Free will and determinism

[partinobodycular]

I'll check the video later. But you are confusing predictability with determinism. They are not the same thing.

Yes, you keep claiming this, but you're confusing unpredictability due to a lack of knowledge concerning the initial conditions, as opposed to an indeterminacy in the initial conditions themselves.

If there simply are no precise initial conditions then everything is by its very nature... indeterminate and unpredictable.

Unpredictability due to a lack of knowledge, and unpredictability due to indeterminacy in the initial conditions are two completely different scenarios.

 

[Bradskii]

Yes, you keep claiming this, but you're confusing unpredictability due to a lack of knowledge concerning the initial conditions, as opposed to an indeterminacy in the initial conditions themselves.

If there simply are no precise initial conditions then everything is by its very nature... indeterminate and unpredictable.

Unpredictability due to a lack of knowledge, and unpredictability due to indeterminacy in the initial conditions are two completely different scenarios.

That you can't determine what the conditions are does not mean that there are no initial conditions. That's obviously impossible. And describing them as being indeterminate simply means that you don't know exactly what they are.

'Unpredictability due to a lack of knowledge, and unpredictability due to indeterminacy' mean exactly the same thing. 'Indeterminate' literally means 'not exactly known'. That is, there is a lack of knowledge. You are using the term in a manner that isn't relevant. The opposite of determinism is not indeterminism. And it's not random either. The opposite is non-determinism.

Determinism: The position that all events have causes.
Non-determinism: The position that some events happen with no prior cause.

You support the second definition. But no-one has yet to give an example.

 

[partinobodycular]

That you can't determine what the conditions are does not mean that there are no initial conditions. That's obviously impossible.

Except that those initial conditions are only knowable 'after the fact', and are completely independent of the preceding conditions, and if a system's behavior is independent of the preceding conditions then it's behavior is by definition indeterminate. I.E. not determined by any preceding conditions.

 

[Bradskii]

Except that those initial conditions are only knowable 'after the fact', and are completely independent of the preceding conditions...

How can 'initial conditions' be independent from 'the preceding conditions'. That doesn't make any sense at all.

And it doesn't matter when the initial conditions are known. They are still 'the initial conditions'. And by referencing them you are agreeing that they exist and have some sort of effect. It seems that I have to remind you that your position is that there are no initial/preceding conditions that have any effect whatsoever to an event. Your position is that there are events that have no antecedent conditions.

 

[partinobodycular]

How can 'initial conditions' be independent from 'the preceding conditions'. That doesn't make any sense at all.

Of course it doesn't make sense, but that doesn't mean that it's not correct

Think of it this way, if time is an emergent property, then in our chain of antecedent conditions there has to be a point at which time becomes meaningless, and it simply makes no sense to ask what preceded T⁰.

In the above video the ball will move at time T⁰. But we have absolutely no idea when T⁰ is going to be. Now if we have a system in which there are an infinite number of events all of which will occur at time T⁰, then accurately predicting what will happen at any given moment in time, or any point thereafter, becomes impossible.

It all hinges on the idea that at some fundamental level time becomes meaningless, and cause and effect no longer apply.

You're assuming that cause and effect is a fundamental property of realty, but that might not be the case, and cause and effect may only be discernible retroactively.

 

[Bradskii]

In the above video the ball will move at time T⁰. But we have absolutely no idea when T⁰ is going to be. Now if we have a system in which there are an infinite number of events all of which will occur at time T⁰, then accurately predicting what will happen at any given moment in time, or any point thereafter, becomes impossible.

Yet again, predictability has no correlate with determinism.

It all hinges on the idea that at some fundamental level time becomes meaningless, and cause and effect no longer apply.

Time is a measurement of changes. Time only exists if there is change. Get to Plank time and measurements and things become fuzzy. But we aren't talking about what happens very many, many levels below the here and now of reality.

You're assuming that cause and effect is a fundamental property of realty, but that might not be the case...

Then give me an example. In the here and now. Otherwise that assumption will stand. Saying 'it might not be the case' is saying nothing at all.

...and cause and effect may only be discernible retroactively.

Only meaning that you couldn't have predicted it. See the first comment in this post.

Let me go back to an example I used a long time back in this thread. I broke a string one evening on my guitar. Is it possible to work out all the events that would have that as a cause? No. Absolutely impossible. But it turned out that en route to the music store the following morning I passed a baker and thought 'Great, they do fantastic croissants. I'll take the opportunity to get a couple'. So breaking a string was an antecedent cause for what I had for breakfast.

 

[partinobodycular]

Yet again, predictability has no correlate with determinism.

