The Myth of Morality

[WorldIsMine]

The following are a couple of excerpts from "The Myth of Morality" by Richard Joyce. They illustrate some of the primary problems with ethical and moral arguments, not merely individually but in total. It is my view, and that of the book's author, that moral statements are non-cognitive, meaningless. This view, presented along consistent and building lines at least as far back as Socrates, is nonetheless unpopular and almost totally ignored despite the vast import they have on the entire concept of 'morality'.
...
This book attempts to accomplish two tasks. The first part of the book
examines moral discourse with a critical eye, and finds the discourse fundamentally
flawed. Just what it means for a discourse to be “flawed” will
need to be carefully discussed. For the moment, it will do to compare
the situation with that of phlogiston discourse. Through the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries, the dominant theory for explaining a variety of
phenomena – most notably combustion – was to posit a kind of invisible
substance in the world: phlogiston. The theory allowed for various
chemists, such as Stahl and Priestley, to employ what might be called
“phlogiston discourse” – they asserted things like “Phlogiston is lighter
than air,” “Soot is made up largely of phlogiston,” etc. In the eighteenth
century Lavoisier showed that this discourse was utterly mistaken: there
simply was no such stuff as phlogiston. I wish to argue that our moral discourse
is mistaken in an analogous way. We assert things like “Generally
speaking, you mustn’t tell lies” and “Cloning humans is a terrible thing
and mustn’t be permitted,” and these assertions fail to be true. They fail
to be true not because lying or cloning are really okay, but because they
employ predicates like “. . . is forbidden” and “. . . is morally good” which
are (in senses to be explored) vacuous. Roughly, when one reflects carefully
on what it would take for an action to instantiate a property like being
morally forbidden, one sees that too much is being asked of the world – there
is simply nothing that is forbidden in the specifically moral sense of the
word. The thought that morality is a fiction in this way is hardly an original
thought, enjoying a long history that can be traced back through Camus,
Wittgenstein, Russell, Nietzsche, Hume, Mandeville, Hobbes, and all the
way to Antiphon and characters like Callicles and Thrasymachus.

Many pieces of our moral vocabulary, of course, have non-moral uses
(moving one’s rook diagonally in chess is forbidden); this non-moral language
is not under attack. A further part of the project will be to argue
that the obvious response of simply “asking less of the world” – that is, of
defining or redefining our moral language in such a way that it matches
the “unproblematic” evaluative language – is to strip the discourse of its
very purpose. The whole point of a moral discourse is to evaluate actions
and persons with a particular force, and it is exactly this notion of force
which turns out to be so deeply troublesome. To push the analogy: if
Lavoisier’s concept oxygen is theoretically successful, then why could we
not redefine “phlogiston” so that it means the same thing as “oxygen,”
thus rescuing phlogiston discourse from its error? The answer is that when
Stahl, etc., asserted things like “Phlogiston plays a central role in calcification,”
he meant something quite specific by “phlogiston” – the whole
point of talking about phlogiston was to make reference to a substance
that is released during combustion. To use the word “phlogiston” to refer
to oxygen – a substance that is consumed during combustion – is to undermine
the very heart of phlogiston discourse. Likewise, to use the words
“morally forbidden” to refer to an “unproblematic” notion of impermissibility
– perhaps one with the same logic as “You mustn’t move your rook
diagonally,” or “You ought not stay up so late” – is to undermine the very
heart of moral discourse.

...
If there are reasons for action, it must be that people sometimes act for those
reasons, and if they do, their reasons must figure in some correct explanation of
their action . . .

In other words, something is a reason only if its consideration could
potentially motivate the agent...This point dovetails with my earlier claim
that an adequate account of practical rationality must not leave an agent
alienated from her reasons. If a normative reason could not potentially
motivate an agent, then, if presented with such a reason, an agent could
say “Yes, I accept that is a normative reason for me, but so what?” – and
this, I have urged, is unacceptable.

....

In short, when we say that a person morally ought to act in a certain
manner, we imply something about what she would have reason to do
regardless of her desires and interests, regardless of whether she cares about
her victim, and regardless of whether she can be sure of avoiding any
penalties. And yet after careful investigation we have found no defensible
grounds for thinking that such reasons exist. Few people in the actual
world may be so heartless or so impregnable to recrimination, but that
is beside the point. Moral judgments are untrue not just because they
sometimes ascribe reasons for (say) honesty to people who have no such
reasons. They are untrue even when they ascribe reasons for honesty to
people who do have reasons for being honest, in that they imply that those
reasons would remain in place across counterfactual situations when in fact
they would not. The distinctive authoritativeness which characterizes our
moral discourse turns out to be well-entrenched bluff.

