Freewill and Souls

[Hnefi]

1st def. If it was possible to stop universe, make a copy and then run them bot in parallel, would I be able to do different things in the original universe and in the copy? If yes, then I have free will.

This definition of free will is identical to the definition of randomness. This is a big problem with free will, and David has expressed this problem.

We have two known types of processes which we can describe accurately regardless of whether they actually exist or not: deterministic events and random events. Deterministic events are events that are the result of a preceding event, a cause. Random events are events that occured spontaneously, without a cause. We can also describe processes that are a mixture of both - many decision-making computer programs, for example, use predictable determinism together with a (pseudo)random guess to make a decision.

But free will is claimed to be none of these. It is claimed to not be deterministic, because it is not dependent on a cause. It is claimed not to be random, because it is rational. It is also usually claimed not to be a mixture of both - why I do not know.

But that's just a whole lot of negatives. It is not enough to describe the phenomenon in terms of negatives. There are an infinite amount of things that free will (or anything else for that matter) is not, but if you cannot describe what it and only it is - that is, construct a unique, positive description of the process that fits no other phenomenon - then the concept is incoherent.

And free will is incoherent. It is indeterministic determinism. That is why noone can seem to come up with a description of the process that does not fit determinism, randomness or a mix thereof.

 

[Upisoft]

Similarly, the reason that I know that free will cannot exist is because of the definition of free and the definition of will.

Here is one my arguments:

1.) Any cause is either caused or uncaused. (from the law of the excluded middle).
2.) If a cause is caused, it is not free. (by definition)
3.) If a cause is uncaused, it is not willed. (again, by definition.)
4.) Hence, free will cannot exist.

Taking your arguments into account you're right. (by definition)

However, I would not agree with the definition you made in #2. I will give you an example. You have a sample of strontium-90. You observe an event of beta decay. You know that beta decay is caused by weak interaction. However the impulse of the resulting beta particle has few degrees of freedom. The particle can go in whatever direction and have energy in certain range.

 

[Hnefi]

I will give you an example. You have a sample of strontium-90. You observe an event of beta decay. You know that beta decay is caused by weak interaction. However the impulse of the resulting beta particle has few degrees of freedom. The particle can go in whatever direction and have energy in certain range.

Ah, but that is a classical example of a mix of determinism with randomness (assuming these factors you mention are truly random). In this particular case, the event itself - the decay - might have been deterministic, whereas some effects of that event - subevents, if you will, such as the resulting energy of the particle - are random. The event as a whole is both random and deterministic, but each atomic event is one or the other (though I suppose even an undividable event may, in principle, also be both random and determined).

 

[Upisoft]

Ah, but that is a classical example of a mix of determinism with randomness (assuming these factors you mention are truly random). In this particular case, the event itself - the decay - might have been deterministic, whereas some effects of that event - subevents, if you will, such as the resulting energy of the particle - are random. The event as a whole is both random and deterministic, but each atomic event is one or the other (though I suppose even an undividable event may, in principle, also be both random and determined).

Is the randomness determined?
If it is, how can it yield different results?
If it is not, then it is indeterministic. How then you can call a mixture of determinism and indeterminism deterministic?

 

[Hnefi]

Is the randomness determined?

In this particular case? I don't know. I'm not a nuclear physicist. Though it is, of course, logically possible for random effects to be bounded by deterministic factors.

If it is, how can it yield different results?

Simple. In this particular example, the time at which the event occured might be deterministic while, for example, the angular momentum of the resulting decay particles might be random. If the scenario was played over and over again, the event would always occur at exactly the same time but the resulting particles would travel at different speeds and in different directions.

If it is not, then it is indeterministic. How then you can call a mixture of determinism and indeterminism deterministic?

The deterministic worldview is often understood to allow for a degree of randomness. Strict determinism does not, but it is not the only philosophy that goes under the common name of determinism.

I'm not sure why non-strict determinism is called determinism instead of indeterminism, but it is probably because these worldviews usually contain a much, much larger degree of determinism than randomness. It therefore makes more sense to emphasize the deterministic qualities of the worldview than the indeterministic ones. And the definition is still useful - it differentiates these worldviews from the ones asserting "free will".

 

[elman]

This definition of free will is identical to the definition of randomness. This is a big problem with free will, and David has expressed this problem.

We have two known types of processes which we can describe accurately regardless of whether they actually exist or not: deterministic events and random events. Deterministic events are events that are the result of a preceding event, a cause. Random events are events that occured spontaneously, without a cause. We can also describe processes that are a mixture of both - many decision-making computer programs, for example, use predictable determinism together with a (pseudo)random guess to make a decision.

