The "Free Will" Dilemma

[EgonTowst]

Wanted to share an article/blog post I wrote elsewhere. Haven't gotten any feedback yet, and thought it might stir some interesting conversation here. Remember this is a blog post I wrote for another website, particularly a Reformed website, and a Reformed website that has a layman audience base, so if I sound like I'm "talking at" non-Calvinists at times, my apologies. I do not wish to unkind, and hope nothing in this post will come across as such. I'm just trying to encourage some fruitful discussion on my thoughts.

I will have to split this into two posts, because it is too long for one.
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The concept of “free will” is so frequently taken for granted that most today would not even think to question it. However, I would suggest this is because few take the time to examine what they actually mean by it. I want to spend a few moments discussing different ways in which “free will” can be defined. Through an analysis of these possible definitions, I will argue that there is no way to coherently define a realistic concept of “free will” in humanity. Christians believe this tradition because they take the concept for granted (it being the common assumption among most everyone else around them) without seriously examining and challenging what they assume to be true.

It is not my intention to present a biblical argument against “free will” here. That I will do elsewhere, as Scripture is my real basis for arguing that man's will is enslaved. Rather, here my primary intention is to examine the concept of “free will,” and possible ways in which to define the term, in order to simply demonstrate that those who use such terminology are not being very coherent or consistent in doing so. So before anyone criticizes me for “relying on philosophy instead of Scripture to argue my Calvinism,” no, I am not presenting a positive case for Calvinism. I am questioning the consistency of those who argue against Calvinism. My positive case for my position will come in later posts.

In order to avoid the tremendous amount of confusion that so often colors the Calvinism debate, we have to define our terms. “Free will” is a philosophical term, not a biblical term, so it must be defined by those who wish to use such language. Further, “free will” cannot be defined in a way that makes it synonymous to the mere act of choosing, because the debate on “free will” involves questions concerning the nature of man's choices, not the reality of them. Yet, the arguments of many “free will” proponents seem to ignore this (or perhaps they’re just not aware of it). The typical strategy involves little more than referencing Scripture verses that refer to the fact that men choose Christ, as if that is somehow supposed to settle something. This equivocation inevitably results in a failure to recognize what those who oppose “free will” are actually arguing, which in itself unfortunately accounts for a vast majority of the debates that take place.

Dave Hunt, for instance, argues from page 169 and following in his book What Love is This? that the Calvinist view implies that God “causes” people to do things as if they were “cardboard puppets.” In a [link]radio broadcast in 2010 by Chuck Smith and Bryan Brodersen of Calvary Chapel, the statement was made that Calvinists believe God “makes it impossible for people to come to Him” (5:15ff minute mark). In another [link]radio broadcast (date unknown), one individual makes the claim that Calvinists believe “man does not have a will” (6:44ff minute mark). Also of Calvary Chapel, George Bryson has likened Calvinism to fatalism in his book The Dark Side of Calvinism, page 21. Norman Geisler accuses the Calvinist position on page 47 of Chosen but Free of suggesting that God “force[s people] into His kingdom against their wills.” Every one of these accusations (and there are many more like them) is so far off the mark it is embarrassing. Not one of these men, or the many like them, has apparently ever taken the time to seriously study and seek to understand the view they oppose before hastily trying to find ways to dismiss it. This is dishonest scholarship, and yet it is representative of the kind of argumentation we hear coming from the vast majority of non-Calvinists.

I'd like to offer a proposal. I suggest that there are essentially two ways in which “free will” can be broadly defined. One of these ways will prove to be unrealistic upon examination, and is therefore easily objectionable. The other way is no real definition of “free will” at all, because it simply involves equating the concept of “free​ will” with what it means to simply ​have​ a will (this is the error of equivocation that many such as those just mentioned are making). I suggest that this is no definition of “free will” at all because ​no one​ would object to the fact that we ​have​ a will, and yet there are people who object to the idea that our will is ​free​. Thus, any coherent definition of the concept must articulate a distinction between what it means to ​have​ a will and what it means for the will to be ​free​. However, this, as I will show, will leave us only with the option of defining “free will” in such a way that the concept must simply be dismissed as nonsense. So my proposal is that we should do away with “free will” terminology altogether. Either it causes confusion by postulating an incoherent concept, or it describes a view of humanity that anyone should be able to agree is unrealistic.

