Maybe He's waiting for you to quit finding fault with all His children's beliefs?
He can speak for himself then. Because the faults of believers is more obvious than any evidence of God.
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Maybe He's waiting for you to quit finding fault with all His children's beliefs?
Ok .. as I said, there can be many motivations for doing something, but no one of these is necessarily a prerequisite for following the scientific method. (Ie: I see no evidence for any such assumptions being necessary, prior to following the method. Thus, it is not subject to any assumptions per se).
Objective, independently verifiable observations are the foundation. The explanations for those observations may not yet be available but this doesn't necessarily imply anything about (science's) current objective reality .. including 'that it exists beyond our current understanding'.
What is 'the process of advancement'?
Can I find a document on this?
Yes, it seems to me that in order for it to be a worthwhile enterprise, you at least need the assumption of something that is observable/measurable, and that observations of it will show patterns or regularities. It may be that we call the subject of those observations 'objective reality', but we necessarily assume it in order to make sense of what we're doing when we make observations. The scientific method itself has been developed explicitly to distinguish between subjective and objective reality.It's one of the assumptions of the method. Literally none of the method works without there being an unknown objective reality.
The first step of the scientific method is to make observations and ask a question. For these we require an objective reality that we don't yet understand.
So, I'm not sure what you're quibbling about.
You wan't me to document for you every single scientific advancement in understanding ever?
Each and every one of them would have depended upon there being an objective reality that was not yet understood.
Yes you're right, the signal is what is broadcast, but I was taking "broadcast" as referring to the output from the receiving device.But the signal is what is broadcast, and when I asked if you thought "messing with the receiver can change the content of the broadcast", you said,
"Of course. Why do you think it wouldn't?"
So now I'm wondering whether you really didn't understand the question or whether you're being deliberately obtuse.
Again, we are talking about two different things, and again I think it's useless. IMO compatibilism does not say that free will is compatible with determinism, rather it's an attempt to say that determinism is compatible with morality.As I keep explaining, my usage of free in this context concerns our experience of making choices that we perceive to be free of constraint or coercion. Most compatibilists express it in terms of physical freedom (from constraint or coercion) to act according to their wishes, i.e. freedom of expression of will through action. In these models, the will is deterministic, i.e. there are reasons for our choices, whether we're aware of them or not.
OK, so now you know that by 'broadcast' I meant the signal the device was receiving, can you accept that being able to change the content of what is produced in the way I described would falsify the broadcast receiver hypothesis?Yes you're right, the signal is what is broadcast, but I was taking "broadcast" as referring to the output from the receiving device.
Compatibilism is defined as describing compatibility between free will and determinism. Some interpretations make a transitive link to moral responsibility:Again, we are talking about two different things, and again I think it's useless. IMO compatibilism does not say that free will is compatible with determinism, rather it's an attempt to say that determinism is compatible with morality.
That's philosophical debate for you - sometimes protagonists fail to understand each other. That doesn't mean they shouldn't try. As it happens, Harris and Dennett did get back together to work out their differences and the reasons for them - in one of Harris's podcasts: #39 Free Will Revisited.You may already know of this, but a couple days ago I learned of something which further discourages me from continuing discussing this with you. Upon release of Harris' book, Harris and Dennett had a nasty disagreement. I learned of this from a discussion where they sat down to try and hash it out. In an hour and a half talk, they cannot agree on what compatibilism means, and neither offers a clear definition. Their discussion is remarkable only for how jumbled and inarticulate it is. Harris later said about it, "...the nature of our remaining disagreement never became perfectly clear to me...". So I think that if those two friends and allies, who both claim to be compatibilists, can't seem to discuss compatibilism, you and I will have an even worse time of it.
No, because if a video image of a red apple is broadcast, I can adjust the tint or color levels to produce (from the receiver) a non-red apple.OK, so now you know that by 'broadcast' I meant the signal the device was receiving, can you accept that being able to change the content of what is produced in the way I described would falsify the broadcast receiver hypothesis?
That's certainly how it's defined. But I need to have that contradiction explained before I can accept it as a valid definition. And I've never heard a good explanation.Compatibilism is defined as describing compatibility between free will and determinism.
That's the discussion I was talking about.That's philosophical debate for you - sometimes protagonists fail to understand each other. That doesn't mean they shouldn't try. As it happens, Harris and Dennett did get back together to work out their differences and the reasons for them - in one of Harris's podcasts: #39 Free Will Revisited.
