Where is the Objective Morality?

[Moral Orel]

First off, should I address you as dude or bub? I'd hate to make a faux pas.

I'm The Dude!

Second, obviously that's true. Murder leads to bad outcomes for yourself. Don't do it! You'll regret it.

Just to be clear, I really mean true in the formal logic sense. As in "One ought not murder" is a true fact just like "The Earth is round" is a true fact. Do you still think it's true? If so, how do you prove it? Is there some way to observe/measure/calculate an "ought" in the real world?

 

[durangodawood]

I'm The Dude!


Just to be clear, I really mean true in the formal logic sense. As in "One ought not murder" is a true fact just like "The Earth is round" is a true fact. Do you still think it's true? If so, how do you prove it? Is there some way to observe/measure/calculate an "ought" in the real world?

Ought indicates duty or correctness. So for sure you have a duty not to murder. That duty is imposed by society. The evidence of this can be observed in many forms of indoctrination as well as in the operation of our legal system. This is as evident as the shape of the earth.

As for correctness, there's what's deemed proper, which is defined socially. Murder is objectively not proper.

Then there's correctness as in being true. So the question becomes: "is it true to not murder?" This is a nonsense question. In this respect the statement "one ought not murder" is neither true nor false but instead is absurd.

Going through this little exercise just reinforces my sense that "ought" is only about the emotional sanctions or rewards that biological and social conditioning places on our actions. It makes no sense to ask about ought in terms of anything else.

 

[Moral Orel]

Ought indicates duty or correctness. So for sure you have a duty not to murder. That duty is imposed by society. The evidence of this can be observed in many forms of indoctrination as well as in the operation of our legal system. This is as evident as the shape of the earth.

Why should we fulfill our duties?

As for correctness, there's what's deemed proper, which is defined socially. Murder is objectively not proper.

One shouldn't murder because murder isn't proper, okay. Why should I be proper?

Then there's correctness as in being true. So the question becomes: "is it true to not murder?" This is a nonsense question. In this respect the statement "one ought not murder" is neither true nor false but instead is absurd.

Eh, I'm glad we're getting closer to agreeing, I guess. But this reasoning is bizarre. "Is it true that I shouldn't murder?" is the question. If you really need another word other than "ought" then "Do I have a duty to not murder?" I guess works, but you answered that in the affirmative already.

Going through this little exercise just reinforces my sense that "ought" is only about the emotional sanctions or rewards that biological and social conditioning places on our actions. It makes no sense to ask about ought in terms of anything else.

Eh, I can wrap my head around it. I mean, it's wrong, but it makes sense. Basically, imagine for every choice there are two potential realities. Ought implies a future event that hasn't been realized yet. One of those realities is the one that's supposed to happen (or the ideal) and one of those realities is not supposed to happen (the wrong one). All is right with the world, and all that. What makes a reality ideal, though? That's all about personal feelings. So lemme dream up how this conversation will go based on the reasons you've given me so far.

D-Wood: You shouldn't murder.
Orel: Why shouldn't I murder?
D-Wood: Because you have a duty imposed by society to not murder.
Orel: Why should I fulfill my duties?
D-Wood: Because society will penalize you if you don't.
Orel: Why shouldn't I receive penalties?
D-Wood: Because you won't like the penalties.
Orel: Why should I only get what I like?

And so on. Or we'll hit the bottom and something will just seem so obvious that you think I'm bonkers for asking "Why?" but they all have to be justified for the top to be justified. Every single step hinges on the next step being true. You can try it if you want, maybe the questions and answers will be a little different. But there's no brute fact of an "ought" so it can't be justified, ultimately.

It's only absurd when you stop to think about it, though. It comes naturally. I agree the idea of a true "ought" is absurd, but we all do it all the time. Humans have a hard time distinguishing between our perceptions and reality. I mean, look at how we describe subjective things. "This chocolate ice cream is delicious". Really? Deliciousness is a property of chocolate ice cream? Of course not. Deliciousness describes the experience I have with chocolate ice cream that happens entirely inside my brain. Not in the ice cream. Not on my tongue.

