Where is the Objective Morality?

[Moral Orel]

Ceteris paribus, and I never opposed the idea that "sometimes we ought not do whatever we want." These are strawmen and non-sequiturs. Obviously we shouldn't do what we want when all things are not equal.

For example, I shouldn't eat food when it is poisoned, but the fact that some piece of food might be poisoned doesn't undermine the general principle that I should eat food (or that I should eat food if I want to survive).

So sometimes "we should do what we want" is true, and sometimes "we should do what we want" is false.

I pointed you to Searle's paper back in August before any of these conversations even began, but you continue boppin' around the kiddie pool. If you want to move into deeper waters you know where to look. If not, that's fine.

We've been over this before. I have no interest in studying philosophy papers. Use his argument against me all you like in your posts.

 

[zippy2006]

So sometimes "we should do what we want" is true, and sometimes "we should do what we want" is false.

Right, like in real life. The fact that some piece of food might be poisoned isn't a real argument against the idea that we should eat food. When a mom tells her boy that he needs to eat food if he wants to grow up, she isn't telling him that he needs to eat every piece of food without qualification, even if it is, say, poisoned.

We shouldn't eat poisoned food. It obviously doesn't follow from that that there is parity between eating food and not eating food. It's not like "You should eat food" is false as often as it is true. The general rule holds even though some food shouldn't be eaten. You have a rule and an exception, not two equal and opposed rules.

We've been over this before. I have no interest in studying philosophy papers. Use his argument against me all you like in your posts.

See, I'm not convinced you have much interest in understanding these issues. I think you're more interested in boppin' all the CF kiddies over the head with a logic mallet. If that's your thing then you will live a full and prosperous life, for the world is chock full of dumb people. If that's not your thing then I think you would've checked out the academic articles I pointed you towards four months ago, and avoided dozens of hours of boppin' on CF.

As for me, I'm bored with it. I am going to interact with smart people, people who write books and articles on things they have studied and pondered in depth. Or at least people who read such articles. I'm fairly certain that the rest is a waste of time (pedagogy aside).

I hope that's not too harsh, but you've outgrown CF. If you don't take the next step then the days of your intellectual growth and development will be confined to the past.

 

[Moral Orel]

Right, like in real life. The fact that some piece of food might be poisoned isn't a real argument against the idea that we should eat food. When a mom tells her boy that he needs to eat food if he wants to grow up, she isn't telling him that he needs to eat every piece of food without qualification, even if it is, say, poisoned.

We shouldn't eat poisoned food. It obviously doesn't follow from that that there is parity between eating food and not eating food. It's not like "You should eat food" is false as often as it is true. The general rule holds even though some food shouldn't be eaten. You have a rule and an exception, not two equal and opposed rules.

Tell me this, since you're the formal logic expert (no sarcasm): is my representation of the argument in question accurate?

A: what I want to do
B: what I ought to do
C: start the car
D: push the button

P1 A is C
P2 C if and only if D
C B is D

If not, where did I go wrong?

See, I'm not convinced you have much interest in understanding these issues. I think you're more interested in boppin' all the CF kiddies over the head with a logic mallet. If that's your thing then you will live a full and prosperous life, for the world is chock full of dumb people. If that's not your thing then I think you would've checked out the academic articles I pointed you towards four months ago, and avoided dozens of hours of boppin' on CF.

As for me, I'm bored with it. I am going to interact with smart people, people who write books and articles on things they have studied and pondered in depth. Or at least people who read such articles. I'm fairly certain that the rest is a waste of time (pedagogy aside).

I hope that's not too harsh, but you've outgrown CF. If you don't take the next step then the days of your intellectual growth and development will be confined to the past.

I treat this as an exercise in critical thinking. You want me to want something else.

Ironically, years ago I presented the very same argument you're defending now. Silmarian and Quid teamed up to prove me wrong.

 

[zippy2006]

Tell me this, since you're the formal logic expert (no sarcasm): is my representation of the argument in question accurate?

A: what I want to do
B: what I ought to do
C: start the car
D: push the button

P1 A is C
P2 C if and only if D
C B is D

If not, where did I go wrong?

I mean, your steps are a bit odd. P1 and C look like assertions of identity, but what you apparently want to do in something like P1 is to use "A" as a placeholder for a string of text. P1 would therefore mean, "[What I want to do] is [start the car]." But P2 is entirely different, and is approximating real propositional logic. P2 interpreted in the same string-substitution sense would yield, "[Start the car] if and only if [push the button]." I think you wanted to say, "[The car will start] if and only if [the button is pushed]." The trick is that there is a distinction between events and actions, and this is especially important when our conclusion prescribes an action. (The computer programming analogy would say that in P1 and C you are trying to equate two variables of different types, for an event and a desire are two different types of things.)