 

[cantata]

You certainly cannot persuade anyone to do anything except by appeal to their existing motivations. To convince someone not to kill someone else, you may present any number of reasons (you will be caught and punished; you will feel guilty; you will cause suffering; &c.), but none of these will be convincing unless the person you are trying to persuade can be shown that the consequences of his or her actions will directly or indirectly thwart some motive, principle, or desire that, for whatever reason, they happen to hold. I will see no reason not to kill people if I do not fear capture, am not likely to feel any guilt about it, and don't feel compelled to avoid any of the other possible consequences of my act. I cannot be reasoned out of this position, unless, as I said, you can appeal to a desire or motivation I already have.

"To be moral" is a desire or motivation that many people have, or think they have. But in fact, "to be moral" is more of a blanket term for a lot of motivations: to function in society, to enjoy others' respect and affection, to avoid the wrath of a vengeful god, to avoid seeing those about whom we care harmed in any way; not to feel guilt, not to be shunned or vilified. You will notice that all of these motivations are selfish. Indeed, all motivations are ultimately self-centred. It is impossible, I believe, to formulate a motivation which is not self-serving. And without motivations, we would not behave at all - least of all "morally".

For many, the inherent selfishness of all of these motivations can only be dealt with if a fantasy of altruism is in place. That's what moral language is for. It's also for calling on other people's desire to avoid feelings of guilt, in order to persuade them to do things. Moral language is not meaningless; it's just dishonest.

 

[WorldIsMine]

Moral language is not meaningless; it's just dishonest.

It is literally meaningless, but presented as literally true. A morality which did not claim to make claims on your actions would not be 'moral' in any meaningful sense. The point is that the fantasy-umbrella that gets placed over these different motivations and ideas/associations is literally non-sensical and thus everything subsumed under it loses all of the compelling force. That argument of 'truth' is why people obey it, why they are so concerned with it, and why they want to control it. The fact that people actually obey for other reasons is a forgone conclusion, since the core concept is nonsensical.

 

[cantata]

It is literally meaningless, but presented as literally true.

Can you explain how you're defining "meaningless"?

For example, are metaphors meaningless? What about metaphors that people have forgotten are metaphors? (Much of our everyday language is metaphorical.)

A morality which did not claim to make claims on your actions would not be 'moral' in any meaningful sense. The point is that the fantasy-umbrella that gets placed over these different motivations and ideas/associations is literally non-sensical and thus everything subsumed under it loses all of the compelling force. That argument of 'truth' is why people obey it, why they are so concerned with it, and why they want to control it. The fact that people actually obey for other reasons is a forgone conclusion, since the core concept is nonsensical.

Well, yes, we don't disagree. I'm not claiming that moral claims are or can be literally, factually correct. But "false" and "meaningless" are not the same thing. Here's a meaningless utterance:

"Books Iceland marries concurrent ocelot denied if."

It's literally non-sense. It is grammatically incoherent and conveys nothing except that I can't speak English very well.

But when someone says "Killing is wrong," they're usually (and falsely) attempting to convey some truth about reality: that there is an inherent quality of not-to-be-done-ness in the act of killing. I agree that this is ridiculous; the notion of inherent not-to-be-done-ness is so silly that I am totally unable to make sense of what it might really mean. So I agree: their claim is patently false. But I do not think it is meaningless. The speaker knows what they mean. They mean that there is, the universe, something that makes killing inherently not-to-be-done. They're wrong, but they're not speaking nonsense.

If I came to you, nursing swollen fingers, and said, "That log just bit me!" I'd certainly be making a false claim. Logs don't bite people. But my telling you that a log did bite me is not meaningless. It contains all sorts of meaning. Firstly, there is my belief, albeit false, that the log bit me. Secondly, there is the information that I am, for some reason, in pain. The source of my pain would seem to be a log. On closer inspection, the scorpion hidden under the bark would appear to be the cause of my discomfort. But my false claim was not meaningless because it was false.

I suppose you would say that the difference is that the notion of morality is inherently silly and nonsensical, yes? So the language of morality must be nonsensical. But I'm really not sure; I think that valuable and important meaning can be gleaned from moral language, however incoherent the underlying assumptions. Someone who says that killing is wrong may be mistaken about the nature of the universe, but she is nevertheless expressing her dislike of killing. In the same way that "Yuck!" is not a meaningless utterance, nor is "Killing is wrong!"

 

[acropolis]

Ignorant moralist checking in with some questions:

Why do amoralists insist on contradicting themselves by implying that someone is wrong for being a moralist?

