Where does morality come from?

[Kylie]

What do you mean different from some reason.

I've said that people can act as though a thing is one way when it's actually another way. This acting like it is one way does not mean that the thing is actually that way. I gave the example of how people act as though the sun circles the Earth.

You said that this can apply to physical things, but it doesn't apply to things like morality.

You have never given a reason as to why it doesn't apply to morality. You just say it doesn't apply because... reasons...

You will have to clarify this as I don't get what you are saying. If acting like X is giving value to honesty in a debate. Then you have acted like honesty is a real value whether you want to claim you don't believe its a value of not. Your action of making honesty an important part of a debate is what makes honesty real.

You can try and pretend that honesty is not a real value and that you don't have to act honestly in a debate but see how far you get. You will never be able to function in any debate. You or I could make up anything and presented. You could no longer say that I am not being honest because you have abandoned honesty as a value.

But the reality is as we see on this forum and thread is that everyone expects honesty. They live like honesty is a real value that has to be conformed to epistemically. It's in the way people think and cannot be denied.

I think it's quite clear.

You do not understand how a proper belief works and can be justified. As I said a properly basic belief needs to stand up to defeaters. The sun going around the earth is an illusion like the stick that is half placed in water and looks bent. It can be defeated easily by showing that it is actually the earth going around the sun through reasoning. So it doesn't stand up to a simple defeater to be justified as a proper belief.

But honesty can withstand any defeaters as a real value within a debate between two people and I have shown how this is the case. You would be irrational to insist the sun goes around the earth if you believe that and you would also be irrational to insist that honesty is not a real value we use within a debate.

So if you can you give me some support for this assertion about people rationally believing the sun goes around the earth then you can defeat this defeater that shows the earth actually goes around the sun. Rather than keep insisting this I will let you support your claim. Likewise, if you can provide a defeater that honesty is not a real value we use in our interactions like debates where an honest measure is required then go ahead.

You think that the merit of an idea is based on how it stands up to defeaters?

No. By this logic, I can make any unfalsifiable claim and there is no way it can be defeated. By your reasoning, that would make it a good idea.

No, if you make a claim, you must provide evidence to support it, not merely find a way to explain away any criticisms that might be leveled against it.

 

[stevevw]

No, its not. Are you even familiar with metaphysics?

So what are you saying? We cannot just say that the only things that are real are verified objectively according to physicalism. That would leave out a big part of life, including all language pertaining to truth claims and many aspects which we believe and act like they are real. All I am saying is we can make a case for certain other claims besides physical things to have a realness and truthful qualities based on the way we treat them and engage with them.

Epistemic values can have a realness to them by the way we understand them, appeal to them, and need them to function independently of our views and preferences. Sometimes they are just epistemically true because they are epistemic. These are beliefs we already have and accept as real. Yet an epistemic value like honesty is interconnected with morality and cannot be separated. So, it follows that if epistemic values are true (epistemic realism) then moral values are true (moral realism).

These are legitimate philosophical arguments based on reason and logic and how people behave in the real world and understand value and truth that support moral realism. They are too complex to be explained in this post so you will need to do further reading. These arguments need to be understood first and then defeated through reason and logic and not just refuted on your say so.

The Best Argument for Moral Realism?
The problem with trying to determine ethic and moral realism is that people want to fit any evidence into a physical scientific description. So already the picture and language are restricted to one way of functioning. Yet the same people are quite happy about talking of justification in science, rational acceptability or warranted acceptability, etc. without a qualm. Yet being warranted, plausible, and coherent are all epistemic value terms.

All the arguments that claim morals cannot be objective such as cultures disagree, whether we will all come to the same moral truths about "what’s". 'What's simple', 'what’s the right action', 'what’s more, coherent' than “what” could also be raised as objections against epistemic values. It is argued that there is something funny about the notion of moral obligation, that it is both something you can believe and is action-guiding that makes it queer. But believing that a theory is superior all-around on a scale of plausibility, simplicity, coherence is also action-guiding.