I think Tinker's approach was fine:

P1. I want to start the car.
P2. I must push the button in order to start the car.
C. Therefore, I ought to push the button.
​

You are not wrong to say that there is an implicit premise which says that we ought to do what we want to do, which is why I just focused on that part.


If you like, you could do this:

I: The ignition of the car's engine
B: The pressing of the button
D(x): I desire x
O(y): I ought to bring about y

P1. D(I)
P2. I if and only if B
C. Therefore, O(B)​

And you are claiming that there is an implicit premise:

P3. If D(x) then O(x)
​

The more central implicit premise is the one which says that insofar as we intend an end, we also intend the means to that end:

P4. (D(x) & (x <-> y)) -> D(y)​

I treat this as an exercise in critical thinking. You want me to want something else.

My point is that critical thinking will be hamstrung if it refuses to move to deeper levels of analysis and more competent interlocutors.

Ironically, years ago I presented the very same argument you're defending now. Silmarien and Quid teamed up to prove me wrong.

Where did that happen?

 

[Moral Orel]

I mean, your steps are a bit odd. P1 and C look like assertions of identity, but what you apparently want to do in something like P1 is to use "A" as a placeholder for a string of text. P1 would therefore mean, "[What I want to do] is [start the car]." But P2 is entirely different, and is approximating real propositional logic. P2 interpreted in the same string-substitution sense would yield, "[Start the car] if and only if [push the button]." I think you wanted to say, "[The car will start] if and only if [the button is pushed]." The trick is that there is a distinction between events and actions, and this is especially important when our conclusion prescribes an action. (The computer programming analogy would say that in P1 and C you are trying to equate two variables of different types, for an event and a desire are two different types of things.)

I think Tinker's approach was fine:

P1. I want to start the car.
P2. I must push the button in order to start the car.
C. Therefore, I ought to push the button.
You are not wrong to say that there is an implicit premise which says that we ought to do what we want to do, which is why I just focused on that part.


If you like, you could do this:

I: The ignition of the car's engine
B: The pressing of the button
D(x): I desire x
O(y): I ought to bring about y

P1. D(I)
P2. I if and only if B
C. Therefore, O(B)
And you are claiming that there is an implicit premise:

P3. If D(x) then O(x)
The more central implicit premise is the one which says that insofar as we intend an end, we also intend the means to that end:

P4. (D(x) & (x <-> y)) -> D(y)

hahahaha That's why I added the expanded argument to contain the argument broken down to variables: just for you. I can barely read that last one. So we have the implicit premise

P3. If D(x) then O(x)

Now, unless D(x) = O(x), then you've got another implicit premise, yes? If/then statements are just mini-arguments with one premise and one conclusion. You need at least one more premise to make an if/then into a valid argument unless you've got a tautology.

My point is that critical thinking will be hamstrung if it refuses to move to deeper levels of analysis and more competent interlocutors.

I dunno about that. It's not as though I've never read any professional philosophers. And when I have (though I didn't care for it because I didn't get to respond to them) it was still a simple matter of spotting faulty premises. It's all the same.

Where did that happen?

In the old Apologetics forum, years and years ago, I tried to fashion an objective morality using chocolate ice cream and how I ought to obtain it. Sil and Quad stomped all over it. And they were right to. Silmarian especially hated my insistence on using chocolate ice cream for my analogies.

 

[zippy2006]

hahahaha That's why I added the expanded argument to contain the argument broken down to variables: just for you.

Well, I think Tinker's simpler approach might be better in this case, especially because we are in the realm of practical syllogisms.

So we have the implicit premise

P3. If D(x) then O(x)

Now, unless D(x) = O(x), then you've got another implicit premise, yes?

Well, even if the identity statement is the truthmaker for the conditional statement, we would still have another implicit premise (namely the identity statement itself, D(x) = O(x)).

But implication and identity are different things. Identical propositions vacuously co-imply one another, but not all conditional statements are founded on identity. Usually they aren't. If P3 is at bottom a matter of identity, then I should rather have written the identity statement than the conditional statement. I don't think it does, though. I don't think D(x) and O(x) are the same thing.