Except, yet again, if time is an emergent property, then there has to be an interface between the level at which time exists, and the level at which it doesn't. That's simply unavoidable, unless one wishes to argue that time isn't an emergent property, but that's highly unlikely. The more likely scenario is, that below a certain level reality simply isn't coherent. I.E the arrow of time simply doesn't exist, because entropy doesn't exist, because order doesn't exist. Change still happens, it's just that without order, you can't have entropy, and without entropy, you can't have time.

It's just that in our macro world, order exists, therefore entropy exists, therefore time exists. But below that threshold time doesn't exist, and things just happen in no particular order. Now as to what causes order to arise out of disorder, I have no idea. For all I know, you might just as well invoke God, or an observer created reality.

But the point is, that if time is an emergent property, then at some point your deterministic model has to break down. It has to become indeterminate and unpredictable.

 

[Bradskii]

Except, yet again, if time is an emergent property, then there has to be an interface between the level at which time exists, and the level at which it doesn't. That's simply unavoidable, unless one wishes to argue that time isn't an emergent property, but that's highly unlikely. The more likely scenario is, that below a certain level reality simply isn't coherent.

We're not talking about 'below a certain level'. We're talking about the macro level. Where decisions are made.

 

[partinobodycular]

We're not talking about 'below a certain level'. We're talking about the macro level. Where decisions are made.

And your assumption is that for systems on a macro level any aforementioned uncertainty in the initial conditions are so small that they don't matter. Which is entirely dependent upon the level of detail that you're attempting to map. For simple systems such as basic planetary systems the information required is quite small. With the main factor under consideration being gravity. But as systems become more complex the level of information required rapidly increases. To the point where even everyday systems such as the weather are beyond our capacity to predict, assumingly due to our lack of information about the initial conditions.

And that's just the weather.

It's a mistake to assume that there are no systems for which the level of detail required doesn't become so granular as to reach the deterministic threshold. I.E. the threshold beyond which the necessary information simply doesn't exist. Such as where an elementary particle is before you measure it.

In disregarding free will you've simply assumed that as a system the brain and its trillions of neural connections hasn't run headlong into the deterministic threshold. You've assumed that determinism holds true simply because it's impossible to prove that it doesn't. So as with theists and God, you're assuming that you're correct simply because nobody can prove that you're not.

 

[Bradskii]

And your assumption is that for systems on a macro level any aforementioned uncertainty in the initial conditions are so small that they don't matter. Which is entirely dependent upon the level of detail that you're attempting to map. For simple systems such as basic planetary systems the information required is quite small. With the main factor under consideration being gravity. But as systems become more complex the level of information required rapidly increases. To the point where even everyday systems such as the weather are beyond our capacity to predict, assumingly due to our lack of information about the initial conditions.

Why are you insisting on bringing up prediction? It's irrelevant. Yes, in a simple system you can predict the effect of a cause. The boy hits the ball at the window and the glass will break. But it's not possible to predict even where the boy will be a week before the event, let along that he's playing cricket at that particular place and the ball is bowled at just the right position and his swing is just at the right angle so the window breaks. But each of those events had a cause. Undoubtedly. It's undeniable.

It's a mistake to assume that there are no systems for which the level of detail required doesn't become so granular as to reach the deterministic threshold. I.E. the threshold beyond which the necessary information simply doesn't exist. Such as where an elementary particle is before you measure it.

It doesn't matter that you don't actually have the information. It exists whether you have it or not. You are actually questioning if something is determined simply because you don't know what the initial conditions are.

Is it not determined if you don't know but then becomes determined if you do? And that's not a hypothetical question. I'd like you to address it.

In disregarding free will you've simply assumed that as a system the brain and its trillions of neural connections hasn't run headlong into the deterministic threshold. You've assumed that determinism holds true simply because it's impossible to prove that it doesn't. So as with theists and God, you're assuming that you're correct simply because nobody can prove that you're not.

I'm assuming I'm correct because of the laws of physics (at the level at which we are talking), my everyday experience (and everyone else's) for the whole of my life. For every single decision I have made I can tell you some of what the determinants were. Many I am unaware of. Most, in fact, as they are all but infinite in number. But there has never, and I mean literally never, been an instance when I have made a decision when there has been no antecedent condition which determined it. And no-one has been able to give a single example of a decision - or even an event, that was not determined by anything.

If people have something more than 'But it's obvious that we have free will' then surely there'd be some way to show that. To show that a decision was made that wasn't determined by anything.

 

[partinobodycular]

Why are you insisting on bringing up prediction?

Because it matters.

It doesn't matter that you don't actually have the information. It exists whether you have it or not.

Somehow you seem to be missing the point. Let me try to simplify.

