In case there remain people in this thread interested in a respectful, adult conversation about the "are rocks conscious?" question, I quickly found this from philosopher David Chalmers. Granted, he may not believe rocks are conscious, but I suspect that is not really the key issue here. The key issue is whether 'consciousness' can be predicated of things other than humans and animals (things with brains):
Panpsychism, taken literally, is the doctrine that everything has a mind. In practice, people who
call themselves panpsychists are not committed to as strong a doctrine. They are not committed
to the thesis that the number two has a mind, or that the Eiffel tower has a mind, or that the city
of Canberra has a mind, even if they believe in the existence of numbers, towers, and cities.
Instead, we can understand panpsychism as the thesis that some fundamental physical
entities have mental states. For example, if quarks or photons have mental states, that suffices
for panpsychism to be true, even if rocks and numbers do not have mental states. Perhaps it
would not suffice for just one photon to have mental states. The line here is blurry, but we can
read the definition as requiring that all members of some fundamental physical types (all
photons, for example) have mental states.
For present purposes, the relevant sorts of mental states are conscious experiences. I will
understand panpsychism as the thesis that some fundamental physical entities are conscious: that
is, that there is something it is like to be a quark or a photon or a member of some other
fundamental physical type. This thesis is sometimes called panexperientialism, to distinguish it
from other varieties of panpsychism (varieties on which the relevant entities are required to
think or reason, for example), but I will simply call it panpsychism here.
Panpsychism is sometimes dismissed as a crazy view, but this reaction on its own is not a
serious objection. While the view is counterintuitive to some, there is good reason to think that
any view of consciousness must embrace some counterintuitive conclusions. Furthermore,
intuitions about panpsychism seem to vary heavily with culture and with historical period. The
view has a long history in both Eastern and Western philosophy, and many of the greatest
philosophers have taken it seriously. It is true that we do not have much direct evidence for
panpsychism, but we also do not have much direct evidence against it, given the difficulties of
detecting the presence or absence of consciousness in other systems. And there are indirect
reasons, of a broadly theoretical character, for taking the view seriously.