A lot of the same arguments against moral realism can be applied to epistemic realism. If more people came to realize that Richard Rorty was right in that if you don’t believe in ethical objectivity, if these are your reasons for not supporting objective morality then consistency requires you to give up epistemic objectivity as well. A lot of people would agree that the best argument for hanging onto moral objectivity rather than agreeing with Rorty in giving the all objectivity up.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VW3VuMUWim0&t=7s

The Normative Web: An Argument for Moral Realism
moral and epistemic facts are sufficiently similar that, if moral facts do not exist, then epistemic facts also do not exist. But epistemic facts (facts that concern reasons for belief), it is argued, do exist. So, moral facts also exist. And if moral facts exist, then moral realism is true. This argument provides not simply a defense of a robustly realist view of ethics, but a positive argument for this position. In so doing, it engages with sophisticated skeptical positions in epistemology, such as error theories, expressivist views, and reductionist views of epistemic reasons.
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/285966919_The_Normative_Web_An_Argument_for_Moral_Realism

Moral Realism: Defended
People prescribe that honesty should be objectively binding in philosophical or scientific discussions. Since in real-life situations we agree there are epistemic duties and values used in discussions we, therefore, agree moral duties and facts are objective.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zjkgD4w9w1k

Moral realism
Still another reply, compatible with the first two but relying specifically on neither, shifts attention from science and from mathematics and logic to epistemology itself. To think of any set of considerations that they justify some conclusion is to make a claim concerning the value (albeit the epistemic as opposed to moral value) of a conclusion. To hold of science or mathematics, or logic, that there is a difference between good evidence or good arguments and bad ones is again to commit oneself evaluatively. This raises an obvious question: under what conditions, and why, are epistemic claims reasonably thought justified? Whatever answer one might begin to offer will immediately provide a model for an answer to the parallel question raised about moral judgments.
Moral Realism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Spring 2008 Edition)

FROM EPISTEMIC TO MORAL REALISM: AN ARGUMENT FOR ETHICAL TRUTH
I argue in favor of epistemic realism indirectly – thereby supporting the first premise of the Epistemic Argument – by arguing against the two forms of epistemic anti-realism that I take to be the most plausible: normative error theory and epistemic instrumentalism. I argue that normative error theory is self-defeating, and that epistemic instrumentalism cannot do justice to our intuitions about the authority of epistemic reasons. I provide three independent arguments for the “Parity Premise,” the claim that if epistemic realism is true, then moral realism is also true.
From Epistemic to Moral Realism: an Argument for Ethical Truth

 

[VirOptimus]

So what are you saying? We cannot just say that the only things that are real are verified objectively according to physicalism. That would leave out a big part of life, including all language pertaining to truth claims and many aspects which we believe and act like they are real. All I am saying is we can make a case for certain other claims besides physical things to have a realness and truthful qualities based on the way we treat them and engage with them.

Epistemic values can have a realness to them by the way we understand them, appeal to them, and need them to function independently of our views and preferences. Sometimes they are just epistemically true because they are epistemic. These are beliefs we already have and accept as real. Yet an epistemic value like honesty is interconnected with morality and cannot be separated. So, it follows that if epistemic values are true (epistemic realism) then moral values are true (moral realism).

These are legitimate philosophical arguments based on reason and logic and how people behave in the real world and understand value and truth that support moral realism. They are too complex to be explained in this post so you will need to do further reading. These arguments need to be understood first and then defeated through reason and logic and not just refuted on your say so.

The Best Argument for Moral Realism?
The problem with trying to determine ethic and moral realism is that people want to fit any evidence into a physical scientific description. So already the picture and language are restricted to one way of functioning. Yet the same people are quite happy about talking of justification in science, rational acceptability or warranted acceptability, etc. without a qualm. Yet being warranted, plausible, and coherent are all epistemic value terms.

All the arguments that claim morals cannot be objective such as cultures disagree, whether we will all come to the same moral truths about "what’s". 'What's simple', 'what’s the right action', 'what’s more, coherent' than “what” could also be raised as objections against epistemic values. It is argued that there is something funny about the notion of moral obligation, that it is both something you can believe and is action-guiding that makes it queer. But believing that a theory is superior all-around on a scale of plausibility, simplicity, coherence is also action-guiding.