When we reason about morality, we're reasoning about how to make the world a place that we'll be happy to live in it. We all just take for granted the premise that "I ought to be happy". We assume it's a goal we should work towards. It can't really be true in any real sense, but so what? The opposite isn't true either.

 

[durangodawood]

Why should we fulfill our duties?

Doesnt matter. "Ought not murder" is explained by the fact that society imposes a duty to not murder. The meaning of ought is now satisfied by the facts. (See my next paragraph for my explanation)

Eh, I can wrap my head around it. I mean, it's wrong, but it makes sense. Basically, imagine for every choice there are two potential realities. Ought implies a future event that hasn't been realized yet. One of those realities is the one that's supposed to happen (or the ideal) and one of those realities is not supposed to happen (the wrong one). All is right with the world, and all that. What makes a reality ideal, though? That's all about personal feelings. So lemme dream up how this conversation will go based on the reasons you've given me so far.

D-Wood: You shouldn't murder.
Orel: Why shouldn't I murder?
D-Wood: Because you have a duty imposed by society to not murder.
Orel: Why should I fulfill my duties?
D-Wood: Because society will penalize you if you don't.
Orel: Why shouldn't I receive penalties?
D-Wood: Because you won't like the penalties.
Orel: Why should I only get what I like?

And so on. Or we'll hit the bottom and something will just seem so obvious that you think I'm bonkers for asking "Why?" but they all have to be justified for the top to be justified. Every single step hinges on the next step being true. You can try it if you want, maybe the questions and answers will be a little different. But there's no brute fact of an "ought" so it can't be justified, ultimately.

It's only absurd when you stop to think about it, though. It comes naturally. I agree the idea of a true "ought" is absurd, but we all do it all the time. Humans have a hard time distinguishing between our perceptions and reality. I mean, look at how we describe subjective things. "This chocolate ice cream is delicious". Really? Deliciousness is a property of chocolate ice cream? Of course not. Deliciousness describes the experience I have with chocolate ice cream that happens entirely inside my brain. Not in the ice cream. Not on my tongue.

When we reason about morality, we're reasoning about how to make the world a place that we'll be happy to live in it. We all just take for granted the premise that "I ought to be happy". We assume it's a goal we should work towards. It can't really be true in any real sense, but so what? The opposite isn't true either.

Sounds like we pretty much agree. Especially on this point: "I agree the idea of a true 'ought' is" absurd". Seems to me that "ought" in the normative sense describes a relationship between an individual and a body of authority. The authority could be society, or God, or a parent. To ask what is "ought" by itself, without it being contingent on an authority is to simply break the meaning or idea of the word.

"Ought" as contingent on authority functions essentially an imperative with emotional seasoning, like "dont, because we love you". Commands arent true or false. Its absurd to expect them to be.

 

[Moral Orel]

Doesnt matter. "Ought not murder" is explained by the fact that society imposes a duty to not murder. The meaning of ought is now satisfied by the facts. (See my next paragraph for my explanation)

You've literally justified "ought" with "Because X said so!", lol.

 

[durangodawood]

You've literally justified "ought" with "Because X said so!", lol.

I said "ought" doesnt require a justification (unless it violates some sort of popular intuition.) Society functions fine saying "people ought not murder" without providing a rationale.

If an ought command violates popular intuition, then people will argue for a new command that does appeal to popular intuition. Never does this have to be justified "all the way down", but only as deep as peoples moral intuitions.

 

[Moral Orel]

I said "ought" doesnt require a justification (unless it violates some sort of popular intuition.) Society functions fine saying "people ought not murder" without providing a rationale.

Things require justification to be true. If you're saying we don't need justification to drive action, then yeah, of course. I can't tell if you actually agree that no "ought" statements are true or not. You interchanged "ought" with "duty" and then said it's a fact we have duty because society imposes it, so I don't know what you're getting at anymore.

We don't have a duty just because society, or god(s), or our parents, or whomever gives a command and/or a threat of penalty if that command isn't followed.

If an ought command violates popular intuition, then people will argue for a new command that does appeal to popular intuition. Never does this have to be justified "all the way down", but only as deep as peoples moral intuitions.

