What does it mean that Jesus fulfilled the law, but did not abolish it?
In Matthew’s record of what is commonly called the Sermon on the Mount, these words of Jesus are recorded: “Do not think that I have come to abolish the Law or the Prophets; I have not come to abolish them but to fulfill them. I tell you the truth, until heaven and earth disappear, not the smallest letter, not the least stroke of a pen, will by any means disappear from the Law until everything is accomplished” (
Matthew 5:17-18).
It is frequently argued that if Jesus did not “abolish” the law, then it must still be binding. Accordingly, such components as the Sabbath-day requirement must be operative still, along with perhaps numerous other elements of the Mosaic Law. This assumption is grounded in a misunderstanding of the words and intent of this passage. Christ did not suggest here that the binding nature of the law of Moses would remain forever in effect. Such a view would contradict everything we learn from the balance of the New Testament (
Romans 10:4;
Galatians 3:23-25;
Ephesians 2:15).
Of special significance in this study is the word rendered “abolish.” It translates the Greek term
kataluo, literally meaning “to loosen down.” The word is found seventeen times in the New Testament. It is used, for example, of the destruction of the Jewish temple by the Romans (
Matthew 26:61;
27:40;
Acts 6:14), and of the dissolving of the human body at death (
2 Corinthians 5:1). The term can carry the extended meaning of “to overthrow,” i.e., “to render vain, deprive of success.” In classical Greek, it was used in connection with institutions, laws, etc., to convey the idea of “to invalidate.”
It is especially important to note how the word is used in
Matthew 5:17. In this context, “abolish” is set in opposition to “fulfill.” Christ came “...not to abolish, but to fulfill.” Jesus did not come to this earth for the purpose of acting as an opponent of the law. His goal was not to prevent its fulfillment. Rather, He revered it, loved it, obeyed it, and brought it to fruition. He fulfilled the law’s prophetic utterances regarding Himself (
Luke 24:44). Christ fulfilled the demands of the Mosaic law, which called for perfect obedience under threat of a “curse” (see
Galatians 3:10,
13). In this sense, the law’s divine design will ever have an abiding effect. It will always accomplish the purpose for which it was given.
If, however, the law of Moses bears the same relationship to men today, in terms of its binding status, then it was not fulfilled, and Jesus failed at what He came to do. On the other hand, if the Lord did accomplish His goal, then the law was fulfilled, and it is not a binding legal institution today. Further, if the law of Moses was not fulfilled by Christ—and thus remains as a binding legal system for today—then it is not just partially binding. Rather, it is a totally compelling system. Jesus plainly said that not one “
jot or tittle” (representative of the smallest markings of the Hebrew script) would pass away until all was fulfilled. Consequently, nothing of the law was to fail until it had completely accomplished its purpose. Jesus fulfilled the law. Jesus fulfilled all of the law. We cannot say that Jesus fulfilled the sacrificial system, but did not fulfill the other aspects of the law. Jesus either fulfilled all of the law, or none of it. What Jesus' death means for the sacrificial system, it also means for the other aspects of the law.
Quasar92
Form my paper: "The Christian and The Law, A Modern Day Look at Legalism":
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The Abolition of Torah
Some scholars who stress the abolition of Torah in Paul contend that the positive statements on fulfilling Torah in Paul do not indicate that external commandments are still binding for the Christians.
[18] They emphasize instead that the believer naturally fulfills Gods will by the power of the Spirit, and that law is for Paul counterproductive to authentic Christian experience. Probably the best defense of this view is found in an article by S. Westerholm, who presents the following arguments:
[19]
1. When Paul says Christians are not under law (Rom. 6.14; 1 Cor. 9.20, etc.), he means that Christians are not under any obligation or constraint to do or observe what the law commands. 2. That Paul thought the law did not have to be obeyed is clear from his attitude toward food laws (Rom. 14.14, 20; cf.
