The Modal Fallacy and the Problem of Free Will

[talquin]

This should be a lesson to you. When you really understand, it will also save you a lot of time (not to make meaningless effort).

Is time traveling ever make logic sense to you? If not, then you can save 95% of the words in your OP. If it does, then what you said are all irrelevant.

I'm not sure if you are trying to refute my argument or not. If you are, then tell me which of the following is wrong:

1) X (or God's knowledge as of day 1 of Fred's day 2 A/B choice) has a value of either A or B on day 1 and this value is fixed and cannot change. If it is A, it will remain A. If it is B, it will remain B. This follows the assertion that God has infallible knowledge of future events.

2) Y (or Fred’s day 2 A/B choice) receives its value on day 2. Once Y receives its value, it becomes locked. Prior to receiving its value, it could potentially become A or B, as Fred freely chooses A or B. This follows the assertion that Fred has free will or can freely make choices.

3) X is equal to Y. This follows the assertion that whatever Fred chooses is precisely the same as what God knew he would choose.

 

[Albion]

If there is no conflict between God's foreknowledge and Man's free will, then which of the following is wrong:

1) X (or God's knowledge as of day 1 of Fred's day 2 A/B choice) has a value of either A or B on day 1 and this value is fixed and cannot change. If it is A, it will remain A. If it is B, it will remain B. This follows the assertion that God has infallible knowledge of future events.

2) Y (or Fred’s day 2 A/B choice) receives its value on day 2. Once Y receives its value, it becomes locked. Prior to receiving its value, it could potentially become A or B, as Fred freely chooses A or B. This follows the assertion that Fred has free will or can freely make choices.

3) X is equal to Y. This follows the assertion that whatever Fred chooses is precisely the same as what God knew he would choose.

Put your proposition in English, will you please. I find that pseudo-scientific lineup to be invalid at best and unreadable at worse.

 

[talquin]

Just because I have a foreknowledge of what would happen if I jump off a 50 story building doesn't mean I don't have a free will to jump or not.

I have the free will in my actions (jump off a 50 story building) but not the reactions of those my actions (gravity).

Let's say you know you're going to choose A out of an upcoming A/B choice. You then freely choose B. What happens to your foreknowledge that you would choose A?

 

[talquin]

??

It doesn't matter if these unthinking objects do what they do. The point still stands that to know what will happen does not mean causing it to happen.

Which of the following do you think is wrong?

1) X (or God's knowledge as of day 1 of Fred's day 2 A/B choice) has a value of either A or B on day 1 and this value is fixed and cannot change. If it is A, it will remain A. If it is B, it will remain B. This follows the assertion that God has infallible knowledge of future events.

2) Y (or Fred’s day 2 A/B choice) receives its value on day 2. Once Y receives its value, it becomes locked. Prior to receiving its value, it could potentially become A or B, as Fred freely chooses A or B. This follows the assertion that Fred has free will or can freely make choices.

3) X is equal to Y. This follows the assertion that whatever Fred chooses is precisely the same as what God knew he would choose.

 

[Smidlee]

Let's say you know you're going to choose A out of an upcoming A/B choice. You then freely choose B. What happens to your foreknowledge that you would choose A?

The question is does foreknowledge automatically removes free will. The fact I can choose A or B doesn't mean I have the free will to choice the outcome.

 

[juvenissun]

I'm not sure if you are trying to refute my argument or not. If you are, then tell me which of the following is wrong:

1) X (or God's knowledge as of day 1 of Fred's day 2 A/B choice) has a value of either A or B on day 1 and this value is fixed and cannot change. If it is A, it will remain A. If it is B, it will remain B. This follows the assertion that God has infallible knowledge of future events.

2) Y (or Fred’s day 2 A/B choice) receives its value on day 2. Once Y receives its value, it becomes locked. Prior to receiving its value, it could potentially become A or B, as Fred freely chooses A or B. This follows the assertion that Fred has free will or can freely make choices.

3) X is equal to Y. This follows the assertion that whatever Fred chooses is precisely the same as what God knew he would choose.

You still do not wake up.

If time traveling is true, then God knows everything related to time.
If time traveling is not true, then God does not control time.

So, is time traveling true. The answer is that we do not know.
If so, all the logic arguments in your OP is meaningless.

