Is belief/non-belief a morally culpable state?

[Niels]

Of course you can. Gullibility is a blameworthy trait.

"Fool me once, shame on you. Fool me twice, shame on me." As the saying goes.

Gullibility implies trust. Those who break the trust are culpable. After trust is broken, however, gullibility is blameworthy. Not before.

 

[zippy2006]

Dishonesty is a pretty easy term to define. So much so that I shan't even bother linking to a dictionary definition. But let's use an example. Say someone is arguing for less immigration. There are reasonable arguments to be made for that position. But let's say that someone blames a lot of crime on immigrants, therefore there should be less. You'd be quite entitled to post links and facts and figures to show that the crime rate among immigrants is lower than the general population, so they can't use that as a reason. And you'll generally not get a response to that because a) it's true, and b) accepting it removes one of the main arguments that the person wants to use.

So that's now off the table. You can move on to taxes, job rates etc. But what you will often find is the same argument used by the same person further downstream, or in a different thread. They might say that they actually believe what they are saying. But they have no evidence for it and have been presented with evidence to the contrary. They are then being....what was the term..? Ah yes. Dishonest.

This examples-instead-of-definitions approach is so crucial to your erroneous positions. This is precisely the sort of thing that Socrates was always at odds with.

The reason you are speaking falsely when you say that you haven't made it an "us vs. them" situation, is because the person you describe here would not describe themselves as dishonest. So it's just your word against theirs within your newest made-up example.

I'm pretty certain that flat earthers are honest, law abiding people. But you can actually prove to them that some of their arguments are wrong. So they'll ignore that argument and head off somewhere else. That's being dishonest.

No, it's demonstrably not. If I prove to you that one of your arguments is false you will ignore that argument and offer something else. You do this continually, perhaps more than anyone else on CF. Is it dishonest? No, it's not. It's pretty standard internet gish gallop. The reason you abandon arguments that were disproven is because you see that they are not workable, and you have done that even within this conversation. It would be great if you said, "Oh, you're right. An argument from authority is not per se invalid. But let me try another approach to defend my broader point..." Even so, that is what you are doing implicitly when you abandon a bad argument and try for a better one.

 

[2PhiloVoid]

I'm pretty certain that flat earthers are honest, law abiding people. But you can actually prove to them that some of their arguments are wrong. So they'll ignore that argument and head off somewhere else. That's being dishonest.

It could also simply be that those like flat-earthers, or whatever your favorite group [X] is over whom you roll your eyes, are simply speaking and acting out of a more or less delusionally cultic worldview. They've been convinced by their guru that the world should be seen as the guru states it should be. Such a condition of mind might be culpable before the state, but we'd have a difficult time actually diagnosing them for sheer dishonesty, especially when they "really do believe it."

 

[2PhiloVoid]

.

 

[zippy2006]

...but we'd have a difficult time actually diagnosing them for sheer dishonesty, especially when they "really do believe it."

Right, and usually we are not privy to the internal grounds for someone's assent. Indeed, one's grounds for assent are often not entirely transparent even to themselves.

The claim that disproving (invalidating) an argument for some position should result in the abandonment of that position is a claim that is based either in the fallacy of denying the antecedent, or else in the (contentious) premise that the invalid argument was the only rational grounds for the position in question. But even in the latter case it isn't easily recognizable when some argument is the only rational grounds for a position. Indeed, it is positively unwise for someone to abandon a position simply because one of the grounds has been invalidated.

This is why I would maintain that a psychological explanation is needed: because humans don't just act irrationally for no reason at all. The flat-earther doesn't hold to his thesis because of sheer stubbornness or dishonesty.

 

[zippy2006]

After trust is broken, however, gullibility is blameworthy. Not before.

Depending on how we define gullibility it is either blameworthy sometimes or else blameworthy always. But I am here opposing the thesis that gullibility is not (ever) blameworthy, which only requires the claim that gullibility is at least sometimes blameworthy. Because you agree that gullibility is sometimes blameworthy, we are in effective agreement vis-a-vis that thesis.

(Yet I would maintain that gullibility is inherently blameworthy, and that not all misplaced trust is gullibility.)

 

[2PhiloVoid]

Right, and usually we are not privy to the internal grounds for someone's assent. Indeed, one's grounds for assent are often not entirely transparent even to themselves.

