exists(I) in the premise.

I have no idea what you just said.

'There is thinking' violates instantiation principle. As I already said you can't prove that you exist if you violate instantiation principle. There is no point to repeat me.

Then that is our problem: you think that the instantiation principle is something significant, while to me it looks like the ontological argument in reverse. Essence and existence are two separate and separable questions. I can list characteristics of something that does not exist.

Isn't that a problem? Can you prove anything? If not, what is the point of this discussion?

You can only prove something within the context of mathematics and logic, and even then the premises remain unproven.

You can, however, provide evidence and argument to support a case. And if the premises are agreed upon, then the conclusions should be, too.

Quote your source please. Last time I checked it was pretty well defined with a wavefunction.

Heisenberg. If the position of the particle is known 100 per cent accurately, the momentum of the particle is undefined.

OK. It is my fault. I used 'impulse' instead of 'momentum'. Please, rethink everything I said using 'momentum' instead of 'impulse'.

I do not see how this changes anything. I am not arguing that the momentum exists separate from the particle. What I am arguing is that something causes the particle to decay but nothing causes it to move in a particular way following the decay.

Go play then with your colorless apples.

In what way is the colour of the apple dependent upon the its motion? If I throw an apple in a certain way, does it suddenly become green? If I alter the colour of an apple, does it suddenly accelerate away from me?

 

[Upisoft]

Similarly, the reason that I know that free will cannot exist is because of the definition of free and the definition of will.

Here is one my arguments:

1.) Any cause is either caused or uncaused. (from the law of the excluded middle).
2.) If a cause is caused, it is not free. (by definition)
3.) If a cause is uncaused, it is not willed. (again, by definition.)
4.) Hence, free will cannot exist.

We started to dig very deep and your problem is shallow.
You prove that free willed action cannot exist. That does not prove that free will cannot exist. Any uncaused cause is free and can be will in the same time.

 

[David Gould]

We started to dig very deep and your problem is shallow.
You prove that free willed action cannot exist. That does not prove that free will cannot exist. Any uncaused cause is free and can be will in the same time.

An uncaused cause is free. But as such it cannot be caused by the will. So I am unclear what you are saying here.

 

[Upisoft]

An uncaused cause is free. But as such it cannot be caused by the will. So I am unclear what you are saying here.

I'm saying that it is the will.

 

[David Gould]

With this argument, it looks as though you are positing that the will is the self. For example, an 'I' separate to the will could not will something, as that would be a cause. The will has to be uncaused in what it does for it to be free - that is what you are saying, correct?

(I want to be clear from the start, if possible)

 

[Upisoft]

With this argument, it looks as though you are positing that the will is the self. For example, an 'I' separate to the will could not will something, as that would be a cause. The will has to be uncaused in what it does for it to be free - that is what you are saying, correct?

(I want to be clear from the start, if possible)

I hope you will agree that will is cause. It can cause things to happen. Not all causes, of course, are will, but some have to be. Now, using you definition(regardless that I have some disagreements on it), there are two types of causes.

1. Caused cause. If Caused cause is a will, then it is not free will, because caused cause is not free.
2. Uncaused cause. Uncaused cause is free and if it is also a will, then it is free will.

Was I clear enough this time? I apologize for my English, but I had to learn it myself (no teachers to help and correct me).

 

[David Gould]

I hope you will agree that will is cause. It can cause things to happen. Not all causes, of course, are will, but some have to be. Now, using you definition(regardless that I have some disagreements on it), there are two types of causes.

1. Caused cause. If Caused cause is a will, then it is not free will, because caused cause is not free.
2. Uncaused cause. Uncaused cause is free and if it is also a will, then it is free will.

Was I clear enough this time? I apologize for my English, but I had to learn it myself (no teachers to help and correct me).

Yes, I understand that. What I am asking is a step further along: is the will the same as the self? It seems from this argument that it must be, but I want to be sure that you agree. If you do not agree, I will argue with you about that. If you do agree, we will move on to something else to argue about.

 

[Upisoft]

Yes, I understand that. What I am asking is a step further along: is the will the same as the self? It seems from this argument that it must be, but I want to be sure that you agree. If you do not agree, I will argue with you about that. If you do agree, we will move on to something else to argue about.

I think that 'self' is caused. As such, self is not 'will', but is caused by 'will' and/or other causes.

 

[David Gould]

I think that 'self' is caused. As such, self is not 'will', but is caused by 'will' and/or other causes.

Okay. But in that case, is it possible for me to do anything that is not caused? Why should I be judged for something, for example, when the will is what made me do it?

My point is that if the will is uncaused, then it is cannot be within our control. And yet this seems to be one of the reasons why people like the idea of free will - the fact that they are thus in control of their lives and not forced to do things.

 

[Upisoft]

Okay. But in that case, is it possible for me to do anything that is not caused? Why should I be judged for something, for example, when the will is what made me do it?

My point is that if the will is uncaused, then it is cannot be within our control. And yet this seems to be one of the reasons why people like the idea of free will - the fact that they are thus in control of their lives and not forced to do things.

