Euthyphro's Dilemma (for atheists)

[Kylie]

Of the things you do call moral, you never call them moral because you prefer them.

Honestly, I've never really thought about it. And for me to say one way or another would involve more thought than I'm able to give at the moment.

 

[zippy2006]

Actually I'm being deliberately vague here...one can judge a behavior as "good" without expressing approval (for example, one can see teaching a child to read as good but disapprove of the methodology).

[...]

This is what I think is the interesting part. Do you express every judgment to everyone? Of course not...in real life, you inevitably keep certain judgments entirely to yourself. You have no utility in sharing them. You probably understand how rare they are, the reaction they get, so there's no real utility in sharing them. To do so invites conflict.

Again, it's better to look at this as a phenomenon arising from social interaction. Imagine a bunch of people who are constantly asking each other how something makes them, and reacting to each other. By finding others who see actions similarly....you can determine the degree to which you and the group agree (and thereby decrease the likelihood you will transgress against the morals of the group) and you can also begin to describe the nature of the behavior you and your in-group agree upon.

That's how we might say a moral "framework" is "constructed". This is mostly done by 3rd party observers, as 1st and 2nd party actors are almost certainly going to paint themselves in the most sympathetic light.

Okay, so you've pointed to three aspects of morality:

1. An assignment of value to the act, either "positive" or "negative,"
2. The emotional reaction that results from the act (?), and
3. "...to the degree of social utility to other parties" (?)​

You prefer to leave (1) vague, you see (2) as something which precedes a moral judgment, and you see (3) as a condition for sharing your thoughts with other people.

You asked me why I thought it would be better to talk about moral judgments rather than morality. On my view it is more precise. On my view one's morality is just the set of moral judgments that one has formed, whether real or possible, concrete or general. If I am correct in this then (1) is the crucial piece of the puzzle. (2) simply explains why and when moral judgments occur (although it assumes that moral judgments are emotion-elicited). (3) simply provides the condition when we decide our private moral judgment should be made public, but on my view it is already a moral judgment even before it is made public (although it might be challenged and revised once it enters the public sphere). So the central, intrinsic nature of moral judgments revolves around (1) rather than (2) or (3).

I think (1) needs to be less vague. In #201 you said that we must "clear up the ambiguity of the language." You implied that "right" and "wrong" are too vague, and instead substituted "positive" and "negative." Then when I asked what those terms actually mean, you said, "I'm being deliberately vague here."

So what does it mean to consider something "positive" or "negative"? And are we assigning this value to the moral act or the moral judgment? I only ask because in #201 you oddly claimed that the value is assigned to the moral judgment, whereas I would think that it is primarily assigned to the moral act that is being judged. Finally, to come back to the OP, are "positive" and "negative" reducible to preference, or not?

 

[Ana the Ist]

Okay, so you've pointed to three aspects of morality:

Yeah...there's more obviously, but these three are necessary for judgements.

You prefer to leave (1) vague, you see

Well it is vague. Good is a relative term. It's relative to you, me, to "bad" etc.

(2) as something which precedes a moral judgment, and you see

Typically yeah.

(3) as a condition for sharing your thoughts with other people.

I'd even go so far as to say it's a condition making a moral statement.

You asked me why I thought it would be better to talk about moral judgments rather than morality.

Actually I'm not entirely certain why you see these as different.

On my view it is more precise.

In what way?

On my view one's morality is just the set of moral judgments that one has formed, whether real or possible, concrete or general.

Are you walking around with a set of moral judgements in your mind ?

They almost never occur to me unless I engage in their formation because I've encountered a situation that I've never encountered before...or I engage in moral judgment with someone

If I am correct in this then (1) is the crucial piece of the puzzle.

Puzzle?

(2) simply explains why and when moral judgments occur (although it assumes that moral judgments are emotion-elicited).

Are they not?

Again, I can go through my day counting up every possible moral action and it would never occur to me to judge 99.9% of them.

The exceptions all have a common link.

(3) simply provides the condition when we decide our private moral judgment should be made public,

3 isn't really a "should" description.

but on my view it is already a moral judgment even before it is made public

Possibly, but we can't know until it's made public.

Let's assume you're correct.

Are there some things which we can state to a relative certainty about morality?

(although it might be challenged and revised once it enters the public sphere).

We can test this...

