Causal exclusion problem

[Fervent]

It seems to me if we aren't committed to physicalism, the causal exclusion problem beomes a non-issue if we separate the ontological assumption that nature is physical from the causal closure principle. The causal exclusion problem states that we have good reason to believe four propositions:

Causal closure- For any event that has a cause at time t, there is a sufficient physical cause at t
Mental causation- Our mental faculties are causally effective
Mental/physical distinction- the mental is not the physical, and the physical is not the mental. Neither is illusory.
No overdetermination- If there is a sufficient cause, there can be no independent supplemental cause

Any 3 of these can be taken together, but when we add the 4th an inconsistency occurs. Now, there are various solutions but most attempt to preserve physicaliism because to give it up would be to give up closure which would be bad for science for what should be obvious reasons. But if we remove the metaphysical presupposition that nature is fundamentally physical from closure so that physicalism stands on its own, the problem seems to dissolve until we add physicalism back into the mix. What I mean by this is if instead of defining closure on the phyical, we define it on the natural and then leave the natural without specification there is no inconsistency. In other words:
Causal closure- For any event that has a cause at time t, there is a sufficient natural cause at t
Mental causation- Our mental faculties are causally effective
Mental/physical distinction- the mental is not the physical, and the physical is not the mental. Neither is illusory.
No overdetermination- If there is a sufficient cause, there can be no independent supplemental cause

All four of these can be true with no inconsistency. So do we have enough evidence for non-physical causes yet, or do we still want to insist that the natural iis physical?

 

[The IbanezerScrooge]

Mental/physical distinction- the mental is not the physical, and the physical is not the mental. Neither is illusory.

What is the justification for this statement? What does it actually mean?

 

[Fervent]

What is the justification for this statement? What does it actually mean?

Base experience is the justification. We have direct mental experiences, and indirect physical experiences. There are different ontological and taxonomic structures within the physical and the mental. Each seems to have distinct properties and they don't seem to share properties. They appear not to be the same thing on a basic intuitive commonsense level. I can construct a distinct metaphysical model of reality as the mental, I can construct a distinct metaphysical model of reality as the physical.

Now of course, your experience could be different than mine so perhaps you don't have a mind of some sort but this argument isn't original to me it was developed by Jaegwan Kim as an argument against strong emergence or supervenience. My only contribution was splitting apart a metaphysical commitment to physicalism to in causal closure and treating it as a stand alone proposition and putting closure in ontologically neutral terms. In other words all I did is remove prior commitment to physicalism in the causal closure principle.

 

[The IbanezerScrooge]

Base experience is the justification. We have direct mental experiences, and indirect physical experiences. There are different ontological and taxonomic structures within the physical and the mental. Each seems to have distinct properties and they don't seem to share properties. They appear not to be the same thing on a basic intuitive commonsense level. I can construct a distinct metaphysical model of reality as the mental, I can construct a distinct metaphysical model of reality as the physical.

Now of course, your experience could be different than mine so perhaps you don't have a mind of some sort but this argument isn't original to me it was developed by Jaegwan Kim as an argument against strong emergence or supervenience. My only contribution was splitting apart a metaphysical commitment to physicalism to in causal closure and treating it as a stand alone proposition and putting closure in ontologically neutral terms. In other words all I did is remove prior commitment to physicalism in the causal closure principle.

Hmm. That was a lot of words.

I'm still not 100% on what you're arguing in the OP. Is it to argue the (possibility of the) existence of "Mind" (mental) without the physical?

 

[Fervent]

Hmm. That was a lot of words.

I'm still not 100% on what you're arguing in the OP. Is it to argue the (possibility of the) existence of "Mind" (mental) without the physical?

No, simply that the notion that the world is fundamentally physical is suspect and that physicalism is the issue in the mind-body problem. Which means we need a non-physical metaphysics to explain science not just more data.

If there is any argument at all, its that we have had evidence for mental causation all along but physicalist metaphysics have forced us to deny the obvious ramifications and created a tangled mess that has made science less explanatory and caused all sorts of confusion on the mind-body problem. It raises some serious questions about the reliability of science on an epistemic level if my simple solution to the causal exclusion problem has merit, because if our metaphysical basis can cause us to treat obviouslly self-refuting ideas like epiphenominalism seriously within science despite a plethora of evidence to the contrary what does that say about our notions of falsifiability?

