When atheists disagree about the Objectivity of Morality ... !

[Speedwell]

"Sins of the flesh" are all about regulating women's bodies or denigrating women in general, within a patriarchal social structure.

Yes, and also about regulating personal pleasurable behavior as a method of social control.

 

[2PhiloVoid]

Yes.

And I'd say, 'no.' I think Alex waffles between implicit and explicit value, axiologically speaking.

Deciding whether 'blue' is the best color or strawberry is the best flavor, however objectively surveyed, is still a matter of taste and ONLY a matter of taste.

However, murdering people is a different value type, and NOT one of taste. If it is just a matter of 'taste,' then we don't need to have designations of sociopath/psychopath in our psych manuals or evil in our ethics manuals. Yet, WE DO!

 

[2PhiloVoid]

Alex is right, and he says all the same stuff I've been saying on this subject around here for years. So I guess I'm as smart as an Oxford grad. Who knew? Aww... Who am I kidding. I knew.

Nope. Alex is axiologically confused. ...but that kind of goes without saying about a lot of people these days!

 

[2PhiloVoid]

Obeying someone merely because they give you a command or a directive isn't moral at all. After all, that was the excuse used by substantial numbers of defendants at Nurenberg. So I very much disagree with the notion that Christian morality as you articulate it is superior.

Well, goodie that you think so, and just continue on your way in continuing to think so, FD. However, for the sake of this thread, I'm not going down that path of discussion and I don't want this thread derailed onto some kind of rabbit chase regarding objectivity in the divine.

No, this thread is simply about the ontological and axiological differences of view point between those atheists like Alex, on the one hand, and Sam on the other.

 

[essentialsaltes]

And I'd say, 'no.' I think Alex waffles between...

Well, the question was "Is Alex right in saying that Sam is wrong about the nature of human morality?"

Sam is indeed mistaken, so Alex is correct in saying so. (His reasoning may or may not be faulty. I wouldn't know. I didn't watch the video.)

 

[2PhiloVoid]

Well, the question was "Is Alex right in saying that Sam is wrong about the nature of human morality?"

Sam is indeed mistaken, so Alex is correct in saying so. (His reasoning may or may not be faulty. I wouldn't know. I didn't watch the video.)

Not if you take into account the entirety of the video. The questions of the OP pertain to the entirety of the video, inclusive of each individual point that Alex attempts to make. So, while I myself may disagree with the extent and the way in which Sam arrives at his own view (and type) of moral objectivity, I still think his position in nudging against Hume (and thereby standing apart from more subjectivist type atheists like Alex) isn't too far off the mark.

Besides, I think Alex waffles by conflating intrinsic value with extrinsic value.

 

[Moral Orel]

If it is just a matter of 'taste,' then we don't need to have designations of sociopath/psychopath in our psych manuals

Why wouldn't they describe different kinds of people?

If it is just a matter of 'taste,' then we don't need to have designations of ... evil in our ethics manuals.

Why wouldn't they describe things that people hate?

I think this next bit is just a typo, but in two different posts you say these things:

I think Alex waffles between implicit and explicit value, axiologically speaking.

Besides, I think Alex waffles by conflating intrinsic value with extrinsic value.

Did you actually mean to use "intrinsic/extrinsic" both times? That would be my guess, but I wanted to point that out. Or did you mean that he waffles both with "implicit/explicit" values and "intrinsic/extrinsic" values?

 

[2PhiloVoid]

Why wouldn't they describe different kinds of people?

Why wouldn't they describe things that people hate?

I think this next bit is just a typo, but in two different posts you say these things:


Did you actually mean to use "intrinsic/extrinsic" both times? That would be my guess, but I wanted to point that out. Or did you mean that he waffles both with "implicit/explicit" values and "intrinsic/extrinsic" values?

The former.

 

[Moral Orel]

The former.

Okay, why do you think he waffles between intrinsic and extrinsic value? I took him to mean that nothing has intrinsic value. Is there something that you think he believes has intrinsic value?

 

[Ana the Ist]

However, murdering people is a different value type, and NOT one of taste. If it is just a matter of 'taste,' then we don't need to have designations of sociopath/psychopath in our psych manuals or evil in our ethics manuals. Yet, WE DO!

Again with the psychopaths and sociopaths.

Having those labels has nothing to do with murder...nor do they even make someone a "morally bad person".

They just describe clusters of personality traits. There's many people who score high on one of those scales that lead happy successful lives.

 

[Jonathan Walkerin]

Morality doesn't really even exist under the atheistic world view. Without God there would really be nothing "right" or "wrong" about anything.

It is more about societal norms. If you lived in a society that thought it was fine to discriminate people based on their sexual orientation then you would not see anything morally wrong with that either.

 

[Caliban]

When one atheist disagrees with another about morality, it sounds a little like what we find in the following video by atheist and Oxford graduate, Alex O'Conner (a.k.a. 'Cosmic Skeptic' on youtube).

In the 20 minute video below, Alex takes a little umbrage with fellow atheist Sam Harris's view that human morality has some kind of substantial 'objective' quality to it. Rather, Alex thinks human morality is firmly 'subjective.'

Is Alex right in saying that Sam is wrong about the nature of human morality? Well, watch the video and decide for yourself. Or don't decide ...

