Origin of Life

[xianghua]

Well, so far a robot is by definition a manufactured object.

so if we will see a robot that can evolve naturally- you will not consider it as a robot because it can evolve naturally?

 

[xianghua]

Design cannot be concluded on the basis of the evidence you are presenting.

so if you will find a self replicating robot you cant conclude design. ok. fair enough.

 

[Silmarien]

Depends what you mean by 'aware' - there's a sense in which a thermostat is 'aware' of temperature (i.e. it responds to changes in temperature). But I presume you mean conscious awareness.

Yes, I'm mixing terminology from various traditions. I do a bit of flirting with Advaita Vedanta, where Brahman is pure, unlimited awareness. But all these words get used differently by different people. To take a page out of David Chalmers' book, there are a lot of things about consciousness that are not too difficult to explain, because a lot of what's going on is the result of cognitive processes. The hard problem is always going to be phenomenal experience.

I think a major part of the difficulty people have with consciousness is the intuitive feeling that the conscious mind is somehow something extra; that it "drives the body around like a soccer mom driving an SUV", as Sean Carroll memorably said. The sense that the physical body just another object and one's conscious mind is something else that has subjective experience is hard to shake; but consciousness is subjective experience, an intermittent process running in the brain of a physical body, much as digestion is a process running in the gut of a physical body.

Oh, I am not a dualist. I like dual-aspect monism and emergent materialism, but I think they both imply panpsychism. Otherwise you have to explain how a purely physical entity can run a process that produces subjective experience. I'm fine with the mind being an emergent property of the brain, but unless physical matter has proto-mental properties that when arranged properly can give rise to a new type of conscious experience, we're not dealing with weak emergence anymore. This would put us in creatio ex nihilo territory, which is not a problem for me, but I would rather not assume it if there are better alternatives.

If you ask why it is that there is 'something that it is like' to be a creature with a brain running certain processes, I can only say that there are plenty of plausible models (e.g. Doug Hofstadter's book 'I Am A Strange Loop' highlights a basic principle), but I don't see how there can be an objective explanation for subjective experience beyond 'that is what happens when these objective criteria are met'. It presumably evolved because it was advantageous - it correlates with niches requiring flexible behaviour, planning and foresight, and involving complex social interaction.

I imagine it would also be evolutionarily advantageous to be glorious energy beings, entirely unfettered by the dangers of physical existence. If that ever happens, we'll know that idealism is true. But evolution isn't magic--it can't produce things that are impossible simply because they're useful, so "Evolution Did It" is actually worse than "God Did It." Both are an evasion, but at least God's supposed to be omnipotent!

More integrated how? Can you explain?

Something like Thomas Nagel's approach. David Chalmers has been moving towards panpsychism also--he's actually got a paper available about it online here.

Personally, none of it is good enough for me. If you already accept necessary existence and then decide that subjectivity is also ontologically fundamental, naturalism crashes and burns altogether and it's time to move on to greener pastures. But I appreciate the Nagels, Searles, and Chalmers of the world.

 

[Speedwell]

so if you will find a self replicating robot you cant conclude design. ok. fair enough.

I think you are missing the point. Design is purpose. Unless you can show evidence of intelligent purpose behind an object you cannot conclude design. Functionality, complexity nor resemblance to a designed object will not do it.

 

[durangodawood]

so if we will see a robot that can evolve naturally- you will not consider it as a robot because it can evolve naturally?

I think it might be possible sometime in the future to design and manufacture a robot that can reproduce and evolve.

But we would also probably have records of what company made it, which talented engineers designed it, the wonderful prizes they got for this amazing feat. It would be a landmark of human ingenuity.

Most of all, it would be this really new thing thing on the scene with no antecedents except for the previous versions of human designed robots.

 

[FrumiousBandersnatch]

The hard problem is always going to be phenomenal experience.

There are plenty of ideas to explain it in neurological and/or information processing terms (e.g. A Framework for Conscious Information Processing), but however plausible they are and whatever fruitful predictions and explanations they provide, there will always be an explanatory gap between the objective description and the nature of the (necessarily private) subjective experience.

I like dual-aspect monism and emergent materialism, but I think they both imply panpsychism. Otherwise you have to explain how a purely physical entity can run a process that produces subjective experience.

See above - with caveat.

I'm fine with the mind being an emergent property of the brain, but unless physical matter has proto-mental properties that when arranged properly can give rise to a new type of conscious experience, we're not dealing with weak emergence anymore.

What 'new type' of conscious experience do you mean?

