The Ontological Argument

[AlexBP]

Pfft, Descartes didn't know what he was talking about . We know everything logical and mathematical with 100% accuracy (except for statistics, those numbers are tricksy).

At risk of hijacking the thread, I disagree completely. Look at Zorn's Lemma and the Axiom of Choice. Look at the Four Color Theorem. Look at plenty of other examples that are out there. The idea that mathematics is the one field where everybody is in agreement because everything is subjected to airtight proof just doesn't stand up to scrutiny.

 

[Wiccan_Child]

At risk of hijacking the thread, I disagree completely. Look at Zorn's Lemma and the Axiom of Choice. Look at the Four Color Theorem. Look at plenty of other examples that are out there. The idea that mathematics is the one field where everybody is in agreement because everything is subjected to airtight proof just doesn't stand up to scrutiny.

I disagree. The Four Colour Theorem has been proven and generalised. As your own links states:

"Mathematicians have proven that the maximum number of colors required for any map drawn on a torus is seven and a double torus is eight."
"The Four Color Theorem was solved by Haken and Appel in 1976, with a proof that involved the use of computers."
"It was not until 1976 that the four-color conjecture was finally proven by Kenneth Appel and Wolfgang Haken at the University of Illinois."
"Beyond proving theorems, including the four color theorem, ..."

We know, for a fact, with 100% accuracy, that, "given any separation of a plane into contiguous regions, producing a figure called a map, no more than four colors are required to color the regions of the map so that no two adjacent regions have the same color. Two regions are called adjacent only if they share a border segment, not just a point".

The controversy, such that it is, involves the validity of computer-aided proofs.

In any case, I stand by my claim: wholly logical statements, and derivations thereof, are known to 100% accuracy. Your objection, it seems, is to the validity of computer-aided proofs, not the epistemological nature of proofs themselves.

 

[LordTimothytheWise]

Yea, it's pretty widely rejected across all camps. Some famous philosopher (Hume? Kant?) said that it's pretty obviously false, it's just a headache trying to pin down precisely why it's false

I think it was Bertrand Russel.

"The argument does not, to a modern mind, seem very convincing, but it is easier to feel convinced that it must be fallacious than it is to find out precisely where the fallacy lies."

To me, that sounds like a dismissal. I can see the ontological argument being logically valid, but not convincing.

I wouldn't accept the existence of God on the basis of this argument, but it strengthens what I believe to be an already strong case that can made through induction.

Anyway, I'm curious, what your opinion of Plantinga's "victorious ontological argument" is.

 

[Wiccan_Child]

To me, that sounds like a dismissal. I can see the ontological argument being logically valid, but not convincing.

If it's logically valid (and sound, of course), then is that not the most convincing thing you will ever see?

I wouldn't accept the existence of God on the basis of this argument, but it strengthens what I believe to be an already strong case that can made through induction.

But if the argument is wrong, as most people seem to think, what we 'feel' is irrelevant. Likewise, no matter how strongly we may 'feel' it is false, it might still be true.

Anyway, I'm curious, what your opinion of Plantinga's "victorious ontological argument" is.

It appears to be an unsound, and possible invalid, argument. I found this summary of the argument:

Maximal excellence: To have omnipotence, omniscience and moral perfection in some world.
Maximal greatness: To have maximal excellence in every possible world.
1. There is a possible world (W) in which there is a being (X) with maximal greatness.
2. But X is maximally great only if X has maximal excellence in every possible world.
3. Therefore X is maximally great only if X has omnipotence, omniscience and moral perfection in every possible world.
4. In W, the proposition "There is no omnipotent, omniscient, morally perfect being" would be impossible—that is, necessarily false.
5. But what is impossible does not vary from world to world.
6. Therefore, the proposition, "There is no omnipotent, omniscient, morally perfect being" is necessarily false in this actual world, too.
7. Therefore, there actually exists in this world, and must exist in every possible world, an omnipotent, omniscient, morally perfect being.


The initial premise is simply assumed right off the bat. What if there isn't a possible world in which there is a maximally great being? The argument ends up defining God to exist. Moreover, you could equally define 'maximal excellence' as 'omnipotent, omniscient, and morally corrupt', thereby proving the existence of an all-powerful evil deity as well - and I don't think Plantinga would concede to that.


