Tricks New Atheist Play (Part 1)

[zippy2006]

I am going to present you with an argument for atheism that you have never heard, and before seeing it you will be given the chance to privately wager on whether the argument will convince you.

Before I tell you, on a scale of 0-10, how inclined do you think you will be to be convinced?

It is very doubtful that I would be convinced.

 

[Non sequitur]

It is very doubtful that I would be convinced.

Would you say that the totality of everything you have heard (on this forum, in your own life, etc.), in regards to what my argument could be, affects your close-to-0 inclination?

 

[zippy2006]

So the followers of New Atheists "have faith" in the spokesmen that if a new argument arises, their spokesmen will be able to shoot it down. I'm sure some don't think they need their spokesmen to be able to shoot down any new arguments too. Plenty of people think they're smarter than the folks who make it onto TV to advocate for the things they agree with. For instance, I like watching Dawkins explain evolution, but I know more about the Bible than he does. So generalizing "followers" as "having faith" is still an inappropriate sweeping generalization.

That may be. I simply said that one reason many New Atheists think future arguments will fail is due to their faith in spokesmen (or official atheist apologists). I didn't say it is the only reason or that it apples to all New Atheists.

I assumed, and I still think I'm right in that assumption, that the "vast majority of all human beings" you refer to is theists in general. Am I incorrect? If not, then my paraphrase of you is accurate.

You are correct that the vast majority are believers, but this does not mean that "theists" is the same thing as "the vast majority." The argument I gave has to do with the vast majority, and makes no sense when you substitute "theists." (This is the difference between a formal and material object.)

More to the point though, Shermer, by saying that bit of irrationality evolved in us, is stating that all humans are irrational, thereby including himself, so it is a far stretch to call that arrogant.

I never called it arrogant. In fact the first thing I said in response was, "If the atheist develops a causal explanation for why certain types of beliefs are often inaccurate then they would successfully sidestep the argument I gave."

You also said that such a claim avoids any epistemology, which Shermer does not avoid but instead explains its reasons.

I said that to assert that the vast majority of human beings are irrational sets the groundwork for a poor epistemology.

You said people ought not act like that, I showed someone not acting like that.

None of this really matters until you actually present a real argument that Shermer gives.

You say you understand my point, yet you still call it an "argument". It is a plausible explanation for a "why" question. It is not an "argument" that tries to prove religious people are irrational. It pokes holes in the argument that there's no good explanation for theist belief other than "it's true".

It is an argument concluding with the idea that religious beliefs are especially fallible. There's simply no reason to believe that it is not an argument. If he gives ordered reasons resulting in a conclusion then it is an argument.

What, what, what? "Supposing"? Are you saying that there was no time in human history that the majority of people thought these examples were true, or are you saying that I'm wrong about my "ain'ts"?

An interesting question that arises is: what is a true consensus? I think it quickly becomes apparent that a consensus summing beliefs across history is more of a consensus than one which only considers beliefs at a given time, a given cross slice of history.

The point is that an argument ad populum is not a probabilistic argument. Just because a lot of people believe something doesn't make it more likely to be true. There's a reason that is already a well accepted fallacy, and to think that you're trying to justify using fallacious reasoning is astounding.

Justify that it is a fallacy without an appeal to authority (e.g. Wikipdia). I've read the various justifications and they explicitly relate to deductive logic, not probabilistic logic. Interestingly, Wikipedia claims that it can be a valid argument in the case of inductive logic (but I think their reasoning fails in this case).

Do you think that scientific consensus provides a probabilistic argument for truth? If 90% of climate scientists claim that global warming is happening, does this provide a legitimate reason to believe that it is?

Let's try to get back on track though. The OP says that "I am an atheist because I lack belief" is not an okay claim to make. He pins it on "New Atheists", sure, but he implies that anyone who would say such a thing must be a "New Atheist". You say, "God is not worthy of belief" is an appropriate replacement for "I lack belief". I say "All evidence I've seen is bad" is a better way to phrase it. Mine can apply to all atheists even if some take it further. So, why is "All evidence I've seen is bad" an insufficient claim to argue about whatever a theist and an atheist want to argue about?

As I explained to Variant, my definition could be taken in two ways. 1) God is not worthy of (my) belief, or 2) God is not worthy of (anyone's) belief. (1) Is equivalent to your definition, and I already gave reasons why (2) may be preferable (i.e. relating to future theistic arguments).

 

[zippy2006]

Would you say that the totality of everything you have heard (on this forum, in your own life, etc.), in regards to what my argument could be, affects your close-to-0 inclination?