So what are these definitions? We can describe the actions of the will as either being “uncaused” or “caused.” I suggest that any definition of the nature of choice must fall into one of these categories. Let’s examine the definitions carefully.

1) The human will is uncaused in its operation. While it may be influenced by internal or external factors, these factors do not necessarily have to impact the decision that is made.

2) The human will is caused in its operation. While the will still operates legitimately (that is to say, men do make their own choices), there are always internal and/or external factors in play that will inevitably not only impact the decision making process, but necessarily determine the outcome.

I don’t see another way of defining the will. Either the will is (A) unaffected by internal and external factors, in which case it is uncaused, (B) potentially influenced by internal and external factors but not necessarily determined by them, in which case we can also say the will is uncaused (or at least can be), or (C) determined by internal and external factors, in which case the will is caused.

Further, note that both of these definitions acknowledge the fact that man has a will. Neither view denies the fact that men make their own choices. The second definition (that the will is caused) does not imply that a man unconsciously goes about doing things like a puppet being pulled on strings. That is not the sense in which I am using the term “caused” here. By “caused,” what I mean is that every action of the will is causally related to the factors that influence our decision making – meaning, simply, that while they are indeed our choices, every one of those choices has a specific reason that motivated it. The choice is causally related to its influencing factors because it cannot be separated from that reason. Rather than being made in a vacuum, the choice is a necessary response or reflection of the impact that one or more internal or external factors (such as desire, emotion, environment, logical inference, etc.) has on the will.

Now, the superficiality of the non-Calvinist position is quickly revealed when the average non-Calvinist is asked to define what he or she means by “free will.” Most often, neither of the above options will be provided as a definition, at least initially. Usually, the only definition that will be offered is something along the lines of, “‘free will’ means that we have the ability to choose.” But as I’ve already noted, this is not an answer to the question at all, because every view of the will, including those views which argue against “free will,” acknowledge that we have the ability to choose. The question does not concern whether that ability is present. The question concerns the nature of the ability. So, even when non-Calvinists believe they have defined “free will,” most often they have not. They assume a definition in their arguments, but they have not critically analyzed their thought deeply enough to articulate specifically what it is they are actually assuming. This is problematic as it hinders the non-Calvinist from being able to test and examine the validity of what he believes to be true, which should naturally raise suspicions concerning the role that unchecked tradition plays in determining one’s beliefs.

But we must examine these things. We can describe the will as either uncaused or caused. When asked in this way (“is the will uncaused or caused?&#8221, the non-Calvinist will almost invariably answer the former – “the will is uncaused.” But I suggest no one actually believes this to be the case. The language is attractive, which is why people will say they believe it to be true. However, upon careful examination the idea quickly becomes unfeasible.

As mentioned earlier, there are two ways in which we can describe a will that is “uncaused.” We can either say that our choices are unaffected by internal and external factors, or that internal and external factors (such as desires, emotions, logical inferences, etc.) have the potential to influence our decisions, but are not guaranteed to determine the outcomes. On these views, choices may or may not be impacted by underlying motives, but ultimately in either case it is not necessary that those motives always and inevitably determine the outcome. The problem with this view is that it implies that decision making, at least in theory, can occur in a vacuum. That is, even given all these potential influences, one can still make a choice that ultimately was not directly impacted or motivated by anything outside itself. It simply happened, and there was no “reason” that caused it to happen. If this is the theory free-willists hold to, they face insurmountable problems.

For one, there is no way to distinguish the act of willing, on this view, from an act of random chance. This destroys all grounds for reliability in an individual's choices. The reason we believe we can trust people, the reason we feel we can know what kind of decision a person is likely to make, is because we assume that an individual's character traits are necessarily going to impact their decision making. This assumes that choices are causally made. If it were possible for an individual to truly make choices that are uncaused, there would necessarily be no way to even begin to predict a person's choices. A person would have absolutely no grounds for rationally believing that the next time he encounters his best friend, he will not arbitrarily pull out a knife and stab him to death. The very fact that we trust people and believe we can predict the choices (or range of choices) of others indicates that on a subconscious level we recognize and presuppose that all our decisions are necessarily impacted by underlying factors. This is simply another way of saying that our choices are causally related to the factors that influence them.

