Yes, we influence our inclinations. Still what is the inclination that makes me choose coffee? It sounds to me you assume there must be an inclination determining my choice for coffee, and you come to that conclusion from your belief there can't be any libertarian free choice, rather than proving how our choices are made by cause and effect. We all know our choices are influenced by cause and effect, but determined? How can that be proven without pointing to there can't be a free libertarian will?
How can one prove by demonstration the myriad causes influencing your choice? I'd guess the fact you like coffee had something to do with it, and maybe I could guess at a few other influences, but why you like coffee, I don't know (nor why I do), but I am sure that too is caused, and not merely a plucked-out-of-thin-air random happening. My reason for denying libertarian free choice is simple. All things after First Cause (God) are caused effects. To claim otherwise is to deny what is central to science and reasoning, not to mention that it denies God's utter authority over all fact.
Mark Quayle said:
What proves our choices are predetermined is simply that there is no such thing as chance, and that all things descend causally from the First Cause (God). There is also the character of God and his active intent (creating) vs the idea of passively watching a project. He had in mind to make something particular, and he made it. We are not privy to the whole line of causation from first effects becoming secondary causes and so on. Only that the only truly spontaneous thing is God himself. EVERYTHING else is effect. And this does not preclude choice, but establishes our choices. Quite literally, apart from him (in this context, apart from his causation) we can do nothing.
He is the source of very existence and life. How can we assume ourselves to be smaller first causes?
I can't tell if chance exists or not. It does not matter to me. What matters is that we are responsible. We both believe we are, but I can't see how we can be responsible if we don't have some kind of free will outside predetermination.
I know you've heard me say this before: Chance is logically self-contradictory. "It is only a shortcut for, 'I don't know'." Simple as that. We have choice, not independence. It matters because libertarian free will depends on mere chance, regardless of whatever principles anyone thinks are necessary for responsibility/accountability regarding sin/choices.
But try to see this look at it: God created all things. All fact subsequent to Himself is dependent upon him for its very existence. The laws of nature are what they are because GOD CREATED. The laws of logic and math are what they are because GOD CREATED. Beauty, and Joy, are what they are because GOD CREATED. Fact is what it is because GOD CREATED. (I don't take you for a Deist, who seem to think that God created all fact, then backed away and fact is not in and of itself something totally independent of God's sustaining it). If we choose, (and I agree we do), it is because of and according to causes that came before it.
If I argue with believers who don't know I am a believer, that this or that they did was influenced and otherwise dependent on what came before their choice to do that thing, they are often inclined to agree, unless they are already in a mode to defend their notion of independent self-determination. But when I put God at the head of those myriad chains of causation that led up to their choice, suddenly they throw a fit! But logically, it simply makes perfect sense that our choices are caused.
So we are left with your objection, that it doesn't seem fair to blame someone for doing what he is caused to do. I'm sorry, but it is a human construction that sees blame and right and wrong as the end of thinking on the matter. What God's commands are for, is not for testing one's resolve or nature, but for demonstrating our need for the Savior, as we ALL fall short. Those that prove out, such as the testing of Abraham, was the testing of his [regenerated] faith. Not his libertarian free will, and not his independent self-determination.
(That is, of course, an oversimplification, as there are many other reasons for the command, such as both mere compliance and utter rejection of law witness to the fallen individual concerning God's purity and justice.)