Atheists/Agnostics: How Much Sense Does God Make?

[Ana the Ist]

Yes. Do you think it's possible for a person to work contrary to his desires or wants?

Contrary to some desires or wants...but in the service of others...sure.

One could, for example, work against the want to survive by killing themselves...but it's something that's motivated by a different desire.

 

[Received]

Contrary to some desires or wants...but in the service of others...sure.

One could, for example, work against the want to survive by killing themselves...but it's something that's motivated by a different desire.

This is getting pretty darn specific. I don't think you by definition work in favor of a desire when you choose. I think when you choose against a bad desire (like the desire to stay in bed), in that moment you use reason and force yourself through pure will to transcend your immediacy (staying with desire) and go with the better path. I don't think there's another desire that's being fulfilled in this case, and let me be very specific here: I do indeed in colloquial terms want what I choose when I get out of bed, but this "want" is understood in a different sense than the "want" of desire. This latter "want" is the want of having willed.

I see it as a continuum: desire works as immediacy, which pulls, and on the other end is ideality, the best or most reasonable way to act in any situation. Sometimes the continuum is very contracted, so that choosing the right thing isn't hard at all in going against your desires. Sometimes the continuum is very wide, when it's especially painful to exert your will against your desires toward the good. IMV, freedom is measured by the contrast between desire and what we can call "reason" or "doing the right or best thing"; in those moments when doing the right or best thing is immediate and takes no effort, then we're not really exerting our freedom.

Ever hear the saying, "I want what I want when I want it, and I want it right now?" That captures the multiple meanings of "want".

 

[Ana the Ist]

This is getting pretty darn specific. I don't think you by definition work in favor of a desire when you choose. I think when you choose against a bad desire (like the desire to stay in bed), in that moment you use reason and force yourself through pure will to transcend your immediacy (staying with desire) and go with the better path.

The very fact that you see it as a "better path" indicates a set of desires (that is, a desire to stay upon this better path).

Why get up? I know it's not something you necessarily think very hard about...but you agreed it's a choice. You could stayed in bed, you could've gotten up...so why choose to get up?

Also, what is this "pure will"? Are you just referring to willpower?

 

[Received]

The very fact that you see it as a "better path" indicates a set of desires (that is, a desire to stay upon this better path).

Why get up? I know it's not something you necessarily think very hard about...but you agreed it's a choice. You could stayed in bed, you could've gotten up...so why choose to get up?

This goes back to my distinction between want/desire as a feeling and as reflecting a preference or action. We use these interchangeably all the time.

Also, what is this "pure will"? Are you just referring to willpower?

Yeah. Nietzsche (who didn't believe in free will, basically considering the will a useful metaphor) said that when reason and desire clash, the will reigns. We exert our wills in proportion to how much we push against desire or lack of desire.

 

[Ana the Ist]

This goes back to my distinction between want/desire as a feeling and as reflecting a preference or action. We use these interchangeably all the time.

Ok...

So why get up? Or should I skip that part and we can go into this "better path" you mentioned and why that's important to you?

Yeah. Nietzsche (who didn't believe in free will, basically considering the will a useful metaphor) said that when reason and desire clash, the will reigns. We exert our wills in proportion to how much we push against desire or lack of desire.

Why does one exert willpower in any given situation?

If I exert my willpower to not eat a bowl of ice cream, is it not because I desire/want to avoid the unhealthy aspects of that particular temptation?

 

[Eudaimonist]

Yes, I agree. A desire can motivate, but to have a motive isn't limited to desire.

I'd think that a motive entails both a reason for action and the desire for action. That's why one can say that one feels "motivated" to do something, and why one can pump up someone's motivation with a pep talk. Unless one wants to make a distinction between the energy to do something and the desire to do something, it seems to me that desire is intrinsically a part of that concept.

If God is lacking in desires, that paints an odd picture of his psychology. It makes God seem mechanical, or at best Spock-like. Even the Buddha wouldn't deny that he has motivations -- just that he is is clinging to them.


eudaimonia,

Mark

 

[Received]

I'd think that a motive entails both a reason for action and the desire for action. That's why one can say that one feels "motivated" to do something, and why one can pump up someone's motivation with a pep talk. Unless one wants to make a distinction between the energy to do something and the desire to do something, it seems to me that desire is intrinsically a part of that concept.

If God is lacking in desires, that paints an odd picture of his psychology. It makes God seem mechanical, or at best Spock-like. Even the Buddha wouldn't deny that he has motivations -- just that he is is clinging to them.


eudaimonia,

Mark

Motivation implies a goal, which implies finitude, and therefore incompleteness. As such, God wouldn't fit this picture. Yes, it makes him seem Spocklike, but the moment we speak like this we're anthropomorphizing. Thinking of a person without desires is not the same as thinking of an omnipresent God as without desire. That's why I have trouble with calling him "personal", although I use this metaphor a lot.

 

[Received]

Ok...

So why get up? Or should I skip that part and we can go into this "better path" you mentioned and why that's important to you?





