Euthyphro's Dilemma (for atheists)

[zippy2006]

Perfectly. But I still don't see how they necessarily result in a duty. One can quite easily imagine circumstances in which they clearly don't, for example, if the promise was coerced.

Generally we would say that when you are being forced to do something your volition is mitigated, and thus what you have done is viewed differently than if you had done it freely. It is the notion that "duress" mitigates culpability. This would apply to promises as well as anything else.

Maybe Hitler thought it was his duty to rid the world of Jews, communists, homosexuals, gypsies, criminals, the disabled etc.

Such a supposition is clearly and uncontroversially false. Hitler thought ridding the world of such persons would result in a good outcome, and that is why he did it. He did not do it as a duty, as something that must be done regardless of the consequences.

I wasn't talking about Hitler, but about one of his elite troops, who gave an oath to serve the Fuhrer loyally, and obey the orders of his superiors. Do you think that circumstance gives rise to a duty?

First, the idea that one has a duty to obey superiors is not a duty in the deontological sense. No deontologist philosophers that I know of claim that there is an absolute duty to obey superiors. In reality obedience to superiors is a consequentialist mechanism which is meant to make institutions and chain-of-command more efficient. No one thinks it is an end in itself. The fact that we sometimes use the word "duty" to describe it does not mean that it is a deontological duty. It clearly is not. The reason the rule is instituted and the reason it is followed has everything to do with consequences.

Oaths are admittedly a more difficult question. In that case we are not talking about a "duty" to obey superiors, but rather a duty to keep one's oath. The short answer is that the deontologist would say that either oaths are subject to conditions, or else that duties sometimes conflict, and that our duty to keep an oath does not outweigh our duty to, say, abstain from murder. One might break an oath for consequentialist or for deontological reasons.

In any case, your larger point that deontology is more dangerous than consequentialism does not follow from things like oath-breaking. I don't think that larger claim is convincing. This is because deontological duties are largely about what we cannot do, and consequences are both about what we can and cannot do. The foundation of evil is connected with acting, not abstaining from acting. Abstaining generally only becomes evil on account of some other, positive evil that precedes it.

Genocide, for example, is a positive act. It cannot exist on the basis of mere abstaining from acting. Deontology can never give rise to the Holocaust--consequentialism is needed for that. The worst that deontology can do is mitigate resistance to evils like the Holocaust.

 

[Strivax]

First, the idea that one has a duty to obey superiors is not a duty in the deontological sense. No deontologist philosophers that I know of claim that there is an absolute duty to obey superiors. In reality obedience to superiors is a consequentialist mechanism which is meant to make institutions and chain-of-command more efficient. No one thinks it is an end in itself. The fact that we sometimes use the word "duty" to describe it does not mean that it is a deontological duty. It clearly is not. The reason the rule is instituted and the reason it is followed has everything to do with consequences.

Oaths are admittedly a more difficult question. In that case we are not talking about a "duty" to obey superiors, but rather a duty to keep one's oath...

So, am I to understand, then, that as far as you are concerned, making a promise results in a corresponding duty to keep that promise, but swearing an oath results in no such corresponding duty to keep the oath?

Best wishes, Strivax.

 

[Strivax]

Such a supposition is clearly and uncontroversially false. Hitler thought ridding the world of such persons would result in a good outcome, and that is why he did it. He did not do it as a duty, as something that must be done regardless of the consequences.

Seems to me a duty can arise out of the pursuit of good consequences. If you can do something to make the world (what you would perceive to be) a better place, surely you ought accept a duty to do it?

Best wishes, Strivax.

 

[Moral Orel]

First of all, the phrasing of the OP suggests it is talking about the things I prefer, not the things I call moral.

No, it doesn't.

1 Some things...those things are moral
2 All things which are moral...

It talks about the subset of the things that you prefer that are moral. Things you prefer that have nothing to do with what you conceive to be involved with morality have zilch to do with the poll.

Secondly, there are some things I enjoy that would be called immoral, but I really can't talk about them here without violating some rule. Suffice it to say, it involved my husband and myself, a rooftop pool at a hotel, and a very early hour of the morning.

"Would be called immoral"? Are you calling it immoral? If not, then it isn't relevant. If you call it immoral, then I can deduce that you prefer folk do such a thing rarely if at all, and you prefer that it is not a common occurrence.

The poll has nothing to do with what is or is not moral. It only has to do with how you conceive of morality.

 

[zippy2006]

So, am I to understand, then, that as far as you are concerned, making a promise results in a corresponding duty to keep that promise, but swearing an oath results in no such corresponding duty to keep the oath?

No, that is not correct. At various points in that reply I spoke of our "duty to keep an oath." An oath is just a special promise.