I imagine it would also be evolutionarily advantageous to be glorious energy beings, entirely unfettered by the dangers of physical existence. If that ever happens, we'll know that idealism is true. But evolution isn't magic--it can't produce things that are impossible simply because they're useful, so "Evolution Did It" is actually worse than "God Did It." Both are an evasion, but at least God's supposed to be omnipotent!

Consciousness clearly isn't impossible... the biological evidence suggests it's a product of evolution, an adaptation for certain niches, and it's the activity of a sophisticated nervous system.

Something like Thomas Nagel's approach. David Chalmers has been moving towards panpsychism also--he's actually got a paper available about it online here.

Yes, I've seen it. I think it's better to base analyses on empirical evidence.

Personally, none of it is good enough for me. If you already accept necessary existence and then decide that subjectivity is also ontologically fundamental, naturalism crashes and burns altogether and it's time to move on to greener pastures. But I appreciate the Nagels, Searles, and Chalmers of the world.

OK.

 

[Silmarien]

There are plenty of ideas to explain it in neurological and/or information processing terms (e.g. A Framework for Conscious Information Processing), but however plausible they are and whatever fruitful predictions and explanations they provide, there will always be an explanatory gap between the objective description and the nature of the (necessarily private) subjective experience.

With regard to that article, it's impressive to me that someone can quote Nagel and then still completely sidestep the real issue. Too much a focus on holistic context and good luck explaining why there is something it's like to be when it comes to meditative and contemplative experiences.

What 'new type' of conscious experience do you mean?

The type that I'm pretty sure we share with my pet fish.

Consciousness clearly isn't impossible... the biological evidence suggests it's a product of evolution, an adaptation for certain niches, and it's the activity of a sophisticated nervous system.

I actually agree with the eliminativists that on a purely materialist model of reality, consciousness is impossible. It never evolved at all--the only thing that evolved were material brains capable of convincing themselves that they were sentient. This view is pretty self-defeating, but I rather think that it pulls the rest of materialism down with it.

My concern doesn't really have anything to do with evolution or nervous systems, though. It's always been "what is the nature of reality that evolution could give rise to nervous systems capable of producing subjective consciousness at all?" Which ties straight back into the fact that we have no idea what matter is, which was my initial point. We're stuck in a Cartesian paradigm even though everyone knows it makes no sense.

Yes, I've seen it. I think it's better to base analyses on empirical evidence.

I think logic and reason should play a role as well when we move from strictly scientific questions into metaphysical territory. If the explanatory gap is unbridgeable, something has been left out.

 

[FrumiousBandersnatch]

... good luck explaining why there is something it's like to be when it comes to meditative and contemplative experiences.

What makes you think meditative and contemplative experiences may be harder to explain? The 'something' that it is like will be slightly different, but that's true of all changes in the quality and/or degree of consciousness.

The type that I'm pretty sure we share with my pet fish.

That's the oldest type of consciousness. All vertebrates have the basic neural structures that generate consciousness in us, so it seems likely they all have at least rudimentary consciousness; there are differences in the size (processing capacity) and connectivity of those structures (especially sensory) in different vertebrates, but the significant difference for consciousness is the number of projections into the cortex and the size (complexity & connectivity) of the cortex, which determines the richness and depth of conscious experience.

A particularly interesting discovery is the behavioural and neurological correlates of consciousness in the octopus - a mollusc whose brain has evolved quite independently, but although structurally different, shows similar functional specificities and patterns of activity.

I actually agree with the eliminativists that on a purely materialist model of reality, consciousness is impossible. It never evolved at all--the only thing that evolved were material brains capable of convincing themselves that they were sentient.

OIC. I find that kind of semantic double-talk unhelpful - it just causes confusion. Most people mean something by 'conscious', so it seems reasonable to address it. The issue is that consciousness (and the sense of self and agency, etc.) are not what they subjectively seem to be. I'm reminded of magician Lee Seigel's quote:

“I'm writing a book on magic”, I explain, and I'm asked, “Real magic?” By real magic people mean miracles, thaumaturgical acts, and supernatural powers. “No”, I answer: “Conjuring tricks, not real magic”. Real magic, in other words, refers to the magic that is not real, while the magic that is real, that can actually be done, is not real magic.”

My concern doesn't really have anything to do with evolution or nervous systems, though. It's always been "what is the nature of reality that evolution could give rise to nervous systems capable of producing subjective consciousness at all?" Which ties straight back into the fact that we have no idea what matter is, which was my initial point. We're stuck in a Cartesian paradigm even though everyone knows it makes no sense.

It seems to me that we can only ever describe and model how our reality behaves. A good model helps us understand what we observe, unifies apparently disparate observations under a common explanatory framework, and enables us to predict what we will observe in novel circumstances. We shouldn't expect what we observe outside our everyday sphere or scale to be intuitive or to 'make sense' - and if we can model it well enough that doesn't matter.