 

[The IbanezerScrooge]

If there is any argument at all, its that we have had evidence for mental causation all along

You'd have to get into the nitty gritty of that evidence. I guess I'm unaware. I mean if we're talking science, it just needs to be demonstrated, right?

 

[Fervent]

You'd have to get into the nitty gritty of that evidence. I guess I'm unaware. I mean if we're talking science, it just needs to be demonstrated, right?

I suppose you must not have the power to move your body with your thoughts? Where does science come from if mental causation is false? How does semanticless physics produce semantics?

Can we produce evidence of the physical without the mental?

And we're at a boundary point where the question of what is and isn't science becomes blurry. Is science just the methods that science employs, or is science an approach to epistemics in general that includes the discussion of what constitutes evidence and reality in general? Do questions like "what is consciousness?" fall into physics or metaphysics? Does science include how we justify scientific conclusions, or is it just a mechanical process? When we're talking about science, do we have to consider the limits of scientists?

 

[The IbanezerScrooge]

I suppose you must not have the power to move your body with your thoughts? Where does science come from if mental causation is false? How does semanticless physics produce semantics?

Can we produce evidence of the physical without the mental?

And we're at a boundary point where the question of what is and isn't science becomes blurry. Is science just the methods that science employs, or is science an approach to epistemics in general that includes the discussion of what constitutes evidence and reality in general? Do questions like "what is consciousness?" fall into physics or metaphysics? Does science include how we justify scientific conclusions, or is it just a mechanical process? When we're talking about science, do we have to consider the limits of scientists?

Wouldn't one need to demonstrate the existence of mental causation without a physical medium in order to justify these arguments though? The mind exists within a physical medium. We have no examples of minds without physical mediums. So, while it may seem like the mental and physical are independent, only one can exist without the other. Mental is dependent on the physical for existence. I don't see it as separate.

 

[Fervent]

Wouldn't one need to demonstrate the existence of mental causation without a physical medium in order to justify these arguments though?

Only if we presume that reality is fundamentally physical. What this argument is meant to accomplish is to ask the question whether or not we need that presumption to do science. If we can restate closure in a metaphysically neutral way and remove metaphysical assumptions, and doing so improves our explanations, why preserve the metaphysical assumption? We don't need to assume that nature is physical for science to work. So why do we have to show mental causation separate from physical causation to not presume that the mental is derivative of the physical? Why can't we understand it as both the physical and the mental being derivative of something more fundamental?

The mind exists within a physical medium.

Are you sure about that? How do we know that the physical doesn't exist wiithin a mental medium?

We have no examples of minds without physical mediums.

Metaphysical garbage. If by changing the closure principle in a way that I remove metaphysical presuppositions resolves the issue, then the metaphysical presuppositions have to go. We don't need to presume physical closure to do science, we just need a closure principle. Occam dictates to multiply entities no more than necessary, so why not let physicalist metaphysics stand on their own feet and not dogmatically enshrine them into science?

So, while it may seem like the mental and physical are independent, only one can exist without the other.

Or both are dependent on a third.

Mental is dependent on the physical for existence. I don't see it as separate.

I don't see it as separate either, but I don't take the physical as fundamental.

 

[The IbanezerScrooge]

Only if we presume that reality is fundamentally physical. What this argument is meant to accomplish is to ask the question whether or not we need that presumption to do science. If we can restate closure in a metaphysically neutral way and remove metaphysical assumptions, and doing so improves our explanations, why preserve the metaphysical assumption? We don't need to assume that nature is physical for science to work. So why do we have to show mental causation separate from physical causation to not presume that the mental is derivative of the physical? Why can't we understand it as both the physical and the mental being derivative of something more fundamental?

I'm not sure we have good reason to presume otherwise. That's what I mean by demonstration.

Are you sure about that? How do we know that the physical doesn't exist wiithin a mental medium?

Yes, pretty sure. I'm open to it being demonstrated otherwise, though.

Metaphysical garbage. If by changing the closure principle in a way that I remove metaphysical presuppositions resolves the issue, then the metaphysical presuppositions have to go. We don't need to presume physical closure to do science, we just need a closure principle. Occam dictates to multiply entities no more than necessary, so why not let physicalist metaphysics stand on their own feet and not dogmatically enshrine them into science?