A lot of the same arguments against moral realism can be applied to epistemic realism. If more people came to realize that Richard Rorty was right in that if you don’t believe in ethical objectivity, if these are your reasons for not supporting objective morality then consistency requires you to give up epistemic objectivity as well. A lot of people would agree that the best argument for hanging onto moral objectivity rather than agreeing with Rorty in giving the all objectivity up.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VW3VuMUWim0&t=7s

The Normative Web: An Argument for Moral Realism
moral and epistemic facts are sufficiently similar that, if moral facts do not exist, then epistemic facts also do not exist. But epistemic facts (facts that concern reasons for belief), it is argued, do exist. So, moral facts also exist. And if moral facts exist, then moral realism is true. This argument provides not simply a defense of a robustly realist view of ethics, but a positive argument for this position. In so doing, it engages with sophisticated skeptical positions in epistemology, such as error theories, expressivist views, and reductionist views of epistemic reasons.
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/285966919_The_Normative_Web_An_Argument_for_Moral_Realism

Moral Realism: Defended
People prescribe that honesty should be objectively binding in philosophical or scientific discussions. Since in real-life situations we agree there are epistemic duties and values used in discussions we, therefore, agree moral duties and facts are objective.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zjkgD4w9w1k

Moral realism
Still another reply, compatible with the first two but relying specifically on neither, shifts attention from science and from mathematics and logic to epistemology itself. To think of any set of considerations that they justify some conclusion is to make a claim concerning the value (albeit the epistemic as opposed to moral value) of a conclusion. To hold of science or mathematics, or logic, that there is a difference between good evidence or good arguments and bad ones is again to commit oneself evaluatively. This raises an obvious question: under what conditions, and why, are epistemic claims reasonably thought justified? Whatever answer one might begin to offer will immediately provide a model for an answer to the parallel question raised about moral judgments.
Moral Realism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Spring 2008 Edition)

FROM EPISTEMIC TO MORAL REALISM: AN ARGUMENT FOR ETHICAL TRUTH
I argue in favor of epistemic realism indirectly – thereby supporting the first premise of the Epistemic Argument – by arguing against the two forms of epistemic anti-realism that I take to be the most plausible: normative error theory and epistemic instrumentalism. I argue that normative error theory is self-defeating, and that epistemic instrumentalism cannot do justice to our intuitions about the authority of epistemic reasons. I provide three independent arguments for the “Parity Premise,” the claim that if epistemic realism is true, then moral realism is also true.
From Epistemic to Moral Realism: an Argument for Ethical Truth

Tl: dr.

I have already studied philosophy thank you, dont need your clueless links.

 

[stevevw]

I've said that people can act as though a thing is one way when it's actually another way. This acting like it is one way does not mean that the thing is actually that way. I gave the example of how people act as though the sun circles the Earth.

You said that this can apply to physical things, but it doesn't apply to things like morality.

You have never given a reason as to why it doesn't apply to morality. You just say it doesn't apply because... reasons...

Well the obvious reason it cannot apply to morality is that you are equating two completely different realms. Morality cannot be measured in a scientific physical sense. There is no way to pick up morals or measure them like the sun. So just on that alone, it is a logical fallacy of false equivalence.

But even if we accept your example it is defeated easily in that we cannot justify the belief that the sun goes around the earth as a properly basic belief. It is easy to prove it is a false belief and therefore it cannot even stand as an example. The problem is with using illusions and false beliefs when determining realism or truth is that the example has to stand up to truth and realism itself to be believable.

I think it's quite clear.

Yes, it is clear but it is also clear that it is an unreal position to take. That is someone insisted that the sun goes around the earth that this could easily be shown to be false. That disqualifies it from being a properly basic belief. It would be like someone saying I don't have a head or that we don't need honesty when two people have a debate.

You think that the merit of an idea is based on how it stands up to defeaters?

We are not talking about ideas but rather truth and realism. We have to test any claims to see if they are proper beliefs and not some false belief.

No. By this logic, I can make any unfalsifiable claim and there is no way it can be defeated. By your reasoning, that would make it a good idea.

But the claims being made are not unfalsifiable. You cannot just make any claim. But the evidence does not always have to be about scientific evidence. A philosophical proposition still has support. We can still provide support for epistemic and moral realism. We live like epistemic values are real and make "truth" claims all the time as noted in the articles I linked for VirOptimus. These are proper valid arguments and therefore a counter argument needs to be made to defeat them.

No, if you make a claim, you must provide evidence to support it, not merely find a way to explain away any criticisms that might be leveled against it.

I already have. For example, we all appeal to epistemic values all the time and give them realness and truth. The evidence is the fact that we give them truth status. Truth is whatever and however, we can justify that claim to be the "truth". We are making a "truth" statement or claim in the language we use. IE

Premise 1: If moral facts do not exist, then epistemic facts do not exist.
Premise 2: Epistemic facts do exist
Conclusion 1: Moral facts do exist.
Premise 3: If moral facts do exist, then realism is true.
Conclusion 2: Moral realism is true.

