This is actually part of a bigger argument of free will versus determinism. Even to atheists, modern philosophers, scientists, and so on, this debate comes up all the time. It's called compatibilism, whether or not free will and determinism are compatible or not.
Determinism would mean action has its antecedent causes, physical, psychological, and so on, traceable, ultimately, back to God's omniscience. Libertarian free will means that we add something, a choice, to our actions.
The trouble comes when you think of free will as a branching path, as though you could have different outcomes from the exact same point in time. If you see it that way, then there is the big fight between determinism and libertarian free will, mirrored in the fight between Calvinism and Arminianism.
The problem is that most modern philosophers, even theistic, believe that libertarian free will is incoherent, and this dichotomy is false. Let's take it this way, if we imagine a young woman picking between two jobs, one in Boston and one in Dallas, we imagine she picks Boston for a variety of good reasons, family, money, interest, and so on. If she has reasons or determinants for her behavior, then it is hard to see how she would make a different choice in that situation unless something were different, her psychology, the situation, whatever. So we see the stronger the choice, the more determined it is. If we just say randomness occurs there to cause a random outcome, that hardly then makes the girl an agent of rational choice, but a random number generator instead.
The problem is the battle between Arminianism and Calvinism is illogical, archaic and illusory based on a primitive, non-sensical understanding of free will as incompatible with determinism. As the great Spurgeon pointed out, neither is biblical or sane, and the compatibilist solution of the Bible as a both/and solution holds.