The claim that disproving (invalidating) an argument for some position should result in the abandonment of that position is a claim that is based either in the fallacy of denying the antecedent, or else in the (contentious) premise that the invalid argument was the only rational grounds for the position in question. But even in the latter case it isn't easily recognizable when some argument is the only rational grounds for a position. Indeed, it is positively unwise for someone to abandon a position simply because one of the grounds has been invalidated.

This is why I would maintain that a psychological explanation is needed: because humans don't just act irrationally for no reason at all. The flat-earther doesn't hold to his thesis because of sheer stubbornness or dishonesty.

All of which is why I alluded to Basil Mitchell's "Laymen's Predicament" as a part of a social-psychological explanation involving a person's locus of trust.

But the way that those on the Left talk (and sometimes those on the Right), any one of us is just supposed to 'intuit' the truth in most circumstances via an obvious sense of empathy, in accordance with their political agenda and ideology, and if we don't........................ it's because we're really being dishonest.

I wish I had a dime for every time I've heard that from someone's mouth.

 

[Bradskii]

This examples-instead-of-definitions approach is so crucial to your erroneous positions. This is precisely the sort of thing that Socrates was always at odds with.

The reason you are speaking falsely when you say that you haven't made it an "us vs. them" situation, is because the person you describe here would not describe themselves as dishonest. So it's just your word against theirs within your newest made-up example.

No, we can both agree that he or she is being dishonest. They are making an argument on figures that they know are wrong. I could care less what they think of their own honesty.

No, it's demonstrably not. If I prove to you that one of your arguments is false...

Feel free. Let's see where it goes.

 

[Larniavc]

And when your surgeon introduces your anaesthetist

Bah! Dial twislers. Slowly turning a dial between ‘too much: Dead’ and ‘not enough: Awake’ isn’t a real job.

 

[Bradskii]

It could also simply be that those like flat-earthers, or whatever your favorite group [X] is over whom you roll your eyes, are simply speaking and acting out of a more or less delusionally cultic worldview. They've been convinced by their guru that the world should be seen as the guru states it should be. Such a condition of mind might be culpable before the state, but we'd have a difficult time actually diagnosing them for sheer dishonesty, especially when they "really do believe it."

I guess it can be delusional in extreme cases. To stick with an extreme case - flat earthers, I spent no small amount of time posting back and forth with one member who insists that it's flat dealing with just two examples of why she was wrong. I went into a great deal of detail and got her to do some of the investigation herself. After umpteen posts we had a conclusion. On the two points we dealt with, she was shown that she was wrong and accepted that the information she's been given exactly contradicted her position.

Result? She simply repeated that as far as she was concerned, whatever the evidence that was produced to counter her claim, she'd ignore it. Not because it was wrong. She actually agreed that it was right. But because it dismantled her position.

Now is she being intellectually dishonest? Well, in my opinion the answer is yes. She's culpable of that. Unless you say that it's better described as a psychological problem and she is actually delusional. That's a medical diagnosis as far as I'm concerned so I couldn't offer an opinion.

 

[Bradskii]

So don't sound as if you do investigations. It's a g*d d*mn delusion from the devil himself!

I think that the idea is to present evidence to which both parties agree. To get common ground.

 

[Larniavc]

I think that the idea is to present evidence to which both parties agree. To get common ground.

I disagree with that.

 

[o_mlly]

Beliefs that lead to right/wrong actions will clearly have a moral component. But what about beliefs regarding evolution or that the earth is flat/spherical?

Do we have a moral obligation to seek the truth? I'm not sure that we do. Is it wrong to believe what is false?

We would expect mathematicians and experimental scientists to be able to resolve whatever disagreements confront them. We would think that concluding those differences to be irresolvable as scandalous and intolerable. We also think that they are morally obligated to sustain their efforts to settle their disputes until they finally succeed in doing so.

However, if those scientists determine that the constraints imposed by the scientific method make resolution in there realm impossible then they must accept the conclusions offered by other realms of inquiry.

 

[childeye 2]

Of course you can. Gullibility is a blameworthy trait.

Depending on how we define gullibility it is either blameworthy sometimes or else blameworthy always. But I am here opposing the thesis that gullibility is not (ever) blameworthy, which only requires the claim that gullibility is at least sometimes blameworthy. Because you agree that gullibility is sometimes blameworthy, we are in effective agreement vis-a-vis that thesis.

(Yet I would maintain that gullibility is inherently blameworthy, and that not all misplaced trust is gullibility.)

Reasoning upon the self-evident truth that that which exists Eternal is NOT a lie --> without equivocation, all statements above show that you're gullible. The meaning of gullibility infers susceptible to deception.