What is 'meaning' to an amoralist?

How would a completely amoral society function?

Is the truth that morals do not exist a trans-historic truth?

 

[acropolis]

But when someone says "Killing is wrong," they're usually (and falsely) attempting to convey some truth about reality: that there is an inherent quality of not-to-be-done-ness in the act of killing. I agree that this is ridiculous; the notion of inherent not-to-be-done-ness is so silly that I am totally unable to make sense of what it might really mean.

What is the basis for a true statement about reality? I'm not trying to be obnoxious, I'm just curious. As I understand you, the same principles that make morals untrue make every abstract notion untrue as well (no inherent quality, no physicality), which makes anything constructed with language untrue, which then destroys the use and meaning of the true/untrue dichotomy, which sucks all the meaning out of everything. Which seems like a difficult thing to believe.

 

[quatona]

Ignorant moralist checking in with some questions:

Why do amoralists insist on contradicting themselves by implying that someone is wrong for being a moralist?

Since "being wrong (mistaken/ in error)" and "being immoral" are different concepts there is no such contradiction, in the first place.

What is 'meaning' to an amoralist?

I wouldn´t call myself an "amoralist" exactly (I´m not even sure I understand what you mean by this term), but I fail to see how my views on morality would have any bearing on my notion on "meaning": Meaning is when something means something to someone.

How would a completely amoral society function?

Please explain what a "completely amoral society" is.
What are the particular problems with its functioning, in your opinion?

Is the truth that morals do not exist a trans-historic truth?

I´m afraid I fail to understand the question.

 

[acropolis]

Since "being wrong (mistaken/ in error)" and "being immoral" are different concepts there is no such contradiction, in the first place.

They make statements about what I ought to do, how is that not moralizing?

I wouldn´t call myself an "amoralist" exactly (I´m not even sure I understand what you mean by this term), but I fail to see how my views on morality would have any bearing on my notion on "meaning": Meaning is when something means something to someone.

I don't think amoralists exist for any useful definition of morals, but I think what the OP is saying is that an amoralist does not believe there is any 'ought' to human action. At least that's what the negation of moralist is, using the common use of the term 'moralist'.

Please explain what a "completely amoral society" is.
What are the particular problems with its functioning, in your opinion?

A society in which no one believes there are morals, no moral authority, no laws, no inherent virtue in any human behavior or thought.

I think the problem I see is that civilization is essentially built on common morality; social organization requires a common belief in what people ought to do. Amoralists could not organize under a common goal because that would require a common belief in what people ought to do. Social organization makes a society strong, which lets them destroy weaker social groups. So the unified moralists destroy the fragmented amoralists. Which makes me question the rationality of wanting everyone to be amoralists.

I´m afraid I fail to understand the question.

It's just a dumb way to ask if someone is a postmodernist or social constructionist, which gives some insight into their epistemic paradigm and changes the meaning of their language. Although those beliefs are so poorly defined that I'm sure someone will jump all over me for not 'getting' it.

 

[cantata]

What is the basis for a true statement about reality? I'm not trying to be obnoxious, I'm just curious.

A true statement is one which accurately describes reality. (Here quatona and I will differ, so beware! )

As I understand you, the same principles that make morals untrue make every abstract notion untrue as well (no inherent quality, no physicality), which makes anything constructed with language untrue, which then destroys the use and meaning of the true/untrue dichotomy, which sucks all the meaning out of everything. Which seems like a difficult thing to believe.

I don't really think I know what is meant by "mak[ing] morals untrue". I believe that moral language, taken literally, doesn't refer to anything in the world. If you say, "Killing is wrong," I might glean from your remark that you disapprove of killing, that you would prefer me not to kill, that you probably wouldn't kill anyone yourself, that you value life, &c., but what I do not glean from your remark is any factual information about killing itself (which seems to be what you actually want to tell me). You say that killing has this quality of wrongness. Can you describe how killing would be different if it didn't have that quality? Or what it is about an act that can be observed to determine whether or not it is wrong? I need more information about this quality of "wrongness". As far as I can see, it's a quality of not-to-be-done-ness, but that doesn't help much - why is it not to be done, and what happens if I do it anyway?

Other abstract concepts are, by comparison, easy to deal with. For example, I could quite sensibly say "That act of killing was sadistic," because we have a working definition of sadism that doesn't contain any weirdness at all: a sadistic act is one where the perpetrator delights in the suffering of her victim, say. And we can test that claim by finding out if the perpetrator did indeed enjoy causing pain. Now, you may think that the word "sadistic" is also pejorative or moralistic (i.e. it suggests that, in addition to sadism being the enjoyment of causing pain, you also shouldn't be sadistic), and I would tentatively agree with you - people do tend to use words like "cruel" or "kind" with moral overtones. But nevertheless, I think it's possible to call an act "kind" without moral overtones, because again we can describe the actual conditions necessary to accurately call an act kind.

