You’re mixing two different claims and treating them as the same:
1. Determinism is true.
2. Choice exists, but it is caused.
Those are not the same position.
They are indeed two points of view, or two different angles, but the definition of each implies the other. They do not oppose each other. They both hold to the Law of Causation, and to deny either one is to deny Cause-and-Effect.
And you can’t defend one by borrowing language from the other.
You say determinism “follows logically,” and yet you also say:
• “We admit to choice.”
• “Computers choose.”
• “Dogs choose.”
• “Choice is influenced by evaluation, reasoning, and persuasion.”
But under total determinism, none of those things qualify as “choice.”
Or so you assert. You see, you assume a definition of "choice" that necessarily involves a philosophical notion of Non-Determinism.
They are simply outputs of prior causes.
Of course they are the results of causes.
Calling a predetermined output a “choice” is just relabeling a reflex.
Like I asked before, can you prove that "choice" is not a reflex?
If determinism is total, then:
• Evaluation is caused.
• Reasoning is caused.
• Persuasion is caused.
• Acceptance or rejection of evidence is caused.
• Belief is caused.
And if all of that is caused, then none of it is chosen.
How not?
It is simply what the system was always going to do.
So when you say I have “vacated my denial of choice,” you’re missing the point:
I’m denying the meaningful sense of choice that your argument keeps assuming.
You're assuming "choice" necessarily implies spontaneous motivation, just to write this. Myriad causes are involved in every choice.
You’re using the word “choice” as if it implies agency, deliberation, or selection between alternatives.
But then you insist that all outcomes are fixed by prior causes.
Right you are! And what's the problem with that?
Says who?
Either:
• Choice is real, in which case the agent can select between alternatives,
or
• Determinism is total, in which case the agent cannot select between alternatives.
In total determinism the agent indeed selects between alternatives. Nobody is showing that "alternatives" implies actually available possibilities. Only that they appear to be possible to choose. But, only one is. They do choose between options, supposing themselves above their causes. Even that supposition is part of the causes. We end up choosing even when we know what we prefer and have a pretty good idea why we prefer it. And if we deliberate, it too is part of the causes. The agent, himself caused, is part of what determines his choices. It is all determined.
Your question about “uncaused events” doesn’t solve the contradiction.
I’m not claiming choices are uncaused.
Then they are not "free" in the sense the OP means it.
I’m saying if determinism is total, then “choice” becomes nothing more than a predetermined output—
which means it isn’t choice at all.
Only by your definition, or better, by your use, of 'predetermined'.
So the fork remains:
• If determinism is total, then reasoning, evaluation, persuasion, and choice are illusions.
• If reasoning, evaluation, persuasion, and choice are real, then determinism is not total.
You can’t defend determinism by using the very categories determinism eliminates.
You can't defend non-determinism by using the very categories you assume determinism to eliminate.
In effect, what you have done here is lay down a long-winded tautology, drawn circularly on the assumption that determinism eliminates choice. At best, you are misusing the term, determinism. Below I will give three views/drawn from definitions and encyclopedic articles on the term, "determinism".
According to
Wikipedia:
Determinism is the metaphysical view that all events within the universe can occur only in one possible way. Deterministic theories throughout the history of philosophy have developed from diverse and sometimes overlapping motives and considerations.
— (I disagree with Wikipedia as far as Det. being a metaphysical view. It may be an abstract concept, but a metaphysical view is irrelevant in the concept. It is a naturalistic view, whether metaphysics is considered or not. That is, even in metaphysics, determinism prevails. (Although, it is curious to me, in interactions with those metaphysicists who insist that "God is good" —whatever they mean by that— who otherwise would agree with me on the chains of causation, when I bring into the question of determinism the fact of GOD being the beginning (as First Cause) of all the chains, the protests begin, yet they can't seem to bridge the gap but by the self-contradictory claim that God caused them to be able to choose uncaused.))
Merriam-Webster:
: a theory or doctrine that acts of the will, occurrences in nature, or social or psychological phenomena are causally determined by preceding events or natural laws
.
—I disagree with Webster to the extent that, IF God exists, diving intervention can also be causative, and not just "natural law". The Law of Causation only says that all effects are caused, and not that God is an effect. If he is God, he is not an effect. Therefore, determinism prevails whether or not there is God.
Britannica:
determinism, in philosophy and science, the thesis that all events in the universe, including human decisions and actions, are causally inevitable.... Determinism in this sense is usually understood to be incompatible with free will, or the supposed power or capacity of humans to make decisions or perform actions independently of any prior event or state of the universe.
—There, in all three, you see the inevitable (haha!) incompatibility of determinism, (as they define it), and free will, (as they define it). There is no mention of whether or not they can deliberate, cogitate, or elaborate, nor does it even mention whether choices can be made, but only whether these can happen independently of any prior event or state of the universe.
You lay a presupposition (whether you realize it or not) that determinism is a strange overlap of mere fate, with (apparently) antagonism toward the will of the human agent. But there is no incompatibility.