We could, for example, find a Christian who has a strong in-group bias, ask his/her opinion on a moral behavior, and then calmly explain why the group feels differently.

I betcha over a relatively short time we can create in-group conformity

So the central, intrinsic nature of moral judgments revolves around (1) rather than (2) or (3).

I used to think that....then I changed my view.

If I created a question about the morality of a trans-woman fighting a biological woman at the professional level of MMA....how many people do you think could confidently make a moral statement? Absent from the safety of anonymity?

How many do you think would hold that position if their "in-group" switched positions? How many do you think hold the exact same position as their political in-group right now???

That's why I find it surprising that you think people are actually holding moral judgements. A very small group are.... very very few. 95%+ aren't. 95% are looking at the 3rd party for in-group status signifiers.

No....3rd party observers are where the judgements get made and propagated.

1st party actors have motives, but those are unknowns. I don't think they could honestly say them even if they knew them.

2nd party recipients have too unique a perspective to accurately assess 3rd party judgments.

I think (1) needs to be less vague. In #201 you said that we must "clear up the ambiguity of the language."

'Good" carries too many alternative definitions.

If you can explain what you mean by good....in a moral sense....to any degree of unambiguousness....I'd like to hear it.

You implied that "right" and "wrong" are too vague, and instead substituted "positive" and "negative." Then when I asked what those terms actually mean, you said, "I'm being deliberately vague here."

Any subjective valuation of feelings.

So what does it mean to consider something "positive" or "negative"?

See above.

And are we assigning this value to the moral act or the moral judgment? I only ask because in #201 you oddly claimed that the value is assigned to the moral judgment, whereas I would think that it is primarily assigned to the moral act that is being judged. Finally, to come back to the OP, are "positive" and "negative" reducible to preference, or not?

 

[Moral Orel]

Honestly, I've never really thought about it. And for me to say one way or another would involve more thought than I'm able to give at the moment.

That was something you already said way back in the beginning when you ruled out number (2).

If you aren't into responding more now, that's cool. If you never feel like jumping back in, that's cool too.

Let me spell out the problems associated with the options for you. For (2) most people recognize right away that morality becomes totally arbitrary if it is determined by personal preference. Most folks can't accept that. The problem with (1) is that what is good has to be intrinsically good. And it's impossible to justify rationally that something is intrinsically good. So things must be good/evil for no reason at all.

No reason or arbitrary reasons, those are the choices. As a Moral Subjectivist, I've accepted that (2) is true, as unsatisfying as it is. I don't vote in my own polls, though.

 

[Ana the Ist]

That was something you already said way back in the beginning when you ruled out number (2).

If you aren't into responding more now, that's cool. If you never feel like jumping back in, that's cool too.

Let me spell out the problems associated with the options for you. For (2) most people recognize right away that morality becomes totally arbitrary if it is determined by personal preference. Most folks can't accept that. The problem with (1) is that what is good has to be intrinsically good. And it's impossible to justify rationally that something is intrinsically good. So things must be good/evil for no reason at all.

No reason or arbitrary reasons, those are the choices. As a Moral Subjectivist, I've accepted that (2) is true, as unsatisfying as it is. I don't vote in my own polls, though.

I don't see how you concluded preferences = morality.

Saying that you prefer preferred outcomes is a tautology.

There are plenty of things I can describe as morally good which I do not prefer.

 

[Moral Orel]

There are plenty of things I can describe as morally good which I do not prefer.

There are plenty of things that you call morally good that you personally don't like to do. But as long as you think it's better that some folk do those things, you prefer those things over a lack of those things.

 

[Ana the Ist]

There are plenty of things that you call morally good that you personally don't like to do.

Actually, I can think of morally good things that I prefer no one had to do.

 

[Moral Orel]

Actually, I can think of morally good things that I prefer no one had to do.

No one "had to do"? But I bet you prefer that what "has to get done" gets done, dontcha?

 

[Strivax]

Greed is a subset of self indulgence

I think the word you need is avarice, rather than greed, which the early church fathers considered to be one of the seven deadly sins.

Best wishes, Strivax.

 

[Ana the Ist]

No one "had to do"? But I bet you prefer that what "has to get done" gets done, dontcha?

But I'd prefer if no one had to.

 

[Astrid]

I think the word you need is avarice, rather than greed, which the early church fathers considered to be one of the seven deadly sins.

Best wishes, Strivax.