But no such luck with moral language. Of course, if you just want to define "right" as kind, loving, gentle, affectionate, considerate, friendly, honest &c., and "wrong" as cruel, unhelpful, hateful, unloving, inconsiderate, hostile, dishonest &c., then you don't have a problem. But the thing is, I don't think these are adequate definitions of what people mean when they say "right" or "wrong". I think it's perfectly possible that you could say "Handing out free condoms is kind," and someone would then ask, "But is it right?" And if you believe in objective morality, that probably doesn't seem like a silly question to you. But to me it does seem silly, because I understand what "kind" means, but I don't understand what "right" means.

 

[quatona]

They make statements about what I ought to do, how is that not moralizing?

Apart from the fact that discussing the accuracy of a concept and telling someone what they ought to do are still two completely diffferent approaches (or else mathematics would be a moral issue) it seems to me that the difference the author sees between telling someone what they ought to do and the idea of a morality existing is exhaustively explained in the OP.

I don't think amoralists exist for any useful definition of morals, but I think what the OP is saying is that an amoralist does not believe there is any 'ought' to human action. At least that's what the negation of moralist is, using the common use of the term 'moralist'.

Since you seem to be determined to even consider the discussion about the accurarcy of a claim a moral issue your notion that "amoralists don´t exist for any useful definition of morals" does not come as a surprise. It´s based in your (extremely broad) definition of "moral".

A society in which no one believes there are morals, no moral authority, no laws, no inherent virtue in any human behavior or thought.

I see - with one exception, though: I don´t seem to understand what laws (even less the belief or non-belief that there are laws) have to do with morality. I do believe that my society has laws (these laws are documented, after all), but I fail to see how that necessitates me to accept the idea that there is a morality or (if I´d accept the idea that there is such a thing as morality) that those laws are necessarily moral.

But back to your question "How would such a society function?"
I don´t see any problem with it functioning just the same way I think society functions anyways: Social behaviour (as well as the agreement on rules and laws, even though they may be arbitrary) is in everyone´s best own interest.

I think the problem I see is that civilization is essentially built on common morality; social organization requires a common belief in what people ought to do.

I think that society is built upon agreements.
The difference between agreements (and the resulting rules and laws) and morality becomes obvious at the point where the moralist faces the question whether a certain set of agreements/laws/rules is moral or not.
I hate to invoke Godwin´s law, but as it happens, the Nuremberg trials and the Eichmann defense are illustrating this problem quite well.

Amoralists could not organize under a common goal because that would require a common belief in what people ought to do.

You keep equating morality and agreements/laws/rules. When entering the badminton court I accept the rules - without thinking that they reflect a morality. I accept them for a completely pragmatic purpose: The game wouldn´t work without rules. About two years ago the badminton rules were changed pretty drastically - if you consider that a change in (my/society´s/the badminton community´s) morality be my guest - but that would mean we have a communication problem. This is certainly not what the OP article means when saying "morality".

Social organization makes a society strong, which lets them destroy weaker social groups.

So your idea of morality is ultimately "might makes right"?

So the unified moralists destroy the fragmented amoralists.

Would that be moral behaviour?
Btw. your description doens´t match my experiences (let alone that an argument from consequences is a logical fallacy, anyways). I disagree with a lot of laws and rules in my society, yet I don´t find myself destroyed by the "unified moralists" (which, of course, aren´t as unified as you would us believe here). Rather, I find myself in good company of other persons who value agreed upon rules and laws (yes: for the sole purpose of a functioning society which they are aware is in their own best interest), no matter whether they agree with each of those rules and laws or even consider them to be "morality".

Which makes me question the rationality of wanting everyone to be amoralists.

Your question would have merits if all moralists were unified in the same idea of what is moral. This is not the case. They are just as fragmented as amoralists are - with the only difference that they use the term "morality" for their ideas.

It's just a dumb way to ask if someone is a postmodernist or social constructionist, which gives some insight into their epistemic paradigm and changes the meaning of their language. Although those beliefs are so poorly defined that I'm sure someone will jump all over me for not 'getting' it.

Well, if you yourself introduce poorly defined terms for an explanation of your question I don´t see how you can possibly expect a clarifying answer.
If you can tell me what you mean by "postmodernist" and "social constructivist" I might possibly be able to label myself by using these terms. Else you may want to go without labels and simply consider the things I say.

