Because I most certainly assure you that the me of ten years ago tried forty times harder to be more intellectual than I am now.
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Skepticism
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That is positing no mechanism or criterion for determining when the skeptic has reached a point of believing (which isn't really out of what I was talking about on this post you quoted from). So what does that leave us with?
Nobody said it's about determining the truth, but rather than it's a matter of how to go about getting the truth, hence a method. And skepticism isn't psychological -- it's not about the person "who claims to know the truth," but about truth claims themselves.
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I disagree! You can say that but you won't be acting as a skeptic at all; you will be making a claim for faith.
Ken
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So someone is inherently overintellectualizing things when a person attempting to understand what he's saying can't make sense of it.
Or by extension when a lot of people say the same thing.
This is a long, drawn-out ad hominem. And all we have to know each other are cold characters on the Interwebs. C'mon now.
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A mechanism or criterion is not necessary to determine when a skeptic has reached the point of believing.
What is the difference between "determining the truth" and going about getting to the truth?
It is about being critical of the truth claim.
K
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So you're saying a skeptic drops his skepticism just about when he feels like it.
One is a standard or criterion, the other is a method or even a temperament -- a way in which one goes about determining what's true.
And a truth claim isn't psychological at all. It's a truth claim.
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durangodawood
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I´m willing to walk you through it.
The first thing we have to do is define "skepticism/being skeptical". Preferably in a way that doesn´t misrepresent skepticism.
Next thing we have to do is make sure we use this definition throughout the entire argument so to prevent us from false equivocation (which means that in the phrase "being skeptical towards skepticism" the word isn´t used in two different definitions).
Thirdly, we will have to take a cricitical look whether "being skeptical about skepticism" isn´t even meaningful (or, on the other hand, isn´t naturally included in skepticism anyway, so that your postulation is redundant, to begin with).
All that is necessary to make sure that imposing something upon itself isn´t just a way of semantic trickery forcing fake paradoxes.
When saying that your OP was based on a category error I was actually giving you the benefit of the doubt that you hadn´t inadvertantly committed one of the more blatant fallacies we are trying to get out of the way above: strawman fallacy (if ascribing a tenet to skepticism that it actually doesn´t hold) and false equivocation (if using the "skeptic-" in "being skeptical" and "skepticism" in different meanings in your statement).
Once we have excluded those more blatant fallacies we will get to checking out if there´s a category error: i.e. a statement is explicitly or implicitly made with a certain frame of reference (e.g. mathematics makes false-true claims within the frame of mathematics - imposing the mathematic method upon mathematics as a system itself is going to lead to nonsense. Which doesn´t prove that mathematics are nonsense - it just proves that you haven´t understood the frame of reference).
IOW: if you impose a statement made about a certain system (the frame of reference) upon itself (by means of ignoring the frame of reference, and assuming the statement must make sense even outside the frame of reference - particularly that it must make sense when being imposed on itself, although the statement isn´t included in the frame of reference), the nonsense you get as result is not induced by the statement but by your erroneous assumption that a meta-statement must make sense even when imposed on itself.
Ok. That would be the long and hard way of walking you through it. (And please note: the result may not be that you have committed a category error but an even more blatant fallacy).
So, if you wish to go this way we'll have to start with the first question:
What is the definition of "sceptic-" that you wish to apply consistently throughout this discussion?
But, OTOH, we can cut it short: you postulate that being skeptical about skepticism is what skepticism requires you to do. This creates a problem for "being skeptical about skepticism" in that it employs the very method that it questions as being a valid method.
In the end it all comes down to the very problem that´s inherent to epistemology (and which I have mentioned quite often in response to your recent attempts of trying to impose postulations upon themselves, without ever getting a response):
You can either criticize a system for being consistent (because in this case its foundational assumptions and the method are necessarily circularly affirming themselves),
or you can criticize them for being non-circular (because they are based on foundations they don´t postulate).
Bottom line:
If you create criteria that can impossibly bet met (because they inevitably either lead to the conclusion that every approach is either circular or inconsistent) , and if - on top - you are creating criteria that systemically discredit every fathomable epistemological approach whatsoever (including the one you yourself are in favour of), you are either postulating epistemological nihilism (which is ok, as long as you don´t conclude that it is somehow strengthening your own epistemological approach), or you need to double-check your logic.
Which would leave us with taking the long and hard way.
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Of course! Nobody can be skeptical 24/7 with every situation 100% of the time! If they were they would never get anything done!
I would say skeptism is neither.
Ken
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1) I don't quite understand the need for an appeal to a definition of skepticism when you've been conversing with me about skepticism, implying that you have a working definition in mind. But let's try this: skepticism means the method of holding things (all things) in suspension until sufficient evidence presents itself. I'll even throw in the infallible Wikipedia definition: "Philosophical skepticism is an overall approach that requires all information to be well supported by evidence."
2,3) "Being skeptical of skepticism" isn't an instance of using two different meanings. If skepticism is about holding things in suspension, the OP question thus asks: why don't we hold our suspension method in suspension? Or: why don't we doubt our method of doubting as well? The logic of it is perfectly fine, and if there is any twisting or stuttering in the implicit conclusion (that we should be able to suspend our suspension), this is the fault only with the premises, here being the definition of skepticism as holding all things in suspension.