Further, choices can have no meaning if they are uncaused. One of the fascinating ironies of criticisms that are leveled against Calvinism is that they can often be turned right around on the non-Calvinist on an even more legitimate basis. One such example is when non-Calvinists suggest that a man’s decision to love Christ is not a “real” and meaningful decision unless it is made “freely.” But the irony here is that meaning is based in causation, not freedom! The very language of “meaning” presupposes purpose, and the very language of “purpose” presupposes determination. If an individual made a completely arbitrary choice to choose Christ, then it was meaningless. It had no motive. It was just a random, thoughtless act. Of course, every non-Calvinist would say that those who choose Christ certainly have motive for doing so. They want to choose Him, for instance. But as soon as one confesses that this is so, they admit that choices are caused, not uncaused. A choice that is based on a particular motive or reason is a choice that is born out of a causal influence. There were underlying factors that caused the individual to choose the way he did.

There is another ironic implication of the idea that our choices are uncaused. Again, the non-Calvinist will often assert that in order for an individual to legitimately be held responsible for his choices, those choices must be “free.” But just as meaning is grounded in causation, so is responsibility. If an individual's choosing is not necessarily causally related to any character trait or other underlying influence, we cannot legitimately call it “his” choice. A random, purposeless, uncaused act, with no meaning or motive necessarily underlying it, cannot even be called a “choice” of the individual. If a man murders his friend and one were to suggest that his choices were uncaused, we would lose all grounds for accusing the culprit of being responsible for the murder. Yet if we admit that it was his choice, then we further evidence our conviction that the choice was determined by underlying motives, character traits, and/or other factors. It is, in fact, the recognition of underlying motive that causes us to say a criminal is guilty for his actions.

...

 

[EgonTowst]

...

One might object to these complaints by suggesting that in saying that choices are “uncaused,” we do not have to go to such an extreme as concluding that they are random acts which are never influenced by other factors (i.e. position ‘A’). It is possible to say, in other words, that underlying motives can more or less have an impact on our decisions, but won’t necessarily “determine” or “cause” the choices that will be made (i.e. position ‘B’). However, this objection misses the point. In fact, it concedes the point. It is the very nature of the human will to act according to its motives. Either a decision has a motive behind it, or it does not. If it does not, it is a random, arbitrary act. If it does, then the decision is causally related to the motive, for the decision was made precisely because the individual acted on that motive, and not another. The very act of considering various possibilities, weighing the pros and cons, and deciding upon which desire to act, is an act of choosing according to a logical inference or reasoning process that is made. That itself is a motive that is causally related to its resulting action or choice. There is simply no way of describing the human will as “uncaused” without simultaneously denying that an individual’s choices are his choices.

So, this should help us to begin to articulate some meaningful definitions.“The will is uncaused” is not a feasible definition. “The ability to choose anything whatsoever” clearly would not work in defining the nature or extent of the will, so any view that would postulate or presuppose such a definition for “free will” is not thinkable. Any acceptable definition of the will must include a condition that defines a limit on what the will is capable of doing – namely, a limit that describes the fact that choices are causally related to their motivating factors.

We could say, for example, that man is “capable of choosing anything he desires.” This definition asserts that a man’s choices are his own, but it also applies a causal condition – his desire (I'm using this term generally to include all kinds of influencing factors that would motivate a decision) – which determines what the outcome of his decisions can be. However, as I mentioned earlier, this would not be a legitimate definition for “free will,” because there is no distinguishing between this concept and what it means to simply have a will. If we define “will” and “free will” in the same way (and many do this), we are guilty of equivocating the meaning of these terms, for we ignore the fact that the addition of the adjective should tell us something about the nature of “the will” that is not inherently implied in the definition of “will.”

Thus, we can objectively conclude that free will is simply a fiction. We cannot define it as an ability to uncausally choose between any range of actions, because of the problems already mentioned, but we also cannot define it as the ability to causally choose between actions, because that seems to equate the act of choosing “freely” with the mere act of choosing at all, which communicates nothing new. Why call it a “free” choice if all one really means is that it’s a choice?

This is where matters get confusing. As it turns out, calling the will “free” is often nothing more than an attempt for many to deny the idea that God “forces” men to “choose” one way or the other. But all this demonstrates is that the critic fails to recognize a distinction where there is one. The common non-Calvinist sees only two options: “God forces people to do things against their will,” or “we have free will.” It is not often that they will recognize that you’re not limited to those two options. They won’t recognize it because they assume a very nebulous concept of “free will” without ever articulating what they really mean by it. Both Calvinists and non acknowledge that men have a will – an ability to make their own choices. The real question is, and always has been, are those choices causally related to their motives (we have already established this is the case), and if so, what is the ground of those motives? Where do the motives come from? Who or what is responsible for them?