Sure, although that seems tautological. What else than everything I have heard in my life could affect my inclination? I don't believe in reincarnation.

 

[Non sequitur]

Sure, although that seems tautological. What else than everything I have heard in my life could affect my inclination? I don't believe in reincarnation.

So that's a good thing, bad thing?

 

[zippy2006]

So that's a good thing, bad thing?

What? My lack of belief in reincarnation? I think it's a good thing.

(I don't know what you are referring to.)

 

[Non sequitur]

What? My lack of belief in reincarnation? I think it's a good thing.

(I don't know what you are referring to.)

I was referring to this:
"If I said to Dawkins, "I am going to present you with an argument for theism that you have never heard, and before seeing it you will be given the chance to privately wager on whether the argument will convince you." Do you think he would wager against the argument? I think it is obvious that he would. Heck, you yourself admitted that the New Atheists are militant, combative, disparaging. They mock religious people, they think they are stupid. They produce documentaries showcasing fundamentalists denying scientific consensus. You don't think any of this produces any sort of inclination about new arguments?"

I'm trying to understand the difference.

 

[variant]

I'm trying to understand the difference.

Well when Richard Dawkins or I myself are fairly well traveled and hard to convince it is something to be criticized.

We're atheists.

 

[zippy2006]

I was referring to this:
"If I said to Dawkins, "I am going to present you with an argument for theism that you have never heard, and before seeing it you will be given the chance to privately wager on whether the argument will convince you." Do you think he would wager against the argument? I think it is obvious that he would. Heck, you yourself admitted that the New Atheists are militant, combative, disparaging. They mock religious people, they think they are stupid. They produce documentaries showcasing fundamentalists denying scientific consensus. You don't think any of this produces any sort of inclination about new arguments?"

I'm trying to understand the difference.

Thanks for your question. It gives me an opportunity to flesh out my argument and dismiss superficial interpretations such as Variant's.


The Prima Facie Situation

Prima facie it is more rational for theists to have an inclination against changing their beliefs than New Atheists. This is because New Atheists define atheism as, "The lack of belief in gods."

Now if a person has positive reasons to believe proposition X, then they have reasons to disbelieve ~X. So if I have various positive reasons to believe that the Earth is spherical, then each of those reasons--and especially the sum of the reasons taken together--constitute a reason to believe that the earth is not flat. Suppose this person was told, "I am going to present you with an argument for a flat Earth that you have never heard, and before seeing it you will be given the chance to privately wager on whether the argument will convince you." They would naturally wager against being convinced because they have many reasons to believe that the Earth is spherical. The key point is that they have positive reasons to disbelieve the new claim, and therefore have reason to believe that they will not be convinced (ceteris paribus).

The theist falls in the same general category. There are various reasons why he believes in theism. These might include religious experiences, arguments for God's existence, arguments from various trusted authorities, etc. Each of these reasons--and especially the sum of them--functions as a reason to disbelieve the claim that God does not exist. He can therefore rationally wager against being convinced.

The New Atheist does not fall into the same general category, and this is by their own admission. Their charter is the lack of belief in God, the absence of reasons to believe, not positive reasons to disbelieve. This is why they are so insistent that they are someone who lacks belief in God, not someone who believes God does not exist. So when they are offered the wager, it seems that the key point is missing: they have no positive reasons to disbelieve the claim that God exists. This is because they have no reasons in favor of the contradictory claim, that God does not exist. They have only lack of evidence, and lack of evidence is not a positive reason for disbelief--this is according to New Atheists themselves. On the face of it, New Atheists who wager against being convinced by new arguments are irrational.


The Caveat

But what I have pointed out in this thread and elsewhere is that New Atheists do wager against being convinced. In this post I gave two possible reasons for this seemingly irrational wager: induction and faith in New Atheists figureheads. My point is not that New Atheists are irrational, but rather that New Atheists implicitly subscribe to the older definition of atheism, "Belief that God does not exist." Unless they subscribe to this definition and have reasons supporting their position, they have no business wagering against the new argument for God's existence. If New Atheists wager against new arguments, then either they are irrational or else they have legitimate reasons to believe that God does not exist. In this post I argue that the latter position is not irrational, but rather quite natural to atheism.

 

[zippy2006]

* Waits for an atheist to come along, ignore the argument, and say, "Can't you just accept the definition we give ourselves!? ...the NERVE of some theists!" *

 

[Non sequitur]

A jury is asked if the evidence presented demonstrates guilt "beyond a reasonable doubt", so, it's not a good barometer. Courts don't decide based upon what they believe, but rather, what they can justly act upon, and what it is fair to ask someone to prove in front of them. It is harder to prove not X than X with evidence so we don't ask people to do so.