You're familiar with the Schrodinger's cat thought experiment... right? Well in the Schrodinger's cat thought experiment we lack information about the state of the particle. It's not just that we don't know the state of the particle, it's that the particle has no fixed state, and it won't have one until after it's measured. Until then it only has a probability.

The odd thing is, that this isn't just true for fundamental particles, it's true for everything. Until something has actually happened, there's never enough information to determine with absolute certainty what's going to happen. Ever. The probability is never 100%. The entire universe can be described by a wave function with a certain probability, and that includes whether or not you're going to have coffee or tea.

Quantum mechanics would seem to tell us that reality isn't deterministic... it's probabilistic. It's just that from our vantage point it certainly looks deterministic.

I'm assuming I'm correct because of the laws of physics (at the level at which we are talking), my everyday experience (and everyone else's) for the whole of my life.

But that's the whole point. Your everyday experience is wrong.

Yes, you're always gonna be able to trace the chain of cause and effect back through the antecedent conditions. So from experience the macro world is always going to look deterministic. But while it's always deterministic looking backwards, it's never deterministic looking forwards, and it's not because you don't have enough information. It's because the information simply doesn't exist. All that exists is a probability. That probability may be extremely high, but it's never 100%.

It's the same way with whether you'll choose to have coffee or tea. Looking backwards the causal chain may seem obvious, and it may also seem obvious looking forward. But quantum mechanics says that the probability is never 100%. Hence whether you'll choose to have coffee or tea is never absolutely certain until you've actually chosen to have coffee or tea. It wasn't certain yesterday, or an hour ago, or five minutes ago.

The question is, when it comes to our choices, what determines the final transition from probability to actuality? Is it merely random chance as it appears to be with the particle in Schrodinger's cat, or could it be that the mind plays a role in the transition from what you might do, to what you actually do do?

 

[Bradskii]

But quantum mechanics says...

I'm not interested in what quantum mechanics says. There may be indeterminacy at that level but we are very many levels above that. We are not operating at the quantum level. Quantum mechanics has no input in whether you go to the pub or the gym. There maybe indeterminate events happening at the lowest level we know of, but as they work their way up towards the macro level there is no effect.

The ball, the bat, the window, the glass itself, there'll be quantum effects relevant to each. But when the bat hits the ball and the ball hits the glass then the glass will break. There was cause and effect working at each stage. Saying 'But if we look at what happens at the quantum level...' doesn't change that process of cause and effect.

In that respect I'll point out that the butterfly flapping it's wings in the Amazon causing a tornado in the US is a metaphor. It's not meant to be taken literally. Tiny effects such as that simply smear out in the grand scheme of things. They become meaningless. You may as well suggest that me taking a few steps to the fridge (which is to the east to me) speeds up the spin of the planet. It's the same with quantum effects. Except they have much, much less effect.

Notwithstanding that I'll assume that you equate indeterminancy with randomness. Do you want to equate randomness with free will? A free will decision is the very opposite of a random decision. Or are you saying that quantum mechanics can still affect decision making? So that a decision can be made with no cause? Literally for no reason? In which case, give me an example.

 

[Ana the Ist]

How do we "get the results" what's our trustworthy portion experience that is supposed to deliver them to us? Don't we have to trust our experiences before we can gather such data? Isn't the very meaning of the word empirical "drawn from experience?" So when did science become free from scientists? Where is this empirical data without an experiencer that is supposed to lead me to conclude that I can't trust my own experience? "You shouldn't trust your own experiences, but you should trust ours when we report them to you." Which is more coherent to doubt, my experiences or the experiences of people I've never met or spoken to? How do I know anyone's taken any measurements at all? Is it more coherent to trust first-hand experiences and deny second hand reports, or trust second hand reports and deny first hand experience? Why should I trust a neuroscientist when he tells me he conducted a study that should lead me to distrust what is possibly the most basic brute fact I can think of?

It really depends upon what you're talking about. Without any context, this is difficult to answer. If you're trying to know what you had for breakfast....feel free to trust your own senses.

 

[Ana the Ist]

Because it matters.



Somehow you seem to be missing the point. Let me try to simplify.

You're familiar with the Schrodinger's cat thought experiment... right? Well in the Schrodinger's cat thought experiment we lack information about the state of the particle. It's not just that we don't know the state of the particle, it's that the particle has no fixed state, and it won't have one until after it's measured. Until then it only has a probability.

The odd thing is, that this isn't just true for fundamental particles, it's true for everything. Until something has actually happened, there's never enough information to determine with absolute certainty what's going to happen. Ever. The probability is never 100%. The entire universe can be described by a wave function with a certain probability, and that includes whether or not you're going to have coffee or tea.

