Not a problem at all. Family and work have stepped in to interrupt my time here, and I appreciate the thoughtful response, as I will attempt here myself.
That picture may not be the best example, as it was constructed in a manner that purposely creates interference with our vision system.
And we do use methodology, but that methodology may range from "does that look real to you, George?" to "Let's analyze this with state of the art instrumentation, with control groups and double-blind data gathering, and publish our data for peer review, based on this testable, falsifiable hypothesis", with understandably differing degrees of accuracy.
Sure. This all looks fine to me.
From what I gather, we rely on our cognitive faculties to produce accurate results until they don't. The Earth looks flat until we climb a high peak. The speed of light appears to be instantaneous until it doesn't. What we observe at the macroscopic scale is not necessarily reflected in the quantum level.
Yes, I agree that our cognitive faculties all by themselves are limited in their ability to accurately tell us how the world works, but I still don't see how we have any choice but to trust -- I might even say to have
faith -- that they're reliable enough to tell us which methods and/or instruments successfully augment our ability to ascertain accurate results and which do not.
At this point, do you mean "true", or "accurate"? While I believe that the surface on which my computer monitor resides is solid, it might be more accurate to describe it as mostly empty space, or more accurate to describe it as space filled with quantum... stuff.
I call a belief “true” only if its conceptual content correctly, or accurately, represents the way that the world actually is. Its truth depends on the conceptual content that's “packaged into” the believed proposition.
Let's take the proposition that “the surface that your computer monitor sits upon is solid.” The truth of this proposition depends on the conceptual content that one intends to convey in any linguistic expression that is meant to assert it. Now let's isolate the word “solid” and try to unpack what content one might mean to convey by inserting it into the proposition in question. One possibility is that the asserter of this proposition might intend to convey that the surface has no visible holes or cracks or seams. So if this holds up as an accurate description of reality, then the person who asserts it does so truthfully (at least insofar as the “solid” part goes; for the sake of expediency, let's just assume that the remainder of the proposition's content also accurately represents reality). However, if by “solid” the utterer of said proposition means to assert that the surface contains no empty space whatsoever -- not even between the electrons and nuclei of atoms -- then his assertion is false, and if he believes it, then that belief is false.
Most of the time? And how do we pick this "most"? When we like the results? When it the "makes sense" when compared to our other [preconceived] notions?
I don't think we can, because any attempt to determine the reliability of our cognitive faculties would have to presuppose the reliability of our cognitive faculties in order to do so, and so any such argument to that effect would be circular. I think we just have to have faith that our faculties are truthful/accurate more often than not. I see this as a bedrock assumption that we just have to make if we're to have any hope of gaining genuine understanding of the world. Even in cases where we discover that our previously-held beliefs about the world are mistaken, we rely upon our cognitive faculties to have truthfully/accurately told us so in some way or other.
I do understand, that if the Bible claims are true, and we need to believe (or else!), then they are justified in their motivation to convey their interpretation of this message to whomever will listen; however, in a venue such as this, they should be prepared to have their "message" and how much (or how little) of it comports with observations of reality, rather than arguing from a position of infallibility.
Except they're not justified because such a monstrous tyrant of a deity as that wouldn't be worthy of such pious reverence, and they ought to know that.
I am very familiar with WLC's attempts at a theistic slight-of-hand, where he trots out all of the non-specific "greatest being/kalamity/etc" arguments, calls this thing he describes as "God", and then, as if no one is going to notice, attempts to swap in the God-of-the-Bible, declaring them to be the same thing.
I will note that WLC does not openly declare that virtually all of mainstream science must be wrong in order to accommodate his beliefs, preferring to waffle and evade that topic when cornered.
Well, I'll neither defend nor criticize Craig's debate tactics here, but I do believe his writings show him to be a serious and rigorous scholar, regardless of whether or not he's right in what he claims or how well (or poorly) he performs in debates.
FWIW, I have a number of disagreements with Craig. I've already mentioned his rejection of God as
Ipsum Esse Subsistens; I also think his Kalam argument has some serious issues that I've yet to see him satisfactorily resolve.
Indeed, it surprises me when I see two religionists agree on more than a few points.
Like I told you once before, it's a neverending exchange of canons and missals!
I have no idea of what you mean by a "typical religious experience". Without evidence to the contrary, I can only conclude that they are all simply imagined.
Religious experiences typically seem to be described in otherworldly or supranatural terms, and as having been caused by something that we can't ordinarily perceive with our natural senses, if they can be described at all. The so-called “mystical” experiences, however, are typically claimed to be so radically transcendent of our everyday experience that anything approaching an accurate description of them is impossible.
Is that all it takes? What about the birth of a child, or a brush with death? Does this not trivialize the "religious" experience to make it really no different than other experiences?
Well, that in conjunction with the other two. I don't see why a religious experience
always has to confer some profound insight. I think they usually do, but I don't see why they always
have to.
That was not where I was going with my point; I can assume reality is that which is observable, repeatable, and testable (if it acts like reality, assume it is reality) and it doesn't matter if the experience is "genuine" or not, or if the person is being sincere or is delusional, or is lying; it boils down to what is most parsimonious: if what the person relates from their "supernatural/religious" experiences is indistinguishable from an experience that is simply a product of their internal imagination, then it can safely be treated as such, whether is be a psychic's prediction, a dowser's pointing, or a religionist's revelation.
Again, I'd say that what you're justified in believing depends on what epistemic resources you have access to. If you've never had such an experience and encounter two complete strangers -- both of whom could be pathological liars or prone to fantastical delusions/hallucinations, for all you know -- who both tell you a very similar (if not identical) fantastic story, then you might perfectly well be justified in believing that both stories are lies/delusions/products of wild imaginations.
If, on the other hand, you yourself have had a similar experience, and you know one of these people and have good reason to believe that he's of sound mind and isn't prone to telling tall tales, then you might have good reason to believe he's had what I call a genuine religious experience.
I don't think there is one privileged epistemic vantage point from which we can all look out and reach universal agreement on which experiences (if any) are genuine and which are not. What might be the most plausible explanation for one person (and justifiably so) might not be for another person (and again, justifiably so).