Sure I agree with that. So do you have a tentative opinion on why I hold the views I do? (Don't worry, I'm thick-skinned.)I like to try to understand why people with differing views have those views and, if they're willing, help them understand why I have the views I have. People are never going to agree on everything, but some understanding is worth making an effort for, because not only do we learn why other people hold the views they do, but in trying to articulate the reasons for our own views we learn more about ourselves.
That's what I'd always thought of him, but I seem to remember at some point Dennett saying "we're both compatibilists" and Harris doesn't object. But if I just go by hearing a lot of his online talks and whatnot, he seems to waver from time to time.E.T.A. Incidentally, if you read his book 'Free Will', you'll see that Sam Harris isn't a compatibilist, he doesn't think we have free will in any useful sense, although it feels as though we do; i.e. he thinks it's illusory.
So do I.I prefer the clarity of Harris's exposition
If I were trying to propound a contradiction, I'd probably find it useful to be evasive and opaque too.- Dennett gives the impression of being evasive, and although he does seem able to explain his reasoning, it's rather opaque.
.. I'm watching this part of the conversation with intrigue ..No, because if a video image of a red apple is broadcast, I can adjust the tint or color levels to produce (from the receiver) a non-red apple.
From this, we can clearly see that the human mind is very much at play in deciphering what we're actually observing in these experiments .. and no evidence of some kind of over-riding, predetermined physical law of the universe which somehow magically exists independently from our abilities to perceive the observations ... and also no evidence for the existence of some over-arching being, who conspired to deliberately confound us when they supposedly created the universe.Wiki said:...Wheeler pointed out that when these assumptions are applied to a device of interstellar dimensions, a last-minute decision made on Earth on how to observe a photon could alter a decision made millions or even billions of years ago.
While delayed-choice experiments have confirmed the seeming ability of measurements made on photons in the present to alter events occurring in the past, this requires a non-standard view of quantum mechanics. If a photon in flight is interpreted as being in a so-called "superposition of states", i.e. if it is interpreted as something that has the potentiality to manifest as a particle or wave, but during its time in flight is neither, then there is no time paradox. This is the standard view, and recent experiments have supported it.
Yaeh, that's why I used examples like, "change the gender of a newsreader, or the layout of the studio, or the news itself, or change the plot of a play or its actors, or change the schedule of programmes" rather than colour.No, because if a video image of a red apple is broadcast, I can adjust the tint or color levels to produce (from the receiver) a non-red apple.
OK. Well, I tried.... I need to have that contradiction explained before I can accept it as a valid definition. And I've never heard a good explanation.
They talked out their differences and came to an understanding. They don't have to agree.That's the discussion I was talking about.
I don't recall that you've given an explanation, besides that you believe "..there's something supernatural going on...", which isn't so much an explanation as a denial of one. From this discussion, I'd guess you'd rather not look too closely or question your beliefs - but I couldn't say why you hold them; upbringing (e.g. cultural indoctrination) ?Sure I agree with that. So do you have a tentative opinion on why I hold the views I do? (Don't worry, I'm thick-skinned.)
I don't recall that quote - Dennett did say that they agreed on all the fundamentals but disagreed on their interpretation of them.That's what I'd always thought of him, but I seem to remember at some point Dennett saying "we're both compatibilists" and Harris doesn't object. But if I just go by hearing a lot of his online talks and whatnot, he seems to waver from time to time.
His position isn't contradictory, he explicitly defines the 'free' of free will in terms of the degrees of freedom an agent has.If I were trying to propound a contradiction, I'd probably find it useful to be evasive and opaque too.
I'm playing with the rules of good analogy in mind. What you're suggesting is an unrealistic science fiction scenario where a brain surgeon can tweak a brain to, for example, make a particular male newsreader appear female, or make a sofa look like a rocking chair, etc.Yaeh, that's why I used examples like, "change the gender of a newsreader, or the layout of the studio, or the news itself, or change the plot of a play or its actors, or change the schedule of programmes" rather than colour.
But hey, if you don't want to play...
I'm not sure they came to an understanding considering what Harris later said, but how could they both be privy to the same neuroscientific evidence and not agree?They talked out their differences and came to an understanding. They don't have to agree.
What have I said that makes you guess that?I don't recall that you've given an explanation, besides that you believe "..there's something supernatural going on...", which isn't so much an explanation as a denial of one. From this discussion, I'd guess you'd rather not look too closely or question your beliefs -
Certainly not upbringing. I don't know, do you think America is a Christian culture?...but I couldn't say why you hold them; upbringing (e.g. cultural indoctrination) ?
