Free will and determinism

[Bradskii]

There is an obvious metaphysical statement in your first sentence. Scientific theories are theories of natural causation. Whether they refer to a world or not is a metaphysical question.

It's not a question. If you think it should be then you're back to doubting everything. Something tells me you don't. That same something else tells me that you'll choose what to doubt. And that it will be that which contradicts what you already believe.

 

[Fervent]

Obviously. You experience it internally (again obviously) but the source is external to you.

What makes you believe this?

This is not a case of 'Oh yeah, I did that'. If you are going to to claim that we can't trust our senses then that includes you and you can't pick and choose what you doubt and when you doubt it. Otherwise you're going to end up claiming that everything is in doubt - except that which you already believe.

No, there are somethings that don't seem to be coherently doubtable. I can't doubt my own subjective experiences, and I can't doubt the existence of the world of extension. But if I take either as fundamental, I am forced to doubt the other. Cartesian skepticism doesn't leave us without reasons for holding to something, though they are uncertain. But did you not just tell me to literally question everything? Now I shouldn't? Should I only question those things that you believe are reasonable to question?

And that's not going to fly.

It does, actually. Because it clarifies what I believe to be true and to be reasonable to believe. Does it matter if someone else is convinced by my reasons? Not really, but if I don't doubt everything and hold that everything is in doubt then how do I know that I don't believe something unreasonable? I'm not afraid to not be able to explain everything from the powers of my own mind, so I can toy with radical skepticism to make sure that I haven't adopted something that I find unreasonable. I don't need axioms or truth, because I can fall back on faith. And by that I mean an ignorant acceptance that the thing that is fundamental to reality is best called God. From there, everything else about my beliefs becomes accessible through arguments that convince me. So tell me, why should I question only those beliefs that you think are unreasonable and not all of my beliefs including those that society at large would have me adopt?

 

[Fervent]

It's not a question. If you think it should be then you're back to doubting everything. Something tells me you don't. That same something else tells me that you'll choose what to doubt. And that it will be that which contradicts what you already believe.

It very much is a question, because science studies behaviors and theorizes objects based on a tautological statement that is defined ostensively. Doubting science's philosophical aspects doesn't require me to doubt everything, especially because the success of science can be explained entirely through its methods without consideration of its ontology. So by occam, if I don't need to consider the ontology of science to accept the findings of science then I see no reason to. So how do we link the phenomenal observations and underlying being? I can doubt those metaphysical issues without rejecting the mechanical pathways that science identifies. The model is a map, but it isn't necessariily the only map. And if or how it refers is worth questioning.

 

[Bradskii]

What makes you believe this?

Because the source of everything that you experience is external to you.

No, there are somethings that don't seem to be coherently doubtable. I can't doubt my own subjective experiences...

But they rely on your senses. And you questioned whether we could trust them.

So tell me, why should I question only those beliefs that you think are unreasonable and not all of my beliefs including those that society at large would have me adopt?

You already answered your own question. You said we couldn't trust our senses. If you can't then you have to doubt everything.

 

[Bradskii]

It very much is a question...

Not regarding determinism and free will it isn't. You can start addressing that matter if you like. That's where I'll be if you consider rejoining the question raised of in the op.

 

[Fervent]

Because the source of everything that you experience is external to you.

What makes you so sure?

But they rely on your senses. And you questioned whether we could trust them.

Not exacty. What I said is why should I prefer to trust my senses to my experience of control over my actions? If my experiences are that untrustworthy, then how can I trust empirical data at all?

You already answered your own question. You said we couldn't trust our senses. If you can't then you have to doubt everything.

Again, it's because the problem crops up when we deny our base experience in which it appears we control our actions and our bodies respond to our will. How can that be if I'm just matter obeying semantically empty laws?

 

[Fervent]

Not regarding determinism and free will it isn't. You can start addressing that matter if you like. That's where I'll be if you consider rejoining the question raised of in the op.

I can trust my experience, so I can trust my experiences of seemingly operating with free will and take them at face value. Why should free will being an illusion be any more reasonable than the world of extension that you seem to believe is determined? I believe the world external to myself has agency, so I can have deterministic behavior and some measure of free will without needing to resort to calling either my base experiences of free will an illusion or the trustworthyness of my senses and the various mechanical relationships I can develop. To deny free will to me is absurd, and to deny so on an empirical basis is self-refuting. If I can trust my experiences, I can trust that I have free will. If I can't trust my experiences, I can't trust empirical arguments.

 

[Bradskii]

If I can't trust my experiences, I can't trust empirical arguments.

If you can trust your experiences then you must trust the external world. On which your experiences are based. If you can't trust the external world or you find that an aspect of the external world that you believed to be correct was wrong then your experiences will have been based on something that's not true.

For example, our experience is that the sun rises in the east. We don't experience the world turning towards the sun. But now we know that the earth spins on it's axis and the sun is relatively stationary so our experience of the sun rising is wrong. Even though everything that we experience tells us that it's right.

I'm sure we can agree on that example.