But free will is claimed to be none of these. It is claimed to not be deterministic, because it is not dependent on a cause. It is claimed not to be random, because it is rational. It is also usually claimed not to be a mixture of both - why I do not know.

But that's just a whole lot of negatives. It is not enough to describe the phenomenon in terms of negatives. There are an infinite amount of things that free will (or anything else for that matter) is not, but if you cannot describe what it and only it is - that is, construct a unique, positive description of the process that fits no other phenomenon - then the concept is incoherent.

And free will is incoherent. It is indeterministic determinism. That is why noone can seem to come up with a description of the process that does not fit determinism, randomness or a mix thereof.

In my decisions, I am one of the causes, not the only cause and my decision is not without influences from all directions, but I am not completly controled by those influences. Therefore I have free will on some things and on some decisions to some extent, but certainly not on everything and never completly free from outside and inside influences.

 

[David Gould]

Taking your arguments into account you're right. (by definition)

However, I would not agree with the definition you made in #2. I will give you an example. You have a sample of strontium-90. You observe an event of beta decay. You know that beta decay is caused by weak interaction. However the impulse of the resulting beta particle has few degrees of freedom. The particle can go in whatever direction and have energy in certain range.

As has been pointed out, sub-events, some of them caused, some of them uncaused. I still see no room for free will there.

 

[Opethian]

In my decisions, I am one of the causes, not the only cause and my decision is not without influences from all directions, but I am not completly controled by those influences.

Define the "I". If you want to include the supernatural, and "I" means your soul, sure, free will could exist, but using the supernatural as an explanation isn't really an explanation.
If you stick to the natural world, "you" is nothing more than a collection of organised matter, following the laws of the universe, and thus determined to an extent. "You" are not some sort of separate entity, "you" are not a cause to "yourself", you are a collection of entities which are influenced by other entities. In the natural world, free will makes no sense at all except for its necessity as an illusion in the human way of thinking.

Therefore I have free will on some things and on some decisions to some extent, but certainly not on everything and never completly free from outside and inside influences.

Try to define "yourself" without the use of the supernatural and see what conclusion you reach.

 

[Upisoft]

As has been pointed out, sub-events, some of them caused, some of them uncaused. I still see no room for free will there.

What is uncaused? And how do you split a single event i.e. decay to sub-events?

 

[Hnefi]

In my decisions, I am one of the causes, not the only cause and my decision is not without influences from all directions, but I am not completly controled by those influences. Therefore I have free will on some things and on some decisions to some extent, but certainly not on everything and never completly free from outside and inside influences.

What you describe fits determinism coupled with randomness better than free will. If you define free will as being just that - determinism with a degree of randomness - then it's possible that it exists. But in that case there's nothing supernatural or even particularly remarkable about it as all animals and even some computer programs would possess what you call free will (assuming the existence of true randomness).

If free will is not defined as above, then your conclusion does not follow from your premises, at least not until you give a definition of what free will is that does not fit either determinism
or randomness.

 

[elman]

Quote:
Originally Posted by Elman
In my decisions, I am one of the causes, not the only cause and my decision is not without influences from all directions, but I am not completly controled by those influences.

Define the "I". If you want to include the supernatural,

When I used I above it did not include the supernatural. It was just me wheather God exists or not.

and "I" means your soul, sure, free will could exist, but using the supernatural as an explanation isn't really an explanation.

If I have a soul, I includes my soul but I have free will as in the ability to impact my world wheather I have a soul or not.

If you stick to the natural world, "you" is nothing more than a collection of organised matter, following the laws of the universe, and thus determined to an extent.

Why should I assume the decsions I appear to be making are not my decisions?

"You" are not some sort of separate entity, "you" are not a cause to "yourself", you are a collection of entities which are influenced by other entities.

I am both.

In the natural world, free will makes no sense at all except for its necessity as an illusion in the human way of thinking.

There is no reason to assume it is illusion.


Quote:
Therefore I have free will on some things and on some decisions to some extent, but certainly not on everything and never completly free from outside and inside influences.

Try to define "yourself" without the use of the supernatural and see what conclusion you reach.

I was already talking about me without any reference to the supernatural.

 

[elman]

What you describe fits determinism coupled with randomness better than free will. If you define free will as being just that - determinism with a degree of randomness - then it's possible that it exists. But in that case there's nothing supernatural or even particularly remarkable about it as all animals and even some computer programs would possess what you call free will (assuming the existence of true randomness).