You can also believe things you have reasonable doubts about.

Of course a lack of evidence is always going to be a reasonable point against any given assertion, which is the problem here.

It was the only thing that popped in my head when trying to find a simple way to respond to positively not believing a negative claim positively... or whatever that was.

Redo:
A "positive reason" to disbelieve a claim is that it the lacks evidence to support itself. One doesn't need to have a reason for a contradictory claim to simply find the asserted claim insufficient.

My head hurts. This is a really simple concept that is getting unnecessarily complex...

 

[Non sequitur]

Whatever the OP says it is?

Something about an atheist being ashamed, tricky rhetoric and claims atheist don't make.

When I got to the recommendation for anything by William Lane Craig, I stopped.

 

[variant]

Redo:
A "positive reason" to disbelieve a claim is that it the lacks evidence to support itself. One doesn't need to have a reason for a contradictory claim to simply find the asserted claim insufficient.

My head hurts. This is a really simple concept that is getting unnecessarily complex...

The issue is that you don't actually have to satisfy Zippys need for a "positive reason". It's just a demand, and not one you have to take seriously.

The origional claim (God) is defined in a non-falsifiable manner. Here he is being snippy about people not believing it due to a lack of evidence.

The only way you can contradict a non-falsifiable claim however, is to point to the lack of evidence. Sure you can try to assert the null position by pointing out the flaws in theism, but actually demonstrating not-God, well you would have to have a good idea what God and not-God look like respectively wouldn't you?

This unfalcifiability effectively puts the claim outside of the idea of being contradicted by contrary evidence, while at the same time demanding that people need to have "positive reasons" (ie contradictory evidence) rather than simple disbelief. All the while not demonstrating the claim.

This is going on in a thread about the "tricks" certain kinds of atheists play?

Think about it.

The whole thing is a mind game. Beginning to end. The theists want to just define things in such a way that they win their own mind game by default.

We don't call this "New Theism" though, as theism has always been exactly like this.

 

[Moral Orel]

1) God is not worthy of (my) belief, or 2) God is not worthy of (anyone's) belief. (1) Is equivalent to your definition

(Bolding added by me for emphasis)
Whew! Okay, then we agree and there's no more reason to argue! My definition works just fine and there's no reason to use yours except:

(2) may be preferable (i.e. relating to future theistic arguments).

Which doesn't apply to every atheist as you admit here:

I didn't say it is the only reason or that it apples to all New Atheists.

So there's no reason to apply your version to atheists in general because it doesn't apply to all of them... but mine does! Even if they take it a step further and they want to add to it.

Now to move on to the other things we've derailed the thread to discuss. The Shermer thing would require me to post a video of him making the explanation next, and I don't see how that is relevant to the thread at all, so I'm going to call that another one for another thread like the others we've put on a back burner that might pop up in the future.

This one is still off-topic, but what the heck, why not?

An interesting question that arises is: what is a true consensus? I think it quickly becomes apparent that a consensus summing beliefs across history is more of a consensus than one which only considers beliefs at a given time, a given cross slice of history.

No. Let's take the idea that the Earth is flat. At one point in time, most people thought it was, agreed? At that point in time, most people prior to the people that currently existed also though the Earth was flat. So at that point in time, we take a cross section of history and find that most people throughout history believed the Earth was flat. Therefore, at that time it was more likely that the Earth is flat than it is round. Anyone at that time employing your appeal to popularity would be wrong. This also means that the probability for something being true or false changes over time, somehow. It used to be more likely that the Earth is flat, and now it is more likely that the Earth is round. See how silly that sounds?

Now let's expand my example to everything that we've learned over time. For everything we've learned, there's a different belief previously held by, what was at the time, the majority of humanity that was wrong. Since we don't know everything, there are beliefs right now that the majority of humans hold that aren't true. Here's one example you can get on board with, I think: the majority of humans believe that the Bible is not the inerrant word of God. So, according to you, they are probably right and the Bible probably is not the inerrant word of God. But you disagree, I presume, yes?

Justify that it is a fallacy without an appeal to authority (e.g. Wikipdia). I've read the various justifications and they explicitly relate to deductive logic, not probabilistic logic. Interestingly, Wikipedia claims that it can be a valid argument in the case of inductive logic (but I think their reasoning fails in this case).