I think we're inevitably stuck with a model-dependent external reality - which is fitting, because we have a model-dependent internal (subjective) reality.

I think logic and reason should play a role as well when we move from strictly scientific questions into metaphysical territory. If the explanatory gap is unbridgeable, something has been left out.

I agree - as long as we recognise where explanation is necessary and reasonable - for example, Paul Churchland used a model of the colour processing neurons in the brain to describe human colour space - which turned out to include colours that don't occur naturally. He called these 'chimerical colours', and was able to use his model to predict the circumstances that would enable these colours to be experienced. His full paper (sadly now behind paywalls) provides sample colour images and describes how to use them to experience these 'unnatural' colours (they involve manipulations of the 'after-image' effect).

This is an example of using a detailed physical model of brain function to predict and describe how entirely novel subjective sensations of a particular kind can be experienced, but even though it can roughly describe what will be experienced via metaphor (as all experiential description), what it can never do is describe what that subjective experience will be like for an individual - because that is unique, private, and inaccessible to others. The objective (physical) description and the subjective experience are simply different views of the same events, just as a rectangle and a circle are different, and seemingly incompatible, views of a cylinder.

And if consciousness is, in a sense, 'illusory', or not what it seems to be, then so is the 'hard question' and the 'explanatory gap'

 

[joshua 1 9]

Well, so far a robot is by definition a manufactured object.

Have you heard of the self assembly of nanoparticles? A lot of money was going into research on this.

Self-assembly of nanoparticles - Wikipedia

 

[Silmarien]

What makes you think meditative and contemplative experiences may be harder to explain? The 'something' that it is like will be slightly different, but that's true of all changes in the quality and/or degree of consciousness.

That article appears to suggest that conscious experience is derived from perceiving things within a holistic context. Which seems to sidestep the whole issue and ignores situations where the wider world does not play a part.

That's the oldest type of consciousness.

Indeed. My problem is all consciousness, not simply higher forms of it.

The issue is that consciousness (and the sense of self and agency, etc.) are not what they subjectively seem to be.

Oh, I see. You reject the subjective nature of consciousness. I believe there are significant problems with that approach, though from a scientific perspective, the biggest is probably that it's completely unfalsifiable when science has no access to subjective experience. I don't care for tossing out the only thing we have direct access to.

And if consciousness is, in a sense, 'illusory', or not what it seems to be, then so is the 'hard question' and the 'explanatory gap'

Indeed. And if subjectivity truly exists, materialism is dead and your whole worldview crashes and burns.

Anyway, I'm traveling for a few days so won't be around, but I think we've figured out where the heart of this particular disagreement lies. We've rejected different horns of the consciousness trilemma.

 

[FrumiousBandersnatch]

That article appears to suggest that conscious experience is derived from perceiving things within a holistic context. Which seems to sidestep the whole issue and ignores situations where the wider world does not play a part.

As I said, it is just one of many attempts at an explanation, and as they said, the visual system was used because it is relatively well-understood.

When the focus of attention is turned inwards, it is efferent cortical activity that initiates activity in the higher sensory processing areas and particularly the mid and hind brain areas involved in generating self perception (location, orientation, bounds, ownership, agency, perspective, etc.) through the downward 'feedback' connections. Also, the neural activity involved in controlled breathing tends to suppress the areas involved with anxiety responses, and repeated sessions involving breathing control will reduce the connectivity to these areas.

My problem is all consciousness, not simply higher forms of it.

For a neurological perspective - if you haven't already explored it, I recommend Stanislas Dehaene's 'Consciousness and the Brain', and Antonio Damasio's slightly more technical 'Self Comes To Mind' .

You reject the subjective nature of consciousness.

No, I think our subjective experience of it is misleading. We typically feel as if the conscious 'us' is in full control, a captain of the ship, making considered and rational decisions, but that is far from the case; and we are conscious of only a very simplified (and distorted) model of ourselves. Kahneman's 'Thinking, Fast and Slow' gives a good overview of one aspect of this.

Indeed. And if subjectivity truly exists, materialism is dead and your whole worldview crashes and burns.

I don't think so; as long as we can continue to develop our models of the world, and they continue to describe, explain, and predict what we can, and do, observe, that's sufficient unto the day.

 

[joshua 1 9]

Maybe an evolutionist will discover an algorithm that can be used in programing a robot for manufacturing. Sense they are using a LOT of robots on the assembly line right now.

 

[2PhiloVoid]

As I said, it is just one of many attempts at an explanation, and as they said, the visual system was used because it is relatively well-understood.