Seems to me a duty can arise out of the pursuit of good consequences. If you can do something to make the world (what you would perceive to be) a better place, surely you ought accept a duty to do it?

I would say that if you think you can make the world a better place then you should go ahead and try. I don't see any deontological duty, though. Every attempt to make the world a better place will be consequence-based. If you do something in order to make the world a better place, then your act is driven by consequences.

Someone might claim that they have a duty to try to make the world a better place, regardless of the consequences (regardless of whether they succeed or not). That makes partial sense, and could perhaps be salvaged. In any case, by the definitions of moral philosophy, if you are acting for the sake of some consequence, then you are not acting for the sake of a duty. Of course two people can perform the same act for different reasons, one for the sake of consequences and one for the sake of duty; or different reasons can overlap in the same act.

Anyway, I don't want to derail the thread further, and I'm short on time. Take care.

 

[Kylie]

No, it doesn't.

1 Some things...those things are moral
2 All things which are moral...

It talks about the subset of the things that you prefer that are moral. Things you prefer that have nothing to do with what you conceive to be involved with morality have zilch to do with the poll.

That may have been how you intended it, but I'm telling you how I interpreted it.

"Would be called immoral"? Are you calling it immoral? If not, then it isn't relevant. If you call it immoral, then I can deduce that you prefer folk do such a thing rarely if at all, and you prefer that it is not a common occurrence.

I think most people would say it was immoral, but as I said, I can't go into much detail here for fear of copping a warning for inappropriate discussion. I will say that despite it being immoral, it was also fun.

The poll has nothing to do with what is or is not moral. It only has to do with how you conceive of morality.

And apparently, it also has to do with the things I prefer, since both options mention that quite prominently. And I've already answered that.

 

[Strivax]

Anyway, I don't want to derail the thread further, and I'm short on time. Take care.

And you look after yourself, and stay safe.

Best wishes, Strivax.

 

[Moral Orel]

That may have been how you intended it, but I'm telling you how I interpreted it.

Well, now that you understand what the poll actually stated, we can do away with this conversation about irrelevant things.

And apparently, it also has to do with the things I prefer, since both options mention that quite prominently.

It states that the things you call moral, you also prefer those things. It says nothing about things that you don't call moral, whether you prefer them or not.

So you see how what you've said in this thread places you as a (1), yes yes? There are some things which are moral, and you prefer them because they are moral. They are not moral because you prefer them.

 

[Kylie]

Well, now that you understand what the poll actually stated, we can do away with this conversation about irrelevant things.

It states that the things you call moral, you also prefer those things. It says nothing about things that you don't call moral, whether you prefer them or not.

So you see how what you've said in this thread places you as a (1), yes yes? There are some things which are moral, and you prefer them because they are moral. They are not moral because you prefer them.

Again, I have to disagree. My preference is not based on morality. There are plenty of things I prefer which have no moral component at all, and even those things that I prefer that DO have a moral component, I don't know if I could say that I prefer them BECAUSE they are moral. What if I prefer them for other reasons?

 

[Moral Orel]

My preference is not based on morality.

No one said that it is. Strawman. "Your preference for X is caused by X being good" does not say anything about why you prefer A, B, or C.

Some is the first word of option 1.

There are plenty of things I prefer which have no moral component at all

Again and again, this is irrelevant. "Things which are moral" is the subject of both sentences. Things which have no moral component are not mentioned in, alluded to in, or implied by the statements in the poll. What you prefer that has no moral component has zero, zilch, nada, nothing to do with the discussion. Period. The end.

those things that I prefer that DO have a moral component, I don't know if I could say that I prefer them BECAUSE they are moral. What if I prefer them for other reasons?

Better and worse are the words for preferences. Better = more good. Worse = more bad. Moral = good behavior. Immoral = bad behavior. You can't separate them. You can prefer them for additional reasons all you like, but that won't get you out of the dilemma.

 

[Kylie]

No one said that it is. Strawman. "Your preference for X is caused by X being good" does not say anything about why you prefer A, B, or C.

Some is the first word of option 1.

And by having "some" as the first word, it requires that the morality of the things is connected to why I prefer them for at least SOME of them. I'm not sure if the morality of things is the reason why I prefer anything.

Again and again, this is irrelevant. "Things which are moral" is the subject of both sentences. Things which have no moral component are not mentioned in, alluded to in, or implied by the statements in the poll. What you prefer that has no moral component has zero, zilch, nada, nothing to do with the discussion. Period. The end.

Comes across to me that the first option is talking about things I prefer, not things that are moral.

Better and worse are the words for preferences. Better = more good. Worse = more bad. Moral = good behavior. Immoral = bad behavior. You can't separate them. You can prefer them for additional reasons all you like, but that won't get you out of the dilemma.

But better and worse can refer to things other than morality, and If I say, "I like X better than Y," that doesn't I like X better than Y because I think X is more moral.

