Sure, that's what we experience. You chose to create the paradox (or at least to pose the question - if you had known at the time it was paradoxical you'd have seen that it couldn't be answered under any conditions), but the determinist would say that was the result of your mental state at the time, and for you to have chosen not to create it, your mental state would have had to have been been different; and that the state that led to you asking the question was either a consequence of, i.e. caused by, prior events - or not a consequence of prior events, i.e. random.I just think it's interesting that I choose whether or not to create the paradox.
Another way to view it is that you either had a reason for your choice, or no reason (the choice was random or pseudo-random). If you had a reason, there were also reasons for that reason, and so-on. Reasons are explanatory causal connections.
As Isaac Bashevis Singer memorably said, "We must believe in free will - we have no other choice".
That ability depends on other personality or character traits, such as a disposition to conform, or rebel, that are themselves a product of genetics, development, and life experiences; how strongly they apply in a particular circumstance will depend on a host of other variables, but even so, if we know their personality traits, we can often predict the likely choices people will make.I mentioned the abilitiy to pick and choose from, or reject entirely, what they've chosen to absorb.
Sure; one shouldn't expect to see the group cooperation of social species in non-social species...Just showing it's not necessary.
Sure; it's not mandatory, it's a predisposition.Even humans cooperate when they want to and don't when they don't want to.
We're not all that hard-wired; that's what brain plasticity implies. The genome provides a 'recipe' for the architecture and gross wiring of the brain. When this recipe is followed during development, it is subject to all kinds of external influences that ensure that even the brains of identical twins with identical genomes develop slightly differently. Throughout life, the fine details of the wiring are influenced by life experiences, from nutrition to education, parental care to social encounters; and there is major restructuring work during adolescence.You mentioned a lot about how individual attitudes and opinions vary, which tells me we're not all that hard-wired, I guess. But maybe I'm missed your point.
It means there's a dependence on the things you expect to find rewarding, or that you expect will minimise unpleasantness that's unassociated with reward.What does "according to one's motives' specifically mean?
I thought I explained this... Most compatibilist positions hold that the freedom in 'free will' is only coherent as freedom of choice, e.g. freedom to exercise, or act according to, your will (which is deterministic). This is often expressed as freedom from coercion or constraint.I don't understand compatibilism - how a thought being determined by physics can be also said to be free.
My position is based on a pragmatic experiential view - what it feels like to make a choice, whether you can act on it or not. It seems to me that this is how most people experience what they call free will, and so the concept is entirely subjective and is not robust, i.e. you can think that you made a free choice, when in fact there were no alternatives (e.g. "pick a card, any card..."). If you discover such a situation, you may change your mind about whether you really did make a free choice; i.e. you may feel your choice was constrained or coerced although you didn't know it at the time.
Objectively, under determinism, it seems to me that there are no choices, only the (subjective) appearance of choices.
It's a question of what you mean by the 'free' in 'free will'.I agree they propose a mysterious third option. But I think compatibilism proposes two contradictory options.
Incompatibilists say it's meaningless, compatibilists say it's a concept that is well-established in human society, so why not try to find a coherent definition for it?
It's not really quite that simple, because there is a range of compatibilist positions, some of which claim free will really is 'free' even under determinism - I'm not sure what they mean by this, I haven't looked into to it in detail. The other problem is that common popular usage of free will is closely linked to the concepts of moral and legal responsibility, which would therefore seem questionable under determinism (although again, some compatibilists claim their views allow for moral responsibility).
If you think we have free will but not in the compatibilist sense, maybe you can explain what you mean by it? You said you couldn't explain how we make decisions, and if free will is expressed in terms of the decisions we make, that might suggest you can't explain what free will is, and that seems problematic when such potentially important concepts as moral and legal responsibility rest on it...
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