The Modal Fallacy and the Problem of Free Will

[Radagast]

For the purposes of this discussion, "free will" means that up until the time one chooses A out of an A/B choice, they could have chosen B.

Please describe one of the standard versions of "free will" used by philosophers. Your vague "definition" is not helpful.

1) X (or God's knowledge as of day 1 of Fred's day 2 A/B choice) has a value of either A or B on day 1 and this value is fixed and cannot change.

You are implicitly assuming God is subject to time, so your comments do not apply to the Christian God.

2) Y (or Fred’s day 2 A/B choice) receives its value on day 2. Once Y receives its value, it becomes locked. Prior to receiving its value, it could potentially become A or B, as Fred freely chooses A or B. This follows the assertion that Fred has free will or can freely make choices.

You need to properly define "free will."

 

[Albion]

Let's say as of day 1, God knows that Fred's day 2 A/B choice will be A. (or variable X has the value of A on day 1). Fred then freely chooses B on day 2

That is impossible. You've already stipulated that God knows A will be Fred's choice.

 

[Sophrosyne]

I think the problem is the OP wants to try and play either no free will or the guy changes his mind after God tells him what he will choose to make God a liar. In other words the whole thread is to paint a strawman god.

 

[Albion]

I think the problem is the OP wants to try and play either no free will or the guy changes his mind after God tells him what he will choose to make God a liar. In other words the whole thread is to paint a strawman god.

or perhaps to paint Christians as illogical or stupid.

 

[talquin]

Please describe one of the standard versions of "free will" used by philosophers. Your vague "definition" is not helpful.

Do you not believe that up until a person chooses A out of an A/B choice, they could have chosen B?

You are implicitly assuming God is subject to time, so your comments do not apply to the Christian God.

If God knows anything at a point in time, then he is subject to time. For example, if you say "God knows what Fred's A/B choice will be tomorrow", then it means at this moment in time, God knows what Fred's A/B choice will be tomorrow. Or are you trying to say God doesn't know at this moment in time, but will know after Fred has made his choice?

You need to properly define "free will."

Irrelevant. I've already drawn up the scenario based on claims that Christians make. Christians agree that up until the time Fred chooses A out of an A/B choice, he could have chosen B. That's what is relevant.

 

[talquin]

Let's say as of day 1, God knows that Fred's day 2 A/B choice will be A. (or variable X has the value of A on day 1). Fred then freely chooses B on day 2

That is impossible. You've already stipulated that God knows A will be Fred's choice.

Now I'm beginning to understand your position. You hold an implicit belief that Fred can't freely choose either A or B and that he is bound by what God knows he will choose.

To clarify, do you believe up until a person chooses A out of an A/B choice, could they have still chosen B?

 

[talquin]

I think the problem is the OP wants to try and play either no free will or the guy changes his mind after God tells him what he will choose to make God a liar. In other words the whole thread is to paint a strawman god.

It's not a strawman God if Christians believe such a god with the attributes I've described to exist.

 

[Sophrosyne]

or perhaps to paint Christians as illogical or stupid.

I've seen this almost exact argument used many times here in the forum often in the exploring Christianity section.

 

[Sophrosyne]

It's not a strawman God if Christians believe such a god with the attributes I've described to exist.

I've already shown you what Christians believe in the story of Peter denying Jesus 3 times

 

[Radagast]

If God knows anything at a point in time, then he is subject to time. For example, if you say "God knows what Fred's A/B choice will be tomorrow", then it means at this moment in time, God knows what Fred's A/B choice will be tomorrow.

OK, you're clearly not understanding the Christian concept of God. Christianity teaches that God is the Creator of time, not subject to time -- so God knows things in an eternal sense. I think Boethius was the first to point out the relevance of that to the free will/foreknowledge question.

You also seem to be assuming that all Christians use exactly the same concept of "free will." In fact, we don't.

Irrelevant. I've already drawn up the scenario based on claims that Christians make. Christians agree that up until the time Fred chooses A out of an A/B choice, he could have chosen B. That's what is relevant.

Defining terms is irrelevant?