When we start to ask these questions, we can begin to see and understand that denying “free will” does not require denying the idea that men have a will. Calvinists believe that men do indeed have a will. Their position is simply that the will is enslaved to its desires, always choosing according to what the heart is inclined toward. Hence, the will exists, but it is not free. Good trees bear good fruit, bad trees bear bad fruit. Born into sin, natural man will always choose sin, because that is his desire. Give him all the opportunities for Christ you want; he will not take them. It is only when the Spirit sovereignly chooses to regenerate the sinner’s heart that he is then granted the desire for righteousness, upon which he will irresistibly act in choosing Christ, because that is his new desire.

While there are various non-Calvinist positions (I should say synergist; I don’t mean to refer to all Lutherans, for example, in my “non-Calvinist” label here), one thing they all share in common is the idea that man is capable of equally choosing between sin and righteousness (this is ultimately how they end up defining “free will”). But the careful reader will already be able to note the problem I perceive here. If man is capable of choosing equally between sin and righteousness, that entails that one of two possibilities must be true:

1) The choice between the two is uncaused, because although desires for sin or righteousness may potentially have influence, neither directly causes the resulting choice. Hence, “free will” is defined as the ability to make an uncaused choice.

2) The choice between the two is caused, because there is some kind of logical inference or other factor at play that necessarily motivates the individual to choose one and not the other. Hence, “free will” is defined as the ability to make one’s own choices, according to his own unique desires or influences (as opposed to one given by God).

Now we’ve hammered out the real position that most non-Calvinists take. What they mean by “free will” is something like this second option, even though, as I’ve suggested, we cannot legitimately call it “free will” and we should do away with that terminology. If we say that man naturally possesses the desire for sin (as a result of the fall), but is not necessarily entailed by that desire to only and always choose sin, or, if we say that God gives man the desire for righteousness (by His act of grace), but man is not necessarily entailed by that desire to choose Christ and forsake sin, we can explain this either by saying that the reason neither desire entails a certain outcome is because nothing necessarily causes the choice (#1), or by saying that the reason neither desire entails a certain outcome is because the choice was caused by man comparing and contrasting the two options, weighing the pros and cons, and reasoning for himself what the outcome should be (#2).

We’ve already discredited the first option. If the choice between the two is uncaused, then it cannot legitimately be called a choice of the individual, nor can it be said that the individual chose Christ meaningfully. In the case of the second option, we have an equally serious dilemma. If we can acknowledge that the choice was caused by its motive, then we need to further ask what the basis of the motive is. Perhaps you see where I am going with this. The position has already assumed that God has given an equal measure of grace to every man. He has treated every man equally. But this means that God’s grace alone cannot be the basis of the motive which determines an individual to embrace Christ. If it were, we should see everyone making the same choice. And yet we continue to see many reject Christ while others embrace Him.

This can only mean that the cause of the difference (the reason some accept Christ and others reject Him), the basis of the motive leading to the decisions, is something inherent in the unique character of each individual making the choice. This is the only thing that can explain, if we assume God has treated everyone equally, why we see different people making different choices. Some people’s choices are caused by motives which are based on personal virtue, while other people’s choices are caused by motives which are based on personal vice. Even though God supposedly gave the same measure of grace to every single individual, whether or not the individual will actually embrace Christ depends on whether they are smart enough, kind enough, humble enough, or whatever the case may be, to develop the motive to make good out of the grace that God has given, whereas the reason that others do not embrace Christ is because they fail to achieve the same. Either they are less intelligent, more prideful, or whatever, but ultimately the reason they reject Christ is because when they weighed the pros and cons between the choices offered them their character produced a negative motive.

The implication is simply that Christians are better people than non-Christians, because they have made the right decision where others have failed. They have chosen to do what is right, while others have chosen to be criminals. This conclusion will surely offend, but is it wrong? To be sure, the Arminian would never articulate such a position. They agree with the Calvinist that we are saved by grace alone through faith alone. But my point all along has been that non-Calvinists are inconsistent in that they say one thing, but presuppose (whether consciously or not) something else in their arguments.