Which is evading the physics problem, and redefing something into something it's not. Same with you, when you say it's the "experience of making choices that we perceive to be free of constraint or coercion..." Constraint and coercion are two different things. Yes, you can physically constrain someone against their will, which is just proof that we have will, but you can't actually coerce anyone. I mentioned a man I knew who was given a choice of "your money or your life" and he gave his life. And history shows many people who have been told to recant their beliefs or die horrible deaths, and they chose to die. So defining "free" in terms of "degrees of freedom" is meaningless.His position isn't contradictory, he explicitly defines the 'free' of free will in terms of the degrees of freedom an agent has.
No; you're confusing the TV receiver analogy with what it's analogising. In brief: just as being able to change the content of programmmes shown on a TV by messing with the TV would falsify the claim that they were received via a broadcast signal, so being able to change all recognised aspects of consciousness by messing with the brain falsifies the claim that the brain is a receiver for consciousness.I'm playing with the rules of good analogy in mind. What you're suggesting is an unrealistic science fiction scenario where a brain surgeon can tweak a brain to, for example, make a particular male newsreader appear female, or make a sofa look like a rocking chair, etc.
They weren't discussing the neuroscientific evidence. They were discussing the meaning and usage of 'free will'.I'm not sure they came to an understanding considering what Harris later said, but how could they both be privy to the same neuroscientific evidence and not agree?
It's what you haven't said.What have I said that makes you guess that?
The statistics indicate that - over 73% of the population are Christian and a majority says religion and prayer is part of their daily life.... do you think America is a Christian culture?
On the contrary, it's expressing freedom in physical terms, i.e. capability; defining your terms is part of such discussions - the whole point is that the popular conception of 'free' in free will is incoherent, so a coherent definition is required for a coherent & meaningful discussion.Which is evading the physics problem, and redefing something into something it's not.
I'm well aware they're different - that's why I mention them both; it's a common definition of freedom in philosophical discussions of free will.Same with you, when you say it's the "experience of making choices that we perceive to be free of constraint or coercion..." Constraint and coercion are two different things.
The fact that people are and have been coerced (and that there's a legal definition of it) shows that you can coerce someone. If unethical means are used to persuade or convince someone to act, particularly against their will or better judgement, that's coercion; it happens a lot.Yes, you can physically constrain someone against their will, which is just proof that we have will, but you can't actually coerce anyone. I mentioned a man I knew who was given a choice of "your money or your life" and he gave his life. And history shows many people who have been told to recant their beliefs or die horrible deaths, and they chose to die. So defining "free" in terms of "degrees of freedom" is meaningless.
Errr .. why even attempt to 'falsify' an implied source of 'consciousness' by inventing (or even playing along with) a notion such as the existence of a consciousness-carrying 'signal', when the very meaning of 'consciousness' itself, is a demonstrably, human invented concept? (The latter is easily testable and generates abundant objective evidence).No; you're confusing the TV receiver analogy with what it's analogising. In brief: just as being able to change the content of programmmes shown on a TV by messing with the TV would falsify the claim that they were received via a broadcast signal, so being able to change all recognised aspects of consciousness by messing with the brain falsifies the claim that the brain is a receiver for consciousness.
I take it that's rhetorical, as the answer should be obvious...Errr .. why even attempt to 'falsify' an implied source of 'consciousness' by inventing (or even playing along with) a notion such as the existence of a consciousness-carrying 'signal', when the very meaning of 'consciousness' itself, is a demonstrably, human invented concept? (The latter is easily testable and generates abundant objective evidence).
And if horses had wings they could fly. So what? The analogy is useless unless you can show that we can "change all recognised aspects of consciousness by messing with the brain".No; you're confusing the TV receiver analogy with what it's analogising. In brief: just as being able to change the content of programmmes shown on a TV by messing with the TV would falsify the claim that they were received via a broadcast signal, so being able to change all recognised aspects of consciousness by messing with the brain falsifies the claim that the brain is a receiver for consciousness.
I asked how they could know the same science yet disagree.They weren't discussing the neuroscientific evidence. They were discussing the meaning and usage of 'free will'.
Well that narrows it down.It's what you haven't said.
By that reasoning, you have no religion because 53% of the U.K. say they have no religion.The statistics indicate that - over 73% of the population are Christian and a majority says religion and prayer is part of their daily life.
