Hey Freodin,
I can´t help thinking that if there is only one way for something to be (if there is no factual, potential, conceptual or conceivable alternative), a valuating qualifier is meaningless: It could as well be replaced by its opposite.
Exactly. In which case there would be a comparandum (at least hypothetically), which would allow us to start evaluating the different scenarios.
But that´s not what Chriliman argued (to me). He said (paraphrased) that existence is per se "perfect" (i.e. independently of the qualities found within a certain way or form of existence). Please note the danger of equivocating "this particular
existence" (as opposed to a factual or conceivable alternative existence) and "the fact
that something exists".
Also, there is a fundamental difference between "existence" (as in "the fact that something exists") vs. "(the quality of)
my existence/life" (which I can compare to that of the life of others) and "(the quality of) this society" (which can also be compared to that of other societies). Chriliman keeps equivocating these meanings of "existence".
Well, it´s also the worst there can be, or the most mediocre there can be, or the most comfortable, or the most miserable.... That´s why I say such qualifiers are not only redundant but also meaningless. They don´t tell me
anything.