When atheists disagree about the Objectivity of Morality ... !

[Caliban]

Sure, but can those means be used to show objectivity? I'm not sure how that would work, but I'm open to learning. It seems to me I can use those means to verify that unicorns are not rocks, but I'm not sure that would also show objectivity. Nonetheless, if those means could verify objectivity, then I see no reason moral claims couldn't be objectively verified in that way.

I was referring to your comment that, "...any truth-claim, according to that way of arguing, is a matter of intersubjective agreement." That is just demonstrably false. Morality is separate from that statement. There is no objective morality with any philosophical system.

 

[zippy2006]

That is not accurate. Truth claims can very verified as true because of the law of non contradiction and the excluded middle.

Honestly, there are professional philosophers who reject both of those laws, and I think Alex could easily reject them as being objectively true with the same sort of reasoning he used to reject the objectivity of morality. As they say, his arguments prove too much.

 

[public hermit]

I was referring to your comment that, "...any truth-claim, according to that way of arguing, is a matter of intersubjective agreement." That is just demonstrably false. Morality is separate from that statement. There is no objective morality with any philosophical system.

I think I see what you're saying. But, logical truths, as Wittgenstein pointed out in the Tractatus, can all be reduced to tautologies. Logical truths are not so much a matter of intersubjective agreement, but definition (which might be argued is ultimately a matter of intersubjective agreement). Those logical laws don't help us settle the argument. So, not only are moral truth-claims separate from those means, empirical truth-claims are as well.

 

[Caliban]

Honestly, there are professional philosophers who reject both of those laws, and I think Alex could easily reject them as being objectively true with the same sort of reasoning he used to reject the objectivity of morality. As they say, his arguments prove too much.

Yes, but that is only because of the problem of hard Soloipcism. If we presume we are not a brain in a vat and we are actually experiencing reality, we can move on with applying logic to achieve reliable answers to questions of objective truth. Most philosophers assume reality as we seem to experience it.

 

[Caliban]

I think I see what you're saying. But, logical truths, as Wittgenstein pointed out in the Tractatus, can all be reduced to tautologies. Logical truths are not so much a matter of intersubjective agreement, but definition (which might be argued is ultimately a matter of intersubjective agreement). Those logical laws don't help us settle the argument. So, not only are moral truth-claims separate from those means, empirical truth-claims are as well.

But if we agree on the semantics of a proposition, we can demonstrate a logical truth; the bachelor example works if we can agree on the terms of men and bachelors and married. I have not read Tractatus, maybe I am missing something, but I don't see how a person cannot arrive at true knowledge of sound logical syllogisms.

 

[public hermit]

But if we agree on the semantics of a proposition, we can demonstrate a logical truth; the bachelor example works if we can agree on the terms of men and bachelors and married. I have not read Tractatus, maybe I am missing something, but I don't see how a person cannot arrive at true knowledge of sound logical syllogisms.

I'm not so much disagreeing with your assessment of the role of logic, or its use. But, I don't think those laws, per se, help settle the question of whether objectivity can be shown to be something more than intersubjective agreement. As you say, "if we agree on the semantics of a proposition." That statement alone shows the limits of logic.

 

[FireDragon76]

If they somehow exist apart from God's personal will, then God isn't God and there is something even he is subject to. So Christians may be right when they point out that atheist have no objective basis for morality, but neither do they. It invariably boils down to "it's wrong because... it just is."

It really depends on whether you think will or nature is primary. Up until Occam, most medievals thought nature was primary over will. Which means that ultimately God plugs into the usual Greek style natural law ethics.

 

[zippy2006]

Yes, but that is only because of the problem of hard Soloipcism. If we presume we are not a brain in a vat and we are actually experiencing reality, we can move on with applying logic to achieve reliable answers to questions of objective truth. Most philosophers assume reality as we seem to experience it.

But if we agree on the semantics of a proposition, we can demonstrate a logical truth; the bachelor example works if we can agree on the terms of men and bachelors and married. I have not read Tractatus, maybe I am missing something, but I don't see how a person cannot arrive at true knowledge of sound logical syllogisms.

I don't think Alex is "most philosophers." His two basic thrusts were that 1) Harris' premises were generally not objectively true, and 2) If they could be made to be objectively true, they ended up being circular and vacuous. For example, your example of "All unmarried men are bachelors" is a classic example of a tautology or analytic truth, and I doubt Alex would find it any more interesting than Harris' tautologies that he criticized in the video.

 

[Caliban]

I'm not so much disagreeing with your assessment of the role of logic, or its use. But, I don't think those laws, per se, help settle the question of whether objectivity can be shown to be something more than intersubjective agreement. As you say, "if we agree on the semantics of a proposition." That statement alone shows the limits if logic.

I don't see how my statement about the human need to semantically define our terms limits the prospect that logic reliably produces truth claims. If we use a tool wrong, that is the fault of the operator, not the tool.