So you keep saying. But this is all philosophical. Science is empirical. How can you resolve this supposed problem empirically?

Or both are dependent on a third.

Introducing more undemonstrated variables? I don't think that really helps.

I don't see it as separate either, but I don't take the physical as fundamental.

Like I said, I'm open to demonstrations of their independence.

 

[Fervent]

I'm not sure we have good reason to presume otherwise. That's what I mean by demonstration.

Why presume at all? Why multiply entities unnecessarily?

Yes, pretty sure. I'm open to it being demonstrated otherwise, though.

If it's not metaphysical, why does swapping words make a difference to the argument? Why does does removing the word "physical" solve a difficulty if the difficulty isn't metaphysical rather than empirical?

So you keep saying. But this is all philosophical. Science is empirical. How can you resolve this supposed problem empirically?

Science isn't purely empirical. Otherwise changing the semantics wouldn't resolve scientific problems so we should be able to switch from calling whatever is fundamental about reality "physical" to simply calling it "natural" and then going where the evidence leads. Since removing the assumption of physicality wthin the closure principle seems to resolve a problem within the mind-body question it would seem that the issue is one of concepts and not reality itself. My argument seems to demonstrate that it truly is a metaphysical issue tjat is problematic, and that despite claims to the contrary "skeptics" do not go where the evidence leads.

Introducing more undemonstrated variables? I don't think that really helps.

There's no variables here. I altered a word and resolved an inconsistency. So if our concept of the physical isn't the issue, why did the issue resolve by switching to a term that doesn't presume physicality? Why did calling it "nature" change the situation?

Like I said, I'm open to demonstrations of their independence.

Again, I'm not trying to separate them. Just questioning whether physicality is a fundamental aspect of reality or if it is an unnecessary metaphysical commitment. If it is an unnecessary metaphysical commitment, then it doesn't belong. I'm not suggesting they are independent, but interdependent.

 

[The IbanezerScrooge]

Why presume at all? Why multiply entities unnecessarily?

If it's not metaphysical, why does swapping words make a difference to the argument? Why does does removing the word "physical" solve a difficulty if the difficulty isn't metaphysical rather than empirical?

Science isn't purely empirical. Otherwise changing the semantics wouldn't resolve scientific problems so we should be able to switch from calling whatever is fundamental about reality "physical" to simply calling it "natural" and then going where the evidence leads. Since removing the assumption of physicality wthin the closure principle seems to resolve a problem within the mind-body question it would seem that the issue is one of concepts and not reality itself. My argument seems to demonstrate that it truly is a metaphysical issue tjat is problematic, and that despite claims to the contrary "skeptics" do not go where the evidence leads.

There's no variables here. I altered a word and resolved an inconsistency. So if our concept of the physical isn't the issue, why did the issue resolve by switching to a term that doesn't presume physicality? Why did calling it "nature" change the situation?

Again, I'm not trying to separate them. Just questioning whether physicality is a fundamental aspect of reality or if it is an unnecessary metaphysical commitment. If it is an unnecessary metaphysical commitment, then it doesn't belong. I'm not suggesting they are independent, but interdependent.

So, this is all philosophical, for sure. As an example, I'm an atheist. I can also resolve philosophical problems and inconsistencies with the existence of god by simply positing its non-existence. And it works beautifully. The difference is it makes my philosophical view more consistent with what we observe. I don't think what you're positing does that with regard the physical vs. metaphysical, literally, mind over matter philosophical problem you're presenting. It just adds variables that are also unknown and not demonstrable. Just like adding a god variable does nothing to further our scientific understanding of the reality we observe.

That's why the presumption of physicalism exists, because it's been demonstrated. Everything about reality that we observe appears to be dependent on the physical. I am wholly unaware of any fact about reality that was explained by physical processes that was later demonstrated to be metaphysical in nature. Lots of examples of the opposite, though.

 

[Fervent]

So, this is all philosophical, for sure. As an example, I'm an atheist. I can also resolve philosophical problems and inconsistencies with the existence of god by simply positing its non-existence. And it works beautifully. The difference is it makes my philosophical view more consistent with what we observe. I don't think what you're positing does that with regard the physical vs. metaphysical, literally, mind over matter philosophical problem you're presenting. It just adds variables that are also unknown and not demonstrable. Just like adding a god variable does nothing to further our scientific understanding of the reality we observe.