You've drawn up a scenario based on your misunderstanding of Christianity. That makes it a strawman. And your unwillingness to do some research and use terms properly shows that you're not genuinely interested in discussion.

This is confirmed now that I see that you posted exactly the same thing (verbatim) six months ago. Since then, you've obviously read none of the thousands of books on the subject.

 

[talquin]

OK, you're clearly not understanding the Christian concept of God. Christianity teaches that God is the Creator of time, not subject to time -- so God knows things in an eternal sense. I think Boethius was the first to point out the relevance of that to the free will/foreknowledge question.

You also seem to be assuming that all Christians use exactly the same concept of "free will." In fact, we don't.



Defining terms is irrelevant?

You've drawn up a scenario based on your misunderstanding of Christianity. That makes it a strawman. And your unwillingness to do some research and use terms properly shows that you're not genuinely interested in discussion.

This is confirmed now that I see that you posted exactly the same thing (verbatim) six months ago. Since then, you've obviously read none of the thousands of books on the subject.

Let's say God has knowledge of Fred's day 2 A/B choice. We'll say God knows Fred's day 2 A/B choice is going to be A. We'll call God's knowledge of Fred's day 2 A/B choice variable X. In this case, variable X is equal to A, as God knows Fred will choose A. To help me get a better understanding of where you're coming from, in this example, would variable X have a value of A as of day 1 or one day prior to when Fred makes his A/B choice?

 

[Radagast]

 

[elopez]

1) Instead of man being able to freely choose A or B, they'll assert that a free choice doesn't actually occur or that everything is pre-determined (I think the word is deterministic). This would mean that we are all actually robots. However, their claim is flawed, because upon my asking the question "up until the time you choose A out of an A/B choice, could you still have chosen B?", they will always say YES.

If God has infallible foreknowledge, then determinism is true in every sense of the word. The question, could we have chosen differently up until our actual decision, would then be answered, "no", not "yes". The issue is at that point whether or not free will is defined by the ability to do otherwise, otherwise known as PAP (Principle of Alternative Possibilities). If PAP is true, determinism may not be, and therefore foreknowledge may not be infallible. If PAP is false, then free will is not defined by such, determinism is true and foreknowledge is infallible.

First, I would ask what support there is to claim PAP is significant to free will? There simply seems no evidence. We can say without doubt that moral accountability and free will are related, yet moral accountability needs to be defined in order to establish the relation. What does it mean to be responsible? For one it is to mentally grasp the consequences of our actions, and that indeed our actions have consequences. MA is to understand why we act. That is why we consider those, for example the mentally disabled, not to be responsible for certain behavior as they simply do not understand why or what they may be doing. That is the component lacked in order to be irresponsible, and thus would nearly mean one who lacks such ability to not be truly free. It is thus a mistake to say PAP is necessary for moral responsibility, as one doesn't need the ability to do otherwise to be considered responsible. One only needs to understand his actions and what they entail. So, since PAP isn't related to MA, it is in turn not related to free will.

Second, I would argue PAP is false per an example dubbed the Frankfurt Example. It runs as follows:

"Donald is a Democrat and is likely to vote for the Democrats; in fact, only in one particular circumstance will he not: that is, if he thinks about the prospects of immediate American defeat in Iraq just prior to voting. Ms White, a representative of the Democratic Party, wants to ensure that Donald votes Democratic, so she secretly plants a device in Donald's head that, if activated, will force him to vote Democratic. Not wishing to reveal her presence unnecessarily, Ms White plans to activate the device only if Donald thinks about the Iraq War prior to voting. As things happen, Donald does not think about Iraq prior to voting, so Ms White thus sees no reason to activate the device, and Donald votes Democratic of his own accord."

Now, following the example, Donald could not have voted differently. Had he chosen Republican, Ms.White activates the device and he votes Democratic. There is only the same outcome from the same action that is possible. Yet regardless of this truth, Donald MUST be responsible for his voting as a) he voted on his own, for his own reasons that may be even independent from that of Ms.White, and b) Ms.White did not activate the device to cause him to vote democratic. What this shows is that even though one could not possibly have done otherwise (PAP), they are still held responsible for their actions, and are therefore free.