I assert that all moral intuitions are Appeal To Emotion fallacies. Agree?

And there is no "all the way" down, that's what my proof showed. "The bottom" is just where people can't think of any more reasoning, even though more is required for the argument to be true.

People argue about morality all the time. Zero arguments for morals are sound, and a lot of them are invalid.

Last, and maybe least, moral statements are not commands. "One ought not murder" is not equivalent to "Do not murder".

 

[zippy2006]

Just to be clear, I really mean true in the formal logic sense. As in "One ought not murder" is a true fact just like "The Earth is round" is a true fact. Do you still think it's true? If so, how do you prove it? Is there some way to observe/measure/calculate an "ought" in the real world?

To ask what is "ought" by itself, without it being contingent on an authority is to simply break the meaning or idea of the word.

In a certain way this is a matter of definitions. 'Ought' does have a meaning in itself (e.g. Merriam-Webster). Nevertheless, whenever we evaluate a proposition we must understand the terms. If Orel wants to consider a proposition, "One ought not murder," then he must supply the meaning of the terms if the proposition is to constitute a meaningful assertion. Apparently he thinks "ought" is a nonsense word, in which case I would fault him for asking a nonsensical question.

Most people believe in "oughts", and they justify them in various ways. Justification by way of harm (or societally-imposed penalties) is surely one way to do it, as durangodawood has done here. Nevertheless, "oughts" are subjective in a way that things like mathematics are not. "Ought I jump over that parking meter?" Perhaps my answer is 'no'. But then I get drunk and my answer becomes 'yes'. But then at the hospital, as they are casting my broken arm, I change my mind again and say 'no'. There are some who would not have changed their mind in the hospital, but they are not me, and the negative consequence is sufficient evidence for me to draw a negative conclusion.

But there's no brute fact of an "ought" so it can't be justified, ultimately.

Ought you reply to this post of mine? Assuming you see the post, the simple presence or absence of a reply will guarantee that you have justified an answer. Ought-propositions can be justified, just in a different way than mathematical propositions are. Speculative knowledge and practical knowledge are not the same thing. Anyone who acts is engaging in practical reasoning. If you respond to this message then you have already justified the ought-proposition that I posed to you.

Anyone who does some things rather than others is employing "ought reasoning."

 

[Moral Orel]

If you respond to this message then you have already justified the ought-proposition that I posed to you.

Nice try, but I replied because I felt like it, not because it was the right thing to do.

P1 I like getting Zippy's goat.
P2 Responding to Zippy's posts gets Zippy's goat
C I ought to respond to Zippy's post

That ain't a valid argument, ergo that "ought" ain't justified.

I noticed you lurking, Zippy. Did you see the post in your thread where I actually spelled out the whole argument about how it's impossible to justify an "ought"? Complete with demonstrations.

 

[zippy2006]

Nice try, but I replied because I felt like it, not because it was the right thing to do.

Whatever your justification, you determined that it ought be done. You justified an 'ought' as soon as you clicked "Reply to Thread." You implicitly said to yourself, "I ought to reply to this post."

All your goat belong to us.

P1 I like getting Zippy's goat.
P2 Responding to Zippy's posts gets Zippy's goat
C I ought to respond to Zippy's post

That ain't a valid argument, ergo that "ought" ain't justified.

Ah, but in order to maintain your claim that the argument is invalid you would have to demonstrate that preferences cannot justify 'oughts'. In order to do that you will have to move away from your claim that 'oughts' are absurd. If C is absurd in itself then it cannot enter into an evaluation of validity.

I noticed you lurking, Zippy. Did you see the post in your thread where I actually spelled out the whole argument about how it's impossible to justify an "ought"? Complete with demonstrations.

I did not. Feel free to link.

 

[Moral Orel]

Whatever your justification, you determined that it ought be done. You justified an 'ought' as soon as you clicked "Reply to Thread." You implicitly said to yourself, "I ought to reply to this post."

All your goat belong to us.

Even if I thought those exact words to myself, that doesn't make it "justified". Even if I attempt to justify such a claim, that doesn't make the claim "justified". It's only justified if it is a fact.