 

[Niels]

Depending on how we define gullibility it is either blameworthy sometimes or else blameworthy always. But I am here opposing the thesis that gullibility is not (ever) blameworthy, which only requires the claim that gullibility is at least sometimes blameworthy. Because you agree that gullibility is sometimes blameworthy, we are in effective agreement vis-a-vis that thesis.

(Yet I would maintain that gullibility is inherently blameworthy, and that not all misplaced trust is gullibility.)

I agree that not all misplaced trust is gullibility. One exception that comes to mind is trusting a recovering addict. Taking them at their word might be a noble gesture. Giving them benefit of the doubt and being understanding of possible setbacks as they recover. That is more a matter of calculated risk than being easily fooled. The expectation that trust may be broken is taken into consideration beforehand.

 

[childeye 2]

Nope, the dictionaries do not say anything about whether such words are "positive" or "negative." Show me a dictionary that does so.

You misunderstand. I made no claim that dictionaries say anything about whether words are positive or negative. I was claiming that the term 'reliable' denotes a 'good' thing, so that 'unreliable' denotes a 'bad' thing.

Positivity is not a function of the dictionary's "object language." Reliability is reliability. Whether it is good or bad depends on context. The reliable doctor is good; the reliable dictator is bad.

The reliable doctor is good; the unreliable doctor is bad.

 

[The Barbarian]

The reliable doctor is good; the unreliable doctor is bad.

Reliability is usually a good thing. But not always. If a politician reliably lies every time, that's not a good thing.

 

[childeye 2]

Reliability is usually a good thing. But not always. If a politician reliably lies every time, that's not a good thing.

Haha! I think I saw this above in one of your earlier posts somewhere. I'd label it as subjectively true partial parsing.
A lie is typically BAD standing alone., A sentence where a liar is the subject matter is usually going to be a Bad thing. A 'Liar', as a noun is going to be more definitive than descriptive terms like reliable/unreliable.

Similar to --> The unreliable truth teller is not always telling the truth. <-- I think this doesn't sound quite as BAD as yours because the subject is a truthteller. not a liar.

We could do this---> "The Good liar is the best liar" <-- I think with the double positive description it makes the liar look smarter than other liars and introduces a premise that lying itself can be smart.

How about? --> GOOD people value honesty as a GOOD quality in a person; therefore--> "To the GOOD people it was a GOOD thing to know that the politician was a reliable liar".

 

[zippy2006]

Reliability is reliability. Whether it is good or bad depends on context. The reliable doctor is good; the reliable dictator is bad.

The reliable doctor is good; the unreliable doctor is bad.

Did you even read what I wrote? Again:

Reliability is reliability. Whether it is good or bad depends on context. The reliable doctor is good; the reliable dictator is bad.

 

[2PhiloVoid]

I guess it can be delusional in extreme cases. To stick with an extreme case - flat earthers, I spent no small amount of time posting back and forth with one member who insists that it's flat dealing with just two examples of why she was wrong. I went into a great deal of detail and got her to do some of the investigation herself. After umpteen posts we had a conclusion. On the two points we dealt with, she was shown that she was wrong and accepted that the information she's been given exactly contradicted her position.

Result? She simply repeated that as far as she was concerned, whatever the evidence that was produced to counter her claim, she'd ignore it. Not because it was wrong. She actually agreed that it was right. But because it dismantled her position.

Now is she being intellectually dishonest? Well, in my opinion the answer is yes. She's culpable of that. Unless you say that it's better described as a psychological problem and she is actually delusional. That's a medical diagnosis as far as I'm concerned so I couldn't offer an opinion.

I agree with you that it is possible your flat-earther may have been dishonest, but I think the social-psychological dynamics that Tali Shalot mentions in the following video (5 minutes) unfortunately have to be considered in the evaluation of our harboring expectations of another person's epistemic culpability here:

So, my earlier affirmation about the psychological presence of "locus of trust" plays a part in the extent/degree to which any one person is willing to adapt and/or adopt new information into his existing view of the world, even if that new information is in essence updated and completely accurate. Sometimes the locus of trust catalyzes a delusional state in a person; sometimes, though, that same relation with a trusted source simply causes a person to be hesitant to accept outside information, even though he or she intuits or understands that it is 'technically' correct.

Some of what I'm saying here should be already familiar to both of us since we both read (and trust) respective sources on neuro-science and psychology, or even evolutionary psychology. It also plays into how you prefer to listen to someone like Robert Sapolsky but I prefer to listen to someone like Malcolm A. Jeeves.