For example, I prefer chocolate ice cream more than vanilla ice cream. That doesn't mean I think chocolate ice cream is more moral than vanilla.

And even if something has a moral component, it doesn't mean I'm going to prefer it more because of it. (Like one time when a coworker had really ticked me off, I noticed one day that she had left her sunroof open a little bit because it had been sunny in the morning, but rain was forecast, but because she was making my life miserable, I didn't tell her, and the inside of the car got wet. Was it the moral thing to do? It's debatable, but I can tell you I certainly preferred doing that more than I would have telling her that her sunroof was open.)

 

[Moral Orel]

And by having "some" as the first word, it requires that the morality of the things is connected to why I prefer them for at least SOME of them.

Yes, and? At least in this statement you get that what is being discussed is only those things which you call moral.

Comes across to me that the first option is talking about things I prefer, not things that are moral.

That's because you're reading it wrong.

Some things which I prefer, I prefer them because those things are moral

The "some things" and "those things" are the subject of the sentence. And "those things" are moral. It isn't about your preferences as a whole. This is grammatically the only correct interpretation of the sentence.

It states that some of the things you call moral, you also prefer them.

It is akin to saying "all dogs are mammals".

You are refuting, "All things that are moral are preferred" by pointing to things that are preferred but are not moral.

This is the same error as refuting "All dogs are mammals" by pointing to things that are mammals but are not dogs.

All things that are moral, you prefer. Not all things you prefer are morals. Doesn't matter. Has nothing to do with the dilemma.

But better and worse can refer to things other than morality, and If I say, "I like X better than Y," that doesn't I like X better than Y because I think X is more moral.

For example, I prefer chocolate ice cream more than vanilla ice cream. That doesn't mean I think chocolate ice cream is more moral than vanilla.

Irrelevant.

And even if something has a moral component, it doesn't mean I'm going to prefer it more because of it. (Like one time when a coworker had really ticked me off, I noticed one day that she had left her sunroof open a little bit because it had been sunny in the morning, but rain was forecast, but because she was making my life miserable, I didn't tell her, and the inside of the car got wet. Was it the moral thing to do? It's debatable, but I can tell you I certainly preferred doing that more than I would have telling her that her sunroof was open.)

What you personally preferred to do in a specific situation that you won't even declare is moral or immoral is irrelevant. We've been over this.

 

[Kylie]

Yes, and? At least in this statement you get that what is being discussed is only those things which you call moral.

I don't think you get my point.

I prefer X.

I think X is moral.

I do not necessarily prefer X because it is moral.

That's because you're reading it wrong.

I'm certain you could have found a more polite way to phrase that.

Some things which I prefer, I prefer them because those things are moral

And I read it as, "Some things which I prefer are preferred because of their morality." And as I've said, there are things I prefer which have some moral aspect to them, but that moral aspect is not the reason I prefer them.

The "some things" and "those things" are the subject of the sentence. And "those things" are moral. It isn't about your preferences as a whole. This is grammatically the only correct interpretation of the sentence.

It states that some of the things you call moral, you also prefer them.

It is akin to saying "all dogs are mammals".

You are refuting, "All things that are moral are preferred" by pointing to things that are preferred but are not moral.

This is the same error as refuting "All dogs are mammals" by pointing to things that are mammals but are not dogs.

All things that are moral, you prefer. Not all things you prefer are morals. Doesn't matter. Has nothing to do with the dilemma.

Again, I read it as, "Some things which are preferred" being what the sentence is talking about and the "because they are moral" being the reason why they are preferred.

Allow me to give an example.

"The style of toothbrush I prefer is bamboo, and I prefer that style because it is environmentally friendly."

While it is true I use a bamboo toothbrush and I like it, I like it because it is cheap.

Irrelevant.

Don't get snippy at me. You're the one who said, "Better = more good. Worse = more bad. Moral = good behavior. Immoral = bad behavior. You can't separate them."

I just gave you an example that does indeed separate better/worse from moral/immoral. No need to get snippy about it.

What you personally preferred to do in a specific situation that you won't even declare is moral or immoral is irrelevant. We've been over this.

You aren't actually interested in a discussion about this, are you? You just want to proclaim your point of view as fact. And anyone who disagrees you just tell them that their points are irrelevant.

 

[Moral Orel]

I don't think you get my point.

I prefer X.

I think X is moral.

I do not necessarily prefer X because it is moral.

If you tell me that "X is moral" I can deduce that "You prefer X".

Once you acknowledge that there is a perfect correlation, in that every single thing you call moral you also prefer those things, we can get into the dilemma and explain the causation and why it isn't just some amazing coincidence.

And I read it as, "Some things which I prefer are preferred because of their morality."