There is no freedom in physical terms. Are gravity and photons free to do other than what they do? Free will is mysterious, not incoherent. Mystery only means "unknown". Free will is only incoherent in terms of naturalism/materialism.On the contrary, it's expressing freedom in physical terms, i.e. capability; defining your terms is part of such discussions - the whole point is that the popular conception of 'free' in free will is incoherent, so a coherent definition is required for a coherent & meaningful discussion.
It seems to be a common definition used to avoid discussion of actual free will, and to try to salvage morality.I'm well aware they're different - that's why I mention them both; it's a common definition of freedom in philosophical discussions of free will.
You can coerce someone if they choose to allow it.The fact that people are and have been coerced (and that there's a legal definition of it) shows that you can coerce someone. If unethical means are used to persuade or convince someone to act, particularly against their will or better judgement, that's coercion; it happens a lot.
I don't recall that part. What are the different ways? Flexibility, complexity and sophistication are nouns, not ways of doing anything.Degrees of freedom (in Dennett's description) is about the number of different ways an agent has to arrive at a choice, i.e. decision-making flexibility/complexity/sophistication. He explains this in the podcast...
I wasn't going to go into detail of his errors, but can you explain how or why Dennett confuses (or pretends to confuse) the evitability of being hit with a brick with the inevitability of ducking to avoid being hit with the brick? What accounts for that? He's either being foolish, or he's trying to fool people....you say you listened to.
I can only cite reported observations, IIRC they include alertness, memory, attention, sense of location, body ownership, bounds, viewpoint, emotional response, sense of self, various aspects of personality & personhood, moral values, religious belief, etc., but if you'd can suggest some aspects that you feel are unlikely to be included, it might be interesting to see if there are any reports of such changes.And if horses had wings they could fly. So what? The analogy is useless unless you can show that we can "change all recognised aspects of consciousness by messing with the brain".
And I said they're not disagreeing on the science, but on the meaning and usage of the term 'free will'.I asked how they could know the same science yet disagree.
No; your question was whether America is a Christian culture, so by that reasoning, the UK is a broadly secular culture.By that reasoning, you have no religion because 53% of the U.K. say they have no religion.
If you recall from the podcast, Dennett was talking of freedom in terms of degrees of freedom as used in control theory; for example, in terms of movement, a hinge joint like the elbow or knee has a one degree of freedom, but a ball & socket joint like the hip or shoulder has many degrees of freedom. Similarly, creatures with complex brains have more cognitive degrees of freedom than creatures with simple brains. Dennett is saying that our freedom in this context is related to the number of different ways we can arrive at, and express, our will, and our competence to control this complexity.There is no freedom in physical terms. Are gravity and photons free to do other than what they do? Free will is mysterious, not incoherent. Mystery only means "unknown". Free will is only incoherent in terms of naturalism/materialism.
It's generally used as an acceptably coherent definition of the 'free' in free will.It seems to be a common definition used to avoid discussion of actual free will, and to try to salvage morality.
Yes; but the point is whether they would voluntarily make that choice in the absence of coercion. For example, if a mugger threatens to stab you unless you give him your wallet, and you then give him your wallet, you have been coerced if you gave him your wallet because he threatened you. If you had decided, in a moment of improbable generosity or madness, to give him your wallet before he even approached you, then you would not have been coerced. In the former case it would not be considered a free choice, in the latter it would.You can coerce someone if they choose to allow it.
See the description of cognitive degrees of freedom above/below.I don't recall that part. What are the different ways? Flexibility, complexity and sophistication are nouns, not ways of doing anything.
As I understand it this is part of his pragmatic argument that, in practice, we need to take a high-level, i.e. behavioural, societal, view of free will rather than a low-level deterministic view; the former is emergent from the latter, and follows rules that are not applicable or meaningful at the lower level, so our analysis should be at the emergent level, not the substrate level.I wasn't going to go into detail of his errors, but since you implied that I may not have listened...I'd like you to tell me whether he's being stupid or disingenuous when he confuses (or pretends to confuse) the evitability of being hit with a brick with the inevitability of ducking to avoid being hit with the brick. What accounts for that? He's either being foolish, or he's trying to fool people.
I find many claims from many AI proponents frankly, quite naive.I work in the AI field, and for an AI to simulate something like a "consciousness", whether internally perceived or externally assumed based on behavior, it's only going to come about, ironically, via evolution, which is how artificial life is simulated.
There's no programming involved. ...
