Free will and determinism

[Bradskii]

I don't think we will find agreement, so I'll just wish you a Merry Christmas.

And a happy new year to you, as well.

 

[Bradskii]

Is it really though? If we can't trust our experience on such a basic level, then how can we trust our experience when it reports sense-data to us? If we can't trust our experiences, then it's pointless to talk about empirical justification. Because our experiences aren't trustworthy, so anything we conclude from them is untrustworthy. So when do our experiences become trustworthy?

I think that we should accept that they are trustworthy. Until it is shown otherwise.

 

[Fervent]

I think that we should accept that they are trustworthy. Until it is shown otherwise.

Shown otherwise by what? If our experience shows that some part of our seemingly undeniable experience is untrustworthy, then how do we know we're trusting the right part of our experience? How do I know it's not my sensations lying to me rather than my sense that I am in control of my actions? If one of them has to go as an illusion, then shouldn't we go with the one with epistemic priority? Which is more coherent to doubt, my own distinct existence or the existence of the world external to myself?

 

[Tinker Grey]

If our experience shows that some part of our seemingly undeniable experience is untrustworthy, then how do we know we're trusting the right part of our experience?

When you get the results you predicted.

 

[Fervent]

When you get the results you predicted.

How do we "get the results" what's our trustworthy portion experience that is supposed to deliver them to us? Don't we have to trust our experiences before we can gather such data? Isn't the very meaning of the word empirical "drawn from experience?" So when did science become free from scientists? Where is this empirical data without an experiencer that is supposed to lead me to conclude that I can't trust my own experience? "You shouldn't trust your own experiences, but you should trust ours when we report them to you." Which is more coherent to doubt, my experiences or the experiences of people I've never met or spoken to? How do I know anyone's taken any measurements at all? Is it more coherent to trust first-hand experiences and deny second hand reports, or trust second hand reports and deny first hand experience? Why should I trust a neuroscientist when he tells me he conducted a study that should lead me to distrust what is possibly the most basic brute fact I can think of?

 

[Neogaia777]

Shown otherwise by what? If our experience shows that some part of our seemingly undeniable experience is untrustworthy, then how do we know we're trusting the right part of our experience? How do I know it's not my sensations lying to me rather than my sense that I am in control of my actions? If one of them has to go as an illusion, then shouldn't we go with the one with epistemic priority? Which is more coherent to doubt, my own distinct existence or the existence of the world external to myself?

In my opinion, our sense that we are in control of our actions, and not something else that has already decided them, comes from and is a part of our rebellious nature. But if we somehow learned through our experience that we couldn't always trust our senses, and that reality could maybe be different, or maybe be made into something else by us entirely, etc, then it would be because you learned that through or by all of your experiences up to that point that were all a part of determinism, or were all caused still, etc, and anything new that you learned or decided to do was also caused, even if you somehow learned how to somehow change or decide or dictate your reality after that, etc, that new knowledge that you now have was caused (and always known) by the theoretical One that always knew/knows all, or that caused all to happen/go from the very beginning, etc. You can't surprise that One with anything, and nothing ever doesn't always go/happen according to that ones will always that was already decided/set forth from the very beginning, or right before it, etc. So if you somehow learned how to not trust your senses always, and maybe got the ability to change or alter some of our current reality sometimes always, then it would be because it was that One's will to bring you to that always, and also whatever happens or whatever you might decide to do after that always, etc. That One is actually the One that made/makes it happen always, and makes/made it happen (even from before the very beginning) always, etc. And who knows, the second you drop this whole free will act that is a part of our rebellious nature, and you truly realize that it is not any of you doing it/that ever anyways, you might just maybe might be able to tap into something like that maybe, etc.

About maybe not trusting your senses though, take a look at this thread here below, etc.

Quantum Superposition, Simulations, Simulated realities, and other thoughts.

Quite a bit of random information to be dropped here, so be ready? The point is discussion, and to discuss, etc. Some of my thoughts about quantum theories made me think of this, or brought this up, if you want to discuss this scientifically, etc. I guess video games is maybe where I should...

www.christianforums.com

God Bless.

 

[Tinker Grey]

How do we "get the results" what's our trustworthy portion experience that is supposed to deliver them to us?

If I'm satisfied with the results, isn't that real enough?

It's like "are we living in a simulation"? Well, it hardly matters. The world appears to work. I can live in it. I can make predictions. I can learn from my mistakes.

The consistency of a set of predictions and outcomes is all one needs to live.

 

[Neogaia777]

If I'm satisfied with the results, isn't that real enough?