Ah, but in order to maintain your claim that the argument is invalid you would have to demonstrate that preferences cannot justify 'oughts'. In order to do that you will have to move away from your claim that 'oughts' are absurd. If C is absurd in itself then it cannot enter into an evaluation of validity.

You can't have an "ought" in the conclusion without an "ought" in the premises or you've got yourself an invalid argument. Oughts are absurd because it's impossible for them to be true, but we treat them as true statements.

My little argument only works if "I ought to get what I like" is also true. And "I ought to get what I like" can only be justified with another argument with another "ought" statement and so on.

I did not. Feel free to link.

Is there Objective Morality?

 

[zippy2006]

Even if I thought those exact words to myself, that doesn't make it "justified". Even if I attempt to justify such a claim, that doesn't make the claim "justified". It's only justified if it is a fact.

1. Only facts are justified.
2. Claims about which course of action one ought to take are not facts.
3. Therefore claims about which course of action one ought to take are never justified.​

I don't find this argument convincing at all, really. Why believe (1)? Why believe (2)? What is a fact?

Practical propositions are different from speculative propositions. I agree that practical propositions cannot be justified in the same manner that speculative propositions are justified, but that doesn't mean they can't be justified.

Oughts are absurd because it's impossible for them to be true, but we treat them as true statements.

If, "I ought to respond to Zippy's post," was false, then why did you respond? The fact that you responded means that you yourself held the ought-proposition to be true.

My little argument only works if "I ought to get what I like" is also true. And "I ought to get what I like" can only be justified with another argument with another "ought" statement and so on.

I think if you proactively define things like "ought," "fact," "justified," etc., the knot you've tied will unravel.

Is there Objective Morality?

I will look at it when I get a chance.

 

[Moral Orel]

I don't find this argument convincing at all, really.

It's out of order.

1 If it can't be justified, then it is not a fact
2 "Ought" propositions cannot be justified
3 "Ought" propositions are not facts

Practical propositions are different from speculative propositions. I agree that practical propositions cannot be justified in the same manner that speculative propositions are justified, but that doesn't mean they can't be justified.

Well don't beat around the bush Philo-style, just jump right into the demonstration!

If, "I ought to respond to Zippy's post," was false, then why did you respond? The fact that you responded means that you yourself held the ought-proposition to be true.

If "I ought to respond" is true, then "I ought not respond" is necessarily false. They can't both be true, but they can both be false (and they are). Not responding wouldn't be an incorrect choice. You know me, though. I just do what feels good.

I will look at it when I get a chance.

No offense, but I won't respond to two separate conversations in two separate threads with the same person. I linked it as a reference for you to catch up to my conversation with DWood, not to spread our discussion out all over the interwebs.

 

[zippy2006]

It's out of order.

1 If it can't be justified, then it is not a fact
2 "Ought" propositions cannot be justified
3 "Ought" propositions are not facts

My answer is the same. Why believe (1)? Why believe (2)? What is a fact?

Well don't beat around the bush Philo-style, just jump right into the demonstration!

I am asking you to defend (1) or define "justify".

If "I ought to respond" is true, then "I ought not respond" is necessarily false. They can't both be true, but they can both be false (and they are). Not responding wouldn't be an incorrect choice. You know me, though. I just do what feels good.

And the fact that you responded entails that you held "I ought to respond" to be true and "I ought not respond" to be false. You justified these 'oughts' on the basis of your feelings. Else, you will have to explain how you did X while not believing that you ought to do X, and what your special definition of "ought" is.

No offense, but I won't respond to two separate conversations in two separate threads with the same person. I linked it as a reference for you to catch up to my conversation with DWood, not to spread our discussion out all over the interwebs.

I agree, but I assumed you would respond to the other conversation, where you laid out your position in more detail.

 

[Tinker Grey]

@zippy2006, I think I am agreement with you.

Let me restate (in a different way) what I've said elsewhere and see.

I think 'oughts' are justifiable if they are the conclusion from a sound syllogism. (I want to start the car. Starting the cars requires that I push the button. I ought to push the button.)