If/then statements are just mini-arguments with one premise and one conclusion. You need at least one more premise to make an if/then into a valid argument unless you've got a tautology.

Conditional (if/then) statements are claims, not arguments. An argument requires at least two premises and a conclusion. A conditional statement is 'simple', it is just a single claim. Conditional statements can be premises, or they can also be the conclusion of an argument. So yes, conditional statements can (and ultimately must) be justified. But they are not in themselves an argument or syllogism. In themselves they are just a claim about the way two things are related. If you think I am wrong then try to spell out the "one premise and one conclusion" of P3.

Obviously we will eventually have to return to Tinker's point here, because that is very important, but I won't do it now.

I dunno about that. It's not as though I've never read any professional philosophers. And when I have (though I didn't care for it because I didn't get to respond to them) it was still a simple matter of spotting faulty premises. It's all the same.

In the case of professional philosophers you have high quality arguments along with transparent peer review. People have scrutinized Searle's argument for years and written formal responses. It is much more fruitful to analyze that kind of argument rather than something a CFer dreamed up, especially when dealing with a difficult topic.

In the old Apologetics forum, years and years ago, I tried to fashion an objective morality using chocolate ice cream and how I ought to obtain it. Sil and Quad stomped all over it. And they were right to. Silmarian especially hated my insistence on using chocolate ice cream for my analogies.

Okay. Again, there are two different kinds of 'oughts' at play. Sometimes they are called the instrumental (or hypothetical) 'ought' versus the moral (or categorical) 'ought'. I am employing the first, but this is in part because I believe thinking about the second has become deeply confused. If someone wants to argue about the 'moral ought', then they will have to tell me ahead of time exactly what they mean by such a thing.

 

[Tinker Grey]

Okay. Again, there are two different kinds of 'oughts' at play. Sometimes they are called the instrumental (or hypothetical) 'ought' versus the moral (or categorical) 'ought'. I am employing the first, but this is in part because I believe thinking about the second has become deeply confused. If someone wants to argue about the 'moral ought', then they will have to tell me ahead of time exactly what they mean by such a thing.

I've been trying to say this. Avoiding all uses of the word ought borders on pathological. IRL, almost no one means anything but an instrumental ought, the exception being, of course, discussion like these.

 

[Moral Orel]

I've been trying to say this. Avoiding all uses of the word ought borders on pathological. IRL, almost no one means anything but an instrumental ought, the exception being, of course, discussion like these.

This response is for @zippy2006 too. I only have time before work to do a two-fer.

I got no problem using "ought" the same way I got no problem using "good". For instance, I might say:

This chocolate ice cream is good.
You ought to try some.

But neither of those statements are true because of the way "is" works and because of the way "ought" works. "Goodness" is not a property of chocolate ice cream, and no prescriptive statement is true.

Of course, in normal conversation, I'm going to say, "Chocolate ice cream is good" even though it is not a true statement because being accurate and stating "I enjoy the experience I have with chocolate ice cream" is a mouthful (pun intended). Same way I'll say, in normal conversation, "You ought to try some" instead of "Based on my evaluation of the evidence I believe that you will enjoy this chocolate ice cream".

If you're putting these statements into a formal argument with them as the conclusion, you are arguing that these statements are true.

My point is that no prescriptive statement can be a fact. If y'all want to acknowledge that I'm merely technically correct, that's good enough for me because being "technically correct" is the best kind of "correct".

 

[durangodawood]

...My point is that no prescriptive statement can be a fact....

I thought this was wrong.

But then I figured I better doublecheck the meaning of prescriptive, which is "relating to the imposition or enforcement of a rule or method".

This is exactly what I said about ought. Prescriptive statements are essentially imperative commands, and not meant to be statements of fact.

 

[zippy2006]

I got no problem using "ought" the same way I got no problem using "good". For instance, I might say:

This chocolate ice cream is good.
You ought to try some.

But neither of those statements are true because of the way "is" works and because of the way "ought" works. "Goodness" is not a property of chocolate ice cream, and no prescriptive statement is true.

Of course, in normal conversation, I'm going to say, "Chocolate ice cream is good" even though it is not a true statement because being accurate and stating "I enjoy the experience I have with chocolate ice cream" is a mouthful (pun intended). Same way I'll say, in normal conversation, "You ought to try some" instead of "Based on my evaluation of the evidence I believe that you will enjoy this chocolate ice cream".

If you're putting these statements into a formal argument with them as the conclusion, you are arguing that these statements are true.