The tail is wagging the dog. Does it matter whether I am a theist or not if I'm not putting in a theologically loaded term? This is purely a semantic question, which shouldn't matter if we're just taking reality as it is and going where the evidence leads. So why did you jump to theism vs atheism? If the semantics matter, the heart of the issue is metaphysical. If it is empirical, then semantics don't matter. Semantics seem to matter, so it seems to be an issue with our conceptual understanding. There's no variables here, just words. And if changing words dissolves difficulties then why cling to a word? There's no added variables, it's just playing wiith semantics. What does atheism or theism have to do with the discussion?

 

[The IbanezerScrooge]

What does atheism or theism have to do with the discussion?

It was just an example of a philosophical position that can be changed by simply adding or taking away things and/or redefining terms. It can be done with any philosophical position like you seem to be doing here. It's literally nothing but semantics. Which is why I find philosophy, while interesting, kind of pointless.

 

[Fervent]

It was just an example of a philosophical position that can be changed by simply adding or taking away things and/or redefining terms. It can be done with any philosophical position like you seem to be doing here. It's literally nothing but semantics. Which is why I find philosophy, while interesting, kind of pointless.

The issue is semantics shouldn't change empirical statements. Closure will be cosure, regardless of what we call it. There seem to be physical causes, there seem to be mental causes. Mental causes seem to impact physical objects(our bodies). If our metaphysics don't enter into the picture, then our semantics won't matter because whatever "closure" entails will be closed causally whether we call it a banana, physical, nature, or a fish. It's not nothing but semantics, because it makes a significant impact on our understanding of reality at its fundamental level. The question is, empirically, what does closure entail? It seems to at least include abstract, immaterial, intentional mental causes and "substantial" causes that display law-like behavior. What we make of that, well, that's a difficulty and is a philosophical question. But our metaphysics should comform to experience rather than trying to force our experiences to fit a metaphysical understanding by denying that we have any metaphysics.

 

[The IbanezerScrooge]

I think "mental causes" are just an extension of physical causes. They don't happen independently of physical causes. Physical causes do, however, happen independently of "mental causes."

 

[Fervent]

I think "mental causes" are just an extension of physical causes. They don't happen independently of physical causes. Physical causes do, however, happen independently of "mental causes."

Doesn't really matter what you think, what matters is what the evidence indicates. And this isn't just "hey, I don't think it's true." This is logical analysis called uncoupling. My word changes weren't arbitrary, I restated causal closure so it was two distinct propositions and then removed the physicalist hypothesis from the equation. I identified the problem term in the causal exclusion problem, and the problem term is the physicalist hypothesis.

 

[The IbanezerScrooge]

Doesn't really matter what you think, what matters is what the evidence indicates. And this isn't just "hey, I don't think it's true." This is logical analysis called uncoupling. My word changes weren't arbitrary, I restated causal closure so it was two distinct propositions and then removed the physicalist hypothesis from the equation. I identified the problem term in the causal exclusion problem, and the problem term is the physicalist hypothesis.

All we're doing here is thinking. What I think matters as much as what you think doesn't it? What evidence are you referring to? "commonsense", "obvious", "base experience" evidence? This is a science forum, sir.

 

[Fervent]

All we're doing here is thinking. What I think matters as much as what you think doesn't it? What evidence are you referring to? "commonsense", "obvious", "base experience" evidence? This is a science forum, sir.

No, we're not just thinking. This is an empirical case against physicalism. All 4 terms are well-supported on an empirical basis so that if there were no inconsistency, they would be taken as factual. The inconsistency leads to the recognitiion that one of the propositions is a problem, so the question is which one? By uncoupling the causal closure principle, the problem term comes out. So on an empirical basis, physicalism appears to be an unlikelly hypothesis.

 

[The IbanezerScrooge]

No, we're not just thinking. This is an empirical case against physicalism. All 4 terms are well-supported on an empirical basis so that if there were no inconsistency, they would be taken as factual. The inconsistency leads to the recognitiion that one of the propositions is a problem, so the question is which one? By uncoupling the causal closure principle, the problem term comes out. So on an empirical basis, physicalism appears to be an unlikelly hypothesis.

You and I seem to have different definitions of what empirical evidence is.