If you reject these epistemic values as not having realness and "truth" then this leaves us in chaos without any values or morals to appeal to. But if you appeal to epistemic values as real then it follows that there is also moral realism.

The Normative Web: An Argument for Moral Realism
moral and epistemic facts are sufficiently similar that, if moral facts do not exist, then epistemic facts also do not exist. But epistemic facts (facts that concern reasons for belief), it is argued, do exist. So, moral facts also exist. And if moral facts exist, then moral realism is true. This argument provides not simply a defense of a robustly realist view of ethics, but a positive argument for this position. In so doing, it engages with sophisticated skeptical positions in epistemology, such as error theories, expressivist views, and reductionist views of epistemic reasons.
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/285966919_The_Normative_Web_An_Argument_for_Moral_Realism

 

[stevevw]

Tl: dr.

I have already studied philosophy thank you, don't need your clueless links.

That's a quick rejection. Any person debating this would at least give some reasoned reply which seems to indicate that this may be too much for you to deal with.

So there are 5 links there citing over a dozen prominent philosophers that you think are clueless like
Terrence Cuneo,
Marsh Professor of Intellectual and Moral Philosophy Philosophy Department University of Vermont
Nathan Nobis,
Nathan Nobis, Ph.D. is an Associate Professor of Philosophy at Morehouse College, Atlanta, GA. He has taught courses, given lectures and published articles and chapters on a wide variety of topics concerning ethics and animals, bioethics, ethical theory, and other topics in philosophy.
Hilary Putnam
Hilary Whitehall Putnam was an American philosopher, mathematician, and computer scientist, and a major figure in analytic philosophy in the second half of the 20th century
Geoffrey Sayre-McCord
The recipient of several university-wide teaching awards, Sayre-McCord is the Morehead-Cain Alumni Distinguished Professor of Philosophy and Director of the Philosophy, Politics, and Economics Program at the University of North Carolina, where he has taught since 1985.
Panayot Butchvarov
Distinguished Professor Emeritus of Philosophy at the University of Iowa.
David O. Brink
David O. Brink is Distinguished Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, San Diego. He works in the areas of moral, political, and legal philosophy.
Russ Shafer-Landau
Shafer-Landau is a leading defender of a non-naturalistic moral realism. Shafer-Landau is a graduate of Brown University and completed his PhD work at the University of Arizona under the supervision of Joel Feinberg.[1] He has been teaching philosophy at the University of Wisconsin, Madison from 2002, where he became Chair of the Department. He is the founder and editor of the periodical Oxford Studies in Metaethics.

 

[Speedwell]

What are you talking about? Do you mean the evidence to show objective morality exists based on naturalism such as human wellbeing, natural laws of evolution, etc? Or that these ideas can be used by subjectivists to reason what is right and wrong morally. Which is more or less the same things.

What I mean is evidence that morality (whether you define it as "objective" or not) can be based on naturalism such as human wellbeing, natural laws of evolution, etc.

You must refute that evidence. There appear to be two possibilities depending on whether you define "objective morality" as possibly arising from natural causes or not...

1. If naturalistic causes are a possible source of an objective morality then the existence of objective morality does not necessarily prove the existence of God.
or
2. If naturalistic causes are a possible source only of a subjective morality, then a possible subjective cause exists for the content of our consciences (our "lived moral experience") which refutes your original argument for an objective morality.

Your turn.

 

[VirOptimus]

That's a quick rejection. Any person debating this would at least give some reasoned reply which seems to indicate that this may be too much for you to deal with.

So there are 5 links there citing over a dozen prominent philosophers that you think are clueless like
Terrence Cuneo,
Marsh Professor of Intellectual and Moral Philosophy Philosophy Department University of Vermont
Nathan Nobis,
Nathan Nobis, Ph.D. is an Associate Professor of Philosophy at Morehouse College, Atlanta, GA. He has taught courses, given lectures and published articles and chapters on a wide variety of topics concerning ethics and animals, bioethics, ethical theory, and other topics in philosophy.
Hilary Putnam
Hilary Whitehall Putnam was an American philosopher, mathematician, and computer scientist, and a major figure in analytic philosophy in the second half of the 20th century
Geoffrey Sayre-McCord
The recipient of several university-wide teaching awards, Sayre-McCord is the Morehead-Cain Alumni Distinguished Professor of Philosophy and Director of the Philosophy, Politics, and Economics Program at the University of North Carolina, where he has taught since 1985.
Panayot Butchvarov
Distinguished Professor Emeritus of Philosophy at the University of Iowa.
David O. Brink
David O. Brink is Distinguished Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, San Diego. He works in the areas of moral, political, and legal philosophy.
Russ Shafer-Landau
Shafer-Landau is a leading defender of a non-naturalistic moral realism. Shafer-Landau is a graduate of Brown University and completed his PhD work at the University of Arizona under the supervision of Joel Feinberg.[1] He has been teaching philosophy at the University of Wisconsin, Madison from 2002, where he became Chair of the Department. He is the founder and editor of the periodical Oxford Studies in Metaethics.