 

[acropolis]

A true statement is one which accurately describes reality. (Here quatona and I will differ, so beware! )

I don't really think I know what is meant by "mak[ing] morals untrue". I believe that moral language, taken literally, doesn't refer to anything in the world. If you say, "Killing is wrong," I might glean from your remark that you disapprove of killing, that you would prefer me not to kill, that you probably wouldn't kill anyone yourself, that you value life, &c., but what I do not glean from your remark is any factual information about killing itself (which seems to be what you actually want to tell me). You say that killing has this quality of wrongness. Can you describe how killing would be different if it didn't have that quality? Or what it is about an act that can be observed to determine whether or not it is wrong? I need more information about this quality of "wrongness". As far as I can see, it's a quality of not-to-be-done-ness, but that doesn't help much - why is it not to be done, and what happens if I do it anyway?

Other abstract concepts are, by comparison, easy to deal with. For example, I could quite sensibly say "That act of killing was sadistic," because we have a working definition of sadism that doesn't contain any weirdness at all: a sadistic act is one where the perpetrator delights in the suffering of her victim, say. And we can test that claim by finding out if the perpetrator did indeed enjoy causing pain. Now, you may think that the word "sadistic" is also pejorative or moralistic (i.e. it suggests that, in addition to sadism being the enjoyment of causing pain, you also shouldn't be sadistic), and I would tentatively agree with you - people do tend to use words like "cruel" or "kind" with moral overtones. But nevertheless, I think it's possible to call an act "kind" without moral overtones, because again we can describe the actual conditions necessary to accurately call an act kind.

But no such luck with moral language. Of course, if you just want to define "right" as kind, loving, gentle, affectionate, considerate, friendly, honest &c., and "wrong" as cruel, unhelpful, hateful, unloving, inconsiderate, hostile, dishonest &c., then you don't have a problem. But the thing is, I don't think these are adequate definitions of what people mean when they say "right" or "wrong". I think it's perfectly possible that you could say "Handing out free condoms is kind," and someone would then ask, "But is it right?" And if you believe in objective morality, that probably doesn't seem like a silly question to you. But to me it does seem silly, because I understand what "kind" means, but I don't understand what "right" means.

Bleh, I can't get any further playing devil's advocate. I think we're just an accidental ego strapped to an organic pain collector racing towards oblivion. We're preprogrammed with certain behavior sets which react with our physical context blah blah blah I don't actually think morals exist, nor is there any inherently worthwhile function for humanity to justify any particular set of rules. But I'm programmed to not want to hurt people who care about me, so it's too painful to self-eliminate just yet. Should those people die off, I'll promptly exit this miserable exercise.

But like I moped about on this forum a few months ago, I very much want to believe in a higher purpose for humanity, so I play pretend sometimes.

IF morals were to exist, they must be created by a being that created our reality. There's nothing observable to indicate beings on a higher order of organization than humans, but it would be a tragedy if humanity was the best all of creation had to offer. Tragic beyond all comprehension. This creator isn't supernatural, just on a higher order of natural that is on such a vastly different scale than ours that we cannot recognize it. And if this creator has a purpose for his creation, and that purpose, for some odd reason, includes human behavior, then that is where morals live. Our minds, or souls or whatever, are like dogs being bred for a purpose: that purpose means nothing to the dogs, they cannot see it nor interact with it, but it becomes real once they either pass or fail the behavior test. Within their doggy reality there is no thought that could capture the purpose for their lives, their minds simply do not handle those kinds of symbols. And since I'm playing pretend, the behavior test would include not killing folk just because you can get away with it. I feel as though something like that could conceivably be true and fit the bill for morality.

I guess the only thing I really disagree with what you wrote is that morality could have a meaning and existence, even though it probably doesn't. Unless morality has been killed off by the same definitional divide that complicates any discussion of the supernatural: since humans only interact with the natural world by definition, there can be no supernatural interaction with humans. In which case I need find another word to redefine as a natural analog to morality so that it can be included within the realm of possibility.

Apart from the fact that discussing the accuracy of a concept and telling someone what they ought to do are still two completely diffferent approaches (or else mathematics would be a moral issue) it seems to me that the difference the author sees between telling someone what they ought to do and the idea of a morality existing is exhaustively explained in the OP.

Since you seem to be determined to even consider the discussion about the accurarcy of a claim a moral issue your notion that "amoralists don´t exist for any useful definition of morals" does not come as a surprise. It´s based in your (extremely broad) definition of "moral".