And that is precisely what has been demonstrated here. There is no possible way of defining and arguing “free will” without (1) postulating a nonsensical idea, (2) equivocating on terminology, resulting in either agreeing with the Calvinist view of the will, or attacking a misrepresentation of Calvinism rather than the real thing, or (3) implying a form of works-righteousness in salvation, thus giving man reason to boast in his decision. Free will is a myth. It is a fiction of human philosophy that has infected the church. We must turn to Scripture, not philosophy, to define our doctrines of man and salvation. And so that is what I will do in upcoming and future posts.

As a last word, I will explain just briefly the Calvinist position on the will. If you don’t like the label “Calvinist,” call it something else. But ultimately this is the only option one has to avoid the problems we have considered in this post. Calvinists believe that man has a will. They believe that man is capable of making his own choices. But what we mean by that is that we choose according to what we desire to choose. We escape the problems that are implied by the definition of an “uncaused” will, because we believe all choices are causally related to underlying motives and other factors. Further, we argue that the will is not “free,” but in “bondage,” meaning, natural men are enslaved to sin, and those who come to embrace Christ do so because God has given them the desire to do so. In other words, the natural born man will never choose Christ – not because God prevents him from doing so – but because his own sin nature keeps him from ever having the desire or ability to consider such an option, let alone act on it. Natural man loves his sin, and so he will always choose to remain in rebellion to Christ. Unless, and until, God sovereignly changes that desire. And this is what happens in the regeneration, the new birth. This is why it is necessary for a man to be born again, and it is why it only makes sense to say that regeneration precedes the choice to come to Christ. God’s sovereign choice to save the sinner from his bondage in sin is what gives rise to the sinner’s desire to choose Christ in the first place. When God grants the desire for Christ, the new heart will certainly act on it favorably, because that is its ultimate desire.

Thus, Calvinism also escapes the problem of providing Christians with a grounds for boasting. Calvinism does not affirm that God’s work of grace in men merely enables them to equally choose between sin and righteousness. It affirms instead that God’s work of grace in men necessarily compels them to respond in favor toward Christ. While it is a necessary act on the part of the individual, it is still legitimately the individual’s act, because he is merely choosing according to the desire of his heart. He is doing what he wants to do. Thus, the Calvinist view suggests that man’s choice to embrace Christ is no more caused by God’s grace than all of man’s choices are caused by other motives and influences. All choices are causally related to their influences. All choices have reasons and motives behind them. The only difference is that in the case of the individual choosing Christ, the sovereign grace given to the individual is that motivating factor. God changes the heart so that it possesses a new desire, and the individual chooses (“freely,” if you will) to act on it, because he wants to.

Finally, this explains why some people choose Christ, and others do not, without giving Christians any grounds for boasting. The reason is simply that God does not extend this grace to every man. His choice is based in His own sovereign good pleasure, and not in anything in us. Surely there are many questions and objections the non-Calvinist would raise at this point – I have heard them all, so I am tempted to anticipate and respond to each. But that will wait for future posts.

 

[SeraphimsCherub]

God bless you brother! This is the most incredible thing you have put together here my friend! WoW...only blind illogical stubborn pride would argue against this.

 

[Reformationist]

I very much enjoyed, and was greatly edified by, that articulate presentation. I agreed with every single part of it.

Thank you.

 

[gmm4j]

The first cause is the responsible cause of the last effect. If the first cause is a living being, he is not only the cause. But he is the causer. And if he intended that the last effect should exist, then he is the intentional causer that the last effect should exist. And if this first supposed causer is a supposed God, and the last effect is sin, the supposed God is the intentional causer of that sin. But surely the intentional causer of a thing is author of that thing. God then, according to necessitarianism, is the responsible author of sin.

Whedon points out,
It teaches that God is the necessitative first cause, through a straight inevitable line of necessitating second causes, of man’s existence, and of his very acts, and of his final damnation for the being and act. Necessitated to be what he is, to do what he does, of that necessitation God is the original necessitator who not only negatively precludes any different results from any possible existence, but positively necessitates that sole result to come into existence. That is, God necessitates his existence, his nature and sin. Man has no adequate ability for different existence, choice, act, or destiny. (ibid., pp. 343, 344)

In the question of responsibility for an intended effect, be it here noted, it makes no difference through how many intermediate necessary causes the causation has to pass from the first cause to the last effect. No matter how long the series of mediate necessitative causes, or how many the terms in the series, the first intentional causer is the responsible author of the final intended effect. If the necessary mediate causes are billions and billions, the intentional causer is as truly the responsible author of the effect at the far end as if it were an immediate voluntary act or a simple volition. The whole series is responsibly one act; the final effect is the one act. The line of causation shoots through the whole series, and binds the first cause to a responsibility for the last effect.