On the contrary, it explicitly demonstrates that 'life' behaviors and 'environment' appear as being intrinsically linked in the mind of the (undistinguished) observer.digitalgoth said:The digital life form "evolves" to react to its environment and if it develops language to communicate among themselves (already been done), perceive threats or dangers (already done), consume or predate in its environment (already been done), then that's great, but is it "alive"? Maybe, but only within that environmental simulation, which doesn't mean much.
Different perspectives (or interpretations) can be made useful by making testable hypotheses. This is the process by which we come up with the meaning of what science calls 'objective reality' .. all that is required is a human mind.digitalgoth said:As far as MWI and all that, it just sounds like navel gazing and marijuana smoking to me. Something to pass the time while you're stoned.
I dunno, it seems to me that life is as life does - does 'living' in an environmental simulation make it less a life? I'm not a big fan of the simulation hypothesis for our own experience (or universe), but it seems a logical possibility, and if we somehow found some signature that it was true, life would still be life...There's no programming involved. The digital life form "evolves" to react to its environment and if it develops language to communicate among themselves (already been done), perceive threats or dangers (already done), consume or predate in its environment (already been done), then that's great, but is it "alive"? Maybe, but only within that environmental simulation, which doesn't mean much.
Arrgghh ...( ) .. a bunch of truisms here ... What is a signature that is 'true'?I dunno, it seems to me that life is as life does - does 'living' in an environmental simulation make it less a life? I'm not a big fan of the simulation hypothesis for our own experience (or universe), but it seems a logical possibility, and if we somehow found some signature that it was true, life would still be life...
Its interesting when one considers the (very likely) scenario of how would we diagnose 'life' via an onsite exploratory expedition of a nearby planet. Following the scientific method, one would observe the 'landscape' first and take note of any unusual features .. I think it all starts with that simple, but often overlooked, first step.FrumiousBandersnatch said:I remember, many years ago, running one of the earliest evolution simulations, Tierra, where minimal self-replicating sequences of code competed in a simulated environment, and discovering that 30 to 40 thousand generations would produce populations with parasites, symbiotes, cooperators, etc. These started as very short sequences, around 60 instructions IIRC, but still produced some rather life-like evolutionary population dynamics. I'm not sure there's a clear distinction to be made between life and non-life in such environments unless one explicitly excludes simulations.
Reading error: Not a signature that is true, a signature that would indicate that the simulation hypothesis is true; i.e. something that would give us a high degree of confidence that we were part of a simulation.Arrgghh ...( ) .. a bunch of truisms here ... What is a signature that is 'true'?
Sure.This argument really boils down to whatever we so choose as being the definition of (or the meaning we associate with) the term 'life'. But meanings change with new evidence. Definitions themselves are therefore an insufficient basis for justifying 'existence' independently from the mind providing them.
I agree; many definitions include a requirement for Darwinian evolution that seems short-sighted - I can imagine other forms of evolution that could conceivably produce life-like complex systems. One of NASA's is: "A self-sustaining chemical system capable of Darwinian evolution."Its interesting when one considers the (very likely) scenario of how would we diagnose 'life' via an onsite exploratory expedition of a nearby planet. Following the scientific method, one would observe the 'landscape' first and take note of any unusual features .. I think it all starts with that simple, but often overlooked, first step.
I think observations of the unusual features would then lead (maybe) onto a defintion of life in that specific environment. Such a new life may or may not be comparable with what we've adopted as the definition from our own Earthly experiences (and knowledgebase).
I think the same applies for the AI scenario.
Ultimately we may well end up with a bunch of 'lifeforms' which only make sense in the environment it evolved in(?) (.. The latter necessarily being objectively evidenced, of course).
... which would make that activity no different from the quest for the Holy Grail.Reading error: Not a signature that is true, a signature that would indicate that the simulation hypothesis is true; i.e. something that would give us a high degree of confidence that we were part of a simulation.
Well then why not just call it the search for God?FrumiousBandersnatch said:I have no idea what that would be - 'ACME Universe Simulations' and a logo stitched into the fabric of spacetime?
Directed searches for what 'might be possible' amounts to the search for the Holy Grail because: 'Its possible its out there somewhere ... therefore it must also be possible to find it'. (Directed searches seek specifically the 'it' .. again, merely by definition).FrumiousBandersnatch said:I agree; many definitions include a requirement for Darwinian evolution that seems short-sighted - I can imagine other forms of evolution that could conceivably produce life-like complex systems. One of NASA's is: "A self-sustaining chemical system capable of Darwinian evolution."