I see - with one exception, though: I don´t seem to understand what laws (even less the belief or non-belief that there are laws) have to do with morality. I do believe that my society has laws (these laws are documented, after all), but I fail to see how that necessitates me to accept the idea that there is a morality or (if I´d accept the idea that there is such a thing as morality) that those laws are necessarily moral.

But back to your question "How would such a society function?"
I don´t see any problem with it functioning just the same way I think society functions anyways: Social behaviour (as well as the agreement on rules and laws, even though they may be arbitrary) is in everyone´s best own interest.

I think that society is built upon agreements.
The difference between agreements (and the resulting rules and laws) and morality becomes obvious at the point where the moralist faces the question whether a certain set of agreements/laws/rules is moral or not.
I hate to invoke Godwin´s law, but as it happens, the Nuremberg trials and the Eichmann defense are illustrating this problem quite well.

You keep equating morality and agreements/laws/rules. When entering the badminton court I accept the rules - without thinking that they reflect a morality. I accept them for a completely pragmatic purpose: The game wouldn´t work without rules. About two years ago the badminton rules were changed pretty drastically - if you consider that a change in (my/society´s/the badminton community´s) morality be my guest - but that would mean we have a communication problem. This is certainly not what the OP article means when saying "morality".

Looks like the problem is just my broad definition of morality. Behaviors are already wired into the human animal, they can be distinct from morality. Though I still find it odd that people only looking out for number one would bother preaching their beliefs to anyone. More rational to game the system rather than oppose it. And I still think amoralists behave so similarly to moralists that the functional distinction is near-useless.

So your idea of morality is ultimately "might makes right"?

Well, does it make any sense to say a society is wrong if the only people who could have disagreed no longer exist?

Would that be moral behaviour?
Btw. your description doens´t match my experiences (let alone that an argument from consequences is a logical fallacy, anyways). I disagree with a lot of laws and rules in my society, yet I don´t find myself destroyed by the "unified moralists" (which, of course, aren´t as unified as you would us believe here). Rather, I find myself in good company of other persons who value agreed upon rules and laws (yes: for the sole purpose of a functioning society which they are aware is in their own best interest), no matter whether they agree with each of those rules and laws or even consider them to be "morality".

The chaos would only happen on the societal scale, but all of that is moot since it was just a problem of incorrect definitions. If life is WYSIWYG, then it's impossible to get wrong, which would be nice. I already act as if this were truth, as much as my mind dislikes it: it is best, in the absence of morals, to appear to be good but actually be very bad. It's all about maintaining a reputation for being trustworthy, but cheating at every possible turn.

Your question would have merits if all moralists were unified in the same idea of what is moral. This is not the case. They are just as fragmented as amoralists are - with the only difference that they use the term "morality" for their ideas.

The important part is that they are united at all. And irrationally so; I can't imagine anyone volunteering for a war based on self-interest.

Well, if you yourself introduce poorly defined terms for an explanation of your question I don´t see how you can possibly expect a clarifying answer.
If you can tell me what you mean by "postmodernist" and "social constructivist" I might possibly be able to label myself by using these terms. Else you may want to go without labels and simply consider the things I say.

I don't care about labels, just the beliefs those labels are tied to. If you believe truth is merely a function of history, then we are on such a different epistemic plane that constructive debate is not possible, so I thought I'd ask.

 

[cantata]

I can't imagine anyone volunteering for a war based on self-interest.

Self-interest is the only reason anyone does anything.

However, people's perception of what is in their own best interests may be misguided.

 

[quatona]

Looks like the problem is just my broad definition of morality.

Not really. The problem in this discussion is that your definition of morality doesn´t seem to be congruent with the definition of the morality that the OP is based upon. Thus, although using the same word, you are not addressing the OP but instead talk about something else.

I must admit, though, that I am not sure entirely sure myself that I understand the OP. It seems to be an excerpt from a book, and some necessary steps and explanations seem to have gotten lost in the summary.

That said, if you consider morality to be in existence whenever someone makes a "should"-claim or a claim that can with a bit of effort be reworded into a "should"-claim or can be understood to have some sort of "should"-implication - then, yes, all sorts of moralities are all around us.
I just sense that this is not the topic of this thread.

Behaviors are already wired into the human animal, they can be distinct from morality.

Well, it might be a good idea to give your definition of "morality". So far I am just trying to do my best to guess from the context.

Though I still find it odd that people only looking out for number one would bother preaching their beliefs to anyone.

Sorry, I don´t understand this sentence. Can you reword it for me, please?
More rational to game the system rather than oppose it. And I still think amoralists behave so similarly to moralists that the functional distinction is near-useless. [/quote]
Sure it is practically useless. People have their ideas as to what´s desirable and undesirable, and they either agree or they don´t. And that´s that.