If free will is not defined as above, then your conclusion does not follow from your premises, at least not until you give a definition of what free will is that does not fit either determinism
or randomness.
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I believe in the supernatural but I don't believe the supernatural is needed for me to have the ability to make decisions and impact my environment. Free will is not determinism because I can make the choice either way and it is not determined ahead of time by any forces other than my decision. My decisions are not random. They are made for reasons and I make them, chosing which reasons I want to use to influence my decisions.

 

[David Gould]

What is uncaused? And how do you split a single event i.e. decay to sub-events?

The notion of whether it is a single event is ours - we mark boundaries where we will.

The decay is an event. The direction of the decay is independent of that event.

Me taking a step is an event. The direction of that step is independent of that event. (In other words, I can discuss the step without discussing the direction)

 

[David Gould]

Do you choose which reasons you want to use for reasons?

 

[quatona]

Particularly for atheists:

Do you believe in freewill?

I would have to know what that´s supposed to mean.
The term is a self-contradiction, but it´s possible that some definition points to a valid concept, nonetheless.

By freewill I mean incompatibilistic or libertarian freewill.

From glancing over the article I had the impression that "freewill", without being defined itself, was merely used to define other terms.
If there is a concise definition of the "freewill" you want me to answer in regards to, please post it.

If so, how do you explain it apart from a non-material soul?

What is an immaterial soul?
Explain how you think the two ideas are linked, and I´ll tell you if and how I explain them apart.

If not, aren't you admitting your opinions are the result of material determinism rather than rational reasoning?

I fail to see how these are mutually exclusive. My rational reasoning is determined.

 

[Upisoft]

The decay is an event. The direction of the decay is independent of that event.

Impulse of a particle is intrinsic to the particle. You cannot separate intrinsic property from the essence and declare they're independent.

A, yes. You can do it if you violate instantiation principle, but then you can't prove you exist, so why I should listen to you?

 

[David Gould]

Impulse of a particle is intrinsic to the particle. You cannot separate intrinsic property from the essence and declare they're independent.

Umm, yes, you can. We define where separation lies, and the definitions depend on what is useful.

If we find that something that we defined as an event has both deterministic and indeterministic properties, and we want to break it down to see which are deterministic and which are indeterministic, then we examine each part separately. And there is no problem with calling each of these things events.

However, if you are not happy with this, all we need to do is say that some events have deterministic and indeterministic components. Again, however, there is no place for free will.

A, yes. You can do it if you violate instantiation principle, but then you can't prove you exist, so why I should listen to you?

I have no idea what the instantiation principle is. I also know that you cannot prove that you exist. However, I do not demand that people prove that they exist before listening to what they have to say. The reason that I listen to people is to determine if they have anything interesting/useful/amusing to say. Your criteria, I guess, is different. I am unclear, though, how it is useful for you. Perhaps you can explain. Do you get people to go through a proof for their existence before listening to them? How bizarre.

I should also note that I do not believe that you or I exist in the traditional sense. There is no self; it is an illusion.

 

[Upisoft]

Umm, yes, you can. We define where separation lies, and the definitions depend on what is useful.

We can't make definition using usefulness as only criterion. The definition must not lead to a paradox.

If we find that something that we defined as an event has both deterministic and indeterministic properties, and we want to break it down to see which are deterministic and which are indeterministic, then we examine each part separately. And there is no problem with calling each of these things events.

Of course, there is no problem calling them events. Your troubles start by declaring them independent.

However, if you are not happy with this, all we need to do is say that some events have deterministic and indeterministic components. Again, however, there is no place for free will.

Here is your problem. If you want to stick with your definition of 'caused cause', then you have to declare deterministic and indeterministic parts independent in order them to have different causes. And indeed, you need at least two independent causes. One caused(deterministic part) and one uncaused(indeterministic part). And they have to be independent, because the uncaused cause cannot be dependent on anything.

I have no idea what the instantiation principle is.

I will explain. It simply says that if X has a property Y, then X exists.
Example: "This apple is red, therefore this apple exists".

Violation example: "This apple is red, but this apple does not exist" is a violation of the instantiation priciple, because you define a property without an essence.

I also know that you cannot prove that you exist.

Yes, you can, if you don't violate instantiation principle.
Cogito, ergo sum. I think, therefore I am.
I have the property "to think", therefore I exist.

And, if you violate the instantiation principle, then you can't prove you exists.

However, I do not demand that people prove that they exist before listening to what they have to say.