But wait. Lots of people reasonably say that skepticism can't mean holding all things in suspension, but only certain things. That then opens up the problem of a line between when to suspend and not to suspend, and so far Ken has unveiled to me that this line is basically separated by feelings.
Feelings. Does that make you uneasy? It does for me, not because that's how I use skepticism (it pretty much at heart is), but it makes me uneasy toward the group of people who tend to tout skepticism as some sort of magical rational panacea to life. That they would ultimately determine what is sufficient evidence or not based on feelings is a massive contradiction to their spirit of rationality.
"Skeptic" here would mean someone who engages in skeptical thinking -- thinking that suspends until evidence is sufficient.
If there are any paradoxes, it's the fault of the premise, not the reasoning.
I don't think this definition works. You're saying a category error is when there's a frame of reference?
Okay, so maybe you mean a category error is when you turn a frame of reference upon itself? I don't view that as a category error, but a more sophisticated philosophical statement. Again, I'm going to fall back on the logic implicit in the premise, itself buried in the definition: if all things must be held in doubt, and skepticism is a thing (sure is), then any problems we have here (paradoxes or otherwise) is due to the way the term is defined.
Exactly. You speak in such a way as if this were obvious.
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So you're saying that the difference between being skeptical and not being skeptical is a type of feeling brought on by the conviction that things just can't go on forever.
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Skeptism is being critical of a claim. Everybody has some skeptism in them; some more than others. Those with more than the usual amount we call skeptics; those with less than what is usual we call gullible. A person's skeptism is constantly going on and turning off on a regular basis through out the day. If someone makes a claim and you verify to make sure they are correct you are being skeptical. The moment you confirm they are correct, you cease to be skeptical. This happens to everybody on a regular basis every day.
K
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The problem is: I have no working definition of "skeptical" in mind that would render "being skeptical of skepticism" meaningful if applying it consistently to both terms that refer to it in this phrase. That has been my question to you since my very first post (#11). I don´t think you dignified it with a response.
Ok, so let´s work from that definition you have picked from Wikipedia. It talks about "information". That´s the frame of reference. Since skepticism - according to this definition - doesn´t provide any information (no factual claims about reality) but merely is an overall attitude skepticism itself doesn´t fall in the category that it addresses.
Thus, imposing it on itself is impossible.
2,3) "Being skeptical of skepticism" isn't an instance of using two different meanings. If skepticism is about holding things in suspension, the OP question thus asks: why don't we hold our suspension method in suspension? Or: why don't we doubt our method of doubting as well? The logic of it is perfectly fine, and if there is any twisting or stuttering in the implicit conclusion (that we should be able to suspend our suspension), this is the fault only with the premises, here being the definition of skepticism as holding all things in suspension.
Yes, and the very Wikipedia article you have provided gives you the qualification: "information" (factual claims asbout reality).
The distinction is pretty clear.
E.g. "God exists" is such a claim about reality, whereas "You should believe that God exists" isn´t.
No offense against Ken intended - but he isn´t the authority you can appeal to when talking with me. You can discuss his opinion with him, but you better don´t hold it against me - simply because he isn´t speaking for me.
No, not at all. What makes me uneasy is that you don´t address my point but ask me to accept, support and justify Ken´s ideas.
Sorry, Received, but you are losing me here completely. I think you are making this up, completely. Right from the top of my head I can´t think of any poster here who explicitly or implicitly argues that "skepticism is a panacea to life". That´s your strawman, and that´s your paranoia playing tricks on you.
People value skepticism for a lot of reasons (and often for reasons I myself do not share), but I haven´t seen "it is a panacea of to life" being among them. If you inflate skepticism beyond anything that it actually is, says, and claims you can´t expect me to congratulate you on cutting it down to its actual size.
You may want to discuss this with Ken. It´s his idea.
Assuming that the statement is question is accurately understood and represented, that is.
I am saying that a category error occurs when a statement is assumed to be made about something that isn´t within its frame of reference, and particularly when a meta level statement is imposed on itself.
Here: skepticism states an attitude towards factual statements about the functioning of the world. Since skepticism isn´t a factual statement about the functioning of the world imposing it on itself is a category error.
Sorry, but I don´t know of any skepticist or skepticistic instance that says "ALL THINGS must held in doubt...". It seems to me that you are making this up just to create a paradox that isn´t there. Not even the Wikipedia article you call to your support defines it that way. It makes a clear qualification as to what those "things" are that skepticism claims must be "held in doubt...".
No, I am trying to explain it in way that hopefully makes it obvious to everyone interested.
However, that´s but one of my points.
The other is that employing logical fallacies isn´t the appropriate means to educate or inspire people to get aware of the obvious (even though the idea supported by those logical fallacies may be worth of thorough consideration).
The third one is that holding a systemic epistemological problem against a particular epistemological approach (thereby singling it out as though the other approaches weren´t subject to the same problem) is careless at best, and disingenious at worst. This is exactly what an appeal to "being skeptical about skepticism" does: It employs the very method that it recommends to be skeptical about. It establishes the very error as valid that it intends to warn us of as being invalid.
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