Wont read your links because of your posting history.

Also, I know you almost always misrepresent and misunderstand (not surprising considering you have no education on the subject).

 

[stevevw]

What I mean is evidence that morality (whether you define it as "objective" or not) can be based on naturalism such as human wellbeing, natural laws of evolution, etc.

You must refute that evidence. There appear to be two possibilities depending on whether you define "objective morality" as possibly arising from natural causes or not...

1. If naturalistic causes are a possible source of an objective morality then the existence of objective morality does not necessarily prove the existence of God.

Naturalistic causes of an objective morality based on naturalistic causes like human wellbeing and evolution have already been refuted. As far as human wellbeing is concerned it has been argued that "wellbeing" itself is subjective. That pleasure and pain do not equate to moral right and wrong. What one person views pain to equate to another sees things differently. But the basis for not using a natural source for morality is that morality can not be reduced to a physical description because it is prescriptive. Physical sciences only explain how something occurs but not why it is right or wrong.

The same for evolution. Whatever idea of morality that has been developed by a sociobiological process is just a human view that is determined by certain subjective ideas like social cohesion, empathy, or survival. All these can be subjectively determined. Evolution is primarily concerned about survival, passing genes on to the next generation. So whatever that maybe is influenced by the environment. That could mean what is regarded as morally good now could change if the environment changes.

Any reason that someone claims as being why we should be morally good to bring about peace, good health, and survivability it can be asked why should these things be the basis for good. Any reason given for this can also be questioned as why we should make those things the basis for morality as well and so forth. These arguments against naturalism are well known and have not been defeated.

A leading UK intuitionist was the Cambridge philosopher G E Moore (1873-1954) who set out his ideas in the 1902 book Principia Ethica. Moore objected to something called 'the naturalistic fallacy', which states that moral truths can be analyzed in terms of physical or psychological things that exist in the natural world. Moral truths were moral truths, and that was that.
BBC - Ethics - Introduction to ethics: Intuitionism

The trouble with moral naturalism, is that it seems to leave open whether you actually ought to act morally! Since morality is no longer defined in terms of what you ought to do, but in terms of facts about the natural world, moral claims translate in a way that does not immediately give you a reason to act on them.
Metamagician and The Hellfire Club: Some thoughts on the concepts of "objective" and "subjective" that are in play

Sam Harris’s argument.
We ought to avoid pain because we all feel that pain is bad. There are about 3 assumptions in Harris’s Tweet. First, “If we should do anything” isn’t that what he is trying to prove. Whose to say that we should do anything. The argument against Harris can be applied to any argument that uses naturalistic things like wellbeing, empathy etc. as they have no synonyms for good or bad.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=V31U9429Qrk

The other problem in using evolution is that any explanation of how humans came to know what was morally right and wrong doesn't mean that we could have discovered objective morality rather than created it. It is a genetic fallacy to say that just because we can explain something that this also answers how morality came about. It leaves out other possibilities as to how morality came about.

or
2. If naturalistic causes are a possible source only of a subjective morality, then a possible subjective cause exists for the content of our consciences (our "lived moral experience") which refutes your original argument for an objective morality.

Your turn.

But this is another logical fallacy and circular reasoning. That because there is subjective morality that this must mean there is no objective morality. That the evidence for subjective morality is subjective morality.

It also doesn't explain why those who claim subjective morality don't actually live like there is only subjective morality and actually believe that there are certain moral truths regardless of subjective morality. Some who deny moral realism act and react like there is moral realism. Like with epistemic realism we all appeal to epistemic values in our interactions especially in arguments where we expect honesty for example.

