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I'm not surprised that I'm lost on this. I'm only now beginning to ponder this Mind-Body problem that you seem to refer to quite often. When it comes to this field, I have to admit you're definitely much more adept at it. I've only touched on this topic briefty here and there, mostly in my Modern Philosophy class where we read Descartes, Spinoza, Berkeley, Leibniz, Hume, and Kant. And I'm just projecting what I think 'skeptics' will retort with … and these are apparently arguments which are trivial for you and which you seem to be able to just bat away out into left-field (or maybe even over the wall...in which case, congratulations...homerun!!)I don't think it works even in principle. You need to get from objectively existing chemical reactions to subjectivity before you can try to handwave consciousness away as an illusion, so you're lost before you've even begun. (Lost your mind, most likely, but I shouldn't speak, being a fan of the sort of Vedic philosophy that takes the opposite approach and wishes away the material world instead. But at least there, we're not denying the only thing we have access to at all.)

I don't really think reductionists deserve to be called skeptics, though. John Searle is a skeptic. Thomas Nagel is a skeptic. Reductionists are dogmatists of the worst kind, since their reasoning seems to amount to, "It has to work that way to fit in with our metaphysical commitments." Heaven forbid our geocentric model of the universe isn't correct.
I suppose reductionists are separate from skeptics, when properly considered. Perhaps I was misunderstanding what Jeeves & Berry (1998) say in one of my books which briefly covers some of this. In particular, I found the following from their book where they refer to comments made by John Polkinghorne and J.B.S. Haldane:
John Polkinghorne refers to 'the perpetual puzzle of the connection of mind and brain' (1986: 92). He points out that if you are a thoroughgoing reductionist, the answer is easy: 'mind is the epiphenomenon of brain, a mere symptom of it physical activity...but the reductionist programme in the end subverts itself. Ultimately it is suicidal' (1986: 92). It destroys rationality, and thought is identified with electro-chemical neural events. Such events cannot confront one another in rational discourse; they are neither right nor wrong; they just happen. Polkinghorne writes: 'If our mental life is nothing but the humming activity of an immensely complexly connected computer-like brain, who is to say whether the programme running on the intricate machine is correct or not?...The very assertions of the reductionist himself are nothing but blips in the neural network of his brain. The world of rational thought discourse dissolves into the absurd chatter of firing synapses. Quite frankly, that cannot be right and none of us believes it to be so.' (1986: 93). He echoes J.B.S. Haldane, who, many years earlier, wrote: 'If my mental processes are determined wholly by the motions of the atoms in my brain, I have no reason to suppose that my beliefs are true...and hence I have no reason for supposing my brain to be composed of atoms' (1927: 209).
Does this sound like something you've been researching, Silmarien? Even if not, I'm confident that you'll lead the way on this subject; I'm just now scratching the surface of it. This is probably because I've never considered the Mind-Body problem a 'real problem,' or maybe I've been too much under the impression that studying the psychological side of epistemology knocks out the necessity of any metaphysics involved since I already have a more Pauline metaphysics instilled. But, my thoughts are always in process (well, duh, Philo!!) and I may need to delve into the metaphysical side of this to some extent to shore up my epistemology. Sometimes I realize I might be shortsighted on some things ...
Reference
Jeeves, Malcolm A. & Berry, R. J. (1998). Science, life, and Christian belief. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic.
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