 

[Albion]

The question is does foreknowledge automatically removes free will. The fact I can choose A or B doesn't mean I have the free will to choice the outcome.

But that seems a different question from the one we were working on. To be able to freely choose either A or B is the issue. If neither A nor B get you what you think it will, that's a different matter, isn't it?

 

[talquin]

Put your proposition in English, will you please. I find that pseudo-scientific lineup to be invalid at best and unreadable at worse.

Well, not all three of those can be true. And since the three are an accurate representation of the claims of many Christians, a reconciliation is in order.

If you don't buy into those three, then your model of freely made choices and/or an all-knowing god is different than that of the Christians whose claims I'm responding to.

 

[talquin]

The question is does foreknowledge automatically removes free will. The fact I can choose A or B doesn't mean I have the free will to choice the outcome.

Let's say you're faced with a choice of A or B. You end up choosing A. Up until the time you chose A, could you still have chosen B?

 

[talquin]

You still do not wake up.

If time traveling is true, then God knows everything related to time.
If time traveling is not true, then God does not control time.

So, is time traveling true. The answer is that we do not know.
If so, all the logic arguments in your OP is meaningless.

Simple logic tells us that not all three of these can be true:

1) X (or God's knowledge as of day 1 of Fred's day 2 A/B choice) has a value of either A or B on day 1 and this value is fixed and cannot change. If it is A, it will remain A. If it is B, it will remain B. This follows the assertion that God has infallible knowledge of future events.

2) Y (or Fred’s day 2 A/B choice) receives its value on day 2. Once Y receives its value, it becomes locked. Prior to receiving its value, it could potentially become A or B, as Fred freely chooses A or B. This follows the assertion that Fred has free will or can freely make choices.

3) X is equal to Y. This follows the assertion that whatever Fred chooses is precisely the same as what God knew he would choose.

Since the three are an accurate representation of the claims of many Christians, a reconciliation is in order.

If you don't buy into those three, then your model of freely made choices and/or an all-knowing god is different than that of the Christians whose claims I'm responding to.

 

[Albion]

Well, not all three of those can be true. And since the three are an accurate representation of the claims of many Christians, a reconciliation is in order.

I meant to put the proposals into English, not use English to tell me that they cannot all be true.

That aside, if you really mean what you say here ^ you are not proving that foreknowledge precludes freewill, but only that some explanations given by some Christians can be shown to be defective.

Sure, I'd think that's possible, but we can prove almost anything to be dubious if we are allowed to select the least convincing arguments offered by only some proponents.

I would think that showing that foreknowledge precludes freewill would be the more important objective. Of course, foreknowledge does NOT preclude free will, per my comments so far. Only predetermination would do that.

 

[Smidlee]

But that seems a different question from the one we were working on. To be able to freely choose either A or B is the issue. If neither A nor B get you what you think it will, that's a different matter, isn't it?

Basically free will is the power to say "no". There seem to be plenty of evidence of that.

 

[Albion]

Basically free will is the power to say "no". There seem to be plenty of evidence of that.

I think free will is more than that, but anyway, how does this answer the question of whether foreknowledge makes free will impossible (or not)??

 

[talquin]

But that seems a different question from the one we were working on. To be able to freely choose either A or B is the issue. If neither A nor B get you what you think it will, that's a different matter, isn't it?

You're mistakenly envisioning A and B as two options out of three possible choices. They aren't. It is a choice of A or B. Or we could say it's a choice of A or anything other than A (we'll call this B).

 

[talquin]

I meant to put the proposals into English, not use English to tell me that they cannot all be true.

That aside, if you really mean what you say here ^ you are not proving that foreknowledge precludes freewill, but only that some explanations given by some Christians can be shown to be defective.

Sure, I'd think that's possible, but we can prove almost anything to be dubious if we are allowed to select the least convincing arguments offered by only some proponents.

I would think that showing that foreknowledge precludes freewill would be the more important objective. Of course, foreknowledge does NOT preclude free will, per my comments so far. Only predetermination would do that.

Not true. Infallible foreknowledge does preclude free will and vice versa. So yes, some explanations given by Christians are defective - likely without them knowing it.

