Skepticism

[bhsmte]

But when people say: be skeptical of skepticism, thats just shorthand for: "Be skeptical of the truth claim that skepticism leads to the best understanding of things all the time." (Or similar).
.

I would be skeptical of any truth claim that didn't have evidence to back it up.

In summary, I believe this thread has made this issue more complex then it really is.

 

[Received]

I guess a big part of this thread is also asking who determines what counts as a viable standard for anything, and where the lines are drawn with what counts and doesn't count with said standards. So with skepticism it's about being skeptical, but not (via reductio ad absurdum) of everything, but only of certain things. Well, who says what is the line between what should and shouldn't be within the radar of skepticism?

 

[Received]

I would be skeptical of any truth claim that didn't have evidence to back it up.

In summary, I believe this thread has made this issue more complex then it really is.

Truthfully, I don't think it's complicated things so much as revealed the complication (see quatona's comments on this point) inherent to any standard we propose, skepticism or otherwise.

 

[bhsmte]

I guess a big part of this thread is also asking who determines what counts as a viable standard for anything, and where the lines are drawn with what counts and doesn't count with said standards. So with skepticism it's about being skeptical, but not (via reductio ad absurdum) of everything, but only of certain things. Well, who says what is the line between what should and shouldn't be within the radar of skepticism?

If you can come up with the answer who who decides when skepticism should be applied, let me know.

This is the equivalent of herding cats.

 

[HitchSlap]

Why not be skeptical about our skepticism?

No, really.

Is that like saying, 'keep an open mind but not so open your brains fall out?'

 

[Received]

If you can come up with the answer who who decides when skepticism should be applied, let me know.

This is the equivalent of herding cats.

That's probably true.

 

[bhsmte]

That's probably true.

More than probably.

 

[durangodawood]

If you can come up with the answer who decides when skepticism should be applied, let me know.

The individual mind, of course. There is no other decider.

 

[bhsmte]

The individual mind, of course. There is no other decider.

Yes, of course. Now lets try to get agreement on what that means as a standard.

 

[durangodawood]

Yes, of course. Now lets try to get agreement on what that means as a standard.

One thing I notice here is some people are pretty trained-up on their philosophy and can talk about all 17 and a half flavors of skepticism (or any philosophical issue) with precision.

I on the other hand, just offer up what occurs to me in the moment. Which is probly old hat to these pros.

 

[leftrightleftrightleft]

Why not be skeptical about our skepticism?

No, really.

Isn't this an infinite regression problem?

Why not be sceptical of your scepticism about our scepticism?

Why not be sceptical about your scepticism about your scepticism about our scepticism?

Etc.



Its also a circular argument paradox because you can never sceptically analyze scepticism and conclude that it is flawed because you used scepticism to come to that conclusion, thus proving it to be valid.

 

[quatona]

Well, I think pragmatists do dig truth, just they define it more along the lines of what works rather than classical understandings. But the standard of "what works" is no different, in my view, than "what is true," only that "what works" is still ascertained as a truthful statement -- IOW, saying "X works" is itself a statement that's either true or not, so we're back at truth/knowledge again.

Of course, you can redefine "truth" so broadly and redefine "pragmatism" so loosely that it floats your boat.
Doesn´t make the differences go away, i.e. the fact that pragmatism doesn´t even attempt to make any "truthful" statement about the nature of the world. It just commits to a certain value: focussing on that which is likely to help achieving a certain goal, as opposed to e.g. pursuing "truth".

Note my "conceptually speaking" tag at the end; i.e., this is a problem for people who like to weigh things down conceptually, because eventually (if each system rests on something outside itself) you get down to axioms, which are intuitively based sorts of things.

You keep equivocating "axiomatic" and "intuitive".
For people like me who don´t swallow such ad-hoc redefinition based equivocations (but instead see significant differences between those two concepts in the way they are traditionally defined) there is no such problem.
The fact that every methodological system is - necessarily and at its core - axiom-based doesn´t suggest or necessitate the resulting method to be intuition- oriented.

Appealing to axioms allows for the freedom to say, "nope, I don't see things that way" (even if the person really does), and doesn't have the firm hat-hanging stuff that can ease anxieties like our systems of thought do.

I´m not sure you and I think of the same thing when saying "axiom". You seem to work from a definition that comes down to "arbitrary proposition" - which couldn´t be further from the way I use this term in this context. I am afraid that in view of the definition you seem to be thinking of I wouldn´t even agree that "axioms" are at the core of a methodology.

Right, but I don't think that makes up a category error, as I understand it. This is a quibbling point.

I hope my post #38 clarifies my point.

 

[quatona]

But when people say: be skeptical of skepticism, thats just shorthand for: "Be skeptical of the truth claim that skepticism leads to the best understanding of things all the time." (Or similar).

Category problem solved.

Except that you would have to look long and hard to find to find "skepticism leads to the best understanding of things all the time (Or similar)" as the defining tenet of skepticism.

Skepticism isn´t supposed to lead to any understanding of anything - if anything of that sort it´s a proposed method to avoid the blind acceptance of unsupported truth claims. That´s not a truth claim (and even less a claim about the nature of reality).
Proposing a method to avoid misconclusions concerning the nature of the world, and making a truth statement about the nature of the world are two different sorts of statements, and on two different levels, at that.

But, of course, if you are determined to ignore the differences, any two things appear to be the same.

 

[durangodawood]

Except that you would have to look long and hard to find to find "skepticism leads to the best understanding of things all the time (Or similar)" as the defining tenet of skepticism.

Its not. A agree. The topic is not "should we skeptical of the definition of skepticism."