Leviticus 11; Deut. 14.3-21), and his stance toward observing festival days and the Sabbath (Rom. 14.5; Gal. 4.10). 3. Even though the phrase everything is lawful in 1 Cor. 6.12 and 10.23 is not a full description of Pauline ethics, Pauls qualifying explanation shows that he avoids speaking of any obligation upon the Christian to do what the law demands. 4. The Christian cannot concretely discover Gods will in the law, but must discover it by giving himself to God (Rom. 12.1-2; Phil. 1.9f.), by testing what is excellent, and by the renewal of the mind. 5. Paul does speak of fulfilling the law, but the point here is not that one is bound to fulfill the concrete demands of the law; rather, such obedience is the natural result of life in the Spirit. Furthermore, Paul usually distinguishes between doing the law and fulfilling it; the latter more indirect way of expressing obedience is preferable for Paul.
Although Westerholm rightly stresses the role of the Spirit, and the importance of the believers testing and proving the will of God, he wrongly downplays the place of external commandments in Pauline ethics. l. Both W. Schrage and T.J. Deidun have demonstrated conclusively that concrete external commandments are still binding for Paul,
[20] for the Pauline parenesis shows that he is not content with simply saying that God wants a person to be committed fully to him. Instead, Paul demands that this obedience be expressed concretely.
The Spirit and the Word work in harmony for Paul (Gal. 3.2; Rom.10.16-17).39 In 1 Cor. 6.18-19 Paul commands the Corinthians to flee inappropriate contenteia but in the same context he speaks of the presence of the Spirit.
Thus, Westerholms generalizing conclusions on Pauline ethics are unconvincing. But are his particular statements on the relationship of the Mosaic law to ethics more accurate? Although this issue is more difficult, his arguments are not conclusive here either. l. What Paul means when he says Christians are not under law (1 Cor. 9.21; Rom. 6.14; Gal. 3.23; cf. 3.25; 4.3-5) will be explained shortly, but he does not mean that all OT commands are unbinding and matters of adiaphora
. The commandments cited from the Decalogue in Rom 13.9 illustrate that these commandments are still externally binding for the Christian. To be sure, they cannot be fulfilled apart from love, but love cannot be manifested apart from the commandments either (cf. Gal. 5.14), i.e. no one can claim to be practicing love and be involved in adultery at the same time. In 1 Cor. 14.34 Paul supports his restriction on the women at Corinth by appealing to the OT.
[21]
Westerholm rightly cites texts which show that Paul was indifferent about some OT laws (cf. Rom.14.14, 20; Gal. 4.9-10), and concludes that the OT law is not authoritative for Paul. Nevertheless, all his citations prove is that
some of the OT law was not binding for Paul. The phrase panta moi exestin (all things are lawful for me) in 1 Cor. 6.12 and 10.23 seems to indicate that Pauls stance toward the law was lax, but the precise phrase is probably a citation of the opponents argument.41 What is more pertinent, moreover, is the context of that statement. Paul is not baldly agreeing that all things are lawful; rather, he is speaking of adiaphora
.[22] Paul certainly does not think that all things are lawful because in this very context he forbids inappropriate contenteia (sexual immorality). 4. Westerholms distinction between doing and fulfilling the law is tenuous. If Paul is speaking of Christian obedience in Rom. 2.25-29,43 then he uses the verbs prassein(to do),julassein (to guard), and telein (to keep) to describe that obedience. 5. Lastly, while the claim that believers naturally fulfill the claims of the law by the Spirit has an element of truth, it is not sufficiently nuanced. For if Paul thought that believers would naturally obey the entire law by the Spirit, then why did he give any commands at all? Paul must have believed that concrete parenesis, and yes even binding and obligatory statements (1 Cor. 7.l0ff ) were necessary for Christians. And that they were even necessary for Christians who were progressing well in the faith is indicated by 1 Thess. 4.1-8. Thus one should not conclude that parenesis is only intended for weaker Christians.