 

[SeraphimsCherub]

The first cause is the responsible cause of the last effect. If the first cause is a living being, he is not only the cause. But he is the causer. And if he intended that the last effect should exist, then he is the intentional causer that the last effect should exist. And if this first supposed causer is a supposed God, and the last effect is sin, the supposed God is the intentional causer of that sin. But surely the intentional causer of a thing is author of that thing. God then, according to necessitarianism, is the responsible author of sin.

Whedon points out,
It teaches that God is the necessitative first cause, through a straight inevitable line of necessitating second causes, of man’s existence, and of his very acts, and of his final damnation for the being and act. Necessitated to be what he is, to do what he does, of that necessitation God is the original necessitator who not only negatively precludes any different results from any possible existence, but positively necessitates that sole result to come into existence. That is, God necessitates his existence, his nature and sin. Man has no adequate ability for different existence, choice, act, or destiny. (ibid., pp. 343, 344)

In the question of responsibility for an intended effect, be it here noted, it makes no difference through how many intermediate necessary causes the causation has to pass from the first cause to the last effect. No matter how long the series of mediate necessitative causes, or how many the terms in the series, the first intentional causer is the responsible author of the final intended effect. If the necessary mediate causes are billions and billions, the intentional causer is as truly the responsible author of the effect at the far end as if it were an immediate voluntary act or a simple volition. The whole series is responsibly one act; the final effect is the one act. The line of causation shoots through the whole series, and binds the first cause to a responsibility for the last effect.

Sin is the "necessary" consequence...be"cause" Adam and Eve eat of the tree of the knowledge of good,and evil. They were "responsible" for eating that which "God" told them not to eat. Once they did,God was Responsible to exact the "reality" of what their consequences of "sin" would be. How all the elements of matter that make up life,and death,in good,and evil, how they would interact in relation of their opposition to one another.

 

[gmm4j]

Sin is the "necessary" consequence...be"cause" Adam and Eve eat of the tree of the knowledge of good,and evil. They were "responsible" for eating that which "God" told them not to eat. Once they did,God was Responsible to exact the "reality" of what their consequences of "sin" would be. How all the elements of matter that matter that make up life,and death,in good,and evil, how they would interact in relation of their opposition to one another.

Did they do so at the decree of God?

 

[SeraphimsCherub]

Did they do so at the decree of God?

Who do you think "caused" the "tree of the knowledge of good,and evil" to grow in the garden"? Do you think satan would remain bound in a sinful nature of death,and perpetual enmity against God? Had he the power to escape,and "relieve" himself of such horrors. GOD is outside and above "the good",and "the evil" that make up that tree. Yet HE is the creator of the laws which make the reality of it up. Both the consequences of good,and evil "work" exactly for the ETERNAL PURPOSE for which CHRIST "THE REDEEMER" created it for...THE REDEMPTIVE "PURPOSE"....of HIMSELF to become the Very Object of the "FAITH" thereof for HIS OWN "GOOD" pleasure. "For without FAITH it is impossible toe please HIM.

 

[gmm4j]

Who do you think "caused" the "tree of the knowledge of good,and evil" to grow in the garden"? Do you think satan would remain bound in a sinful nature of death,and perpetual enmity against God? Had he the power to escape,and "relieve" himself of such horrors. GOD is outside and above "the good",and "the evil" that make up that tree. Yet HE is the creator of the laws which make the reality of it up. Both the consequences of good,and evil "work" exactly for the ETERNAL PURPOSE for which CHRIST "THE REDEEMER" created it for...THE REDEMPTIVE "PURPOSE"....of HIMSELF to become the Very Object of the "FAITH" thereof for HIS OWN "GOOD" pleasure. "For without FAITH it is impossible toe please HIM.

So, if you are saying that God intended and decreed sin to exist, then He is the causer and responsible author of sin.

 

[SeraphimsCherub]

So, if you are saying that God intended and decreed sin to exist, then He is the causer and responsible author of sin.