Sounds good

 

[Moral Orel]

But I'd prefer if no one had to.

So what?

 

[Ana the Ist]

So what?

So you're conflating acceptance of the necessity of certain acts with "preferring" them.

 

[Moral Orel]

So you're conflating acceptance of the necessity of certain acts with "preferring" them.

Nope. No act is necessary without a conditional. That's why I put your "has to be done" in quotes. You need to eat in order to live. You eat because you prefer to be alive than dead. You don't need to live; you don't need to eat.

Seriously, this is the most uncontroversial thing in the world. People like things they believe are good. People dislike things they believe are bad. Trying to argue that you don't like the things you call "good" is utterly ridiculous.

 

[Ana the Ist]

Nope.

Yup.

No act is necessary without a conditional.

Then when you said this...

Let me spell out the problems associated with the options for you. For (2) most people recognize right away that morality becomes totally arbitrary if it is determined by personal preference

You were incorrect.

Preferences aren't arbitrary. They are conditional.

Congratulations, you just disproved your own conception of morality.

 

[Moral Orel]

Yup.

Nope.

Then when you said this...

Let me spell out the problems associated with the options for you. For (2) most people recognize right away that morality becomes totally arbitrary if it is determined by personal preference

You were incorrect.

Preferences aren't arbitrary. They are conditional.

Congratulations, you just disproved your own conception of morality.

I can't even unpack all the things that are wrong with this. Try harder.

 

[Ana the Ist]

Nope.

Yup.

I can't even unpack all the things that are wrong with this. Try harder.

Sure sure....you "understand" the "things" that are "wrong" with my post lol.

You just can't explain it...and you think I need to try harder.

It not hard to recognize this dodge. I don't expect you to admit that you're wrong or anything....but you did just prove morality isn't arbitrary.

So as long as you don't keep pushing the idea....I won't keep exposing it's flaws.

 

[Moral Orel]

Sure sure....you "understand" the "things" that are "wrong" with my post lol.

You just can't explain it...and you think I need to try harder.

It not hard to recognize this dodge. I don't expect you to admit that you're wrong or anything....but you did just prove morality isn't arbitrary.

So as long as you don't keep pushing the idea....I won't keep exposing it's flaws.

Meh, I've already been explaining it in the other two or three threads on objective v subjective morality for months now. I don't have the patience for amateur hour anymore.

You used to be more useful for a bit of entertainment back in the day. Morals =/= preferences =/= needs. And no one said they did. When you stop dreaming up arguments for me to make, get back to me.

 

[Ana the Ist]

Meh, I've already been explaining it in the other two or three threads on objective v subjective morality for months now.

I think there's an inherent problem in thinking about morality as objective or subjective.

It would be better to consider if it is post hoc or ad hoc.

I don't have the patience for amateur hour anymore.

I got bored with this conversation years ago....it appears to be in the same place as then.

You used to be more useful for a bit of entertainment back in the day.

It's always more fun when it's aimed at someone else.

Morals =/= preferences =/= needs. And no one said they did.

.....That wasn't a quote from your post?

When you stop dreaming up arguments for me to make, get back to me.

You appear to be taking a secular humanist position.

If you genuinely have held this conversation with others a couple of posts before now...just link me to the relevant page.

Otherwise I'm sure you know how this looks. It's like when the Christians used to tell me they had a personal relationship with Jesus....then I'd ask them to describe it.

Suddenly they don't have any time for the thing they'll drone on about post after post.

 

[Moral Orel]

.....That wasn't a quote from your post?

You've got a quote of me claiming that "morals = preferences = needs"? Let's see it.

You appear to be taking a secular humanist position.

I'm not one of those "don't label me" types. But I am too lazy to research all of them to see what fits specifically. Moral non-realism is a broad enough category. I'm in there somewhere.

If you genuinely have held this conversation with others a couple of posts before now...just link me to the relevant page.

Otherwise I'm sure you know how this looks. It's like when the Christians used to tell me they had a personal relationship with Jesus....then I'd ask them to describe it.

Suddenly they don't have any time for the thing they'll drone on about post after post.

I'm here to argue for sport. But if your "arguments" require me to respond with things like "that isn't what I wrote" and "that's not what that word means", then it isn't an argument anymore. That's teaching someone to read. No thanks.

Everything you want me to write here I've already written in the threads I pointed you to.