This leaves the definition of free will in the form of campatibilism, which is to say free will and determinism are not mutually exclusive, but can co - exist. Free will means that there are no external or internal factors forcing or preventing from acting how you desire. If one attempts to rob a store and is deferred by a police officer and is arrested, his free will is infringed upon as there is an external factor preventing from acting how he wants (of course for the best). Freedom is also defined in the sense of MA and grasping ones actions.

Consequently, divine foreknowledge does not conflict with the compatibilist type of free will defined above. Foreknowledge is not an internal or external factor that prevents or forces us to act. I understand that would be highly contended, yet reflect on that claim. Foreknowledge is knowledge of our desires; they dot form our desires.

 

[Radagast]

Second, I would argue PAP is false per an example dubbed the Frankfurt Example. It runs as follows:

"Donald is a Democrat and is likely to vote for the Democrats; in fact, only in one particular circumstance will he not: that is, if he thinks about the prospects of immediate American defeat in Iraq just prior to voting. Ms White, a representative of the Democratic Party, wants to ensure that Donald votes Democratic, so she secretly plants a device in Donald's head that, if activated, will force him to vote Democratic. Not wishing to reveal her presence unnecessarily, Ms White plans to activate the device only if Donald thinks about the Iraq War prior to voting. As things happen, Donald does not think about Iraq prior to voting, so Ms White thus sees no reason to activate the device, and Donald votes Democratic of his own accord."

A classic example, and one that illustrates how "free will" is not as obvious as it appears on first sight.

 

[talquin]

If God has infallible foreknowledge, then determinism is true in every sense of the word. The question, could we have chosen differently up until our actual decision, would then be answered, "no", not "yes". The issue is at that point whether or not free will is defined by the ability to do otherwise, otherwise known as PAP (Principle of Alternative Possibilities). If PAP is true, determinism may not be, and therefore foreknowledge may not be infallible. If PAP is false, then free will is not defined by such, determinism is true and foreknowledge is infallible.

First, I would ask what support there is to claim PAP is significant to free will? There simply seems no evidence. We can say without doubt that moral accountability and free will are related, yet moral accountability needs to be defined in order to establish the relation. What does it mean to be responsible? For one it is to mentally grasp the consequences of our actions, and that indeed our actions have consequences. MA is to understand why we act. That is why we consider those, for example the mentally disabled, not to be responsible for certain behavior as they simply do not understand why or what they may be doing. That is the component lacked in order to be irresponsible, and thus would nearly mean one who lacks such ability to not be truly free. It is thus a mistake to say PAP is necessary for moral responsibility, as one doesn't need the ability to do otherwise to be considered responsible. One only needs to understand his actions and what they entail. So, since PAP isn't related to MA, it is in turn not related to free will.

Second, I would argue PAP is false per an example dubbed the Frankfurt Example. It runs as follows:

"Donald is a Democrat and is likely to vote for the Democrats; in fact, only in one particular circumstance will he not: that is, if he thinks about the prospects of immediate American defeat in Iraq just prior to voting. Ms White, a representative of the Democratic Party, wants to ensure that Donald votes Democratic, so she secretly plants a device in Donald's head that, if activated, will force him to vote Democratic. Not wishing to reveal her presence unnecessarily, Ms White plans to activate the device only if Donald thinks about the Iraq War prior to voting. As things happen, Donald does not think about Iraq prior to voting, so Ms White thus sees no reason to activate the device, and Donald votes Democratic of his own accord."

Now, following the example, Donald could not have voted differently. Had he chosen Republican, Ms.White activates the device and he votes Democratic. There is only the same outcome from the same action that is possible. Yet regardless of this truth, Donald MUST be responsible for his voting as a) he voted on his own, for his own reasons that may be even independent from that of Ms.White, and b) Ms.White did not activate the device to cause him to vote democratic. What this shows is that even though one could not possibly have done otherwise (PAP), they are still held responsible for their actions, and are therefore free.