When the focus of attention is turned inwards, it is efferent cortical activity that initiates activity in the higher sensory processing areas and particularly the mid and hind brain areas involved in generating self perception (location, orientation, bounds, ownership, agency, perspective, etc.) through the downward 'feedback' connections. Also, the neural activity involved in controlled breathing tends to suppress the areas involved with anxiety responses, and repeated sessions involving breathing control will reduce the connectivity to these areas.

For a neurological perspective - if you haven't already explored it, I recommend Stanislas Dehaene's 'Consciousness and the Brain', and Antonio Damasio's slightly more technical 'Self Comes To Mind' .

No, I think our subjective experience of it is misleading. We typically feel as if the conscious 'us' is in full control, a captain of the ship, making considered and rational decisions, but that is far from the case; and we are conscious of only a very simplified (and distorted) model of ourselves. Kahneman's 'Thinking, Fast and Slow' gives a good overview of one aspect of this.

I don't think so; as long as we can continue to develop our models of the world, and they continue to describe, explain, and predict what we can, and do, observe, that's sufficient unto the day.

...and it's this kind of angle which contributes to my being a Representational Realist rather than a Direct Realist. (And thanks for the references...)

 

[durangodawood]

Have you heard of the self assembly of nanoparticles? A lot of money was going into research on this.

Self-assembly of nanoparticles - Wikipedia

Neat! But if for the sake of argument we're going to divide 'creation' into two categories: natural and manufactured, this falls mostly into "manufactured" as I see it.

 

[xianghua]

I think it might be possible sometime in the future to design and manufacture a robot that can reproduce and evolve.

thanks. so if we will find such a robot on a far planet, you will conclude design or not?

 

[durangodawood]

thanks. so if we will find such a robot on a far planet, you will conclude design or not?

Does other evidence on the planet indicate design and manufacture of the robot, or evolution from rudimentary forms or even from molecules?

Without such evidence, I would not have enough information to conclude.

 

[xianghua]

Without such evidence, I would not have enough information to conclude.

so you cant conclude that such a robot is evidence for design in such a case? ok. fair enough.

 

[durangodawood]

so you cant conclude that such a robot is evidence for design in such a case? ok. fair enough.

If the robot is composed of biological components similar to life on Earth, then I'd be tempted to conclude it evolved naturally like life on Earth does. But how would I know for sure?

...and the inverse for mechanical components.

 

[Silmarien]

No, I think our subjective experience of it is misleading. We typically feel as if the conscious 'us' is in full control, a captain of the ship, making considered and rational decisions, but that is far from the case; and we are conscious of only a very simplified (and distorted) model of ourselves. Kahneman's 'Thinking, Fast and Slow' gives a good overview of one aspect of this.

You just said that the Hard Problem dissolves if subjective experience is an illusion. Now you don't think subjectivity is illusory? Which is it? I recognize that conscious control over our actions is quite limited and that we're not nearly as rational as we think we are, so this is just muddying the water with unrelated issues. I'm closer to a non-dualist than a Cartesian dualist and quite comfortable with the idea that the self is in some sense an illusion. I suspect as much. But either unconscious processes can give rise to the illusion of subjective consciousness or subjectivity is in some sense ontologically irreducible. The latter view is not at all incompatible with the reality that consciousness is a product of neural activity--it's the grounds by which any of this is possible at all and not an explanation of the mechanics.

 

[2PhiloVoid]

You just said that the Hard Problem dissolves if subjective experience is an illusion. Now you don't think subjectivity is illusory? Which is it? I recognize that conscious control over our actions is quite limited and that we're not nearly as rational as we think we are, so this is just muddying the water with unrelated issues. I'm closer to a non-dualist than a Cartesian dualist and quite comfortable with the idea that the self is in some sense an illusion. I suspect as much. But either unconscious processes can give rise to the illusion of subjective consciousness or subjectivity is in some sense ontologically irreducible. The latter view is not at all incompatible with the reality that consciousness is a product of neural activity--it's the grounds by which any of this is possible at all and not an explanation of the mechanics.

...I've always had a different tact. I reflect upon the fact that I started earlier on in life with the basic idea that I am 'just' a collection of cells that thinks it's something (amounting to basically what is an illusion).

But then, later, I tripped over this Bible and philosophy thing (along with other religious pericopes), and since that time, I've also kept experiencing the sobering reality which various forms of pain provide me as they intrude into my otherwise illusory existence. And with the pain, suddenly things begin to appear considerably more substantive and more possible. Maybe I do exist.

There's nothing life a 'stubbed-toe' in the morning to wake one up. It works better than coffee...