That's fine. Means the same thing. Even in your phrasing, all of the "things" (which are just a subset of things you prefer) are about morality because, as you state, they have "their morality". Your counterexamples like cake do not have "their morality" and are therefore irrelevant. Things which have nothing to do with morality are not part of the discussion and never were.

You aren't actually interested in a discussion about this, are you? You just want to proclaim your point of view as fact. And anyone who disagrees you just tell them that their points are irrelevant.

I've already demonstrated that those points are irrelevant, and you just keep telling me they are because you want to proclaim your point of view as fact. You want me to keep doing the same demonstration over and over again?

 

[Kylie]

If you tell me that "X is moral" I can deduce that "You prefer X".

And what if both X and Y are moral, but I hold that X is more moral than Y, and you claim that Y is more moral than X?

That's fine. Means the same thing. Even in your phrasing, all of the "things" (which are just a subset of things you prefer) are about morality because, as you state, they have "their morality". Your counterexamples like cake do not have "their morality" and are therefore irrelevant. Things which have nothing to do with morality are not part of the discussion and never were.

Irrelevant, since I've already told you that I have enjoyed things that would be considered immoral by quite a few people.

 

[Moral Orel]

And what if both X and Y are moral, but I hold that X is more moral than Y, and you claim that Y is more moral than X?

What I believe is good or bad has no effect on your position on the dilemma.

Irrelevant, since I've already told you that I have enjoyed things that would be considered immoral by quite a few people.

That's a non-sequitur if I've ever seen one.

Everything that you call moral, you also prefer.
Not everything that you prefer do you call moral.
Of the things you do call moral, you never call them moral because you prefer them.

Do we agree on these facts so far?

 

[Strivax]

...I would say that if you think you can make the world a better place then you should go ahead and try. I don't see any deontological duty, though. Every attempt to make the world a better place will be consequence-based. If you do something in order to make the world a better place, then your act is driven by consequences...

Uh huh. It just occurred to me to make this point. The thing is, the duty arises out of the combination of two situations:
A) I can see that performing some act would lead to a better world, and
B) I have the capability to perform the act.
Then, even given the duty is derived in this way, it gives rise to a deontological imperative to fulfill the duty.

Best wishes, Strivax.

 

[Strivax]

...Genocide, for example, is a positive act. It cannot exist on the basis of mere abstaining from acting...

First they came for the Jews. And I did not protest because I am not a Jew.
Then they came for the homosexuals. And I did not protest because I am not a homosexual.
Then they came for the communists. And I did not protest because I am not a communist.
Then they came for the disabled. And I did not protest because I am not disabled.

Then they came for me. And there was no one left to protest.

Best wishes, Strivax.

 

[Ana the Ist]

Okay. I assume that by 'positive' and 'negative' you mean something like approval and disapproval.

Actually I'm being deliberately vague here...one can judge a behavior as "good" without expressing approval (for example, one can see teaching a child to read as good but disapprove of the methodology).

Most of what you said is straightforward, but this needs a great deal of unpacking and explanation.

I'll send a copy of my book when I finish writing it.

Further, it would probably be better to define a moral judgment rather than morality

Why?

When the judge sees the agent act on the patient, they render a moral judgment. What is a moral judgment? You seem to think it is:

I don't mind the term "judge"....but the term carries a certain formality to it. I prefer observer or 3rd party.

1. An assignment of value to the act, either "positive" or "negative,"​

Correct.

2. The emotional reaction that results from the act (?), and

[/QUOTE]


Or simply precedes the judgement. We rarely bother to make a judgment about anything banal or pedestrian.

3. "...to the degree of social utility to other parties" (?)

This is what I think is the interesting part. Do you express every judgment to everyone? Of course not...in real life, you inevitably keep certain judgments entirely to yourself. You have no utility in sharing them. You probably understand how rare they are, the reaction they get, so there's no real utility in sharing them. To do so invites conflict.

Again, it's better to look at this as a phenomenon arising from social interaction. Imagine a bunch of people who are constantly asking each other how something makes them, and reacting to each other. By finding others who see actions similarly....you can determine the degree to which you and the group agree (and thereby decrease the likelihood you will transgress against the morals of the group) and you can also begin to describe the nature of the behavior you and your in-group agree upon.

That's how we might say a moral "framework" is "constructed". This is mostly done by 3rd party observers, as 1st and 2nd party actors are almost certainly going to paint themselves in the most sympathetic light.

 

[Ana the Ist]

Are you trying to say that no one has any idea what is moral or immoral because no one has any idea what the outcomes will be?

That's a pretty good short version of the problem.

A slightly longer version would explain that outcomes are different, depending circumstances, how far from the action they are. and a whole host of factors.

Even then....you'll never quite hit on a "moral" and "immoral' position that isn't relative to all others.