This is before God curses satan.
Gen 3:1 Now the serpent was more subtil than any beast of the field which the LORD God had made. And he said unto the woman, Yea, hath God said, Ye shall not eat of every tree of the garden?

Notice...it is GOD who curses satan. Why would satan curse himself?
Gen 3:14 And the LORD God said unto the serpent, Because thou hast done this, thou art cursed above all cattle, and above every beast of the field; upon thy belly shalt thou go, and dust shalt thou eat all the days of thy life:

Act 17:28 For in him we live, and move, and have our being; as certain also of your own poets have said, For we are also his offspring.

Psa 139:8 If I ascend up into heaven, thou art there: if I make my bed in hell, behold, thou art there.

Who do you think keeps the fires of hell going,and suffers "consciousness" to exist there.

Yes GOD is "RESPONSIBLE" for it in that sense. If HE were not...it would cease to exist.

 

[gmm4j]

This is before God curses satan.
Gen 3:1 Now the serpent was more subtil than any beast of the field which the LORD God had made. And he said unto the woman, Yea, hath God said, Ye shall not eat of every tree of the garden?

Notice...it is GOD who curses satan. Why would satan curse himself?
Gen 3:14 And the LORD God said unto the serpent, Because thou hast done this, thou art cursed above all cattle, and above every beast of the field; upon thy belly shalt thou go, and dust shalt thou eat all the days of thy life:

Act 17:28 For in him we live, and move, and have our being; as certain also of your own poets have said, For we are also his offspring.

Psa 139:8 If I ascend up into heaven, thou art there: if I make my bed in hell, behold, thou art there.

Who do you think keeps the fires of hell going,and suffers "consciousness" to exist there.

Yes GOD is "RESPONSIBLE" for it in that sense. If HE were not...it would cease to exist.

You are mixing the consequences of sin with the sin itself. He commanded them to not eat of the tree. Do you think He really decreed and wanted them to do so?

 

[SeraphimsCherub]

You are mixing the consequences of sin with the sin itself. He commanded them to not eat of the tree. Do you think He really decreed and wanted them to do so?

Yep for the purpose He created the world for. Absolutely...For Christ was slain before the foundation of the world. God is just...because He did not subject man to anything which He Himself had not subjected His Own Self to. There's no way around it...otherwise your living in a purposeless reality of random,and contingent fortune without rhyme nor reason. No different than an "atheists" universe.

 

[SeraphimsCherub]

God bless you bro...Like David said...it's too high for me.Infinitely so...I still believe that "GOD is light,and in Him there is no darkness at all". Yet on the other hand. I know that life,and death,and good,and evil and everything that is,and shall ever be. Is all in the PALMS OF HIS HANDS.

 

[EgonTowst]

The first cause is the responsible cause of the last effect. If the first cause is a living being, he is not only the cause. But he is the causer. And if he intended that the last effect should exist, then he is the intentional causer that the last effect should exist. And if this first supposed causer is a supposed God, and the last effect is sin, the supposed God is the intentional causer of that sin. But surely the intentional causer of a thing is author of that thing. God then, according to necessitarianism, is the responsible author of sin.

Whedon points out,
It teaches that God is the necessitative first cause, through a straight inevitable line of necessitating second causes, of man’s existence, and of his very acts, and of his final damnation for the being and act. Necessitated to be what he is, to do what he does, of that necessitation God is the original necessitator who not only negatively precludes any different results from any possible existence, but positively necessitates that sole result to come into existence. That is, God necessitates his existence, his nature and sin. Man has no adequate ability for different existence, choice, act, or destiny. (ibid., pp. 343, 344)

In the question of responsibility for an intended effect, be it here noted, it makes no difference through how many intermediate necessary causes the causation has to pass from the first cause to the last effect. No matter how long the series of mediate necessitative causes, or how many the terms in the series, the first intentional causer is the responsible author of the final intended effect. If the necessary mediate causes are billions and billions, the intentional causer is as truly the responsible author of the effect at the far end as if it were an immediate voluntary act or a simple volition. The whole series is responsibly one act; the final effect is the one act. The line of causation shoots through the whole series, and binds the first cause to a responsibility for the last effect.

Two things:

1) You are equivocating on a legitimate distinction between causation and decree. We will have to discuss this later as I am running out the door.