But how can it be the case that, "This chocolate ice cream is good," is not true, and, "I enjoy the experience I have with chocolate ice cream," is true? From what you say here it seems like you use the first as shorthand for the second, and yet you claim the first is not true and the second is true.

There are reasonable arguments close to hand:

P1. I enjoy the experience I have with chocolate ice cream.
P2. You and I often enjoy the same experiences.
C. Therefore, you ought to try some.​

Equivalently:

P1. This chocolate ice cream is good.
P2. We find similar things to be good.
C. Therefore, you ought to try some.​

And sure, we could add an implicit premise, "You desire to undergo enjoyable experiences," but that premise is already largely present in the meaning of the word, 'enjoy'.

 

[durangodawood]

...There are reasonable arguments close to hand:

P1. I enjoy the experience I have with chocolate ice cream.
P2. You and I often enjoy the same experiences.
C. Therefore, you ought to try some.​

Equivalently:

P1. This chocolate ice cream is good.
P2. We find similar things to be good.
C. Therefore, you ought to try some....​

​

But "ought" in each case is basically a gentle imperative. A nudge. Its not a statement of fact.

If you want to make one of those arguments in factual terms it might go like:.
P1. I enjoy this ice cream
P2. We enjoy similar things
C. Therefore, its probable that you will like it too.

There's no room for "ought" when stated in terms of fact.

 

[zippy2006]

But "ought" in each case is basically a gentle imperative. A nudge.

Right. When I say, "You ought to try some of this ice cream," I am not using 'ought' in precisely the same way as when I say, "You ought to believe that two plus two is four."

There's no room for "ought" when stated in terms of fact.

Well, you'd have to say what you mean by a fact, but I don't see why not. The reasonableness of that "gentle nudge" is factual. It is a matter of fact that Tinker ought to push the button.

 

[durangodawood]

Right. When I say, "You ought to try some of this ice cream," I am not using 'ought' in precisely the same way as when I say, "You ought to believe that two plus two is four."

I think you are using it in the same way tho. Essentially youre saying "dont be an idiot, I urge you to believe true things!" Thats different than saying, factually, "2+2=4 is a true thing", or "life would improve if you believed true things".

Well, you'd have to say what you mean by a fact, but I don't see why not. The reasonableness of that "gentle nudge" is factual. It is a matter of fact that Tinker ought to push the button.

I think you are both wrong about this.

Its a matter of fact that the button starts the car, and that he wants to start it. "Ought" is just someone, possibly himself, imposing an urge on him to do it. Yes, there is sound reasoning compelling that. But those are the previously stated facts.

The ought is a different kind of statement altogether. It is justified by facts, hopefully. But what actual fact is it? When you look for that fact, you end right back at "ought". Its entirely self referential because it doesnt refer to anything. Its a command, essentially.

"Ought" as a truth vanishes when you really look for it. All thats left is an imperative. And some investigation into word meanings backs me up on this.

 

[zippy2006]

I think you are using it in the same way tho. Essentially youre saying "dont be an idiot, I urge you to believe true things!" Thats different than saying, factually, "2+2=4 is a true thing", or "life would improve if you believed true things".

Well, only subtly, for any communicated argument is an attempt to convince another that the conclusion is true. It is a way of urging them to believe it.

I think you are both wrong about this.

Given that we have no established definition of 'fact', the topic isn't overly interesting to me.

Its a matter of fact that the button starts the car, and that he wants to start it. "Ought" is just someone, possibly himself, imposing an urge on him to do it. Yes, there is sound reasoning compelling that. But those are the previously stated facts.

It's not an imposition; it follows logically from the fact that he wants to start the car. It's a fact that you have to push the button to start the car, and given the additional fact that Tinker wants to start the car, it is also a fact that he ought to press the button.

The ought is a different kind of statement altogether. It is justified by facts, hopefully. But what actual fact is it? When you look for that fact, you end right back at "ought". Its entirely self referential because it doesnt refer to anything. Its a command, essentially.

Speculative facts are no more self-justifying than normative facts. In each case it is the premises and the argument that justify the fact. So we don't "end right back at 'ought'," we go back to the premises, as we do in any argument.

The object of a practical conclusion is the action that ought to be taken and the normativeness of that action, given the circumstances of reality.

"Ought" as a truth vanishes when you really look for it. All thats left is an imperative. And some investigation into word meanings backs me up on this.

Why can't an imperative be true?

 

[durangodawood]

.....Why can't an imperative be true?