We do this by expecting our opponent to not lie and represent their argument honestly. We will object if people use logical fallacies and misrepresentations. We then cannot claim that these epistemic truths are relative as this would collapse all arguments and leave open anyone to say whatever without any recourse. So by appealing to epistemic values we are showing we believe they are real and that they determine "true" from false. We also do this in science when we give value judgments to claims and theories.

Yet epistemic values are intertwined with moral values and cannot be separated and work just the same. When we appeal to moral values we are making them real in the world and not just our heads because we are putting them out there like epistemic values in our interactions. This is our lived moral experience which makes morals objective.

 

[stevevw]

Won't read your links because of your posting history.

This is your stock standard reply and really it is beyond fair now. It makes it impossible to debate. You are more or less saying no matter what I say or present it doesn't matter, I am wasting my breath and time because you have already decided that I am wrong and full of it. That is a glaring fallacy and shows bias. But hey I cannot help that you are like this. Only that hopefully something slips through as I cannot be that wrong or uneducated like a total ignorant.

Also, I know you almost always misrepresent and misunderstand (not surprising considering you have no education on the subject).

That is another massive fallacy. That you assume misrepresentation before even finding if this is true. I cannot win whichever way. But even with the quotes posted and the authors who anyone can easily look up show that this is not the case and that epistemic and moral realism are well supported as that is what they are well known for.

Otherwise, are you saying that there is no such thing as epistemic and moral realism and that there are no philosophers who support this? That would be an obviously false position to take.

 

[Speedwell]

Naturalistic causes of an objective morality based on naturalistic causes like human well being and evolution have already been refuted.

Not by you. All you have done is fabricate your own version of the possibilities and refuted that. It's called knocking down a straw man:

As far as human well being is concerned it has been argued that "wellbeing" itself is subjective. That pleasure and pain do not equate to moral right and wrong. What one person views pain to equate to another sees things differently. But the basis for not using a natural source for morality is that morality can not be reduced to a physical description because it is prescriptive. Physical sciences only explain how something occurs but not why it is right or wrong.

The same for evolution. Whatever idea of morality that has been developed by a sociobiological process is just a human view that is determined by certain subjective ideas like social cohesion, empathy, or survival. All these can be subjectively determined. Evolution is primarily concerned about survival, passing genes on to the next generation. So whatever that maybe is influenced by the environment. That could mean what is regarded as morally good now could change if the environment changes.

Any reason that someone claims as being why we should be morally good to bring about peace, good health, and survivability it can be asked why should these things be the basis for good. Any reason given for this can also be questioned as why we should make those things the basis for morality as well and so forth. These arguments against naturalism are well known and have not been defeated.

A leading UK intuitionist was the Cambridge philosopher G E Moore (1873-1954) who set out his ideas in the 1902 book Principia Ethica. Moore objected to something called 'the naturalistic fallacy', which states that moral truths can be analyzed in terms of physical or psychological things that exist in the natural world. Moral truths were moral truths, and that was that.
BBC - Ethics - Introduction to ethics: Intuitionism

The trouble with moral naturalism, is that it seems to leave open whether you actually ought to act morally! Since morality is no longer defined in terms of what you ought to do, but in terms of facts about the natural world, moral claims translate in a way that does not immediately give you a reason to act on them.
Metamagician and The Hellfire Club: Some thoughts on the concepts of "objective" and "subjective" that are in play

Sam Harris’s argument.
We ought to avoid pain because we all feel that pain is bad. There are about 3 assumptions in Harris’s Tweet. First, “If we should do anything” isn’t that what he is trying to prove. Whose to say that we should do anything. The argument against Harris can be applied to any argument that uses naturalistic things like wellbeing, empathy etc. as they have no synonyms for good or bad.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=V31U9429Qrk

The other problem in using evolution is that any explanation of how humans came to know what was morally right and wrong doesn't mean that we could have discovered objective morality rather than created it. It is a genetic fallacy to say that just because we can explain something that this also answers how morality came about. It leaves out other possibilities as to how morality came about.

But this is another logical fallacy and circular reasoning. That because there is subjective morality that this must mean there is no objective morality. That the evidence for subjective morality is subjective morality.

It also doesn't explain why those who claim subjective morality don't actually live like there is only subjective morality and actually believe that there are certain moral truths regardless of subjective morality. Some who deny moral realism act and react like there is moral realism. Like with epistemic realism we all appeal to epistemic values in our interactions especially in arguments where we expect honesty for example.