Liberation From the Law
But if the Sinai covenant has been abolished, as was argued above
contra Cranfield, then how can the above criticisms of Westerholm stand? Here it is crucial to make a very important distinction. When Paul says that Christians are no longer under law (Gal. 3.23-25; 4.4S, 21;1 Cor. 9.20; Rom.6.14-15), that they are released from the law through the death of Christ (Rom. 7.1-6), that the law was an interim period in salvation history (Gal. 3.15ff ), that the Mosaic diakonia is impermanent and has come to an end (2 Cor. 3.7ff; cf. Rom.10.4) he means that the Mosaic law in terms of the Mosaic covenant has ceased.
[23] The Mosaic
covenant was intended by God to be in force for a certain period of salvation history (Gal. 3.15ff; 2 Cor. 3.7ff ), but it was always subsidiary to the covenant with Abraham, for the promise to bless all people would only become a reality through the promise to Abraham and the seed of Abraham (Gal. 3.8, 16; cf. Gen. 12.3; 18.18-19; 22.18; 26.4; 28.14).
What does it mean, though, to say that the Mosaic covenantis abolished, and yet the ethical commands from the same law are binding? The insights of the new perspective on Paul
[24] should be included at this point. It has already been noted that Paul contended that Gentile Christians did not have to obey the entire OT law, but what is remarkable is that the laws which Paul specifically excludes, as Sanders and Dunn have pointed out, focus on circumcision (Gal. 2.3ff.; 5.2ff.; 6.15; 1 Cor. 7.19; Rom. 2.25-29; 4.9-12; Phil. 3.3), food laws (Gal. 2.llff.;
Romans 14-15;
1 Corinthians 8-10), and the observance of certain days (Gal. 4.10; Rom. 14.5f.; cf. Col. 2.16f.).
[25] Now it is precisely these practices that separated Jews from Gentiles in the Greco-Roman world. It is well known that these particular practices were the object of scorn and curiosity in the Greco-Roman world, and that they distinguished the Jews from the Gentiles.
[26] For Paul the Mosaic covenant was of such a character that it separated Jews and Gentiles. The promise to bless all nations which was contained in the OT was to be fulfilled in and through the Abrahamic covenant, not through the Mosaic covenant. Of course, for Paul this did not mean that the Mosaic covenant was evil; instead, the Mosaic covenant had only a temporary role in salvation history.
To sum up: Paul spoke against particular ritual practices in the Mosaic covenant which separated the Jews from the Gentiles because it was these practices which uniquely characterized that covenant, and uniquely characterized the Jews.
[27] Now that Christ the seed of Abraham (Gal. 3.16) had arrived and had taken upon himself the curse of the law (Gal. 3.13) the Mosaic covenant was no longer in force for those who had believed in Christ. The new era had dawned, and the blessings of the new age were now available to
all nations.
But if the above explanation is correct, then why does Paul speak of the condemnation of the law,
of sin being provoked by the law, of sin increasing because of the law, and of the believer dying to the law through the death of Christ (Gal. 2.15ff; 3.10-13,19, 22; Rom. 5.20; 7.1-25; 1 Cor. 15.56; 2 Cor. 3.7ff? These texts seem to imply that the dissolution of the law is necessary because through the law sin is provided with a bridgehead and even increases in its power. This would also suggest that the problem with the Mosaic law was not only cultural and ethnic, i.e. that it created a distinction between Jews and Gentiles, but the law also had an intrinsic problem, namely that because of sin it ended up producing more unrighteousness.
Therefore, one could infer, as Westerholm seems to, that the law as a whole must be abolished in order to counter sin. Furthermore, Pauls statement about the law producing transgressions in Gal. 3.19 must refer to more than just transgressions in the ritual sphere, but it must also include transgressions in the moral sphere as well (cf. Rom. 5.20; 7.7ff ). And this would suggest that it is improper to limit the dissolution of the Mosaic covenant to the particular ritual practices which distinguish Jews from Gentiles.