If you really believe that foreknowledge doesn't preclude free will, then please tell me which of the following is wrong:

1) X (or God's knowledge as of day 1 of Fred's day 2 A/B choice) has a value of either A or B on day 1 and this value is fixed and cannot change. If it is A, it will remain A. If it is B, it will remain B. This follows the assertion that God has infallible knowledge of future events.

2) Y (or Fred’s day 2 A/B choice) receives its value on day 2. Once Y receives its value, it becomes locked. Prior to receiving its value, it could potentially become A or B, as Fred freely chooses A or B. This follows the assertion that Fred has free will or can freely make choices.

3) X is equal to Y. This follows the assertion that whatever Fred chooses is precisely the same as what God knew he would choose.

 

[juvenissun]

Simple logic tells us that not all three of these can be true:

1) X (or God's knowledge as of day 1 of Fred's day 2 A/B choice) has a value of either A or B on day 1 and this value is fixed and cannot change. If it is A, it will remain A. If it is B, it will remain B. This follows the assertion that God has infallible knowledge of future events.

2) Y (or Fred’s day 2 A/B choice) receives its value on day 2. Once Y receives its value, it becomes locked. Prior to receiving its value, it could potentially become A or B, as Fred freely chooses A or B. This follows the assertion that Fred has free will or can freely make choices.

3) X is equal to Y. This follows the assertion that whatever Fred chooses is precisely the same as what God knew he would choose.

Since the three are an accurate representation of the claims of many Christians, a reconciliation is in order.

If you don't buy into those three, then your model of freely made choices and/or an all-knowing god is different than that of the Christians whose claims I'm responding to.

This is the last time I repeat it:

This issue can NOT be analyzed by logic. It is an illogical idea. You are doing some meaningless analysis.

This is the way you should start: Recognize that God is beyond (more than) logic. Then you will be on the right track for the rest of it.

 

[Smidlee]

Just because God knew what Judas would do doesn't mean Jesus didn't give him the choice when Judas kissed him and Jesus called him friend. So both A and B was given to Judas but he went his own way. Saul was given the same choice and choice Christ and became the apostle to the gentiles. No matter if Judas accepted Christ or not God's will was done.
Whosoever will is predestined to be saved and whosoever won't are not.

Luke 19:40 "And he answered and said unto them, I tell you that, if these should hold their peace, the stones would immediately cry out."

 

[talquin]

This is the last time I repeat it:

This issue can NOT be analyzed by logic. It is an illogical idea. You are doing some meaningless analysis.

This is the way you should start: Recognize that God is beyond (more than) logic. Then you will be on the right track for the rest of it.

Incorrect. If more than one claim is made, those claims can be analyzed through one of a number of means to determine if all can be true. For example, someone claims A is equal to B, then claims B is equal to C and then C is not equal to A. We can use very simple logic to see that not all of those can be true.

As not all three of the following can be true, one must be false. Which do you believe it to be.

1) X (or God's knowledge as of day 1 of Fred's day 2 A/B choice) has a value of either A or B on day 1 and this value is fixed and cannot change. If it is A, it will remain A. If it is B, it will remain B. This follows the assertion that God has infallible knowledge of future events.

2) Y (or Fred’s day 2 A/B choice) receives its value on day 2. Once Y receives its value, it becomes locked. Prior to receiving its value, it could potentially become A or B, as Fred freely chooses A or B. This follows the assertion that Fred has free will or can freely make choices.

3) X is equal to Y. This follows the assertion that whatever Fred chooses is precisely the same as what God knew he would choose.

 

[Sophrosyne]

An example that pretty much puts to rest this argument is Peter being told by Jesus that he will deny him 3 times before the [bless and do not curse][bless and do not curse][bless and do not curse][bless and do not curse] crows. Peter himself said he would never do that, and had free will to not do it but scripture says even with prior knowledge of the event Peter did exactly as God (Jesus) predicted.

 

[talquin]

Just because God knew what Judas would do doesn't mean Jesus didn't give him the choice when Judas kissed him and Jesus called him friend. So both A and B was given to Judas but he went his own way. Saul was given the same choice and choice Christ and became the apostle to the gentiles. No matter if Judas accepted Christ or not God's will was done.
Whosoever will is predestined to be saved and whosoever won't are not.

This has nothing to do with the scenario which I have drawn up.

BTW, when I say "faced with a choice of A or B", it doesn't mean that C is an option. A or B is identical to A or "not A".