Well, does it make any sense to say a society is wrong if the only people who could have disagreed no longer exist?

I don´t know that it makes any sense at all to say that a society is wrong, but I see that happening all the time.
I´m not sure, though, where you pull the idea that disagreement necessarily results in being killed.

The chaos would only happen on the societal scale, but all of that is moot since it was just a problem of incorrect definitions. If life is WYSIWYG, then it's impossible to get wrong, which would be nice.

I never am sure whether you mean "factually wrong" or "morally wrong" when you say "wrong". I find that confusing.

I already act as if this were truth, as much as my mind dislikes it: it is best, in the absence of morals, to appear to be good but actually be very bad. It's all about maintaining a reputation for being trustworthy, but cheating at every possible turn.

I guess that pretty much depends on your goals and desires. Something here tells me that they are very different from mine.
On a side-note, given your own broad definition of "morality" you are making a moral claim here: you are saying what one "should" do. That´s exactly the reason why this definition seems to be pretty much useless, to me: it includes pretty much every statement that can be made.

The important part is that they are united at all. And irrationally so; I can't imagine anyone volunteering for a war based on self-interest.

And what, praytell, can you imagine to be the basis for going to slaughter persons just because they belong to a different nation - if not self-interest?

I don't care about labels, just the beliefs those labels are tied to. If you believe truth is merely a function of history, then we are on such a different epistemic plane that constructive debate is not possible, so I thought I'd ask.

I don´t subscribe to the notion that "truth is just a function of history" (I suspect I don´t even understand what this is supposed to mean). Hope that helps.

 

[acropolis]

Self-interest is the only reason anyone does anything.

However, people's perception of what is in their own best interests may be misguided.

But it doesn't matter that they are misguided, it is of no consequence. Some people take a different path to oblivion, but the sum is the same.

EDIT: What I'm trying to say is: What makes a person's self-interest misguided? Is there an objective standard? It seems to me that it follows from this definition of self-interest that the self is the only judge, so it wouldn't make any sense to say a person can be incorrect or misguided in any way about their self-interest: if they believe they're doing it right and correct, which they must by definition, then they are doing it right and correct.

 

[quatona]

But it doesn't matter that they are misguided, it is of no consequence.

Sure it comes with consequences. Everything always and necessarily comes with the consequences it has.
Or are you actually talking about willfully inflicted punishment?

 

[acropolis]

Not really. The problem in this discussion is that your definition of morality doesn´t seem to be congruent with the definition of the morality that the OP is based upon. Thus, although using the same word, you are not addressing the OP but instead talk about something else.

I must admit, though, that I am not sure entirely sure myself that I understand the OP. It seems to be an excerpt from a book, and some necessary steps and explanations seem to have gotten lost in the summary.

That said, if you consider morality to be in existence whenever someone makes a "should"-claim or a claim that can with a bit of effort be reworded into a "should"-claim or can be understood to have some sort of "should"-implication - then, yes, all sorts of moralities are all around us.
I just sense that this is not the topic of this thread.

Yeah, I missed the mark. Whoops.

Well, it might be a good idea to give your definition of "morality". So far I am just trying to do my best to guess from the context.

Morality, as I've understand the word and it's meaning, is like summarized above: any "should"-claim on human behavior that coincides with reality. Humans create morality in this sense, but it's also conceivable that another being could substantiate morality for humans. In which case it could be possible that morality exists always and for everyone, and if any part of man exists beyond death, morality would as well. Nothing supernatural, just higher orders of nature, which would add a moral dimension to life functionally equivilent to the religious and dogmatic morality that (I think) is being attacked by the OP. That would also substantiate the requirement for moral actions to have a meaning unto themselves, from the human perspective. But I suspect life is really every bit as banal as the OP seems to believe it is.

Sorry, I don´t understand this sentence. Can you reword it for me, please?

It seems to me that if your only moral standard is your own desires, you would want everyone else to believe whatever makes them most likely to fulfil your desires. I don't believe convincing people to be egoists is the best way to do that, so it's odd when other people do reach that conclusion.

Sure it is practically useless. People have their ideas as to what´s desirable and undesirable, and they either agree or they don´t. And that´s that.

It seems like the OP is making a claim that rejecting morality is fundamentally different from accepting it, but if the behavior is the same either way, how can that claim be meaningful?

I don´t know that it makes any sense at all to say that a society is wrong, but I see that happening all the time.
I´m not sure, though, where you pull the idea that disagreement necessarily results in being killed.