Like "leave!" ? Whats the truth in that?

More to the point: what is the general truth domain of a moral "ought"? Please drill in and find it. I cant.

Interestingly, the best known instances when God and Jesus told us what we ought to do (or not do), its was in the form of commands. The 10 Commandments. Or Jesus's 2. "Thou shalt". Imperative. No appeal to truth at all.

 

[zippy2006]

Like "leave!" ? Whats the truth in that?

Like, "I ought to press the button."

More to the point: what is the general truth domain of a moral "ought"? Please drill in and find it. I cant.

Interestingly, the best known instances when God and Jesus told us what we ought to do (or not do), its was in the form of commands. The 10 Commandments. Of Jesus's 2. "Thou shalt". Imperative. No appeal to truth at all.

I am going to hold off on moral 'oughts' until the conversation with Orel progresses, but feel free to begin formulating an argument as to why general 'oughts' or moral 'oughts' can't be true.

 

[Moral Orel]

Conditional (if/then) statements are claims, not arguments. An argument requires at least two premises and a conclusion. A conditional statement is 'simple', it is just a single claim. Conditional statements can be premises, or they can also be the conclusion of an argument. So yes, conditional statements can (and ultimately must) be justified. But they are not in themselves an argument or syllogism. In themselves they are just a claim about the way two things are related. If you think I am wrong then try to spell out the "one premise and one conclusion" of P3.

And an argument is just a claim about how the conclusion is related to the premises!

So an argument is valid when it is the case that if all the premises are true, then the conclusion is true, yes? Every argument is implicitly stating this:

P1 If this statement is true
P2 And If this statement is true
P3 And If this statement is true
...
C Then this statement is true

See? All if/then statements are mini-arguments. So P3 as it's own argument is the following:

P1 D(x)
C O(x)

I never said it was a valid argument though. To make it valid and thereby prove C we need to show the missing premise. Identifying hidden premises is a great way to test an argument. Usually, just saying out loud what needs to be true is enough to make you realize you goofed up.

And arguments can have one premise. Sorry, bro, but you're just factually incorrect about that one.

 

[zippy2006]

And an argument is just a claim about how the conclusion is related to the premises!

No, an argument is a rational movement from what is known to what is unknown. But a conclusion cannot follow from a single premise because there is no rule of inference that presupposes less than two premises. Discursive thought doesn't work that way.

So an argument is valid when it is the case that if all the premises are true, then the conclusion is true, yes? Every argument is implicitly stating this:

P1 If this statement is true
P2 And If this statement is true
P3 And If this statement is true
...
C Then this statement is true

Arguments presuppose an attempt at validity, but validity is not the purpose of arguments, soundness is. Nevertheless, validity also requires at least two premises.

When we say, "An argument is valid if the truth of the premises entails the truth of the conclusion," we are presupposing the basic definition of an argument as something with at least two premises. A single proposition cannot formally entail a conclusion.

See? All if/then statements are mini-arguments.

No, that's still not true.

You're also failing to take into account the fact that arguments are an attempt at transparent reasoning. That's why they require at least two premises. Anything less is just assertive.

So P3 as it's own argument is the following:

P1 D(x)
C O(x)

That's not an argument, because there is no transparent reasoning taking place. Rather than being an invalid argument, it is no argument at all. Feel free to send that to someone who understands formal logic and ask them if it is valid. They will say, "Valid? It's not even an argument."

I never said it was a valid argument though. To make it valid and thereby prove C we need to show the missing premise. Identifying hidden premises is a great way to test an argument. Usually, just saying out loud what needs to be true is enough to make you realize you goofed up.

Some arguments do have implicit premises, but when you omit a premise from a modus ponens argument (the simplest inference in propositional logic) you're not even left with an argument. You're just left with two assertions.

And arguments can have one premise. Sorry, bro, but you're just factually incorrect about that one.

This is like telling me, as someone who has played tennis his entire life, that tennis racquets don't have strings. lol. And I just got done telling you that I am bored of CFers making stuff up out of thin air.

Sometimes in everyday speech we give minor nods to implicit premises and call it an argument. "Because the fuel tank is empty we therefore need to stop for gas." Supposing your passenger knows that the car runs on gasoline, there is no need to explicitly state this premise. Nevertheless, even the words "because" and "therefore" point to a simple conditional premise. Yet you are the one who has been intent on introducing formal argumentation, and in formal argumentation there is simply no such thing as an argument with only one explicit premise.