Why does one exert willpower in any given situation?

If I exert my willpower to not eat a bowl of ice cream, is it not because I desire/want to avoid the unhealthy aspects of that particular temptation?

Why do a good thing? If you avoid eating ice cream, it's because you want in the sense of preference (and not feeling) to avoid the unhealthy aspects of this temptation.

Let me ask you: if you choose through reasoning to follow a smaller desire (the harder one, like getting up after little sleep) over a bigger one (the easier one, like staying in bed), how is it about desire? It seems in this case, because you're going with the smaller desire, to be about something more than desire, which is why a smaller desire is chosen.

And again, related to this, if reason is different than desire, then by reasoning we're detaching ourselves from desire momentarily, which means desire isn't necessary in all situations to determine outcome. Reasoning here becomes an instance of determining preference, which people equate with desire in a second sense.

You can see how much jumbled semantics in everyday use has contributed to our disagreement here. I'm saying there's desire in the sense of conscious or unconscious feeling inclining a person in a certain way, and there's also desire in the sense of preference, which doesn't involve feeling and refers only to one's abstract idea of the good in a particular situation.

 

[Ana the Ist]

Why do a good thing? If you avoid eating ice cream, it's because you want in the sense of preference (and not feeling) to avoid the unhealthy aspects of this temptation.

I think you're making a distinction that's of no consequence there.

Let me ask you: if you choose through reasoning to follow a smaller desire (the harder one, like getting up after little sleep) over a bigger one (the easier one, like staying in bed), how is it about desire?

What's the reason I got out of bed after little sleep? I had to work early and I want to be on time.

What's the reason I want to be on time? Because I want to keep my job...

Why do I want to keep my job? So I can continue providing for myself and my wife.

Why would I want to provide for my wife? Because I love her and I desire her love in return.

I know that you probably think it's entirely unrelated to getting out of bed...

...but consider what would happen if I no longer loved my wife nor cared for her love. Would I still care about getting to work on time? Quite possibly not...these things don't happen in a vacuum.

It seems in this case, because you're going with the smaller desire, to be about something more than desire, which is why a smaller desire is chosen.

And again, related to this, if reason is different than desire, then by reasoning we're detaching ourselves from desire momentarily, which means desire isn't necessary in all situations to determine outcome. Reasoning here becomes an instance of determining preference, which people equate with desire in a second sense.

You can see how much jumbled semantics in everyday use has contributed to our disagreement here. I'm saying there's desire in the sense of conscious or unconscious feeling inclining a person in a certain way, and there's also desire in the sense of preference, which doesn't involve feeling and refers only to one's abstract idea of the good in a particular situation.

 

[quatona]

Motivation implies a goal, which implies finitude, and therefore incompleteness. As such, God wouldn't fit this picture. Yes, it makes him seem Spocklike, but the moment we speak like this we're anthropomorphizing. Thinking of a person without desires is not the same as thinking of an omnipresent God as without desire. That's why I have trouble with calling him "personal", although I use this metaphor a lot.

The point at which you want to stop anthropomorphizing your God seems to be rather arbirtrarily chosen. (IOW, it doesn´t help me making sense of God). I am not seeing how "God has preferences, intentions" is any less anthropomorphic than "God has desires".
And, while we are at it, as long as you guys call God "him" you better not be surprised when people assume that your God concept is anthropomorphic at its very core, anyway.

 

[Ana the Ist]

The point at which you want to stop anthropomorphizing your God seems to be rather arbirtrarily chosen. (IOW, it doesn´t help me making sense of God). I am not seeing how "God has preferences, intentions" is any less anthropomorphic than "God has desires".
And, while we are at it, as long as you guys call God "him" you better not be surprised when people assume that your God concept is anthropomorphic at its very core, anyway.

I was thinking just today that perhaps the childish notion of a man in the sky granting wishes is the most easily understandable version of god after all.

He has a body, a location, a limited set of powers (which aren't understandable anyway but who cares) and he watches his flock and interacts with them.

There's still a lot of problems with that version, mind you, but it seems less so than when we make him this infinite, omni-magnificent, time bending, mind-reading, entity that for some strange reason has a problem stringing together a sentence and instead reveals himself through "feelings" of awe and wonder.

 

[quatona]

I was thinking just today that perhaps the childish notion of a man in the sky granting wishes is the most easily understandable version of god after all.

Yes, it is a very powerful and in many ways attractive metaphore that we learn about very early.

He has a body, a location, a limited set of powers (which aren't understandable anyway but who cares) and he watches his flock and interacts with them.

There's still a lot of problems with that version, mind you, but it seems less so than when we make him this infinite, omni-magnificent, time bending, mind-reading, entity that for some strange reason has a problem stringing together a sentence and instead reveals himself through "feelings" of awe and wonder.

Yes.
I suspect that those believers who argue for such an abstract impersonal omni-force would actually be very disappointed if it turned out that they have to settle for it. (Most religious behaviours - prayer, worship, sacrifices... - wouldn´t even make sense if it weren´t for a personal God.)
It´s almost like refusing to give up the idea that there´s Santa, and instead trying to make the case that Amazon is the real Santa.

