stevevw
inquisitive
- Nov 4, 2013
- 15,980
- 1,727
- Gender
- Male
- Faith
- Christian
- Marital Status
- Private
Not really. We can know about objective morality by the way we act/react just like we can for other things in life and how we act/react like they are real. We can make logical propositions just like we do for other non-physical aspects of life. Support for moral realism can be made from the argument for epistemic realism by Terrence Cuneo for example. IEI dont think support for objective morality is possible to show. Its un unfalsifiable unscientific concept like magic or god(s).
Premise 1: If moral facts do not exist, then epistemic facts do not exist.
Premise 2: Epistemic facts do exist
Conclusion 1: Moral facts do exist.
Premise 3: If moral facts do exist, then realism is true.
Conclusion 2: Moral realism is true.
How can a moral skeptic prescribe epistemic ‘ought’s’ while rejecting moral ‘ought’s’?
For example, when a moral skeptic engages in an argument with someone about moral realism they will assume certain epistemic duties must be made during the debate. They will assume that their opponent ought to not misrepresent their argument and pretend to refute them. They shouldn't use logical fallacies, they ought, to be honest, and not lie. Any person who disputes moral realism assumes these oughts to be there and abided by in any philosophical debate.
But why should anyone uphold these epistemic duties if everything is relative? Someone could object and say everyone should abide by these epistemic truths because it is the pragmatic thing to do and if a person doesn't follow them they are not valuing reason and truth. But an opponent can say why should we be pragmatic, why is this particular duty being prescribed. Why should we value reason and truth? We are still assuming epistemic truths that are objectively binding.
So if you are a moral non-realist and you have ever claimed someone has done something objectively wrong in misrepresenting your argument then you have assumed epistemic virtues and duties while arguing such duties are either subjective or not real.
You are prescribing that honesty should be objectively binding in philosophical or scientific discussions.
However, this epistemic virtue of honesty is tied to our moral virtue of honesty so you cannot reject moral realism either. If you reject honesty as being objectively binding then you cannot appeal to honesty in any real-world debate.
Since in real-life situations we agree there are epistemic duties and values used in discussions we, therefore, agree moral duties and facts are objective.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zjkgD4w9w1k
The Normative Web: An Argument for Moral Realism
https://philpapers.org/rec/[bless a...s and do not curse][bless and do not curse]NW
This is similar to the logical argument for objective morality I have also linked based on our lived moral experience. People assume and believe in objective morality in the way they act/react and live morally. You cannot expect others to act morally objective and support a relative and subjective moral position act the same time.
Last edited:
Upvote
0