It would seem to prove that the
whole law is abolished now that Christ has come (see Gal. 3.1525; 4.1-7), not just the ritual aspect of the Mosaic law. The above objections can be satisfactorily answered. Doubtless Paul sees a close relationship between the law and sin, but he never sees a problem with the law per se (Rom 7.12, 14; Gal. 3.21). The problem is with the flesh or with sin which use the law to produce sin (Rom. 7.8,11,14,17-18, 24). Thus, when Paul speaks of release from the law (Rom. 7.6) he is not implying that all external law is counterproductive for Christians. The point is that the person in the flesh
cannot obey the law of God (Rom. 7.14-25; 8.5-8). The problem is not with the law, but with sin and the flesh. So the necessity of freedom from the law which Paul speaks of must be carefully explained. Believers need freedom from the law in
this sense because they cannot obey it, because they are in slavery to sin. However, in the new age the power of the Spirit makes obedience to the law possible (Rom. 8.4). Thus, when Paul relates sin and the law to each other, he has the moral demands of the law in mind, and he does argue that the person who is in the flesh
cannot obey the law and therefore is condemned (Gal. 3.10-13), but his solution is not to do away with all external commands. He asserts that Christians by the power of the Spirit can now fulfill what the law demands.
[28]
Thus, Paul had at least two things in mind when he spoke of the dissolution of the Mosaic covenant. The nature of that covenant was such that it divided Jews from Gentiles, and thus the covenant was intrinsically nationalistic. With the arrival of Christ the time of particularism was over and now the universal blessing promised to Abraham was available for all nations. But Paul conjoins with this another thought, namely, the idea that those under the law are under a curse (Gal. 3.1x13), that to be under the law is to be under sin (Gal. 3.21-25; Rom. 6.1415; 7.1-6), and that the commandments of the law even provoke one to sin (Rom. 7.7ff.), and that the power of sin is found in the law (1 Cor. 15.56). Paul is still using a salvation-historical argument here, for in his mind obedience to the law was simply impossible for those who did not have the Spirit, who were dominated by the flesh (Rom. 8.5-8). But Paul strains to make it clear in Rom. 7.7ff. that he sees no intrinsic problem with the content of the law. The commandment is still from God; the problem is the lack of power
to dowhat God has commanded.
Thus, Paul can speak of being liberated from the law in two senses. 1. It can signify liberation
from the Mosaic covenant which contains rites that are particularly Jewish and therefore leads to a separation between Jews and Gentiles. 2. It can also signify liberation from the power of sin which uses the law as a bridgehead. But now that the age of the Spirit has arrived and Christ has broken the power of sin by his death, the age of slavery to sin has ended. Paul does not carefully distinguish these two notions of liberation from the Mosaic law because they were inextricably intertwined in the era before the descent of the Spirit, the fulfillment of the Abrahamic covenant, and the death and resurrection of Christ. Before the new age arrived the Mosaic covenant erected barriers between Jews and Gentiles by requiring Gentiles to be circumcised, to observe certain days, and to keep the food laws. What I am suggesting, of course, is that there is a distinction in Pauls mind between the ritual and moral law. The dissolution of the Mosaic covenant also implies the abolition of practices, such as circumcision, Sabbath, and food laws, which separated Jews from Gentiles. On the other hand, Paul still thinks that the universal moral norms contained in the Mosaic laws are authoritative for the church. Believer by faith in the power of the Sprit can obey the moral norms of the OT law. Thus, when Paul says believers are not under the law, he s not saying that they are liberated from all moral norms. Such a distinction between the moral and ritual law is still held by some scholars,
[29] but it is rejected by most.
Continued...
[1] Alexander Pope,
An Essay on Criticism (1711) 3.66.
[2] For a survey of recent research see D J. Moo, Paul and the Law in the Last Ten Years,
SJT 40 (1987): 287-307. O. Kuss (Nomos bei Paulus,
MThZ 17 [1966]: 177-210) has a helpful summary of older literature on Paul and the law.