That isn't the point. The point is that if you violate the instantiation principle, you create a paradox rendering our discussion meaningless.

You started the paradox by saying that the particle and its impulse are independent. I.e. particle can exist without impulse (not impulse = 0, but without the property itself) and impulse can exist without particle.

 

[David Gould]

We can't make definition using usefulness as only criterion. The definition must not lead to a paradox.

If the definition leads to a logical contradiction then I agree. However, logical contradictions are not apparant to me here.

Of course, there is no problem calling them events. Your troubles start by declaring them independent.

As I am a determinist, no event is independent in the sense that you seem to mean. Every event - except an uncaused one - is dependent on other events.

Here is your problem. If you want to stick with your definition of 'caused cause', then you have to declare deterministic and indeterministic parts independent in order them to have different causes.

And indeed, you need at least two independent causes. One caused(deterministic part) and one uncaused(indeterministic part). And they have to be independent, because the uncaused cause cannot be dependent on anything.

Would you agree that the colour of an apple is independent of the apple's motion?

I will explain. It simply says that if X has a property Y, then X exists.
Example: "This apple is red, therefore this apple exists".

Violation example: "This apple is red, but this apple does not exist" is a violation of the instantiation priciple, because you define a property without an essence.

People do this all the time in stories. I am unclear of the problem. There is a boat called Swallow in the Swallow and Amazon stories. It can have a property, and yet not exist. This to me sounds like the ontological argument in reverse.

Yes, you can, if you don't violate instantiation principle.
Cogito, ergo sum. I think, therefore I am.
I have the property "to think", therefore I exist.

This is a logical fallacy, in that you have the conclusion in the premise 'I think' contains 'I'.

It should be: 'There is thinking' and from that premise, you cannot reach 'I exist'.

And, if you violate the instantiation principle, then you can't prove you exists.

You cannot prove that you exist, either, at least not to me, even if cogito ergo sum is accepted.

That isn't the point. The point is that if you violate the instantiation principle, you create a paradox rendering our discussion meaningless.

You started the paradox by saying that the particle and its impulse are independent. I.e. particle can exist without impulse (not impulse = 0, but without the property itself) and impulse can exist without particle.

Quantum mechanics suggests that particles can indeed exist without impulse. Their motion can be completely undefined (not = zero, but non-existent).

And I did not suggest that the impulse can exist without the particle, although I see no logical contradiction there, either, to be honest.

What I suggested was that the decay of the particle was one event and the direction the particle took was another event. I see no paradox there.

 

[Upisoft]

If the definition leads to a logical contradiction then I agree. However, logical contradictions are not apparant to me here.

Good. You agree. Now let find the contradiction.

As I am a determinist, no event is independent in the sense that you seem to mean. Every event - except an uncaused one - is dependent on other events.

Yes I can comprehend that and I used it in my proof that the events must be independent, because one of them is uncaused.

Would you agree that the colour of an apple is independent of the apple's motion?

I don't agree. They are dependent. You either have both of them or have none of them. There is no apple without color but with moton nor an apple with color but without motion.

People do this all the time in stories. I am unclear of the problem. There is a boat called Swallow in the Swallow and Amazon stories. It can have a property, and yet not exist. This to me sounds like the ontological argument in reverse.

Is that your problem? I can say "The beard of the dwarf is brown". The essence (the beard of the dwarf) must exist according to the instantiation principle, even if it only exists in my imagination.

This is a logical fallacy, in that you have the conclusion in the premise 'I think' contains 'I'.

P(X, Y) => Exists(X)
P(I, Thinking) => Exists(I)

I don't see Exists(I) in the premise.

It should be: 'There is thinking' and from that premise, you cannot reach 'I exist'.

'There is thinking' violates instantiation principle. As I already said you can't prove that you exist if you violate instantiation principle. There is no point to repeat me.

You cannot prove that you exist, either, at least not to me, even if cogito ergo sum is accepted.

Isn't that a problem? Can you prove anything? If not, what is the point of this discussion?

Quantum mechanics suggests that particles can indeed exist without impulse. Their motion can be completely undefined (not = zero, but non-existent).

Quote your source please. Last time I checked it was pretty well defined with a wavefunction.

And I did not suggest that the impulse can exist without the particle, although I see no logical contradiction there, either, to be honest.

OK. It is my fault. I used 'impulse' instead of 'momentum'. Please, rethink everything I said using 'momentum' instead of 'impulse'.

What I suggested was that the decay of the particle was one event and the direction the particle took was another event. I see no paradox there.

Go play then with your colorless apples.