Indeed, you could define anything into existence, simply by changing the arbitrary definition of 'maximal excellence'. As the article states, it's an exercise in modal logic, nothing more.

 

[ToHoldNothing]

With the ontological argument being, for all I can tell at the moment, the only a priori argument for God's existence, every other argument being contingent on our observations of things after the fact, makes the argument compelling moreso in its category than necessarily whether it is in its original form a compelling argument. It's gone through different formulations anyway, such as Descartes and Plantinga's of course that has been explained previously.

But if anything, the ontological argument doesn't even have to be criticized on the grounds of the problem of existence as a predicate or even the problem of tautology that exists in how the argument is structured to only apply to God and not anything else contingent as opposed to necessary.

The biggest problem I consistently seem to observe is how can we agree on what is "that which nothing greater can be thought"? We have qualifications by theists about God's omniscience, omnipresence, omnipotence and benevolence,not to mention God's mercy and justice, Anselm qualifying one as innate in God and the other innate in God's relation to humanity, I don't recall at the moment which is why, but I think justice is the former, mercy the latter.

With the difficulty of even defining "God", Anselm's dodging of a theological noncognitivist's question only presents a similar problem because not everyone has the same conception of excellence and what necessitates it.

 

[Wiccan_Child]

The biggest problem I consistently seem to observe is how can we agree on what is "that which nothing greater can be thought"? We have qualifications by theists about God's omniscience, omnipresence, omnipotence and benevolence,not to mention God's mercy and justice, Anselm qualifying one as innate in God and the other innate in God's relation to humanity, I don't recall at the moment which is why, but I think justice is the former, mercy the latter.

I once made a thread about how God can't be both perfectly just and perfectly merciful: to be just, you must punish others as they are due. To be merciful, you must not punish others.

With the difficulty of even defining "God", Anselm's dodging of a theological noncognitivist's question only presents a similar problem because not everyone has the same conception of excellence and what necessitates it.

I think the argument does quite well in defining God: God is that which no greater being can be conceived. True, it's a flawed definition, but it's quite good nonetheless, imo.

 

[bling]

I once made a thread about how God can't be both perfectly just and perfectly merciful: to be just, you must punish others as they are due. To be merciful, you must not punish others.
, imo.

I did not see that tread, but have spent hours explaining atonement and how God is both “just”, “fair” and “merciful”.
I think I could add a different perspective to this, but it is a long discussion.

 

[solarwave]

I once made a thread about how God can't be both perfectly just and perfectly merciful: to be just, you must punish others as they are due. To be merciful, you must not punish others.

Maybe we have a flawed view of justice, which can sound much like revenge. Maybe justice is making things right and bringing the world from evil to good. If that is the case then making bad people good could be seen as more just because it increases goodness in the world and doesn't involve yet more pain inflicted in reality.

Just a suggestion

 

[Wiccan_Child]

Maybe we have a flawed view of justice, which can sound much like revenge. Maybe justice is making things right and bringing the world from evil to good. If that is the case then making bad people good could be seen as more just because it increases goodness in the world and doesn't involve yet more pain inflicted in reality.

Just a suggestion

Well, that boils down to 'what is justice?'. Justice could be defined as making the world a better place, but we already have an adjective for that: 'good'. I am good if I make the world a better place, but I am just if I give people their due. At the end of the day, the authors of the Bible meant something when they wrote "God is Just", and I don't think they meant "God is trying his gosh-darn hardest to embetter the world", not least because, y'know, he isn't

 

[ToHoldNothing]

I don't see how the conclusion found in point #4 is derived from the previous 3 points. It seems like a jump to a conclusion not based on the evidence provided. God, at this point in time, cannot be logically proven to everyone. It's personal realizations of not only God, but the probability of God working in my life that has brought me to Him.

In this context, you seem to be arguing based on observations of events and such after the fact. Your proof of/belief in God is based on an a posteriori observation,not an a priori consideration of God's nature, which honestly seems unlikely to convert but a few skeptics.