We do this by expecting our opponent to not lie and represent their argument honestly. We will object if people use logical fallacies and misrepresentations. We then cannot claim that these epistemic truths are relative as this would collapse all arguments and leave open anyone to say whatever without any recourse. So by appealing to epistemic values we are showing we believe they are real and that they determine "true" from false. We also do this in science when we give value judgments to claims and theories.

Yet epistemic values are intertwined with moral values and cannot be separated and work just the same. When we appeal to moral values we are making them real in the world and not just our heads because we are putting them out there like epistemic values in our interactions. This is our lived moral experience which makes morals objective.

I can't make much sense out of that word salad.

Can naturalistic causes be the source of an objective morality? Yes or no.

Can naturalistic causes account for the content of our consciences? Yes or no.

 

[VirOptimus]

This is your stock standard reply and really it is beyond fair now. It makes it impossible to debate. You are more or less saying no matter what I say or present it doesn't matter, I am wasting my breath and time because you have already decided that I am wrong and full of it. That is a glaring fallacy and shows bias. But hey I cannot help that you are like this. Only that hopefully something slips through as I cannot be that wrong or uneducated like a total ignorant.

That is another massive fallacy. That you assume misrepresentation before even finding if this is true. I cannot win whichever way. But even with the quotes posted and the authors who anyone can easily look up show that this is not the case and that epistemic and moral realism are well supported as that is what they are well known for.

Otherwise, are you saying that there is no such thing as epistemic and moral realism and that there are no philosophers who support this? That would be an obviously false position to take.

You reap what you sow.

I’m well aware about different schools on morality as I really have studied the subject.

 

[stevevw]

Not by you. All you have done is fabricate your own version of the possibilities and refuted that. It's called knocking down a straw man:



I can't make much sense out of that word salad.

These are not my versions of disputing naturalism. I have not made up anything but simply posted links to the experts who refute naturalism. Naturalism is self-refuted. Naturalism equates to producing a scientific explanation for morality. Morality cannot be equated to scientific explanations. It's as simple as that.

Didn't you even refer to the links? If so you need to argue why what they say does not stand.

Can naturalistic causes be the source of an objective morality? Yes or no.

No

Can naturalistic causes account for the content of our consciences? Yes or no.

No

 

[stevevw]

You reap what you sow.

I’m well aware about different schools on morality as I really have studied the subject.

Then what do you think about epistemic and moral realism.

 

[VirOptimus]

Then what do you think about epistemic and moral realism.

I think its a complex issue that is unfalsifiable and therefore of little to no use.

 

[stevevw]

I think its a complex issue that is unfalsifiable and therefore of little to no use.

So what about how people appeal to epistemic values like they are real.

 

[VirOptimus]

So what about how people appeal to epistemic values like they are real.

Some do, many dont.

Most have not given it a thought.

Just as most have not given a thought to how is knowledge possible.

 

[Speedwell]

These are not my versions of disputing naturalism. I have not made up anything but simply posted links to the experts who refute naturalism. Naturalism is self-refuted. Naturalism equates to producing a scientific explanation for morality. Morality cannot be equated to scientific explanations. It's as simple as that.;

Why not?

Didn't you even refer to the links? If so you need to argue why what they say does not stand.

It doesn't appear that they say quite what you think they do. But you have to articulate your own position--you can't just throw links at us and expect us to take you seriously.

"Can naturalistic causes be the source of an objective morality? Yes or no."
No

Yet some of the "experts" you quoted when trying to convince us that the majority of moral philosophers accept an objective morality believe just that.

"Can naturalistic causes account for the content of our consciences? Yes or no."
No

All you have offered is an a priori argument which boils down to saying that there is something about morality which rules out a natural explanation.

 

[Kylie]

Well the obvious reason it cannot apply to morality is that you are equating two completely different realms. Morality cannot be measured in a scientific physical sense. There is no way to pick up morals or measure them like the sun. So just on that alone, it is a logical fallacy of false equivalence.

Maybe that should tell you that morals are SUBJECTIVE!

Yet you are the one who claims that morality is objective, despite admitting to having no way to measure them objectively.

But even if we accept your example it is defeated easily in that we cannot justify the belief that the sun goes around the earth as a properly basic belief. It is easy to prove it is a false belief and therefore it cannot even stand as an example. The problem is with using illusions and false beliefs when determining realism or truth is that the example has to stand up to truth and realism itself to be believable.

Excuses, excuses...