Skepticism isn´t supposed to lead to any understanding of anything - if anything of that sort it´s a proposed method to avoid the blind acceptance of unsupported truth claims. That´s not a truth claim (and even less a claim about the nature of reality).
Proposing a method to avoid misconclusions concerning the nature of the world, and making a truth statement about the nature of the world are two different sorts of statements, and on two different levels, at that.

I disagree. Proposing a method means making a truth claim about the world: "skepticism IS useful for people to avoid falsehood."

Essentially whatever value people assign to skepticism, that value can be expressed as a truth claim about the world. And so, we can be skeptical of it!

 

[quatona]

I disagree. Proposing a method means making a truth claim about the world: "skepticism IS useful for people to avoid falsehood."

No, it means making a claim about the most useful way to avoid truth claims about the world. It doesn´t make a statement about the world.

Now, you may want to postulate some kind of meta-skepticism (a skepticism that doesn´t deal with truth claims about the world - that which "skepticism" actually refers to, but a skepticism that is skeptical towards approaches to avoid the blind acceptance of misconclusions when scrutinizing truth claims about the world), but that´s an entirely different animal.
However, in case you would like to propose a meta-skeptical method that results in a more effective way of avoiding the blind acceptance of misconclusions about the world than "skepticism" (the refusal of blindly accepting unsupported truth claims about the world) I am all ears.

Essentially whatever value people assign to skepticism, that value can be expressed as a truth claim about the world. And so, we can be skeptical of it!

No. Describing your values is not even meant to be an attempt to describe the (objective nature of the) world. It´s meant to describe 1. values (which are a property of the person, not of the world), and 2. your values.
A person´s preferences are not truth claims concerning the nature of the world. They are 1. the preferred/proposed way, and 2. the preferred/proposed way to deal with claims concerning the nature of the world.

 

[durangodawood]

No, it means making a claim about the most useful way to avoid truth claims about the world. It doesn´t make a statement about the world.

Now, you may want to postulate some kind of meta-skepticism (a skepticism that doesn´t deal with truth claims about the world - that which "skepticism" actually refers to, but a skepticism that is skeptical towards approaches to avoid the blind acceptance of misconclusions when scrutinizing truth claims about the world), but that´s an entirely different animal.
However, in case you would like to propose a meta-skeptical method that results in a more effective way of avoiding the blind acceptance of misconclusions about the world than "skepticism" (the refusal of blindly accepting unsupported truth claims about the world) I am all ears.


No. Describing your values is not even meant to be an attempt to describe the (objective nature of the) world. It´s meant to describe 1. values (which are a property of the person, not of the world), and 2. your values.
A person´s preferences are not truth claims concerning the nature of the world. They are 1. the preferred/proposed way, and 2. the preferred/proposed way to deal with claims concerning the nature of the world.

I am rather baffled by this idea that human behavior is not part of "the world".

Seems to me that "skepticism is useful for people to avoid falsehood." is a claim of the exact same order as "sonar is useful for bats to fly around". In other words: a claim about the world.

 

[quatona]

I am rather baffled by this idea that human behavior is not part of "the world".

Except that this is not what I was saying. What I was saying:
Any proposal what´s the best way to achieve correct (or in this case: avoid incorrect) understandings concerning the mechanisms how the world functions is a different (meta-) class of statements about the way the world functions.
(While proposing that an essential part of a method to win a badminton game is to avoid touching the net with the racket you can touch the net with the racket quite fine. While playing a match touching the net is a fault, whereas when explaining a method it isn´t. Just so much for the difference between statements and meta-statements.)

Actually the difference between the different nature/class/level of the idea "This is how I best go about investigating claims about mechanisms of the world." and a claim "This is how the world functions" should not be too hard to spot.
It´s basically the same difference as between a proposal "This is the best method to check the accuracy of a mathematical calculation." and the claim "1+1=2".

But as I said before: If you are determined to ignore the differences, any two things will be the same.

 

[durangodawood]

Except that this is not what I was saying. What I was saying:
Any proposal what´s the best way to achieve correct (or in this case: avoid incorrect) understandings concerning the mechanisms how the world functions is a different (meta-) class of statements about the way the world functions.
(While proposing that an essential part of a method to win a badminton game is to avoid touching the net with the racket you can touch the net with the racket quite fine. While playing a match touching the net is a fault, whereas when explaining a method it isn´t. Just so much for the difference between statements and meta-statements.)

But as I said before: If you are determined to ignore the differences, any two things will be the same.

If you are determined to create a difference, any two things will be different.

Human perception, reasoning, all metal activities are 100% embedded in "how the world works". Proposing skepticism is just like proposing any other human behavior. Human behavior as truly "meta" requires something essentially magical, like a supernatural soul.

I completely miss the point of your badminton example. You can touch the net while explaining the rules, but not when playing a match? Yes, of course.

 

[quatona]

If you are determined to create a difference, any two things will be different.

Human perception, reasoning, all metal activities are 100% embedded in "how the world works". Proposing skepticism is just like proposing any other human behavior. Human behavior as truly "meta" requires something essentially magical, like a supernatural soul.

Yes, if the only criteria you apply is "Do they happen in the world" then literally everything will be the same. It is, however, beyond me why anyone would allow only for the broadest fathomable criteria which literally includes everything and leaves no space for any distincition whatsoever.

 

[Ken-1122]

Why not be skeptical about our skepticism?

No, really.

People who are skeptical of skepticism are those who believe anything anyone tells them without question or investigation (gullible). There are plenty of people like that, but they are not skeptics.

Ken