Do you think that scientific consensus provides a probabilistic argument for truth? If 90% of climate scientists claim that global warming is happening, does this provide a legitimate reason to believe that it is?

That isn't what scientific consensus means. When they say there is a consensus, it isn't because they polled a bunch of scientists and asked them their opinion. It means that of all the tested hypotheses about a subject, the majority of those hypotheses turned out in favor of the subject. So you aren't comparing people's opinions, you're comparing actual data. It isn't comparable.

If you did poll a bunch of scientists and 90% said global warming is real, it would be an appeal to authority, which is not necessarily a fallacy. If those scientists all studied climatology, then it is appropriate. If those scientists all studied biology, then it would be inappropriate.

 

[mnorian]

Mod hat on

Thread has gone thru a small
clean-up
Please do not flame other
members; even if you do not
agree with their point of view.
Carry On.​

 

[KCfromNC]

Because of the continual rhetorical tricks you are deploying, I have decided to answer you with responses by an atheist philosopher out of Australia.

Just out of curiosity, do you believe everything atheist philosophers write? If not, why would you expect anyone else to?

"The first thing I can say here is that belief and knowledge are not usually paired this way. As our justification for a belief being true gets stronger, it eventually qualifies as knowledge (because knowledge is at least a ‘justified, true, belief’). So this makes both the gnostic positions rather redundant, as you necessarily have to have a belief if you also have knowledge."

Yes, justified belief is typically defined as knowledge. Not sure what this has to do with the conversation, though.

"When we’re talking about scientific concepts, we make the effort to use appropriate scientific language. We ought to make the same effort to be philosophically precise in matters of philosophy. ‘Atheism’ and ‘belief’ are also technical terms in philosophy. This might rub some anti-philosophical types the wrong way, but like it or not, if you engage in rational argument, you’re doing philosophy. And anything worth doing is worth doing correctly."

Presumes that everyone else is using the wrong definitions, not you.

 

[KCfromNC]

That may be. I simply said that one reason many New Atheists think future arguments will fail is due to their faith in spokesmen (or official atheist apologists).

The more descriptions of New Atheists I see by believers in this thread, the more I become convinced that very few of them actually exist - outside of the imagination of believers, that is. But by including that label, at least you admit that this isn't true for most everyone you're actually discussing things with here.

Do you think that scientific consensus provides a probabilistic argument for truth? If 90% of climate scientists claim that global warming is happening, does this provide a legitimate reason to believe that it is?

Depends on the methods they're using to come to their conclusions.

As I explained to Variant, my definition could be taken in two ways. 1) God is not worthy of (my) belief, or 2) God is not worthy of (anyone's) belief. (1) Is equivalent to your definition, and I already gave reasons why (2) may be preferable (i.e. relating to future theistic arguments).

Seems like an attempt to pin claim #2 on people making a claim related to #1 to me.

 

[KCfromNC]

Thanks for your question. It gives me an opportunity to flesh out my argument and dismiss superficial interpretations such as Variant's.
The Prima Facie Situation
Prima facie it is more rational for theists to have an inclination against changing their beliefs than New Atheists. This is because New Atheists define atheism as, "The lack of belief in gods."

Just to be clear, has Variant identified himself as your definition of a New Atheist? If not, this post seems to be a non-response to him.

 

[zippy2006]

Redo:
A "positive reason" to disbelieve a claim is that it the lacks evidence to support itself. One doesn't need to have a reason for a contradictory claim to simply find the asserted claim insufficient.

My head hurts. This is a really simple concept that is getting unnecessarily complex...

Apparently I missed the posts that were cleaned up by the moderator.

The concept is simple: an inclination against believing future arguments against one's position must be supported by reasons. If the inclination is not supported by any reasons then the inclination is irrational. Finally, if something functions as a reason for the inclination, then it at the same time functions as a reason to believe the contradictory opposite of the future argument. So if the argument concludes with, "God exists," then something functioning as a reason to incline against such an argument in the future at the same time functions as a reason to believe that God does not exist. If you don't have a reason to believe that God does not exist, then you don't have a reason to wager against future arguments in favor of God's existence. Of course this is fleshed out in more detail in my post here.

Just to be clear, has Variant identified himself as your definition of a New Atheist? If not, this post seems to be a non-response to him.

I said that my post provides an opportunity to dismiss superficial interpretations such as Variant's, namely the response Variant gave here. It is noteworthy that no one has opposed the argument I gave.