Quantum mechanics would seem to tell us that reality isn't deterministic... it's probabilistic. It's just that from our vantage point it certainly looks deterministic.



But that's the whole point. Your everyday experience is wrong.

Yes, you're always gonna be able to trace the chain of cause and effect back through the antecedent conditions. So from experience the macro world is always going to look deterministic. But while it's always deterministic looking backwards, it's never deterministic looking forwards, and it's not because you don't have enough information. It's because the information simply doesn't exist. All that exists is a probability. That probability may be extremely high, but it's never 100%.

It's the same way with whether you'll choose to have coffee or tea. Looking backwards the causal chain may seem obvious, and it may also seem obvious looking forward. But quantum mechanics says that the probability is never 100%. Hence whether you'll choose to have coffee or tea is never absolutely certain until you've actually chosen to have coffee or tea. It wasn't certain yesterday, or an hour ago, or five minutes ago.

The question is, when it comes to our choices, what determines the final transition from probability to actuality? Is it merely random chance as it appears to be with the particle in Schrodinger's cat, or could it be that the mind plays a role in the transition from what you might do, to what you actually do do?

I brought this up with Hume's argument against inductive logic. It's easier to understand. Rejected without consideration.

 

[Ana the Ist]

I'm not interested in what quantum mechanics says. There may be indeterminacy at that level but we are very many levels above that. We are not operating at the quantum level. Quantum mechanics has no input in whether you go to the pub or the gym. There maybe indeterminate events happening at the lowest level we know of, but as they work their way up towards the macro level there is no effect.

The ball, the bat, the window, the glass itself, there'll be quantum effects relevant to each. But when the bat hits the ball and the ball hits the glass then the glass will break. There was cause and effect working at each stage. Saying 'But if we look at what happens at the quantum level...' doesn't change that process of cause and effect.

In that respect I'll point out that the butterfly flapping it's wings in the Amazon causing a tornado in the US is a metaphor. It's not meant to be taken literally. Tiny effects such as that simply smear out in the grand scheme of things. They become meaningless. You may as well suggest that me taking a few steps to the fridge (which is to the east to me) speeds up the spin of the planet. It's the same with quantum effects. Except they have much, much less effect.

Notwithstanding that I'll assume that you equate indeterminancy with randomness. Do you want to equate randomness with free will? A free will decision is the very opposite of a random decision. Or are you saying that quantum mechanics can still affect decision making? So that a decision can be made with no cause? Literally for no reason? In which case, give me an example.

Define randomness in this context.

It seems entirely unnecessary.

 

[Ana the Ist]

Science doesn't do anything

It does cause some folk to make long winded pointless arguments about determinism because they don't understand it, fundamentally.

 

[Ana the Ist]

Even if they could maybe be in part illusionary, or might be able to be made to operate differently by some of us maybe?

You're the one, Neo.

 

[Ana the Ist]

Please don't ask nonsensical questions.

That's a valid question concerning knowledge.

Much more of this and the conversation will end quite abruptly. You can definitely trust me on that.

Because it's a problem for all the assumptions you've made.

 

[Ana the Ist]

That you can't determine what the conditions are does not mean that there are no initial conditions.

How would you know if there are?

You don't know what you don't know.

Refer to my two doors example and the various "cause of the gaps" arguments made to answer them.

'Unpredictability due to a lack of knowledge, and unpredictability due to indeterminacy' mean exactly the same thing. 'Indeterminate' literally means 'not exactly known'.

It could also mean "impossible to know".

That is, there is a lack of knowledge. You are using the term in a manner that isn't relevant. The opposite of determinism is not indeterminism. And it's not random either. The opposite is non-determinism.

Then why do you demand randomness whenever anyone challenges determinism?

Determinism: The position that all events have causes.

This is too vague since events and causes are the same thing. You're saying "things keep happening".

Non-determinism: The position that some events happen with no prior cause.

No prior identifiable cause....sure.

You support the second definition. But no-one has yet to give an example.

I make a choice, without any consideration, done.

 

[Fervent]

It really depends upon what you're talking about. Without any context, this is difficult to answer. If you're trying to know what you had for breakfast....feel free to trust your own senses.

The point of the post you had quoted was to highlight that some people try to have it both ways, telling us to trust our experiences while denying the relability of our experiences when it comes to questions they think science has demonstrated our experiences untrustworthy. If our experiences are reliable, our experiences of deliberately making choices(free will) are trustworthy...which should cause us to doubt anything that leads us to concluding free will is an illusion rather than deluding ourselves into believing that free will is an illusion