[3] H. Räisänen,
Paul and the Law (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr,1983; reprint, Philadelphia: Fortress, 1986). He sees inconsistencies in many other areas of the Pauline theology of the law as well. A J. M. Wedderburn (Article Review:
Paul and the Law,
SJT 38 [1985]: 613-22) thinks Räisänens case is convincing.
[4] J .D. G. Dunn, Works of Law and the Curse of the Law,
NTS 31 (1985): 523-24; cf. here the comments of P. Stuhlmacher, Pauls Understanding of the Law in the Letter to the Romans,
SEA 80 (1985): 102-103.
[5] Räisänen
Paul and the Law, 68.
[6] Ibid
[7] C. K Barrett,
A Commentary on the First Epistle to the Corinthians (HNTC; New York: Harper & Row, 1968), 169; cf. G .D. Fee,
The First Epistle to the Corinthians (NICNT; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1987), 312-14.
[8] In Galatians, according to H. Hübner
(Law in Pauls Thought [ET: Edinburgh; T. & T. Clark, 1984], 148-49), Paul rejects the law totally, but in Romans he rejects only the misuse and abuse of the law. J. W. Drane perceives Pauls view on the law in Galatians to be close to libertinism, while he veers dangerously close to legalism in 1 Corinthians. In 2 Corinthians, however, Paul is on the road to a balanced statement between these two extremes, and this balanced statement finds its definitive expression in Romans (
Paul Libertine or Legalist? A Study of the Theology of the Major Pauline Epistles [London: SPCK, 1975]). Cf. F. Hahn who maintains that for Paul the law only relates to Jews in Galatia, but in Romans Paul now sees the law relating to all, both Jews and Gentiles (Das Gesetzesverständnis im Römer- und Galaterbrief, [8]
NW 67 [1976]: 59-60). Wilckens (Entwicklung) also sees Paul as coming to amore balanced position on the law from Galatians to Romans.
[9] For a critique of the notion of development in Pauline theology an older article by J. Lowe is still helpful (An Examination of Attempts to Detect Developments in St. Pauls Theology,
JTS 42 [1941]: 129-42). See also Räisänen,
Paul and the Law, 7-10.
[10] So Drane,
Paul, pp.140-43.
[11] So Hübner
(Law in Pauls Thought, 63) who, despite this, says there was at least a significant period of time between Galatians and Romans. See J. Hall, Paul, the Lawyer on the Law,
Journal of Law and Religion 3 (1985): 370-76, for a critique of Hübner.
[12] Räisänen,
Paul and the Law, 9.
[13] The identity of the adversaries in Galatia continues to be debated. For a recent treatment see B. H. Brinsmead,
Galatians-Dialogical Response to Opponents (Chico: Scholars, 1982). That the opponents were Judaizers still seems most probable. So e.g. F. F. Bruce, Galatian Problems 3: The Other Gospel,
BJRL 53 (1970-71): 253-71.
[14] C. E. B. Cranfield, St Paul and the Law,
SJT 17 (1964): 55, 60-66; idem
, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans (ICC; Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1975-1979), 853, 857-61; C. F. D. Moule, Obligation in the Ethic of Paul,
Christian History and Interpretation: Studies Presented to John Knox (ed. W. R. Farmer, C .F. D. Moule, and R. R. Niebuhr; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), 391-93; C. H. Cosgrove, The Mosaic Law Teaches Faith: A Study in
Galatians 3,
WTJ 41 (1978-79): 146-64; D. P. Fuller,
Gospel and Law: Contrast or Continuum? (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1982), 65-120, 199-204.
[15] Ibid
[16] R. H. Gundry (Grace, Works and Staying Saved in Paul,
Bib 66 [1985]: 1-38) convincingly argues that legalism was a problem which Paul opposed.
[17] Cf. Räisänen (
Paul and the Law, 42-50) and D. J. Moo (Law, Works of the Law, and Legalism in Paul,
WTJ 45 [1983]: 85-88) for a critique of Cranfields thesis.