2) Your argument does not address any of the points I raised in my article, and I do believe I covered all possible grounds (I mean, I don't think you can define the will in a way that would escape falling under any of the scenarios I presented). Thus, your argument is not a rebuttal. It really amounts to just saying, "But if what you say is true, then that must mean that this further issue is true as well..."

I don't mean to be crude, but my reply would simply be, so what? I don't agree with your conclusion, but, even if I accept it for the sake of argument, it does nothing to refute the argument already presented in the OP.

 

[SeraphimsCherub]

Two things:

1) You are equivocating on a legitimate distinction between causation and decree. We will have to discuss this later as I am running out the door.

2) Your argument does not address any of the points I raised in my article, and I do believe I covered all possible grounds (I mean, I don't think you can define the will in a way that would escape falling under any of the scenarios I presented). Thus, your argument is not a rebuttal. It really amounts to just saying, "But if what you say is true, then that must mean that this further issue is true as well..."

I don't mean to be crude, but my reply would simply be, so what? I don't agree with your conclusion, but, even if I accept it for the sake of argument, it does nothing to refute the argument already presented in the OP.

Hey brother. What do you think about the things that I said?

 

[SeraphimsCherub]

I mean...I know that GOD can not sin,and the iniquity was found in Lucifer:
Eze 28:15 Thou wast perfect in thy ways from the day that thou wast created, till iniquity was found in thee.
Yet GOD had to of ordain that it be.

 

[Jarrod Kruger]

Read the OP. Boy Satan has done a wonderful Job at antagonizing Grace and mans volitional response to the Grace the Lord Has offered mankind.

Two pages of "intellectual blabber" to veil people from making a choice for Christ. Satan wants it to be complicated and convoluted, I just read 2 pages from His play book in my opinion.

 

[SeraphimsCherub]

Read the OP. Boy Satan has done a wonderful Job at antagonizing Grace and mans volitional response to the Grace the Lord Has offered mankind.

Two pages of "intellectual blabber" to veil people from making a choice for Christ. Satan wants it to be complicated and convoluted, I just read 2 pages from His play book in my opinion.

There's nothing blabber in that my friend. If God by His grace gives you the capacity of mind to be able to grasp,and understand it. It can only increase one's faith in GOD,and bless your socks off.

 

[SeraphimsCherub]

2Th 2:6 And now ye know what withholdeth that he might be revealed in his time.
2Th 2:7 For the mystery of iniquity doth already work: only he who now letteth will let, until he be taken out of the way.
2Th 2:8 And then shall that Wicked be revealed, whom the Lord shall consume with the spirit of his mouth, and shall destroy with the brightness of his coming:
Eze 28:13 Thou hast been in Eden the garden of God; every precious stone was thy covering, the sardius, topaz, and the diamond, the beryl, the onyx, and the jasper, the sapphire, the emerald, and the carbuncle, and gold: the workmanship of thy tabrets and of thy pipes was prepared in thee in the day that thou wast created.
Eze 28:14 Thou art{Present tense} the anointed cherub that covereth; and I have set thee so:{Present tense} thou wast upon the holy mountain of God; thou hast walked up and down in the midst of the stones of fire.
Eze 28:15 Thou wast perfect in thy ways from the day that thou wast created, till iniquity was found in thee.
Eze 28:16 By the multitude of thy merchandise they have filled the midst of thee with violence, and thou hast sinned: therefore I will cast thee as profane out of the mountain of God: and I will destroy thee, O covering cherub, from the midst of the stones of fire.
Eze 28:17 Thine heart was lifted up because of thy beauty, thou hast corrupted thy wisdom by reason of thy brightness: I will cast thee to the ground, I will lay thee before kings, that they may behold thee.
Eze 28:18 Thou hast defiled thy sanctuaries by the multitude of thine iniquities, by the iniquity of thy traffick; therefore will I bring forth a fire from the midst of thee, it shall devour thee, and I will bring thee to ashes upon the earth in the sight of all them that behold thee.

What a mystery indeed! I going to delve into this.....

 

[EgonTowst]

Read the OP. Boy Satan has done a wonderful Job at antagonizing Grace and mans volitional response to the Grace the Lord Has offered mankind.

Two pages of "intellectual blabber" to veil people from making a choice for Christ. Satan wants it to be complicated and convoluted, I just read 2 pages from His play book in my opinion.

In other words, you have no rebuttal. At least you've put your name to that fact.