 

[Caliban]

I don't think Alex is "most philosophers." His two basic thrusts were that 1) Harris' premises were generally not objectively true, and 2) If they could be made to be objectively true, they ended up being circular and vacuous. For example, your example of "All unmarried men are bachelors" is a classic example of a tautology or analytic truth, and I doubt Alex would find it any more interesting than Harris' tautologies that he criticized in the video.

This would be a tautology:
a) Bachelors are necessarily unmarried.
b) John is a bachelor.
Therefore, c) John cannot marry.

Not this:
a) Bachelors are necessarily unmarried.
b) John is unmarried
c) John is a bachelor

 

[public hermit]

I don't see how my statement about the human need to semantically define our terms limits the prospect that logic reliably produces truth claims. If we use a tool wrong, that is the fault of the operator, not the tool.

Defining our terms is an endeavor of intersubjective agreement (e.g. between you and I). How do we show those terms are objective (i.e. not a matter of mere opinion)? If a thousand people agree on a definition that doesn't change the fact that definition is a matter of intersubjective agreement. In other words, the opinions of a thousand people agree. Maybe what we need to do is define objective is some way other than not a matter of opinion (If memory serves that is how Alex defines subjectivity-opinion).

 

[FireDragon76]

I watched the video, but unless I am missing something, Cosmic Skeptic gets Harris' position from The Moral Landscape wrong. Harris acknowledges that well-being is a subjective standard to base morality upon. He claims we cannot find an objective moral foundation to justify a moral system. When Harris talks about objective measurements of moral choice, he means that if people agree to subjectively use well-being as a foundation, we could then objectively measure, in most cases, if an action was increasing or decreasing well-being. I don't see the flaw with Harris' idea. It is ultimately subjective. It is similar to how we use measurements; we subjectively choose a unit of measurement (standard or metric) and then we can objectively determine the volume or distance of a thing.

"Well-being" is ultimately a fancy way to appeal to nature/ontology, albeit in a manner that is more scientifically sophisticated than in the past.

 

[Caliban]

Defining our terms is a endeavor of intersubjective agreement (e.g. between you and I). How do we show those terms are objective (i.e. not a matter of mere opinion)? If a thousand people agree on a definition that doesn't change the fact that definition is a matter of intersubjective agreement. In other words, the opinions of a thousand people agree. Maybe what we need to do is define objective is some way other than a matter of mere opinion (If memory serves that is how Alex defines subjectivity-opinion).

You are right about intersubjective agreement, but I'm talking about once you have worked that out, a true thing can be known. We are having a written discussion. These is very little ambiguity in that statement--not much room for misinterpretation. What is your confidence level that it is true (excluding hard solipsism)? Mine would be high, almost certain; you could be a bot (I doubt it).

 

[Caliban]

"Well-being" is ultimately a fancy way to appeal to nature/ontology, albeit in a manner that is more scientifically sophisticated than in the past.

I don't see your point. What do you mean by the word fancy? I'm not seeing the downside to basing consensus on Well-being.

 

[FireDragon76]

I don't see your point. What do you mean by the word fancy? I'm not seeing the downside to basing consensus on Well-being.

It's not an objection so much as an explanation. Well being has been something previous eras and cultures have recognized as a sound basis for ethics. It's just western culture took a strange turn with the rise of the Franciscan/Occamist influence in philosophy in the late middle ages.

 

[Caliban]

It's not an objection so much as an explanation. Well being has been something previous eras and cultures have recognized as a sound basis for ethics. It's just western culture took a strange turn with the rise of the Franciscan/Occamist influence in philosophy in the late middle ages.

I know nothing about Franciscan/Occamist, what is that and how does it relate?

 

[2PhiloVoid]

Yes, but that is only because of the problem of hard Soloipcism. If we presume we are not a brain in a vat and we are actually experiencing reality, we can move on with applying logic to achieve reliable answers to questions of objective truth. Most philosophers assume reality as we seem to experience it.

Bull, yet again !!!

Stop making brash statements, R.Miller! For someone who is supposedly self-proclaimed as being rational, logical and sensible, you sure make a lot of 'just so' statements.

Why do you do that?

 

[Caliban]

Bull, yet again !!!

Stop making brash statements, R.Miller! For someone who is supposedly self-proclaimed as being rational, logical and sensible, you sure make a lot of 'just so' statements.

Why do you do that?

Instead of getting triggered, how about explaining what error you found in my response. Be clear this time and use language that is not vague.

 

[FireDragon76]

I know nothing about Franciscan/Occamist, what is that and how does it relate?

Franciscans believed that will was more primary than nature. They also tended to be philosophical nominalists and began the move away from metaphysics, as a result.

 

[Speedwell]

That is not accurate. Truth claims can very verified as true because of the law of non contradiction and the excluded middle.

Those aren't laws, they are axioms of a logical formal system.