Here ya go:

In logic, an argument requires a set of (at least) two declarative sentences (or "propositions") known as the "premises", along with another declarative sentence (or "proposition"), known as the conclusion. This structure of two premises and one conclusion forms the basic argumentative structure.

-Wikipedia​

 

[Moral Orel]

This is like telling me, as someone who has played tennis his entire life, that tennis racquets don't have strings. lol. And I just got done telling you that I am bored of CFers making stuff up out of thin air.

Sometimes in everyday speech we give minor nods to implicit premises and call it an argument. "Because the fuel tank is empty we therefore need to stop for gas." Supposing your passenger knows that the car runs on gasoline, there is no need to explicitly state this premise. But you are the one who has been intent on introducing formal argumentation, and in formal argumentation there is simply no such thing as an argument with only one explicit premise.

Here ya go:

In logic, an argument requires a set of (at least) two declarative sentences (or "propositions") known as the "premises", along with another declarative sentence (or "proposition"), known as the conclusion. This structure of two premises and one conclusion forms the basic argumentative structure.

-Wikipedia

I see your Wikipedia entry, and I raise you One Two Three Four other sources.

"There can be one or many premises in a single argument."
"Arguments can have any number of premises (even just one) and sub-conclusions."
"In philosophy, an argument is a connected series of statements, including at least one premise, intended to demonstrate that another statement, the conclusion, is true."
From the first three that are courses on philosophy/logic. The first one I was able to track down the professor who has a BS in philosophy.

The last source (WikiBooks) uses a famous example:

I think; therefore I am.

There is only one premise in this argument: "I think".​

The rest of your post sort of hinged on me being totally wrong about this, huh? But it was all just kind of a red herring anyways since you need to prove that D(x) -> O(x) and that's the real point. We're assuming D(x) is true, ya know, like a premise. And you're trying to prove that O(x) is true, ya know, like a conclusion so...

P1 D(x)
...
C O(x)

 

[zippy2006]

I see your Wikipedia entry, and I raise you One Two Three Four other sources.

"There can be one or many premises in a single argument."
"Arguments can have any number of premises (even just one) and sub-conclusions."
"In philosophy, an argument is a connected series of statements, including at least one premise, intended to demonstrate that another statement, the conclusion, is true."
From the first three that are courses on philosophy/logic. The first one I was able to track down the professor who has a BS in philosophy.

Well, you've demonstrated that there are still plenty of dumb people on the internet, as long as you have enough time to fish them out to support bizarre claims. Of course no one manages to give real examples of such a thing, but source #3's attempt is particularly fun:

Premise: No items on this menu are chicken dishes.
Conclusion: Therefore, no chicken dishes are items on this menu.​

These are some quality sources you've dug up, Orel!

The last source (WikiBooks) uses a famous example:
I think; therefore I am.

There is only one premise in this argument: "I think".

Nah. There is a premise that thinking substances exist. This is in Descartes' text, which you and your source have ironically never read. The "cogito" is just a shorthand way to reference it:

But immediately upon this I observed that, whilst I thus wished to think that all was false, it was absolutely necessary that I, who thus thought, should be somewhat; and as I observed that this truth, I think, therefore I am...

...

And as I observed that in the words I think, therefore I am, there is nothing at all which gives me assurance of their truth beyond this, that I see very clearly that in order to think it is necessary to exist...

-Discourse on Method​

Here is the formalization:

P1. In order to think it is necessary to exist
P2. I think
C. Therefore, I exist

This is similar to the gasoline example.

If you know anything about validity you will know that it is a formal property. This means that it can be assessed without knowing the specific content of an argument. "P, therefore, Q," is not a valid form. Descartes' claim can only be considered a valid argument if we go back to his text and recognize the presupposition of P1. If you truly believe that Descartes is not including P1, then his claim is invalid and unsound, and does not even rise to the level of a proper argument.

But it was all just kind of a red herring anyways since you need to prove that D(x) -> O(x) and that's the real point.

Then why not just ask me to justify P3? Why all this nonsense about "arguments" with a single premise? I said in #426 that conditional statements can and must be justified.

Heck, in #418, #420, and #422 I was already arguing for P3, but you kept drawing us off onto tangents about the strange formalizations you wanted to present, ignoring the substance that was being presented to you. I am the one who preferred Tinker's informal approach. You are the one who felt the need to formalize everything. In informal speech we often omit premises. Again, I think that is the better approach, but if you want to get all formal then you'll have to play by the rules.