Premises might be a justified 'ought' if, in turn, they derive from a previous sound syllogism. But, when we go as far back as possible, if one treats an 'ought' as axiomatic, then the 'ought' is fundamentally subjective.

I've a saying: All axioms are arrived at inductively, including this one.

I do think things can be justified by one's experience. Or perhaps we should say that we are justified in believing something is true if all our experience teaches us that it is true.

3 things then:

1. When something is justified inductively, one should recognize that this is the case.
2. The recognition of that should entail that one is willing to revise one's beliefs upon new evidence, and
3. Necessarily, such beliefs are subjective -- they are my interpretations of my experiences and it doesn't following that everyone or anyone will agree.

Hence 'oughts' that one treats as axiomatic are inescapably subjective. YMMV

 

[zippy2006]

@zippy2006, I think I am agreement with you.

I think this is basically right. I haven't gotten to this with Orel, but all 'axioms' are arrived at 'inductively', and this is not a special feature of ought-axioms. His infinite regress of grounding reasons applies to ought-axioms no more than it applies to speculative axioms.

I should also add that "ought-axioms" are subjective (and therefore others may disagree) but this does not make them non-truth-evaluative. "I ought to push the button" is a sound conclusion (and therefore also true). The difficulty comes with complicated premises, such as, "Having a better life requires that I drive my car across the southern border." It's harder to tell whether that is true or false, but that doesn't mean it isn't true or false.

Of course the question in the back of everyone's mind is about categorical 'oughts'. "Killing is never justifiable," says the pacifist. The question everyone wants to answer is whether such categorical 'oughts' are truth-evaluative.

 

[Moral Orel]

My answer is the same. Why believe (1)? Why believe (2)? What is a fact?

Fact: A thing that is known or proven to be true
Ought: Used to indicate duty or correctness
Justify: Demonstrate the truth of something by evidence or argument.

I've been using "justify" as opposed to "prove" to avoid the proverbial "Proof is for math and alcohol, bro!" response.

I am asking you to defend (1) or define "justify".

You said you could justify a practical proposition, I wanted to see you do it so I know how you go about it.

And the fact that you responded entails that you held "I ought to respond" to be true and "I ought not respond" to be false. You justified these 'oughts' on the basis of your feelings. Else, you will have to explain how you did X while not believing that you ought to do X, and what your special definition of "ought" is.

It does not entail that. I don't have to believe I would have been wrong to not respond, that's silly.

I think 'oughts' are justifiable if they are the conclusion from a sound syllogism. (I want to start the car. Starting the cars requires that I push the button. I ought to push the button.)

You and I have already been through this, Tinker, but since you and Zippy seem to be in agreement, I'll demonstrate for him too. The following argument:

P1 I want to start the car
P2 The car will start if and only if I push the button
C I ought to push the button

The argument is invalid. To reach that conclusion the following premise must be true:

P3 I ought to do what I want

If the negation of that premise was true, your argument would flip to the negation of your current conclusion. This is how we know that premise is integral to your argument.

P1 I want to start the car
P2 The car will start if and only if I push the button
P3 I ought to not do what I want
C I ought to not push the button

So...

"I ought to not do what I want" must be not true.
"I ought to not do what I want" must be not true.
"I ought to do what I want" must be true.

Let's break it down to letters. Zippy's better at this than me so it might need a little cleaning up.

A: what I want to do
B: what I ought to do
C: start the car
D: push the button

P1 A is C
P2 C if and only if D
C B is D

Where the heck did B come from?! It must take the form:

P1 A is C
P2 C if and only if D
P3 B is A
C B is D

 

[zippy2006]

Fact: A thing that is known or proven to be true
Ought: Used to indicate duty or correctness
Justify: Demonstrate the truth of something by evidence or argument.

I've been using "justify" as opposed to "prove" to avoid the proverbial "Proof is for math and alcohol, bro!" response.

We can define 'ought' in terms of duty and obligation, but the colloquial meaning of the word does not require that meaning. I think the better course is to understand how the word and concept is used in terms of simple practical action before moving to obligatory actions.