 

[Neogaia777]

For example, our experience is that the sun rises in the east. We don't experience the world turning towards the sun. But now we know that the earth spins on it's axis and the sun is relatively stationary so our experience of the sun rising is wrong. Even though everything that we experience tells us that it's right.

Do you think we could still have some experiences today, but maybe with some other things, that might be like that for us today maybe?

Where everything we are experiencing always tells us one thing, and so we automatically always accept and believe that, and we have come to always expect that, because that is what all of our experiences with it are telling us, etc, but it's maybe not all always that way maybe in all actuality?

I'm thinking about some of the ways this reality works in this instance right now currently? What if we just don't have all of the facts right now, like how it was with us with the sun rising or setting, but only this as it applies to the subject of this (physical) reality maybe, etc? What if there exists a more kind of information or knowledge about it that would allow us to maybe do some other kinds of things in or with it maybe, etc? I think some of what is in, or has/is being discovered in QM/QP/QT, puts this all in doubt, or calls this all into question maybe, etc? Can't trust our own experiences/expectations in this reality, because it might not even be real, and our senses could be deceiving us here in this reality, etc, and there is maybe another way of how or what it's supposed to be like maybe, etc? And not just only for us, or maybe just our own selves only, etc, but maybe for everyone in it maybe?

Take Care/God Bless.

 

[Bradskii]

Do you think we could still have some experiences today, but maybe with some other things, that might be like that for us today maybe?

I'm pretty certain that we will. Just from increased knowledge.

 

[Fervent]

If you can trust your experiences then you must trust the external world. On which your experiences are based. If you can't trust the external world or you find that an aspect of the external world that you believed to be correct was wrong then your experiences will have been based on something that's not true.

On what basis am I supposed to trust the external world? If I can't trust my experiences, I can't trust that there is an external world. How can I move from my experiences to the external world if I can't trust my experiences? I have no basis to justify what I learn about the external world, because my experiences are not trustworthy. So I have no way to justifiably hold anything as true. So what am I suppose to trust, exactly?

For example, our experience is that the sun rises in the east. We don't experience the world turning towards the sun. But now we know that the earth spins on it's axis and the sun is relatively stationary so our experience of the sun rising is wrong. Even though everything that we experience tells us that it's right.

And how do I know the world is turning towards the sun? What's my basis for justification?

I'm sure we can agree on that example.

I'm not sure, how am I supposed to justify my knowledge? My experiences are supposedly untrustworthy, so I don't know if I can reliably determine anything at all to be true. How am I supposed to develop knowledge about the physical world? I have to start with my experiences, but since they're untrustworthy anything I know about the physical world is suspect. So how am I supposed to trust science?

 

[Bradskii]

On what basis am I supposed to trust the external world? If I can't trust my experiences, I can't trust that there is an external world. How can I move from my experiences to the external world if I can't trust my experiences? I have no basis to justify what I learn about the external world, because my experiences are not trustworthy. So I have no way to justifiably hold anything as true. So what am I suppose to trust, exactly?

You trust that what you just wrote will appear on my tablet. You trust that the light will come on when you flick the switch. You trust that your brakes will work when you next drive your car.

And how do I know the world is turning towards the sun? What's my basis for justification?

Please don't ask nonsensical questions.

I'm not sure, how am I supposed to justify my knowledge? My experiences are untrustworthy, so I don't know if I can reliably determine anything at all to be true.

Much more of this and the conversation will end quite abruptly. You can definitely trust me on that.

 

[Fervent]

You trust that what you just wrote will appear on my tablet. You trust that the light will come on when you flick the switch. You trust that your brakes will work when you next drive your car.

Yeah, but that trust begins with trust in my experiences. If I can trust my experiences, I can trust my experiences of free will. If I can't trust my experiences of free will, then I lose any basis for justifying any belief that follows from experience. You're cutting yourself off at your knees, and gleefully going down the garden path. You think you're so wise, but you've destroyed your epistemic foundations.

Please don't ask nonsensical questions.

It's not a nonsensical question. If my basic experience is so fundamentally mistaken that what I experience about myself is mistaken, then I certainly can't dependably rely on anything that comes from my physical senses. Which means I can't trust what science says, if it demands that I deny something so central to my experience.

Much more of this and the conversation will end quite abruptly. You can definitely trust me on that.

So? It's a simple question...if my fundamental experiences can be so drastically mistaken, how do I justifiably hold anything true? If I am so easiily fooled, how can I move to developing an understanding based on my senses? I have no epistemic basis to build upon.

 

[Bradskii]

It's not a nonsensical question.

It most certainly is. This is a discussion about practical matters. And in situations like this, where it's difficult to get even a simple agreement as a basis for continuing, I will make a statement that is quite impossible to deny, ask for agreement and continue from that point. If the other person refuses then I know they are not arguing in good faith.

You can't get more basic than 'the earth spins on it's axis so the sun appears to rise.'