It's like "are we living in a simulation"? Well, it hardly matters. The world appears to work. I can live in it. I can make predictions. I can learn from my mistakes.

The consistency of a set of predictions and outcomes is all one needs to live.

Even if they could maybe be in part illusionary, or might be able to be made to operate differently by some of us maybe?

 

[Fervent]

If I'm satisfied with the results, isn't that real enough?

Is it?

It's like "are we living in a simulation"? Well, it hardly matters. The world appears to work. I can live in it. I can make predictions. I can learn from my mistakes.

I have no qualms with that. My issue is that there is a metaphysical commitment that need not be assumed that creates all sorts of oddities but most of those oddities go away when we remove that metaphysical commitment and instead use an ontologically neutral term for our scientific model.

The consistency of a set of predictions and outcomes is all one needs to live.

The problem is that most metaphysical naturalists presume that a metaphysical commitment to physicalism is either implied or entailed by the devices of science and then presume that the success of science demonstrates the probable truth of their metaphysical understanding of science. But science is ontologically neutral until we introduce metaphysical baggage. And occam's razor says we should not multiply entities necessarily, so if we can avoid making that metaphysical commitment than we should. And we can, so why do so many physicalists presume that there is an ntrinsic link between science and their metaphysical understanding of science?

 

[Tinker Grey]

The problem is that most metaphysical naturalists presume that a metaphysical commitment to physicalism is either implied or entailed by the devices of science and then presume that the success of science demonstrates the probable truth of their metaphysical understanding of science.

I don't assume or presume anything. If it works, it works. The rest is metaphysical/philosophical wankery.

 

[Fervent]

I don't assume or presume anything. If it works, it works. The rest is metaphysical/philosophical wankery.

The metaphysical/philosophical is hugely important since our interpretations of science depend on it. And our terms often end up being metaphysiically laden even if we claim not to be engaging in metaphysics. The theories themselves tend not to involve metaphysical notions, especially when we get into purer physics and math, but calling the model "physical" has metaphysical indications that alter how we conceive of the results. We think in terms of ontologies and substance, but science operates in terms of the phenomenon themselves. The model is defined tautologically, and then ostensively. But what we call the model changes how we think about it in ways that seem to be creating problems that are making the theories make less sense and we're simply told to ignore our instinctual, basically self-apparent apprehension of reality in favor of an incomprehensible mess that has created debate over whether or not consciousness is an illusion. Most of the most vexing mind-body problems resolve when we remove physicalism from the equation and instead accept a non-physicalist neutral monist model.

My interest is not to dissuade anyone from engaging in science as they always have, it is to stop it from being able to be used as a blugeon based on unnecessary metaphysical baggage inherent in the way we talk about science. The process is ontologically neutral, and I think our conceptual model should strive to be as well by using ontologically neutral language.

 

[Tinker Grey]

The metaphysical/philosophical is hugely important since our interpretations of science depend on it. And our terms often end up being metaphysiically laden even if we claim not to be engaging in metaphysics. The theories themselves tend not to involve metaphysical notions, especially when we get into purer physics and math, but calling the model "physical" has metaphysical indications that alter how we conceive of the results. We think in terms of ontologies and substance, but science operates in terms of the phenomenon themselves. The model is defined tautologically, and then ostensively. But what we call the model changes how we think about it in ways that seem to be creating problems that are making the theories make less sense and we're simply told to ignore our instinctual, basically self-apparent apprehension of reality in favor of an incomprehensible mess that has created debate over whether or not consciousness is an illusion. Most of the most vexing mind-body problems resolve when we remove physicalism from the equation and instead accept a non-physicalist neutral monist model.

My interest is not to dissuade anyone from engaging in science as they always have, it is to stop it from being able to be used as a blugeon based on unnecessary metaphysical baggage inherent in the way we talk about science. The process is ontologically neutral, and I think our conceptual model should strive to be as well by using ontologically neutral language.

Science depends only on what works. Philosophers just like to think otherwise.

 

[Fervent]

Science depends only on what works. Philosophers just like to think otherwise.

Science isn't self-interpreting. And so long as there are conceptions of what science tells us about what it is exactly that science studies, there are metaphysics involved. We don't think of the model as a model, we think of it as a metaphysical concept that is telling us the true nature of being by examining how it behaves. But it's not clear that we can shoot a direct line from phenomenal to ontological but all of our terms in science are ontological. Science doesn't study matter or causes, it studies effects.