 

[Received]

The point at which you want to stop anthropomorphizing your God seems to be rather arbirtrarily chosen. (IOW, it doesn´t help me making sense of God). I am not seeing how "God has preferences, intentions" is any less anthropomorphic than "God has desires".
And, while we are at it, as long as you guys call God "him" you better not be surprised when people assume that your God concept is anthropomorphic at its very core, anyway.

It's not arbitrary if you can provide a justification. If God relates to the universe, he does so through intentionality; that's the only way you really relate to anything. And calling him "him" has justifiable quibbles by the more moderate and reasonable theologians; God actually encompasses both genders (insofar as gender is a useful construct), as is reflected in Meister Eckhart's statement that God is the great father because he created the universe, but is also the great mother because he sustains all things.

 

[Received]

I think you're making a distinction that's of no consequence there.

Sez you. To me, the distinction is seen every day by English speakers.

What's the reason I got out of bed after little sleep? I had to work early and I want to be on time.

What's the reason I want to be on time? Because I want to keep my job...

Why do I want to keep my job? So I can continue providing for myself and my wife.

Why would I want to provide for my wife? Because I love her and I desire her love in return.

I know that you probably think it's entirely unrelated to getting out of bed...

...but consider what would happen if I no longer loved my wife nor cared for her love. Would I still care about getting to work on time? Quite possibly not...these things don't happen in a vacuum.

But these examples don't underscore the fact that phenomenologically speaking (in the moment of your experience during these things), you have conflicting desires of different size. Getting out of bed is the smaller desire and staying in it is the bigger one. So again, what is it that allows you to forego the bigger desire and choose the smaller one?

 

[quatona]

It's not arbitrary if you can provide a justification. If God relates to the universe, he does so through intentionality; that's the only way you really relate to anything.

...and the only way you arrive at intentions is desires.
One could even make the case that the only you arrive at intentions are shortcomings.

Now, the question is: Do we want to conclude from "you" (humans) on God (i.e. are we willing to anthropomorphize), or not.

And calling him "him" has justifiable quibbles by the more moderate and reasonable theologians; God actually encompasses both genders (insofar as gender is a useful construct), as is reflected in Meister Eckhart's statement that God is the great father because he created the universe, but is also the great mother because he sustains all things.

I didn´t even mean to address the gender specific thing (which is an issue, also), but the personal pronoun used for an allegedly impersonal force.
I´m not sure how you can call God "mother" and/or "father", "him" or "her", "shepherd", "loving" and whatnot - and keep a straight face when arguing for an impersonal God.

 

[FrumiousBandersnatch]

... I see this a lot with clinically depressed folks, and one of the treatments is to stop waiting for motivation or desire, and instead act "as if" you weren't depressed, the action itself creating a chain reaction of dopamine releases that creates motivation and makes a person less depressed.

So, IMV, God created the universe without a want in terms of a desire, but colloquially "wanted" to create the universe because he willed it into existence.

The implication of all that is that God acted "as if" He wasn't depressed...

 

[FrumiousBandersnatch]

Your view seems to be that motivation in the sense of desire is needed for action to be possible. I'm saying that with many people, depressed or not, it's required to act against the grain of motivation (or when it's lacking entirely) in order to do the best thing.

It looks as if this interpretation needs something like Harry Frankfurt's second-order desires, i.e. desires about desires. In the case of acting to counter depression, the first order desire would be dysfunctional or negative (the depression), and the second order desire would be the desire to stop feeling that way, which, given suitable prompting, would provide the motivation for corrective action - making it an effective desire, which Frankfurt associates with the will, in contrast to first-order desires, that are not deliberative.

 

[FrumiousBandersnatch]

Any reason, potentially. My motive for getting up in the morning is based in reasons (things I have to do that day); these reasons might create desires, but many times these desires aren't sufficient to get me out of bed (especially if I didn't get enough sleep, etc.).

It seems to me that what motivates you is either your desire to do the things you have to do that day, or your desire to avoid the consequences of not doing them.

As you say, sometimes the desires are insufficient to motivate you to get out of bed; or perhaps the desire to sleep, or the desire to avoid facing those responsibilities outweighs them and motivates you to remain; however, I see no instance in your example where your motivation is not the result of a desire.

OTOH, desire can filter out which reasons are most apparent to us; if I want to kill someone, it's not very apparent that his being alive is a good thing.

I don't follow you; can you explain?

 

[FrumiousBandersnatch]

So are you saying that reasoning itself is a type of desire, because if reason is different than desire, then by reasoning we're detaching ourselves from desire momentarily, which means desire isn't necessary in all situations to determine outcome.

Reasoning is motivated by desire.

 

[FrumiousBandersnatch]

... at some point you choose without influences (motivations, desires, reasons), and this choice has no explanation or reasons...

This effectively makes it random.