This leaves the definition of free will in the form of campatibilism, which is to say free will and determinism are not mutually exclusive, but can co - exist. Free will means that there are no external or internal factors forcing or preventing from acting how you desire. If one attempts to rob a store and is deferred by a police officer and is arrested, his free will is infringed upon as there is an external factor preventing from acting how he wants (of course for the best). Freedom is also defined in the sense of MA and grasping ones actions.

Consequently, divine foreknowledge does not conflict with the compatibilist type of free will defined above. Foreknowledge is not an internal or external factor that prevents or forces us to act. I understand that would be highly contended, yet reflect on that claim. Foreknowledge is knowledge of our desires; they dot form our desires.

Please go back and read my original post. For the purposes of this discussion, "free will" means to freely make choices. This means up until the time Fred chooses A out of an A/B choice, he still could have chosen B. That ability of humans is incompatible with a god who has infallible knowledge of all yet to occur events.

 

[Radagast]

For the purposes of this discussion, "free will" means to freely make choices.

And you are STILL refusing to properly define this, even when difficulties with the concept are pointed out.

This is not genuine discussion; this is just spamming us with the same thread posted 6 months ago. I suggest that this thread be closed, just like that one was.

FWIW, I'm with elopez -- I believe in compatibilist free will and in determinism, so your "scenario" doesn't apply.

 

[DogmaHunter]

Not at all. It may seem that way to you at first, but it's not. What would be a contradiction would be predetermination.

How is predetermination different from foreknowledge?

But foreknowledge in no way binds the hands of the person making the decisions, nor does that--believing God to foreknow the decisions--influence his choices.

That is simply false.
If god (or anyone else) can know beforehand what decision I will make, how can I be free to decide otherwise?
If it can be known what I will decide before I decide with 110% accuracy... then my decisions are set in stone and I am not free to decide what I want. I might have the illusion that I'm deciding freely, but I'm really not.

My decision is predetermined if it can be known what it will be before I make the decision.

Nope. Knowing the future and causing the future to be what it is are two different things.

I didn't speak about "causing" the future.
I said: if it can be known BEFOREHAND what I will decide, then I am NOT free to decide otherwise. The my decision is predetermined. If it wasn't, it couldn't be known what the decision will be. Then you'ld have to wait till I make the decision.

If I, for example, know that night will follow day, I am in no way making it happen

Not the point. But a good example....
You know that night will follow day because it is predetermined. Because the laws of physics are deterministic. If the rotation of the earth was subject to the free will of the earth, then you wouldn't know when night will come until the earth decides that it's time for night to come.

If you think that, you've only tricked yourself. And I don't see any evidence or even a good argument from anyone that to know the future is to make it happen.

You should read posts with a bit more attention....
I never spoke about causing anything by anyone.

I merely said that if it can be known what I'll decide BEFORE I decide, then I am not "free" to decide otherwise. I might be under the illusion to freely make my decision, but nevertheless, it was predetermined what that decision would be. It couldn't be known beforehand if it wasn't....

 

[DogmaHunter]

Just because I have a foreknowledge of what would happen if I jump off a 50 story building doesn't mean I don't have a free will to jump or not.

The law of gravity is deterministic. That is why you know what will happen if you jump of the building.

But the issue here is not being able to predict deterministic things. The issue here is "free will".

Your analogy is incorrect. It's not about knowing what will happen if you jump... it's about knowing before hand that you WILL DECIDE to jump.
Meaning that your decision was pre-determined. You were never free to NOT jump. If you were, it couldn't be known before hand what you would decide.

I have the free will in my actions (jump off a 50 story building) but not the reactions of those my actions (gravity).

Right. But the "foreknowledge" in this topic is not about the reaction, but about the action that is supposedly "free". If foreknowledge of actions exists, then your decisions aren't free.

 

[DogmaHunter]

??

It doesn't matter if these unthinking objects do what they do. The point still stands that to know what will happen does not mean causing it to happen.

Again: it's not about causality. It's about what it means for free will.

And the point being made is: if perfect foreknowledge of your future decisions exists, then free will does not.

 

[Radagast]

if perfect foreknowledge of your future decisions exists, then free will does not.

Nonsense!

Any good book on philosophy will explain that foreknowledge only rules out certain kinds of free will.