 

[Tinker Grey]

Science isn't self-interpreting. And so long as there are conceptions of what science tells us about what it is exactly that science studies, there are metaphysics involved. We don't think of the model as a model, we think of it as a metaphysical concept that is telling us the true nature of being by examining how it behaves. But it's not clear that we can shoot a direct line from phenomenal to ontological but all of our terms in science are ontological. Science doesn't study matter or causes, it studies effects.

Science doesn't try to interpret itself. It interprets data. If it works, it works. No metaphysics needed.

 

[Fervent]

Science doesn't try to interpret itself. It interprets data. If it works, it works. No metaphysics needed.

Science doesn't do anything, scientists interpret data and then they interpret what the data means and express their findings in terms of human language. Human language involves concepts that could be prejudicial to one metaphysical concept over another and introduce an element of "empiirical support" to a metaphysical understanding that does not exist. Metaphysics can't be escaped, and all claiming it doesn't have a role in the process means is whatever metaphysical understanding you adopt from how you understand the explanations is going to be accepted without critical examination. In other words, all I'm suggesting is we should remain skeptical of metaphysics by actively criticizing the metaphysics of science. Sometimes we need to realize that no matter what the theories seem to involve if a metaphysical element of the theory requires us to believe something that is absurd on its face then we need to reject that theory because it reduces the sensibility of our explanation.

 

[Bradskii]

Shown otherwise by what? If our experience shows that some part of our seemingly undeniable experience is untrustworthy, then how do we know we're trusting the right part of our experience? How do I know it's not my sensations lying to me rather than my sense that I am in control of my actions? If one of them has to go as an illusion, then shouldn't we go with the one with epistemic priority? Which is more coherent to doubt, my own distinct existence or the existence of the world external to myself?

Look, you have to deal with what you consider to be reality in your own way. But you can't pick and choose what might be unreal and what isn't. You have to literally doubt everything. Including your personal beliefs. Because they have been formed by what you have read, been told and by what you have experienced. All external to you.

To be honest, I actually do doubt everything. I just can't be bothered putting 'As far as I know...' in front of everything I say. But just assume it's there and you'll be fine. It doesn't change anything I've said.

 

[Fervent]

Look, you have to deal with what you consider to be reality in your own way. But you can't pick and choose what might be unreal and what isn't. You have to literally doubt everything. Including your personal beliefs. Because they have been formed by what you have read, been told and by what you have experienced. All external to you.

What I have experienced is external to me? And I have questioned my beliefs, as well as the metaphysical underpinnings of science and the methodologies of science. What I found is that the metaphysics don't appear to hold water and that people who believe the metaphysics end up believing things that are absurd on their face because they are self-refuting. So are you willing to do what you advise yourself and question the metaphysical and epistemic foundations upon which your worldview is based? Are you willing to question metaphysical naturalism, or the idea that the physical world is fundamental? Are you willing to be radicallly skeptical and question everything including the reliabiliity of science in revealing objective truth?

To be honest, I actually do doubt everything. I just can't be bothered putting 'As far as I know...' in front of everything I say. But just assume it's there and you'll be fine. It doesn't change anything I've said.

To a certain extent I doubt everything that I believe can be coherently doubted. My faith doesn't depend on the absence of doubt, nor does it depend entirely upon an arbitrary decision to believe without questioning it. A big part of why I believe in God on an intellectual level is because everything I know about the world depends on His existence such that to question His existence would leave me in solipsism and nihilism. But that foundation seems to be corroborated in my understanding of philosophy, anthropology, and history in addition to the sum total of my experience.

 

[Bradskii]

...if a metaphysical element of the theory requires us to believe something that is absurd on its face then we need to reject that theory because it reduces the sensibility of our explanation.

Scientific theories are explanations about the physical world. There are no metaphysical explanations required. And you don't reject a theory because you think it's absurd. You may indeed think it's absurd, but you can reject it only if there is a better explanation.

 

[Fervent]

Scientific theories are explanations about the physical world. There are no metaphysical explanations required. And you don't reject a theory because you think it's absurd. You may indeed think it's absurd, but you can reject it only if there is a better explanation.

There is an obvious metaphysical statement in your first sentence. Scientific theories are theories of natural causation. Whether they refer to a world or not is a metaphysical question.

 

[Bradskii]

What I have experienced is external to me?

Obviously. You experience it internally (again obviously) but the source is external to you.

And I have questioned my beliefs, as well as the metaphysical underpinnings of science and the methodologies of science.

This is not a case of 'Oh yeah, I did that'. If you are going to to claim that we can't trust our senses then that includes you and you can't pick and choose what you doubt and when you doubt it. Otherwise you're going to end up claiming that everything is in doubt - except that which you already believe.

And that's not going to fly.