[18] S. R. Westerholm, Letter and Spirit: The Foundation of Pauline Ethics,
NTS 30 (1984): 229-48; idem
, The Law and the Just Man (1 Tim 1, 3-11),
ST 36 (1982): 79-95; idem
, Fulfilling the Whole Law, 229-37; F. F. Bruce, Paul and the Law of Moses,
BJRL 57 (1975): 259-79; Belleville, Under Law, 53-78, esp. 70-71.
[19] Westerholm, Letter and Spirit, see esp.): 242ff.
[20] Schrage,
Einzelgebote; Deidun,
New Covenant, esp. 188-217.
[21] The text is often suspected of being an interpolation (see the recent discussion by Fee,
First Corinthians, 699ff), but contra Fee
et al. the evidence for an interpolation is not impressive. Such a theory should only be embraced as a last resort. The manuscript evidence overwhelmingly favors the inclusion of the verses. Fee claims (p. 700) that no one would insert the text after v. 40 because all agree that the placement of the text is Logical here. But such a statement assumes what cannot, in fact, be proven. Some copyists may not have thought the text was logically placed, and they may not have understood it as well as Fee thinks they would have.
[22] Schrage,
Einzelgebote, 57-58; Fee,
First Corinthians, 252.
[23] Cf. Moo, Works of the Law, 88-89.
[24] To borrow J. D. G. Dunns term (The New Perspective on Paul,
BJRL 65 [1983]: 95-122).
[25] Dunn, New Perspective, 107-10, 114-15; idem
, Works of Law, 524ff.; E. P. Sanders,
Paul, the Law, and the Jewish People (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1983), 100-03. Nevertheless, Dunns attempt to limit works of law to these identity markers is not successful. For a more convincing explanation see Moo, Works of Law, 90-99; cf. H. Räisänens (
Galatians 2.16 and Pauls Break with Judaism,
NTS 31 [1985]: 543-53) criticism of Dunn.
[26] M. Stern,
Greek and Latin Authors on Jews and Judaism (Jerusalem: Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities, Vol. I, 1976, Vol. II, 1980) see sections 195, 258, 281, 301.
[27] On this point see K. Kertelge, Gesetz und Freiheit im Galaterbrief,
NTS 30 (1984): 391; N. T. Wright, The Paul of History and the Apostle of Faith,
TynB 29 (1978): 61-78; M. Barth,
Ephesians (AB; Garden City: Doubleday, 1974), 290-91; C. Haufe, Die Stellung des Paulus zunm Gesetz,
TLZ 91 (1966), 173.
[28] For the view that significant ethical righteousness is now possible in Christ see B. J. Byrne, Living out the Righteousness of God: The Contribution of Rom. 6.1-8.13 to an Understanding of Pauls Ethical Presuppositions,
CBQ 43 (1981): 557-81; A. van Dülmen,
Die Theologie des Gesetzes bei Paulus (SBM, 5; Stuttgart; Kathohsches Bibelwerk, 1968), 140-52, 158-68, 185-204.
[29] G. E. Ladd,
A Theology of the New Testament (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1974), 510; Cranfield, St. Paul and the Law, 49-52, 66; Gundry, Grace, 7; C. F. D. Moule, Obligation, 397; D .P. Fuller, Paul and the Works of the Law,
WTJ 38 (1975): 38-39; Haufe, Paulus zum Gesetz, 171-78; J. Hempel, On the Problem of the Law in the Old and New Testaments,
ATR 34 (1952): 229-31. For the view that such a distinction was implicit in the teaching of Jesus see K. Berger,
Die Gesetzauslegung Jesu: Ihr historischer Hintergrund im Judentum und im Alten Testament (Teil I: Markus und Parallelen) (Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag,1972)pp.171ff.; R. H. Stein,
The Method and Message of Jesus Teachings (Philadelphia: Westminster,1978), 102-104; D. Wenham, Jesus and the Law: An Exegesis of
Matthew 5.17-20,
Themelios 4 (1979): 5.