Yes, it is clear but it is also clear that it is an unreal position to take. That is someone insisted that the sun goes around the earth that this could easily be shown to be false. That disqualifies it from being a properly basic belief. It would be like someone saying I don't have a head or that we don't need honesty when two people have a debate.

Okay, they both go around their baycenter which is inside the sun, but now you're just quibbling...

We are not talking about ideas but rather truth and realism. We have to test any claims to see if they are proper beliefs and not some false belief.

And that has nothing to do with whether people actually believe it or not.

But the claims being made are not unfalsifiable. You cannot just make any claim. But the evidence does not always have to be about scientific evidence. A philosophical proposition still has support. We can still provide support for epistemic and moral realism. We live like epistemic values are real and make "truth" claims all the time as noted in the articles I linked for VirOptimus. These are proper valid arguments and therefore a counter argument needs to be made to defeat them.

But you are unable to provide anything more than opinion to do so.

I already have. For example, we all appeal to epistemic values all the time and give them realness and truth. The evidence is the fact that we give them truth status. Truth is whatever and however, we can justify that claim to be the "truth". We are making a "truth" statement or claim in the language we use. IE

Premise 1: If moral facts do not exist, then epistemic facts do not exist.
Premise 2: Epistemic facts do exist
Conclusion 1: Moral facts do exist.
Premise 3: If moral facts do exist, then realism is true.
Conclusion 2: Moral realism is true.

If you reject these epistemic values as not having realness and "truth" then this leaves us in chaos without any values or morals to appeal to. But if you appeal to epistemic values as real then it follows that there is also moral realism.

The Normative Web: An Argument for Moral Realism
moral and epistemic facts are sufficiently similar that, if moral facts do not exist, then epistemic facts also do not exist. But epistemic facts (facts that concern reasons for belief), it is argued, do exist. So, moral facts also exist. And if moral facts exist, then moral realism is true. This argument provides not simply a defense of a robustly realist view of ethics, but a positive argument for this position. In so doing, it engages with sophisticated skeptical positions in epistemology, such as error theories, expressivist views, and reductionist views of epistemic reasons.
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/285966919_The_Normative_Web_An_Argument_for_Moral_Realism

Again, you've never provided any objective evidence to back up your claims.

 

[stevevw]

Some do, many dont.

Most have not given it a thought.

Just as most have not given a thought to how is knowledge possible.

What do you mean by not given it a thought? People may not have stopped to consider how they appeal to epistemic values philosophically as they would take a certain type of enquiry that most people don't really get that deep with. But that doesn't mean they have not given it a thought as far as their default responses to situations that cause them to appeal to epistemic values. No one can avoid it and if they do then they are operating outside the norms of society and they would not be able to function and get along with others.

Whenever we are interacting with someone and we appeal to certain standards that we expect and assume others to abide by like being honest and respectful we are appealing to epistemic values as if they are real and truthful in being an independent measure of how we should behave. We cannot avoid it. Even if someone claims to not value these things they are forced to if they want to engage.

 

[stevevw]

Why not?

Quite simply because science can only describe/explain something and not tell us why something is. It can explain how the universe came about, how evolution helps us survive. But it cannot tell us why the universe is there and why we need or should survive and why something is right and wrong. This is an obvious understanding in ethics.

It doesn't appear that they say quite what you think they do. But you have to articulate your own position--you can't just throw links at us and expect us to take you seriously.

I did give my own explanation but you said "All you have done is fabricate your own version of the possibilities and refuted that. It's called knocking down a straw man". As I stated I was explaining things based on the articles linked. It was a summary of what ethicists say about moral naturalism.

Yet some of the "experts" you quoted when trying to convince us that the majority of moral philosophers accept an objective morality believe just that.

Which experts are you talking about. The ones I quoted support varying forms of anti-naturalism. The point is naturalism refutes itself and you don't need to be an expert. Besides, it seems contradictory that a subjectivist wants to even support any form of objective morality as it negates subjective morality. It actually supports what I am saying that there are objective moral values that we all appeal to by our lived moral experience.

All you have offered is an a priori argument which boils down to saying that there is something about morality which rules out a natural explanation.

Of course, it is a fundamental understanding of ethics. It is not an appeal to a vague something. It is a clear and logical argument that morality which is non-physical cannot be equated to something physical like scientific explanations. No matter what idea you use (wellbeing, evolution, or whatever) it doesn't explain right and wrong morally.