If you refuse to accept that as a basic, reasonable and undeniable fact about the world, then you'll get a Merry Xmas from me and you can find someone else on whom to practice what I'm sure you think is a deep and meaningful philosophical take on metaphysics. I've got better things to do with my time.

 

[Fervent]

It most certainly is. This is a discussion about practical matters. And in situations like this, where it's difficult to get even a simple agreement as a basis for continuing, I will make a statement that is quite impossible to deny, ask for agreement and continue from that point. If the other person refuses then I know they are not arguing in good faith.

This isn't about agreement or disagreement, this is about how we justify our knowledge. So while I recognize that what you have stated is true, how I am supposed to get to that truth if I can't take my experiences as fundamentally trustworthy. You have cut yourself off at the knees by denying that our basic conscious experience is generally trustworthy. If free will is an illusion, then our experiences aren't trustworthy enough to proceed to from our experience to the science.

You can't get more basic than 'the earth spins on it's axis so the sun appears to rise.'

The question is, how do we get from untrustworthy experience to the earth's rotation? What are our epistemics supposed to be based upon?

If you refuse to accept that as a basic, reasonable and undeniable fact about the world, then you'll get a Merry Xmas from me and you can find someone else on whom to practice what I'm sure you think is a deep and meaningful philosophical take on metaphysics. I've got better things to do with my time.

The factual status isn't the issue, it's how I'm supposed to proceed from an untrustworthy experience to facts about the world.

 

[Bradskii]

The factual status isn't the issue, it's how I'm supposed to proceed from an untrustworthy experience to facts about the world.

But you do accept the fact that the earth is turning and thus it looks like the sun is rising? I'm not asking how you got to the decision. This not delving into metaphysics or how we can know what is true. It's not a deep dive into the philosophical mysteries of philosophy and reality. It's a simple question.

Do you accept that the earth is spinning on its axis? Any qualifications you add to your answer will be ignored. It's a simple yes or no. Just tick the one box please.

 

[Fervent]

But you do accept the fact that the earth is turning and thus it looks like the sun is rising? I'm not asking how you got to the decision. This not delving into metaphysics or how we can know what is true. It's not a deep dive into the philosophical mysteries of philosophy and reality. It's a simple question.

What does metaphysics have to do with this? I think you mean epistemics. Though I'm not sure what whether I accept that as factual has to do with the conversation, because the issue isn't the status of it as a fact but how I am supposed to arrive at that fact if I can be fundamentally mistaken about my own experiences. How am I supposed to get to that point?

Do you accept that the earth is spinning on its axis? Any qualifications you add to your answer will be ignored. It's a simple yes or no. Just tick the one box please.

How am I supposed to get there? How do I justify that acceptance? What's the basis?

 

[Bradskii]

What does metaphysics have to do with this? I think you mean epistemics. Though I'm not sure what whether I accept that as factual has to do with the conversation, because the issue isn't the status of it as a fact but how I am supposed to arrive at that fact if I can be fundamentally mistaken about my own experiences. How am I supposed to get to that point?

How am I supposed to get there? How do I justify that acceptance? What's the basis?

Have an nice Xmas. See, I told you that you could at least trust that promise.

 

[partinobodycular]

All decisions we make are determined by existing and prior influences. There has been an effectively infinite chain of events which has resulted in me sitting here writing this sentence. They have all led to this point. From the major events - I was born at a specific time and place, to the minor ones - it's raining today, to the seemingly inconsequential - I broke a string on my guitar last night.

There is no way that existence cannot be described other than determined.

The question is then not whether we make decisions that affect the trajectory of future events - I obviously decided to do this rather than something else. But if free will is defined as the ability to make decisions that are not determined by prior events and we could rerun the last hour exactly as it happened and make a different decision, then something actually needs to be different. But rerunning it exactly as it happened means that nothing is different.

So free will cannot be compatible with determinism. And if existence is deterministic then free will is an illusion.

This video just dropped on Youtube!

Now you might argue that this doesn't apply in the macro world, but remember we're talking about a potentially infinite set of antecedent conditions. Which would mean that there's an infinite number of chances for indeterminism to creep into the equation. Which means that even given a precise set of initial conditions it's impossible to predict a system's behavior beyond a finite period of time, and the more complex that system is, the shorter that period of time should be.

Thus in any system, no matter what it's size, there's always a non-zero chance that determinism fails.

 

[Bradskii]

This video just dropped on Youtube!

Now you might argue that this doesn't apply in the macro world, but remember we're talking about a potentially infinite set of antecedent conditions. Which would mean that there's an infinite number of chances for indeterminism to creep into the equation. Which means that even given a precise set of initial conditions it's impossible to predict a system's behavior beyond a finite period of time, and the more complex that system is, the shorter that period of time should be.

Thus in any system, no matter what it's size, there's always a non-zero chance that determinism fails.

I'll check the video later. But you are confusing predictability with determinism. They are not the same thing. The weather is unpredictable a year from now. But there really is no doubt that whatever it will be will have been caused by prior conditions (it's plainly not a random event). Just because you don't know today what thoseconditions will be in a year's time doesn't mean it's not deterministic.