I think it is more than fair. Hate crimes are punished more than equivalent crimes that have been committed with non-race related motivations. Is that unfair?
You're talking apples and oranges. The punishment for hate crimes is still a finite punishment for a finite crime. It may be more serious than a similar non-hate crime, but that's irrelevant. It's the same principle why you have a more serious sentence for murder than you do for petty theft.
My point dealt with eternal punishment for a finite crime, which is inherently unjust.
Indeed. So, as long as the premise is true, then everything else proceeding from the premise is also true.
Agreed
I cannot prove to you that everything I believe is true. However, it is not irrational (meaning, it is therefore internally consistent).
Well, even there I'd have to disagree. If you positively believe things that you can't demonstrate to be true, that is irrational. Even if your belief is internally consistent, that doesn't make it a rational belief.
Being that this is the case, you cannot try to employ a seemingly rational argument (Epicurus' Argument from Evil) and expect me to take it seriously if I can find assumptions are logical inconsistencies within it. It's chief presupposition is that morality is anthropocentric. It's second is that the total non-existence of evil is preferrable to its co-existence with good.
Whereas I disagree that those are presuppositions. Those are positions that can be backed up with reason.
What are the logical inconsistencies you speak of though?
Those are serious presuppositions that have to e proved out for me tot ake the argument seriously.
Sure, and I can do that:
1) Morality is anthropocentric: First off, as I stated in a previous post "sentient being-centric" would be a better label. By sentient being, I could be referring to various types of animals, or intelligent aliens, or whatever... I'll use the word anthropocentric or human to simplify things, but keep in mind any sentient being could be substituted in its place.
First off, we can demonstrate that moral actions, moral judgments, moral consequences, etc have a major and direct impact on humans and human society. Therefore, humans clearly play a role in morality.
From this point of the argument, we can tentatively say that morality is anthropocentric. To move beyond that and show that morality is not anthropocentric, we would then need to show something else non-human that plays a direct role in moral actions, judgments, etc.
Inanimate objects can not possess morality since they have no intent, and can not make conscious decisions, actions or judgments. All inanimate objects are therefore amoral in and of themselves. Therefore, "the universe" doesn't matter when it comes to morality, it is amoral.
In order to consider the universe as a whole relevant to the discussion, you'd have to show how the universe acts as a moral agent of some sort. I'm not aware of any examples of that.
2: The non-existence of evil is preferable to its co-existence with good:
This one isn't that difficult. Evil is the antithesis of good, and good is the antithesis of evil.
If your goal is a perfectly pure example of anything, you can not achieve a purer form of something by adding it's antithesis into the mix. If your goal is perfectly pure white sheets, you can't make it more pure by adding black dye.
If your goal is a perfectly working operating system, you can't make it better by adding bugs.
If your goal is perfectly pure water, you can't make it more pure by adding salt.
Likewise, if your goal is perfect goodness, you can't make it more good by adding evil.
Actually, you can. First, a "cute" example: My wife is the opposite of me in a lot of ways. I am better with her than without her.
Right, but if you were perfect, then her opposite nature of yours could not improve you. The only reason she can improve you is because you are not perfect.
Likewise, if something is purely/perfectly good, you can not improve it by adding evil. By definition, any evil you add will dilute it's pureness or spoil its perfection.
Now, a more logically consistent example (as marriage is extremely irrational
) I would take is forgiveness. Forgiveness is a very good thing. The greater the wrong, the greater the forgiveness. So, the inverse relationship between the two actually increases the overall greatness.
The matter of debate therefore is an existence that lacks forgiveness is preferable over one that does. How do we make this judgment?
As I mentioned in a previous post, you don't need evil in order to run into situations that require a level of forgiveness. Showing up late for a lunch date, or being clumsy and breaking someone's glass are acts that require a level of forgiveness, but aren't evil.
As for serious crimes, or genuine examples of evil, I'd say the world would be a better place without that. A world where you forgive the person who murdered your kid is not as good as a world where your kid didn't get murdered at all. A world where a woman forgives her rapist is not as good as a world in which she hadn't been raped in the first place, etc.
A great example, and one that should conclusively prove my point is as follows:
Heaven is a place which is commonly defined as being perfectly good. There is a complete absence of evil and sin in heaven.
Based upon your argument, heaven could then be improved by allowing Satan in the door to spread around some evil.
If you don't agree that the inclusion of evil would make heaven a better place, then you are forced into admitting a place of perfect goodness is a place that lacks all evil.
I can define God as omnipotent, omniscient, and all-loving. However, my perspective of what makes Him all-loving is clearly very different from yours.
Apparently.
Which he? Augustine, Epiciurus, or both?
I was referring to Augustine