 

[solarwave]

Well, that boils down to 'what is justice?'. Justice could be defined as making the world a better place, but we already have an adjective for that: 'good'. I am good if I make the world a better place, but I am just if I give people their due. At the end of the day, the authors of the Bible meant something when they wrote "God is Just", and I don't think they meant "God is trying his gosh-darn hardest to embetter the world", not least because, y'know, he isn't

I was talking more about making the wrong right after death by mercy for sinners rather than punishing sinners. But still you make a good point.

 

[Key]

Does any Christian believe the Ontological argument? Has any current theist ever converted due to the Ontological argument?

(For those who don't know, the ontological argument tries to prove the existence of God in four steps:

1. God is a perfect being; whatever property he has, it is maximal. His justice is maximal, his benevolence is maximal, etc.
2. Existence is a property, whose maximum is the state of existing.
3. Therefore, God's property of existence is maximal.
4. Therefore, God exists.)

Everyone converts or de-converts for purely emotional motives. There are no exceptions to this rule.

God Bless

 

[ToHoldNothing]

Don't you mean primarily emotional? I would extend it to compulsion of a sort. Any logical argumentation would be argued to be secondary to the emotional compulsion brought forward by religious experiences.

 

[Chesterton]

Don't you mean primarily emotional? I would extend it to compulsion of a sort. Any logical argumentation would be argued to be secondary to the emotional compulsion brought forward by religious experiences.

But the same applies to irreligious experiences.

 

[ToHoldNothing]

We aren't necessarily compelled by emotion though in terms of performing what would be secular activities, since they are compelled by necessity as opposed to desires. This would involve a whole other thread honestly to discuss this sort of thing. There are those, for example, that claim that atheists are just going through a phase, or at the least that their nonbelief can be explained logically or through some quality of their age, whatever it may be.

 

[Wiccan_Child]

Everyone converts or de-converts for purely emotional motives. There are no exceptions to this rule.

God Bless

Really? Because I deconverted for reasons that were not purely emotional, and I would gladly reconvert for any coherent argument demonstrate God's (at least probable) existence.

 

[Key]

Don't you mean primarily emotional? I would extend it to compulsion of a sort. Any logical argumentation would be argued to be secondary to the emotional compulsion brought forward by religious experiences.

Correction: all world views and outlooks (Religious and Irreligious), as well as the acceptance of any accompanying "dogma" are also the product of emotional decision making.

Just to clear that up for you.

God Bless

 

[Key]

Really? Because I deconverted for reasons that were not purely emotional, and I would gladly reconvert for any coherent argument demonstrate God's (at least probable) existence.

Ok. I don't mean to be rude, but I have heard this line (rephrased) more times then I care to admit, -or any mortal person should suffer though- so, in lieu of what might pass as a Christian trying in some vain attempt to convert you, I shall respond as life has taught me I need to respond and that sadly is in a bitter critical manner.

So. In counter to what you have said above my response is:

"Oh Really? Well, Prove it."

God Bless

 

[ToHoldNothing]

I think we could meet a middle ground with the notion I qualified that our reasons for conversion are primarily by compulsion of some sort, emotional or rational. To say we completely and purely choose our beliefs is to deny the involvement of inborn psychological traits and external environmental influence.

No one could be said to make purely emotional decisions without some degree of reason behind them, even if it is purely solipsistic logic (I experience it, therefore it must be true), there is still a logical progression in the mind.

So to reach a middle ground, one could argue that perhaps people are not compelled solely by their emotions, nor are they totally able to say that they believe simply because of logical consistency, but personal coherence also takes a part within why one chooses to believe or not believe in God, or in my case, only concern myself with how the concept is formed in various contexts and not whether God exists in any real sense beyond conception, but that's a topic I could start eventually

 

[Key]

No one could be said to make purely emotional decisions without some degree of reason behind them, even if it is purely solipsistic logic (I experience it, therefore it must be true), there is still a logical progression in the mind.

The emotion is the reason.

So to reach a middle ground, one could argue that perhaps people are not compelled solely by their emotions

That is a lovely illusion. But that is like taking a magician's tick as real.

God Bless