I forgot to specifiy the meaning of 'wrong' again, I meant it as 'incorrect'. If I understand you correctly, an entire society could be incorrect by believing in a God, or an invisible pink unicorn, or whatever. Although cantata alluded to the fact that you don't share her corrospondence metric for truth, so I could be incorrect. If the incorrect society iced everyone who wasn't incorrect, could they still be incorrect? I suppose I'm asking if 'incorrect' is an intrinsic value, or if it's just another state created by humans. But I can't remember why I where I was going with that in the first place, so it probably doesn't really matter.

I never am sure whether you mean "factually wrong" or "morally wrong" when you say "wrong". I find that confusing.

I meant 'wrong' in both senses. If life is nothing but fulfilling our own desires, those desires require no corrospondence with reality. In the tautological sense of self-interest, which seems to be the one used in this thread, it doesn't make any sense to say a person's self-interest is incorrect, since they are the only judge of that. If the goal of life is to do whatever is in your own self-interest, and everything you do must be in your self-interest, there is no way for a person to do anything wrong in any sense.

I guess that pretty much depends on your goals and desires. Something here tells me that they are very different from mine.

No doubt.

On a side-note, given your own broad definition of "morality" you are making a moral claim here: you are saying what one "should" do. That´s exactly the reason why this definition seems to be pretty much useless, to me: it includes pretty much every statement that can be made.

I'm only making a statement about what I should do, but I guess that would qualify as making a should statement. I haven't been including should statements about one's self as moral, but if the argument is taken the logical conclusion it would count.

And what, praytell, can you imagine to be the basis for going to slaughter persons just because they belong to a different nation - if not self-interest?

If self-interest is tautological, it's the reason for everything, like has been said.

 

[cantata]

EDIT: What I'm trying to say is: What makes a person's self-interest misguided? Is there an objective standard? It seems to me that it follows from this definition of self-interest that the self is the only judge, so it wouldn't make any sense to say a person can be incorrect or misguided in any way about their self-interest: if they believe they're doing it right and correct, which they must by definition, then they are doing it right and correct.

Someone's self-interest cannot be misguided. (I never said it could.) If, however, someone's notion of how to further their self-interest is based on a false belief, they are misguided.

For example, I would be misguided if I erroneously believed that I had a disease which can only be cured by the application of puréed avocado to my ears. My ultimate desire to be free from suffering, including suffering from this particular disease, is not (cannot) be misguided. But my desire to apply puréed avocado to my ears is misguided, because it will not, in fact, further my purpose, which is to be free from suffering. This kind of error is all I mean when I talk about someone's perception of what is required in order to further their self-interest being misguided or in error.

Now, someone who believes that their god will reward them if they go to war, for example, is, in my opinion, misguided in their understanding of how they might best go about furthering their best interests. If it were true that their god would reward them for voluntarily going to war, they might indeed be acting in their own best interests. I happen to believe that they are misguided.

Another reason that someone might volunteer to go to war: they believe that the pain and fear they perceive to be involved with fighting in a war, perhaps especially when coupled with the adrenaline, camaraderie and heroism they associate with soldiering, would produce less suffering overall than the guilt and shame they would experience if they didn't volunteer. This may or may not be misguided, depending on the outcome of their actions.

I am absolutely happy to make a distinction between moral wrongness and factual wrongness. My rejection of the concepts involved with the former does not contradict my acceptance of the reality of the latter. Why would my rejection of the notion of objective morality mean that I couldn't believe that, for example, someone who wanted to bake a cake would be imprudent to go about it by throwing eggs at a leopard?

 

[stan1980]

I've seen this thread come up before albeit in different guises and it always seems pointless to me.

When someone says killing is wrong or immoral, just take it to mean "in their opinion, killing is an act that shouldn't be carried out".

If you ever hear me say something is wrong, I'm simply expressing my opinion that I think this *something* is undesirable. It is simply my opinion, which may or may not be shared with many others.

I don't really see where the debate is here.

 

[cantata]

I don't really see where the debate is here.

Some people think that rightness and wrongness are actual qualities of actions, and are independent of human opinions about them.

 

[stan1980]

Some people think that rightness and wrongness are actual qualities of actions, and are independent of human opinions about them.

I know, but you know better. Even if they think the rightness or wrongness of whatever they are talking about is independent of human opinions, you know it is really just their opinion.

For example, someone tells me "killing is wrong", I could correct them and say "in your opinion it is wrong", and they'd likely tell me "no, killing IS wrong". It's a futile exercise, me and you know it is just their opinion, even they don't. Instead of correcting them, just take it as their opinion and move on, who cares how they got there?