Nevertheless, how is a fact justified or proven? Why doesn't your infinite regress apply to fact-explanations as well? Why can't I keep asking "why?" about facts?

You said you could justify a practical proposition, I wanted to see you do it so I know how you go about it.

Practical propositions like "I ought to push the button," or "You ought to be honest and friendly," are justified by the aims of the agent and the necessary means to achieve that aim. If I really want the car to start, and pushing the button is the only (or easiest) way to start the car, then it is indubitably true that I ought to push the button.

Else, you will have to explain how you did X while not believing that you ought to do X...

It does not entail that. I don't have to believe I would have been wrong to not respond, that's silly.

Well, now you've given your special definition of 'ought', but you are still avoiding the simple problem that you are claiming to do things that you do not believe ought be done.

The technical difficulty here is that you are equivocating on the two different meanings of 'ought' at stake, whereas I believe the two terms are analogous rather than equivocal. Rather than restricting all arguments to the rarefied form of 'ought', the better course is to understand the arguments as they relate to each form, and then understand how the two forms relate. Hint: they aren't altogether different.

You and I have already been through this, Tinker, but since you and Zippy seem to be in agreement, I'll demonstrate for him too. The following argument:

P1 I want to start the car
P2 The car will start if and only if I push the button
C I ought to push the button

The argument is invalid. To reach that conclusion the following premise must be true:

P3 I ought to do what I want...

Oh, I think the argument is undeniably valid, and it is sound for anyone who truly holds the two premises. If you want to start the car and only the button will start the car, then you should definitely push the button.

And yes, P3 is definitely true, understood correctly. I.e. Ceteris Paribus, I ought to do what I want. It would be absurd to claim that, generally speaking, we ought to do what we do not want, just as it would be absurd to grant P1 & P2 while denying C. We could also phrase it this way: ceteris paribus, I ought to undertake the means necessary to achieve my goals.

 

[Moral Orel]

Oh, I think the argument is undeniably valid, and it is sound for anyone who truly holds the two premises. If you want to start the car and only the button will start the car, then you should definitely push the button.

And yes, P3 is definitely true, understood correctly. I.e. Ceteris Paribus, I ought to do what I want. It would be absurd to claim that, generally speaking, we ought to do what we do not want, just as it would be absurd to grant P1 & P2 while denying C. We could also phrase it this way: ceteris paribus, I ought to undertake the means necessary to achieve my goals.

It's absurd that sometimes we ought not do whatever we want? That's absurd. It also kind of destroys morality, no? I see your "generally speaking" in there to account for exceptions, but there are way too many exceptions.

P1 I want my neighbor to be dead right now!
P2 My neighbor will be dead right now if and only if I murder him.
C I ought to murder my neighbor.


Side note. I see our posts growing out of control already. I'm not down for long responses. After a year of trying, I finally landed my PS5 the other day, so I am far too busy cutting down Mongols in Ghost of Tsushima to be writing dissertations. I do have to take short breaks from slaying my foes from time to time, so I'll address whatever I find to be the crux of your argument. But large portions of your responses are going to be redacted; which would be rude of me if I didn't warn you ahead of time.

 

[zippy2006]

It's absurd that sometimes we ought not do whatever we want? That's absurd.

Ceteris paribus, and I never opposed the idea that "sometimes we ought not do whatever we want." These are strawmen and non-sequiturs. Obviously we shouldn't do what we want when all things are not equal.

For example, I shouldn't eat food when it is poisoned, but the fact that some piece of food might be poisoned doesn't undermine the general principle that I should eat food (or that I should eat food if I want to survive).

Side note. I see our posts growing out of control already. I'm not down for long responses. After a year of trying, I finally landed my PS5 the other day, so I am far too busy cutting down Mongols in Ghost of Tsushima to be writing dissertations. I do have to take short breaks from slaying my foes from time to time, so I'll address whatever I find to be the crux of your argument. But large portions of your responses are going to be redacted; which would be rude of me if I didn't warn you ahead of time.

I pointed you to Searle's paper back in August before any of these conversations even began, but you continue boppin' around the kiddie pool. If you want to move into deeper waters you know where to look. If not, that's fine.