I watched the video, but unless I am missing something, Cosmic Skeptic gets Harris' position from The Moral Landscape wrong. Harris acknowledges that well-being is a subjective standard to base morality upon. He claims we cannot find an objective moral foundation to justify a moral system. When Harris talks about objective measurements of moral choice, he means that if people agree to subjectively use well-being as a foundation, we could then objectively measure, in most cases, if an action was increasing or decreasing well-being. I don't see the flaw with Harris' idea. It is ultimately subjective. It is similar to how we use measurements; we subjectively choose a unit of measurement (standard or metric) and then we can objectively determine the volume or distance of a thing.

 

[essentialsaltes]

Harris acknowledges that well-being is a subjective standard to base morality upon.

Does he? [I have not watched the video, but my impression of Harris is that he does not acknowledge this.]

If so, does that mean that there is no conflict, since both people in the video agree than morality has no objective basis?

 

[Tinker Grey]

Does he? [I have not watched the video, but my impression of Harris is that he does not acknowledge this.]

I've read his book, though it's been a while. I've also see Alex and RationalityRules debate this topic.

My impression is that @R.Miller is correct. It's like this: If well-being is agreed upon, then certain behaviors are objectively better than others for achieving this; in some situation we can choose an action that is objectively better than the other considered actions.

For me, though, this is an end run around what people mean (or think they mean) when they are discussing this topic.

 

[2PhiloVoid]

Again with the psychopaths and sociopaths.

Having those labels has nothing to do with murder...nor do they even make someone a "morally bad person".

I didn't say they did.

They just describe clusters of personality traits. There's many people who score high on one of those scales that lead happy successful lives.

So, it'd be okay if one's own therapist happens to be a sociopath then, or to act in ways that are supremely 'care-free'?

 

[Caliban]

Does he? [I have not watched the video, but my impression of Harris is that he does not acknowledge this.]

If so, does that mean that there is no conflict, since both people in the video agree than morality has no objective basis?

He does more than acknowledge it; it's part of his entire argument. I don't see how Cosmic Skeptic missed that.

 

[Ana the Ist]

So, it'd be okay if one's own therapist happens to be a sociopath

Sure.

then, or to act in ways that are supremely 'care-free'?

Why not?

 

[2PhiloVoid]

Sure.

Why not?

I'm glad you asked. As IF you needed to, right?

Because, psychologists and psychiatrists, like folks in, say, the field of law enforcement, probably have a professional code of ethics that they are expected to abide by and to which a sociopath/psychopath won't 'really' care about. And those codes aren't present in these various kinds of professions as merely subjective instruments. No, they are rather expected to be taken as-----at the very, very least by each professional within the organization----- to be at least minimal expressions of objective ethical expectation for and within the system of organizational accountability. So, for instance, we find that the following documents are not really 'OPTIONAL' within each respective profession. Wouldn't you agree?

APA’s Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of Conduct

FBI Ethics and Integrity Program Policy Directive Policy Guide

Etc.,

Etc.,

Etc.,...
​

The above is also why we see just one example of a psychologist, like Martha Stout (2005), begins her book, The Sociopath Next Door, with the following little ditty (p. xi):

The descriptions in The Sociopath Next Door do not identify individuals. At the very heart of psychotherapy is the precept of confidentiality, and as usual I have taken the most exacting measure to preserve the privacy of all real persons. All names are fictitious, and all other recognizable features have been changed. Some individuals who appear in the book willingly gave consent to be anonymously portrayed. In these cases, no information has been included that might in any way identify them.​

So, just straight off the bat, we see Martha Stout extol the principle (and really virtue) of maintaining "the precept of confidentiality," as if it's somehow an objectively appreciable value that needs to be protected and administered. In fact, in might be interesting to find that a lot of people would agree with her that this principle, especially in her line of work, has a high value, one that (prescriptively) isn't supposed to be relatively thwarted by the practicing psychologist OR by prying outside parties even, let alone be merely taken with loose subjective whims by the practicing psychologist/psychiatrist. Right?

And this kind of thing seems to intuitively transcend the idea of mere 'taste.' Of course, we wouldn't expect a sociopath to think it is actually much more than that, now would we ... ? No, not really.

Reference

Stout, Martha. (2005). The Sociopath Next Door. New York, NY: MJF Books.

 

[Moral Orel]

So, just straight off the bat, we see Martha Stout extol the principle (and really virtue) of maintaining "the precept of confidentiality," as if it's somehow an objectively appreciable value that needs to be protected and administered.

There are people who talk about morality as if it was objective across all four corners of the Earth.

 

[2PhiloVoid]

There are people who talk about morality as if it was objective across all four corners of the Earth.

Right. But I'm ONLY honing in on the FACT that there is [or I think should be deemed to be] an intuited bare minimum that should be recognized and shared among all people everywhere; and if it's not shared, then it may be that some nation or culture that doesn't harbor some minimum objective moral value X is, itself, to some degree, a cultural facilitator of sociopathy among its own people. That's all I'm saying. I'm not saying that some Full Set of Morals or Ethical System X should be expected, all in all, to be intuited ...

Is this more clear as to what I'm honing in on?