Judged in which sense? Juridical or theological?

 

[David Gould]

Judged in which sense? Juridical or theological?

Maybe I should have said 'blamed' rather than judged.

 

[Upisoft]

Maybe I should have said 'blamed' rather than judged.

There is no reason to blame anyone for what they have done. That does not mean there is no need of jails, though. Since 'self' is a correction mechanism of will, i.e. 'self' controls will in sense that 'self' can change itself and make some effects less probable (like killing other people), it makes sense that such facilities exist. Fear to be jailed can cause change in 'self' that will make less probable doing of crimes.

So people that belive they're in control of their will are wrong. The free will is free. They wrongly think of 'self' as 'will' and particulary as 'free will'

 

[David Gould]

There is no reason to blame anyone for what they have done. That does not mean there is no need of jails, though. Since 'self' is a correction mechanism of will, i.e. 'self' controls will in sense that 'self' can change itself and make some effects less probable (like killing other people), it makes sense that such facilities exist. Fear to be jailed can cause change in 'self' that will make less probable doing of crimes.

So people that belive they're in control of their will are wrong. The free will is free. They wrongly think of 'self' as 'will' and particulary as 'free will'

This is kind of close to what I believe, except I would not call anything in that system 'free will'. There would simply be behaviours of ours that are caused (the vast majority of them), with some extremely rare - if any - which can be traced back an uncaused beginning.

It also seems to me that what you call free will is not what the vast majority speak of when they use the same term. As that is really the only version of free will that I am interested in debunking, I think that we basically have reached our end point.

 

[quatona]

There is no reason to blame anyone for what they have done. That does not mean there is no need of jails, though. Since 'self' is a correction mechanism of will, i.e. 'self' controls will in sense that 'self' can change itself and make some effects less probable (like killing other people), it makes sense that such facilities exist. Fear to be jailed can cause change in 'self' that will make less probable doing of crimes.

So people that belive they're in control of their will are wrong. The free will is free. They wrongly think of 'self' as 'will' and particulary as 'free will'

It seems to me that - rather than being in disagreement with David - you are in disagreement with most of those who talk about our "freewill" here.
Usually "freewill" is brought up as that which makes us free determining agents. Whilst in your notion the "freedom of will" is exactly the opposite: Another determining factor that limits our freedom (if there is such at all).

 

[Upisoft]

It seems to me that - rather than being in disagreement with David - you are in disagreement with most of those who talk about our "freewill" here.
Usually "freewill" is brought up as that which makes us free determining agents. Whilst in your notion the "freedom of will" is exactly the opposite: Another determining factor that limits our freedom (if there is such at all).

I say free will is uncaused cause. It is free, because it is uncaused. And it is determining, because it is cause that determines other caused causes. I don't see any reason to say that my definition of "free will" is not free and determining. What are your reasons to say that?

I understand that most people believe they're in control of their will. However, nothing that is controlled is free. So, believing in that is a kind of strange, don't you think so?

 

[elman]

I say free will is uncaused cause. It is free, because it is uncaused. And it is determining, because it is cause that determines other caused causes. I don't see any reason to say that my definition of "free will" is not free and determining. What are your reasons to say that?

I understand that most people believe they're in control of their will. However, nothing that is controlled is free. So, believing in that is a kind of strange, don't you think so?

If I have free will, i.e. the ability to chose to love or not love others, then I control those choices. My having that control establishes free will and thus it is not correct that nothing that is controled is free if I am the controller.

 

[Upisoft]

If I have free will, i.e. the ability to chose to love or not love others, then I control those choices. My having that control establishes free will and thus it is not correct that nothing that is controled is free if I am the controller.

Then slaves are free, if you're their controller. Is there any difference what is being controlled?

 

[quatona]

I say free will is uncaused cause. It is free, because it is uncaused. And it is determining, because it is cause that determines other caused causes. I don't see any reason to say that my definition of "free will" is not free and determining. What are your reasons to say that?

I didn´t say that.

I understand that most people believe they're in control of their will. However, nothing that is controlled is free. So, believing in that is a kind of strange, don't you think so?

I have at least not argued against it.

 

[elman]

Then slaves are free, if you're their controller. Is there any difference what is being controlled?

If they are their own controller, they are not slaves.

 

[Upisoft]

If they are their own controller, they are not slaves.

OK. But you said:

it is not correct that nothing that is controled is free if I am the controller.

Making that positive it sounds like this:
There is something that is controlled and free, if I am the controller.

Your point was that this 'something' is free will.

I decided to make a test of your hypothesis and substituted 'free will' with 'slaves'.

1. I'm in control of my free will and my free will is free.
2. I'm in control of some slaves and they are free.

You insist that 1 is true. I asked you if 2 is true and got no answer. Also I asked, if it is not true why it is not true?

I think that both 1 & 2 are false, because of 1 reason. My reason is that anything that is controlled is not free.

What do you think? Are they both true? What is your reason.



You didn't answer my questions. I asked you