 

[zippy2006]

(Bolding added by me for emphasis)
Whew! Okay, then we agree and there's no more reason to argue! My definition works just fine and there's no reason to use yours except:

Which doesn't apply to every atheist as you admit here:

You misrepresent me yet again. What I said is that the appeal of faith does not apply to all New Atheists, not that definition (2) does not apply to all New Atheists.

This one is still off-topic, but what the heck, why not?

That's true, and I said that I have little desire to discuss it in this thread, but you continued to press the issue by asserting against the probabilistic nature of arguments from consensus.

No.Let's take the idea that the Earth is flat. At one point in time, most people thought it was, agreed? At that point in time, most people prior to the people that currently existed also though the Earth was flat. So at that point in time, we take a cross section of history and find that most people throughout history believed the Earth was flat. Therefore, at that time it was more likely that the Earth is flat than it is round. Anyone at that time employing your appeal to popularity would be wrong.

It's true that 3000 years ago this particular argument from consensus would have been false, but a single counterexample does not undermine a probabilistic argument. What would undermine a probabilistic argument is the claim that the argument fails more than 50% of the time, and is therefore generally unreliable.

But this reduces to an absurdity. Suppose that a consensus is incorrect more than 50% of the time. Since a consensus is simply a sum of individual opinions, this means that each individual is incorrect more than 50% of the time. But if each individual is incorrect more than 50% of the time, then all of our perceptions, beliefs, and opinions are generally unreliable and cannot be trusted. It is only if humans are generally reliable (i.e. correct greater than 50% of the time) that we can trust human knowledge. Refined scientific methodologies can increase our reliability, but they cannot create reliability where none previously existed.

A long conversation on this topic--albeit with respect to the burden of proof or rational inclination--took place between myself and Archaeopteryx beginning with this post. The meat of the discussion is certainly present by this post.

This also means that the probability for something being true or false changes over time, somehow. It used to be more likely that the Earth is flat, and now it is more likely that the Earth is round. See how silly that sounds?

But consensus does not determine absolute probability, it is only one probabilistic argument. Therefore the probability for something being true or false under the aspect of an argument from consensus changes over time. This is no different than saying that opinions about what is true change over time, and is no more mysterious. The probabilities for what we believe to be true change as new data is gathered and new arguments considered. There is nothing strange about this.

Now let's expand my example to everything that we've learned over time. For everything we've learned, there's a different belief previously held by, what was at the time, the majority of humanity that was wrong. Since we don't know everything, there are beliefs right now that the majority of humans hold that aren't true. Here's one example you can get on board with, I think: the majority of humans believe that the Bible is not the inerrant word of God. So, according to you, they are probably right and the Bible probably is not the inerrant word of God. But you disagree, I presume, yes?

Again, you're committing the error of assuming that a single counterexample or set of counterexamples undermines a probabilistic argument. That's not true. If the majority of humans believe that the Bible is not inerrant then this constitutes a probabilistic argument in favor of the thesis that the Bible is not inerrant.

That isn't what scientific consensus means. When they say there is a consensus, it isn't because they polled a bunch of scientists and asked them their opinion.

That's exactly what a scientific consensus is.

It means that of all the tested hypotheses about a subject, the majority of those hypotheses turned out in favor of the subject. So you aren't comparing people's opinions, you're comparing actual data.

No, this is manifestly incorrect. It is not a poll of hypotheses or data, it is a poll of persons, scientists.

If you did poll a bunch of scientists and 90% said global warming is real, it would be an appeal to authority, which is not necessarily a fallacy. If those scientists all studied climatology, then it is appropriate.

It would be a combination of an appeal to authority and an appeal to consensus.

In order for us to accept scientific consensus and deny general consensus, it would have to be the case that scientists are right > 50% of the time (when opining on their field of study) and general people are right < 50% of the time. But this is not possible, for if it were then it would be impossible to transition from being a general person to being a scientist. Someone who is generally unreliable (right < 50% of the time) cannot "pull themselves up by their bootstraps" into general reliability. For example, every attempt they make to arrive at general reliability will be plagued with de facto general unreliability and untrustworthiness. Every scientific method they develop will more likely be false than true, and every attempt to discern whether something is in fact true will also be plagued by the same unrealiability, thus barring the way to improved reliability.

It only makes sense if the general person is right > 50% of the time and the scientist is right more than the general person. Perhaps the general person is right 58% of the time and scientists are right 82% of the time (in their own field). It is possible to move from 58% to 82%, but it is not possible to move from <50% to >50%.

If those scientists all studied biology, then it would be inappropriate.

Which is why I specified climate scientists.